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Authors’ Note  
 
This report summarises some of the most important results of an in-depth 
investigation into the social dynamics of vulnerability and social protection   
commissioned for National Treasury via SIPP: a research programme aimed 
at Strengthening the Impact of Pro-Poor Programmes in the Budget, run by the 
National Treasury, South Africa.  
 
The research agenda for this project was developed through a dialogue between 
National Treasury and the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies at the 
University of the Western Cape, as part of its partnership with the Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre (CRPC), an international network of researchers focussing on 
chronic poverty (www.chronicpoverty.org).  In its partnership with the CPRC, 
PLAAS strives to do basic work that illuminates some of the core dynamics of 
persistent and structural poverty in South Africa in a way that permits engagement 
by both government and civil society; by policy interested researchers and by 
decision makers.   The initial discussions that led to the formulations of this 
research programme took place in mid 2004; the project itself started in April 
2005; and fieldwork took place between June 2005 and February 2006.  In part, the 
project was also an attempt to explore and test the potential of in-depth 
qualitative methods in the exploration of poverty dynamics.  The material elicited 
through fieldwork proved to be very rich. The current report touches on some of 
the most important and policy relevant patterns highlighted by field material.  We 
hope that the insights described here, and the conclusions we draw, will be of use 
to all the role players who are concerned with crafting appropriate and effective 
social policy in South Africa, and with developing adequate policy responses to the 
challenge posed by persistent poverty in our democracy.  
 
 
Andries du Toit and David Neves, December 2006 
 








This report sets out the results of an in-depth study of livelihood strategies and 
‘coping mechanisms’ among poor people in one very specific, but highly significant 
context of poverty in South Africa.  Its core concrete concern is with social grants 
and cash transfers; but it does not focus narrowly on how they are administered 
and used. Instead, it firstly focuses on the broader context of the livelihood 
strategies and coping mechanisms within which these are used – strategies that 
might be called ‘private social protection’ and which other researchers have 
referred to as ‘distal social welfare’. Secondly, it is motivated by a conviction that 
social protection and social grants should be aimed, not only at the important goal 
of alleviating poverty, but also supporting pathways out of it. While current 
research clearly suggests that the massive expansion in social welfare has made 
possible a significant reduction in monetary poverty, a decisive and further 
reduction in poverty requires attention to the structural conditions that interrupt 
or impede these pathways out of poverty.  If these underlying structural issues are 
not addressed, there is a very real danger that social protection, and social grants 
in particular, may end up contributing only towards ensuring what might be called 
‘managed poverty’ – in other words, a situation in which poverty is managed 
through the amelioration of its harshest effects – but not reduced in a sustainable 
manner.  
 
These concerns are widely shared. They are embodied in emergent policy 
discourses about the possibility that persistent poverty may be due to people being 
mired in a ‘second economy’ that exists parallel to but in disconnection from the 
economic mainstream; and also in hard fought and often deeply divided battles 
about the appropriateness or impact of social grants.  Solving these questions 
requires an in-depth investigation into the actual livelihood strategies of people at 
the margins of the formal economy. While models of economic behaviour can 
highlight some of the strategic issues faced, an understanding of the way in which 
individuals and households actually take decisions also requires exploration of the 
nature of local realities, social meanings, identities and embedded, 
institutionalised forms of practice.  
 
The present study cannot answer these questions for all poor South Africans. It 
looks instead at livelihood formations among poor people in the African township of 
Khayelitsha, and one impoverished district in the Eastern Cape. Inevitably this is a 
somewhat localised understanding.  Though the locales on which this study focuses 
are of central importance, and cast much light on the nature of livelihood 
strategies in the aftermath of Apartheid migrancy, this locatedness also confers 
limits. Although the centrality of migrancy means that our findings are not only of 
relevance narrowly to the sites of study, care must be taken in extrapolation and 
generalization.   







Vulnerability and Private Social Protection 
 
The research casts important light on some of the key causal dynamics of persistent 
poverty and the responses of those on the margins of the formal economy 
 
1) In the first place, the report suggests that it is necessary to go beyond the 
limitations of the concept of the ‘second economy’ in explaining or 
accounting for poverty and vulnerability.  Far from poor areas being 
characterised by disconnection from the ‘mainstream economy’, they seem 
in many ways highly integrated – but on adverse terms. Rather than think 
about poor people being ‘structural disconnected’ from the mainstream 
economy it is important to look at the ways in which they are connected – 
and how to ensure that those connections are to their advantage. 
 
2) The report argues that self-employment (and in the rural areas, informal 
agriculture) still plays a crucial role in ameliorating poverty and 
contributing to food security – but these activities are also strikingly 
fragile and marginal. One key issue is that there is a policy vacuum around 
the so-called survivalist sector; and SMME policy fails to grasp the the real 
difficulties faced by those engaged in truly ‘survivalist’ self employment. 
 
3) A corollary of this is the suggestion that important as the informal sector is, 
poverty eradication needs to be a central focus also in mainstream 
economic policy making.  Job creation and formal employment must be a 
central plank in any sustainable poverty eradication programme.  
 
4) The report highlights the central role of private social protection in 
ameliorating the consequences of poverty and vulnerability. It shows how 
the individuals and households in the study responded to the challenges 
they faced by participating in complex practices of reciprocal exchange 
within spatially extended care chains that allowed them to distribute 
resources, risks, costs and even people within elaborate urban-rural 
networks. Gendered ‘care chains’ constructed around paid and unpaid care 
work play a key role in these networks. These networks and practices may 
even be seen to create a patchy but extensive system of ‘distal social 
welfare’ that helps reduce poverty and vulnerability even for many not 
linked to the formal economy or not in receipt of grants. 
 
5) The report however argues that, as important as this system of ‘distal social 
welfare’ or ‘private social protection’ is, it has fundamental limits.  In the 
first place, these networks are fragile. The failure of the mainstream 
economy to create appropriate jobs, and the rising crisis of HIV & AIDS 
impose insupportable burdens on them.  Secondly, these networks and 
practices work in very uneven ways. ‘Social capital’ does not benefit 
everyone in the same way. Some of the forms of exchange it relies on or 
enables are thoroughly unequal, and there are net winners and losers. 
Those who are not empowered within patriarchal ideology — particularly 
unemployed youth, single female household heads and women who do not 
toe the traditional gender lines — are more likely to be marginalized, 
ostracized, exploited or punished. 





6) Within this context, the report describes the complex ways in which people 
made use of social grants. Findings offer support to other studies that have 
argued that social grants — particularly pensions and disability grants — play 
a crucial role in enabling survival, not only for direct recipients, but also for 
other household members and sometimes even for distant connections.  The 
report shows the wide range to which grant moneys could be put: in 
addition to improving food security, social grants were used as ‘seed 
money’ for businesses or as a subsidy to keep self-employed activities going; 
to support informal agricultural activity; to invest in acquiring or improving 
housing stock or property; and to invest in the education of household 
members. Receipt of social grants empowers those who would otherwise be 
marginalised in their social network, allowing them to ‘transact’ and 
accumulate ‘social capital’ on their own behalf.   
 
Key policy implications 
 
This analysis of the dynamics of vulnerability and the role of social spending leads 
the report to suggest a number of key policy implications 
 
1) In the first place, the report highlights the need for closer integration 
between policy on economic growth more generally, and that on poverty. 
There should not be a conceptual distinction that sees ‘pro-poor’ policy as 
the function of a ‘social cluster’ only and which disconnects it from 
mainstream economic policy.  
 
2) The report therefore also reiterates that an effective poverty reduction 
policy in South Africa needs pro-poor job creation at its centre.  Important 
as the informal sector is, it has a supplementary and dependent role; and 
employment creation for poor people in the mainstream economy must be a 
central part of any sustainable poverty eradication policy in South Africa 
 
3) Policy talk about ‘eliminating the second economy’ is of limited utility in 
addressing the problems faced by those at the margins of the formal 
economy.  Rather, steps need to be taken to ameliorate the actual 
disadvantages poor people face in relation to the broader economy.  
 
4) One aspect of a more ‘integrated’ poverty reduction framework is to ensure 
that cash transfers are not simply recycled back into government through 
cost recovery from poor people. There are too many instances – school fees 
are one – where social grants are essentially used to subsidise the budgets 
of other government departments. This undermines the effectiveity of 
social spending.  
 
5) Another key area for better integration with pro-poor policy is in the broad 
area of housing policy and spatial development strategies. The 
perpetuation of the spatial legacy of apartheid puts poor black people far 
from the economic hubs and imposes massive transport costs upon them.   
 
6) A key symptom of the lack of an integrated pro-poor policy is the vacuum in 
government policy around supporting the survivalist sector.  The 
‘survivalist’ sector plays a massively important role but the policies and 
conceptual framework through which government approaches the SMME 
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sector have not yet succeeded in confronting the real challenges faced by 
sub-micro (‘nano’) and ‘survivalist’ economic activity. 
 
7) A further challenge to an integrated pro-poor policy framework are the 
skewed economic playing field faced by micro-enterprise and self-employed 
people. Ways are needed to address anti-competitive behaviour and 
crowding out of self-employed activity by formal firms. This is a challenging 
area and will need creative approaches.  
 
8) In the field of social policy itself, the report re-affirms the central role of 
cash transfers in mitigating vulnerability. The report offers support to the 
idea that social grants, besides simply allowing survival, also plays an 
important socially and economically empowering role.  The broader socially 
and economically empowering role of grants should be valued and protected 
in policymaking and implementation. 
 
9) There seem to be little grounds for supporting the notion of conditional 
social grants, e.g. rendering the payment of child care grant conditional on 
school attendance.  There is already a very high commitment to education, 
and conditionality is unlikely to have additional incentive effects. Truancy is 
likely to be a symptom of breakdown of control in the household, and 
withdrawing child grants from such households is likely to further 
disempower female household heads and reduce their domestic authority.  
 
10) The utility and effectiveness of cash transfers requires careful attention to 
the enabling conditions on the ground for effective grant use.  One key 
factor that undermines the effectiveness of social grants is the way in which 
administrative discretion and official inefficiencies impose costs on poor 
people.  Careful systems design and training needs to be aimed at ensuring 
the user-friendliness of these services and reducing their propensity to 
impose additional costs on poor people. Making grants conditional is likely 
to increase levels of bureaucracy and the costs these impose on poor 
people. 
 
11) Delivery systems also need to take into account the mobility of grant 
recipients. Pension pay-out systems imagine that recipients are sedentary, 
but the reality is that migrant social networks require many people — 
including the elderly and disabled — to be mobile and to travel between 
provinces.  The fact that a pension is paid out only in a specific province is 
another factor that imposes unnecessary transaction and opportunity costs 
on grant recipients, and hampers their survival and coping strategies. 
 
12) The empowering effect of social grants transfers appears to be linked to 
the fact that they are paid over as money. This should mitigate against 
proposals that grants should be paid over in a non-cash form, e.g. as 
vouchers. Vouchers would undermine the socially empowering effects of 
pensions and DG pay-outs; given the cash-hungry nature of poor households, 
making grants available in vouchers is likely only to produce a situation in 
which vouchers are exchanged for cash, perhaps even at a discounted price.  
This would significantly reduce the effectiveness of social spending.  
 
13) The report confirms the importance of the need for developing a 
comprehensive social security system, both to address the situation of those 
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falling outside the present system and to remove perverse incentives and 
distortions. 
 
14) The report stresses that current ‘coping mechanisms’ are under severe 
stress and can probably not cope indefinitely with the severe strains 
imposed upon them by high levels of unemployment and the HIV/AIDS crisis.  
 
The main body of this executive summary provides an overview of the research 
approach, sketches the social and historical background of the areas studies, 
highlights some of the key features of migrant livelihoods, describes the forms of 
vulnerability produced by the social and economic context, and the ways in which 
poor people respond to these challenges. It then discusses in detail the ways in 
which social grants are used and the implications for policy 
 
CORE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The priority questions informing the project were pursued in relation to a core 
research question: What is the impact of the provision of social grants on the 
strategies whereby people make a living and seek to escape poverty?  
 
This in turn was unpacked into three subsidiary questions: 
 
 What do people on the margins of the formal economy do in order to 
survive?    
 How do people get into (and out of) poverty?  
 How do people use social grants, and what role do grants play in the 
decisions that people make about strategies and activities that affect their 




The current report is shaped by a broadly sociological understanding of poverty. 
Although monetary deprivation is an important indicator of poverty, this indicator 
should not be confused with the underlying condition it indicates.  Poverty is here 
understood not simply as monetary deprivation but as a complex, multidimensional 
state of material lack and ill-being of such a nature that it undermines the basis of 
minimal social and economic agency - preventing the person(s) in question from 
being able to live an even minimally human life.  Understanding poverty requires 
an investigation not only of peoples’ resource endowments, but also of the social 
relations within which they use those resources. Developing this understanding 
requires the integration of qualitative and quantitative modes of investigation.   
 
The baseline for the study was provided by an in-depth Household Livelihood 
Survey of 1348 households done in 2002 by the Programme for Land and Agrarian 
Studies (PLAAS) in partnership with the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC).  
This survey involved a detailed profile of poverty indicators, resource endowments 
and health issues in three focal areas: Mount Frere in the Eastern Cape; selected 
African townships in Cape Town, and the fruit producing region of Ceres.  From this 
study a subsample of 48 households were randomly selected from the first and fifth 
expenditure quintiles of households in Sites B and C, Khayelitsha, and three villages 
in Mount Frere in the rural Eastern Cape. These households were subjected to an 
in-depth qualitative survey involving semi-structured interviews focussing on 
household structure, livelihood activities, social capital and grant use. On the basis 
of these interviews, ten households were selected for in-depth investigation that 
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included detailed mapping of social networks, kinship structure and life histories. 
These were followed up by focus group interviews in which emergent themes were 
further tested and explored. 
 
Qualitative interviews elicited a wealth of complex detail.  Analysing this detail 
poses particular challenges and calls for for what is known as a ‘medium-n’ study – 
a study that surveys a number of case studies too great for individual presentation, 
and too small for statistical analysis.  In this project, a clustering approach was 
used to group households, following which cross-cutting themes were identified for 
further exploration.  In the body of the report, these themes and groupings are 
illustrated through the detailed presentation of life histories and case study 
descriptions. 
  
POVERTY IN MOUNT FRERE AND KHAYELITSHA: A BACKGROUND AND PROFILE 
 
Poverty in Mount Frere and Khayelitsha is shaped by the history of the development 
of the system of migrant labour in the context of segregation and Apartheid. These 
created very complex and strong linkages between the rural economy of the 
Eastern Cape and key sectors of the formal economy. The collapse of employment 
in the mining and manufacturing sectors means that entrants to the labour market 
today face a very different and challenging context. This brings with it the 
prospect of even greater marginalisation. 
 
The 2002 PLAAS-CPRC Household Livelihood Survey highlights some aspects of the 
poverty situation created by this history. In the Eastern Cape, the survey shows 
high levels of access to land (87% of households) – but this high access to land is not 
translated into increased food security, with 93% of households reporting more than 
40% of their expenditure allocated to food. Some 40% of households report that no 
member has access to paid work, and grants make up 79% of income in grant-
receiving households. Almost 80% of households reported going hungry for some of 
the 12 month period prior to the survey.  In the Western Cape, 36% of all adults 
were reported to have paid work, while 28% of households were reported to have 
no adults with access to paid work.  A little more than a fifth of adults in the urban 
sample were reported to have access to paid employment. A third of households 
reported the loss of a job and income by a breadwinner in the previous year.  
 
LIVING IN THE MIGRANT SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Qualitative analysis of particular case studies highlights some of the complex 
dynamics behind these figures. Although each case study is singular, they can 
powerfully illustrate some of the realities about the nature of livelihood strategies 
in the aftermath of Apartheid era migrancy.  Some key features stand out 
 
(1)  In the first place, the case studies highlight the central role of ‘social 
capital’ and social networks.  High levels of resource sharing and reciprocal 
exchange between households fundamentally ameliorate and shape the 
impact of monetary poverty, and play a fundamental role in the strategies 
people develop in dealing with poverty and vulnerability. 
 
(2)  Secondly, households are neither stable nor clearly bounded.  In-depth 
interviews and a comparison of the findings of the 2005 and 2002 surveys 
reveal high levels of domestic fluidity, with almost every household in the 
sample changing composition in an important way.   
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(3) These flows are shaped by decades of migrancy, which have set up strong 
and complex systems of connection that link households to one another 
across large distances. These connective systems have survived the end of 
Apartheid-era migrancy, and continue to be the vectors for significant flows 
of resources.  Even some poor and marginalised households can be found to 
be characterised by high rates of saving and back-investment into the 
Eastern Cape rural economy, foregoing significant levels of consumption in 
order to ensure the accumulation of rural assets, ‘building the homestead’ 
and the accumulation of status and isidima (material and social dignity).  
 
These systems and networks are vital to understanding the configuration of 
livelihood strategies in the areas studied. Individual choices are profoundly 
shaped by underlying livelihood strategies that involve investments, 
exchanges, and distributions of resources, people and risks within the 
larger spatially extended network constituted by kinship networks and the 
rural-urban linkages created by decades of migrancy. The flows of 
resources are not simply unidirectional. Rather, resources and people move 
back and forth between rural contexts and urban, responding to shocks and 
opportunities.  
 
(4)  Fourthly, self employment and informal economic activity play a vital role 
in these networks.  Qualitative interviews uncovered much higher rates of 
participation in economic activity than suggested by the 2002 survey. Self 
employment seems to be ubiquitous (present to some extent in the vast 
majority of households), elusive (hard to surface in quantitative and even in 
qualitative research), vital (making a crucial contribution to livelihoods) 
and marginal (highly constrained, and profoundly limited in terms of 
returns). 
 
(5) Fifthly, care work and household reproductive labour are central to 
individual and household choices.  This is firstly because the massive 
investments of labour and time required by these activities – particularly 
from women; but also because of the significant economic value that they 
represent. Care and household reproductive work need to be recognised as 
central forms of ‘social value creation’.  They are usually not paid or 
directly rewarded but they do figure in complex processes of reciprocal 
exchange. These processes (and the terms of exchange) play a key role in 
determining who is vulnerable and who is not. 
 
DIFFERENTIATING MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Although the features described here are true of each household in the study, 
there were also important areas of variation and change.  
 
(1)  In the first place, households could differ from one another in terms of the 
nature of their insertion into and connection with the formal economy. 
Households ranged from those with members that had permanent formal 
sector jobs, through those that relied on regular remittances from non-
resident members, to those that had no reliable connection to formal 
economic employment at all. 
 
(2)  Secondly, households could differ from one another in terms of the nature 
of their involvement with self-employment and small-scale informal 
economic activity.  This ranged from involvement in relatively remunerative 
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businesses requiring some endowments of skill, significant assets, or 
protected positions within the informal economy, and which were to some 
extent enterprises with an economic existence separate from that of the 
households, through to households involved in micro (or even ‘nano’) 
enterprises not readily distinguishable from the domestic economy; through 
to households with no discernable involvement with self-employment or 
informal employment at all. 
 
(3)  Thirdly, households differed in the extent of their involvement in 
agricultural activities.  Some households invested highly in agriculture and 
relied on it significantly; for some it constituted an important but 
essentially supplementary activity; while others had no investment in 
agriculture at all. 
 
(4) Finally, households differed from another in terms of their location within 
broader networks of kinship. Some households were important social hubs, 
strongly and centrally connected with a tightly integrated network of kin 
and other allies. Some were not so central but were still an integral part of 
a larger spatially distributed kin and social network.  A third group of 
households were socially isolated or marginalised; either disconnected from 





An initial survey of the characteristics of households and their overall well-being 
suggests that households essentially clustered into four (‘fuzzy’ and somewhat 
overlapping) groups. 
 
(1)  Urban-connected rural households: Some of the households in the deep 
rural areas were clearly profoundly influenced by the fact that they had 
established strong linkages into the urban economy: either they were 
receiving significant remittances from urban non-resident members or 
closely linked non members; or they were households that had such links in 
the past, and had managed to consolidate significant savings either on the 
basis of remittances, retrenchment or retirement packages. These 
households would often be large, pluri-active, significantly involved in 
formal, informal and agrarian activities; they often had a strong local 
patriarch or matriarch at the centre of a tightly integrated kinship network. 
 
(2)  Urban-disconnected rural households: At the other extreme of the rural 
spectrum were rural households that had lost — or which had never had — a 
strong urban connection. These usually relied heavily on social grants, and 
on doing poorly paid (and sometimes only paid-in-kind) local service work. 
They would often be female-headed; they had little or no resources for 
engaging in agricultural activity; and they were usually isolated and 
marginalised within their larger kin network. 
 
(3)  Rural-connected urban households: Some households in the urban areas, 
in turn, were distinguished by having strong and vibrant rural connections.  
Sometimes these would take the shape of high rates of rural remittance, 
savings and back-investments. Sometimes these connections would also 
allow these households to rely on the support of rural kin.  Care 
arrangements, in which rural kin took care of offspring, were of key 
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importance, often allowing urban households to survive employment related 
shocks; and sometimes essential to allowing members to be economically 
active.  The importance of these links was evident partly in the significant 
resources that could be devoted to maintaining and servicing them. 
 
(4)  Rural-disconnected urban households: Finally, there were urban 
households that had weak links with rural kin, or where these links had 
become severed.  This seems to be a variegated group.  We know that some 
households that fall into this group are those that have successfully in-
migrated to the urban context. Though they might have some sentimental 
and social links with rural areas, they seemed neither to be investing back 
into the rural areas, nor to rely heavily on rural kin.  These households were 
a small minority in the sample (they are somewhat unusual in Khayelitsha) 
but anecdotal evidence indicated their existence.  Another group of 
households were those that had lost their rural links, or had become 
marginalised or isolated within them, but who had not managed to establish 
a secure foothold in the urban economy.  Again, these were often (but not 
always) female headed households, and they were invariably those with the 
highest levels of ill-being and deepest poverty.  Like their isolated rural 
counterparts, these households were heavily reliant on social grants and on 
poorly paid self-employment and menial service work; they however were 
even less able to engage in agriculture.  
 
 
CONTEXTUALISING VULNERABILITY: BEYOND THE ‘FIRST’ AND ‘SECOND 
ECONOMY’ 
 
Being able to identify vulnerable and impoverished groups of households and to link 
their poverty to their place within the larger infrastructure of spatially extended 
kin networks is important, but it is only part of the story. Another important 
element of the story needs to be an understanding of the economic context that 
creates these forms of vulnerability in the first place. 
 
In recent years, a growing body of theoretical and empirical research has identified 
the possibility that there may be important structural aspects to poverty that 
undermine the ability of the poorest and most marginalised to escape from it 
unaided. The dominant way in which these issues have been framed is with 
reference to the notion of a ‘second economy’ – the notion that the persistence of 
poverty for many in South Africa is explained by the fact that they are excluded 
from the ‘First World economy’ and subsist in a underdeveloped, informal 
economy, existing alongside but disconnected from the economic mainstream.  
While this is an important advance, some scholars have warned that there is a risk 
of sliding back into the economic dualism that characterised liberal economic 
thinking during the 1970s - a tendency to conceive South Africa in terms of a 
‘successful’ mainstream and a problematic periphery; coupled with a failure to see 
how the two are in fact intimately connected.  To avoid this danger, it is important 
to understand in detail the actual structural insertion of poor people into the 
broader economy. 
 
De-agrarianisation and corporate penetration in the Eastern Cape 
 
In the Mount Frere area, poor people’s economic prospects are defined by the 
broader context of deep and sustained under-development. Three dynamics stand 
out in particular. 




(1)  De-agrarianisation:  Agrarian activities continue to constitute a vital and 
often under-estimated component of livelihood activities. At the same time 
they are increasingly marginalised and undermined by other dynamics.  One 
important contributing factor is increasing levels of monetization - evident, 
for example, in the increasing reliance on mechanical traction. Poorer 
households do not have the money to plough by tractor. At the same time, 
livestock ownership has become more concentrated, which means that poor 
households cannot rely on animal traction. These elements form part of a 
vicious circle of de-agrarianisation driven also by declining incentives to 
protect poorly fenced fields against stray livestock, ability to pool the 
labour and resources required for agricultural production. 
 
(2)  Extractive corporate penetration: Another important role is played by the 
penetration into the deep rural areas of well resourced firms that are able 
to extract profits from even the most impoverished areas, and which crowd 
out local activity.  Retail deregulation has led to the collapse of trading 
stores that were at the hub of a local agrarian economy; these have been 
replaced by large national supermarkets whose supply chains by-pass local 
producers that siphon money out of the local context, and that compete 
sometimes head-to head with informal traders.  
 
(3)  The collapse of mining and manufacturing-based migrancy:  Thirdly, the 
economic institutions and sectors that supported male circular migrancy and 
rural ‘back-investment’ and remittances are in collapse.  Informal migrancy 
continues, but it is much more risky and remittances may be declining. 
What resources the better off households have managed to accumulate 
often represent the benefits of past processes of saving and back-
investment.  Several of the better off households included in the study are 
subsisting off defined benefit retirement or retrenchment packages. The 
rolling out of old age pensions and disability grants can compensate for this 
to some extent, but in the context of the increasing care burdens and 
narrowing economic options imposed by the HIV & AIDS epidemic and the 
underdevelopment of agriculture, these shifts raise serious questions about 
the medium to long term prospects for economic growth and employment. 
 
 
Race and space in Khayelitsha 
 
In Khayelitsha, the context of vulnerability is defined by four very different 
dynamics:  
 
(1)  The nature of formal employment: High levels of unemployment are 
partially driven by the fact that economic growth in Cape Town is 
dominated by the service sectors, particularly in business process 
outsourcing, financial services and tourism – sectors in which African 
migrants, often lacking English and appropriate tertiary education – are 
poorly positioned to compete. What employment is available is often highly 
insecure and transitory.  
 
(2)  Monetization and insecurity: Secondly, urbanisation and integration into 
the urban economy is a double edged sword: while closeness to the urban 
sector assures greater chances of employment and a better income the local 
economy is far more thoroughly monetized, and there is no agrarian 
  xv 
 
 
economy that can cushion monetary shortfalls. While cash is more plentiful, 
the effects of cash shortfalls are more dire; while closer integration into the 
urban economy brings increased opportunities, it also means that urban 
livelihoods are more sensitive to fluctuations and changes in that economy.  
 
(3)  The spatial legacy of Apartheid: While it is populated mostly by those who 
have left the Eastern Cape and the rural areas to seek jobs in Cape Town, 
those who live in it are still in a very large measure economically, spatially 
and racially marginalised from the city. In an important sense, Khayelitsha 
is in, but not of Cape Town.  It is situated more than 30 kilometres away 
from the city centre, remote from the shopping and manufacturing sectors 
where most of the jobs are to be found.  Travel to and from these centres is 
expensive and even dangerous.  Unemployed African migrants in Khayelitsha 
trying to make a living from informal economic activities are essentially 
pinned down in the poorest parts of Cape Town.    
 
(4)  Corporate penetration and crowding out: As in the case of Mount Frere, 
while poor people are not able to gain access the markets constituted by 
the wealthy city hub and white suburbs, ‘first economy’ corporations have 
untrammelled access to markets in marginalised communities and again are 
likely to be crowding out informal sector activity. 
 
(5) Crime and violence: crime and violence – and the fear of crime and 
violence – are a central fact of life in both research sites.  Some current 
research indicates that fear of crime and criminality may play an important 
role inhibiting plans for informal economic activity.  In more than one case, 
informants corroborated this, indicating that crime, violence and the fear of 
violence was an obstacle to their informal economic activities  
 
Together, these factors mean that while African migrants constitute the majority 




The ineffectiveness of the local state 
 
In both Mount Frere and in the Eastern Cape, another contributing factor is the 
ineffectiveness of the local state. In the context of Mount Frere, traditional 
authority was in cases found to be highly ineffectual and marginal; and while there 
had been an increase in the roll out of vital services such as clinics, these social 
goods were often undermined by levels of poor functionality that reduced their 
utility and effectiveness. Capture of local resources (including corrupt access to 
grants) by local elites further disadvantage the poor, while in a range of ways, 
informality – not only in land tenure, but for example in the definition of conjugal 
contracts – also systematically disadvantage the powerless.  
 
Implications for self-employment and informal economic activity 
 
These contextual factors tended to undermine and limit the scope for self-
employment and informal economic activity. In this research project we did not 
attempt to assess the profitability or sustainability of any ‘informal businesses’ or 
investigate in depth the micro-economics of informal economic activity.  Such an 
investigation would require a detailed research project in its own right.  At the 
same time, in-depth interviews produced many insights into the nature of the 
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informal economic activities, their place in people’s livelihood strategies, and 
some of the constraints and difficulties that they faced.   
 
(1)  The nature and scope of self-employment.  An overview of the nature of 
self-employment in the households involved in the study reveals the 
relatively narrow range and marginal nature of self-employed activity.  
While these activities often required limited outlay of capital or training, 
they were for that reason also highly overcrowded and competitive.  
Contrary to popular notions that township residents lack entrepreneurial 
spirit or know-how, case studies reveal the significant amount of ingenuity, 
strategic knowledge, and high levels of effort required to keep even micro 
and ‘nano’ businesses afloat.  Often the competitive edge for these 
businesses was provided by their dependence on complex networks of social 
relations; in other cases they required the willingness to invest huge 
amounts of hard work, effort and time for slender and insecure gains. 
 
(2)  Synergies with domestic economies and reliance on formal employment 
and grants: Secondly, research highlighted the supplementary and 
complementary nature of informal economic activity. Businesses were often 
poorly distinguished from the domestic economy of the households that 
engaged in them – not because the people engaged in these businesses did 
not understand basic business principles, but because of the realities of 
poverty and vulnerability, and strategic realities that would make such a 
separation impossible.  Closely linked to this was the way in which informal 
economic activity often relied on complex synergies with other activities 
and sources of cash.  Engagement in informal retail, for example, was often 
made possible by access to formal wages, or on the seed money provided by 
social grants.  
 
(3)  The politics of credit: Finally, a key theme that emerged from interviews 
was the need not to get credit but the need to provide it. Interestingly, 
neither the quantitative survey nor the qualitative interviews provided 
much support for the notion that the lack of adequate micro-credit created 
a situtation where extortionate lending by informal lenders (mashonishas) 
helped to perpetuate poverty.  Informants did highlight the significant 
issues linked to giving credit. In the money-scarce context of township life, 
the survival of businesses often relied on their ability to manage the 
demands of customers for credit. This was one of the reasons why 
businesses relied so heavily on the framework provided by already existing 
social connections. At the same time, this had highly gendered implications 
– women (particularly those without male allies) and those marginalised by 
other factors such as identity are at a disadvantage in dealing with the 
complex power politics of informal credit. This heavily constrains the 
returns that are available to them. 
 
MANAGING VULNERABILITY: AGENCY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Vulnerability, risk and livelihood strategies 
 
The study elicited much data that allow a deeper understanding of the ways in 
which poor people managed their vulnerability, strategising to reduce the impact 
of shocks and to escape from poverty.  Managing ‘social capital’ was one important 
part of these sets of activities, but before engaging with social capital, it is 
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necessary to look in some detail at some items on the broader menu of imperatives 
and aims that seemed to inform individual and household choices. 
 
(1)  Developing a range of livelihood activities: One key strategic issue relates 
to the ability of individuals and households to combine a wide-ranging 
portfolio of livelihood activities and kinds of resources.  Successful 
households were often able to use one resource or activity to ‘leverage’ 
their gains from another.  Pluri-activity was present in most households – a 
notable exception being households that had recently lost formal 
employment, and in which all available resources were being concentrated 
on the hope of regaining employment. Successful pluri-active households 
were distinguished not only by having a wide range of activities and 
resources, but also by considerable skill in using them – and by some level of 
internal co-operation in balancing conflicting household member needs.  
This ability to co-operate, to co-ordinate and to negotiate internally was 
present both in well-to-do households, and in highly impoverished 
households that were successfully managing to reduce their vulnerability.  
 
(2)  Investing in education and access to the labour market:  In the struggle to 
reduce vulnerability and escape poverty, access to formal employment was 
the first prize.  Research revealed the significant investments of effort 
households put into trying to ensure that at least one member had access to 
formal employment.  One key example was the significant levels of 
investment in education. Even when investment in education had in the 
past not proven to bring results, households would continue to invest 
heavily in their school-age children in the hope that such investments would 
pay off in future.  Research also highlighted the significant risks involved in 
migration to find jobs, particularly for those without strong pre-existing 
networks of kin.  In some cases, returning to rural homesteads, even 
impoverished ones, was the only option for urban job-seekers in between 
assaults on the urban job market. 
 
(3)  Securing urban and rural outposts:  A vital difference was clearly made for 
individuals and households by the ability to rely on a geographically 
distributed network of rural and urban outposts.  For rural households, 
connections with urban kin were important not only because of possible 
remittances, but also by the crucial footholds these could provide for future 
migrants.  For urban households, rural kin constituted a vital resource.  
Numerous examples were found in the study of urban households sending 
offspring back to the rural areas in response to economic or other shocks.  
The receipt of pensions by rural kin played a role here, but clearly the 
agrarian economy also helped rural households absorb the shocks 
transmitted to them through these practices. 
 
(4)  Investing in social standing:  Social capital and social standing played a 
central role in enabling rural households and their members in practices of 
reciprocal exchange (see below).  The willingness of even poor households 
to invest massively in funerals and in male initiation testifies to the crucial 
economic role played by household standing and respectability.  
 
(5)  Consumption and asset smoothing and other practices: Research also 
elicited data about complex ‘indigenous’ asset and money management 
practices.  A wide range of strategies exist, ranging from ‘asset smoothing’ 
(where people minimize consumption in order to protect assets) to 
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sophisticated ‘lay accounting’ and financial management techniques aimed 
at protecting particular bundles of resources (e.g. discrete and sometimes 
small ‘pots’ of money dedicated to particular purposes). 
 
(6)  Securing patronage: Access to patronage can play a very significant role. 
Key sources of patronage included patronage from (usually white) 
employers, but patronage from government officials and traditional 
authorities could also play an important role.  Although these could give 
them significant access to resources, all of these also meant that the 
recipients of patronage were subject to disadvantageous power relations.  
 
(7)  Ensuring one’s place in the household.  One important strategic terrain 
where interests could converge – but where they could also diverge in 
negative ways - was in individuals’ relationships to the households to which 
they were attached.  Attachment to households could sometimes be the 
only strategy open to those who had failed to find independent livelihoods – 
but this could often lead to significant tension and internal conflict.  Often 
household members would be appearing to ‘earn their keep’ by contributing 
to households in non monetary ways; but sometimes the forms of reciprocal 
exchange involved in these internal dynamics were perceived to be unfair 
and unequal and gave rise to significant tension.  These interpersonal trade-
offs are deeply shaped by gendered power relations 
 
Social capital and reciprocal exchange 
 
Although the term social capital has come to be widely used in recent times, it is 
often used very vaguely and misunderstood. One problem is that even the 
theoretical literature is widely divergent. Some theorists speak of social capital as 
‘generalised social trust’ – surely an important thing, but not something which is 
much help in understanding how poor people manage vulnerability. Rather, ‘social 
capital’ should be analysed with reference to the very particular social 
relationships within which it is mobilised and used. Social capital was accumulated 
and mobilised partly through engagement in complex patterns of reciprocal 
exchange; depended significantly on the pre-existing assets to which people 
already had access; was shaped centrally by the kinds of social relationships within 
it was used; and also by the underlying frameworks of social meaning on which 
these practices drew. 
 
(1)  The importance of underlying social relations: The research highlighted 
that the way in which social capital could be used and the forms of 
exchange it relied on were powerfully shaped by the nature of the local 
social relations within it was used.  Clan, village and kin networks were all 
important – and each allowed different kinds of exchange and 
reciprocation.  In the urban areas, community and neighbour networks were 
much less important, and kin networks (particularly relations to close kin) 
were much more important.  
 
(2)  Power and reciprocity: The forms of resource sharing that social capital 
allowed always involved processes of reciprocal exchange. These forms of 
exchange were not necessarily equal.  Gender and status powerfully 
mediated the terms of exchange.  The ability of households to extract 
unpaid care work and household reproductive labour from its female 
members is a case in point. Sometimes, these processes of reciprocal 
exchange can end up deeply marginalising and disadvantaging those who are 
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not empowered by patriarchal discourse.  The isolation and poverty of some 
of the urban-and rural-disconnected households described in this study are 
directly due to the unequal distribution of social capital and the unequal 
forms of exchange it can engender. 
 
(3)  Care chains and rural urban linkages: The networks created through kin 
connections and migrancy, and the processes of sometimes unequal 
reciprocal exchange play a key role in setting up complex ‘care chains’ 
between urban and rural households, in which rural households often end up 
taking care of the offspring of urban dwellers. Similar care chains exist 
within urban and rural contexts. These care chains can play a vital role in 
helping households’ weather health and employment related shocks – but by 
that very token they are also mechanisms by which shocks and burdens are 
transmitted from one household to another.  
 
The dark side of social capital  
 
These patterns mean that social capital should not simply be seen as a universally 
good thing.  Policy thinking which is simply about ‘promoting social capital’ can 
serve to obscure the ways in which social relationships and practices of reciprocal 
exchange can be both advantageous and disadvantageous to poor people.  In 
addition to the fact that criminal networks and others mobilise destructive forms 
of social capital, even ‘good’ social capital is unevenly distributed, can result in 
net disadvantage for marginalised groupings, and is also linked to danger and 
conflict. ‘Jealousy’ and the fear of ‘gossip’ are key ways in which poor people 
experience the negative underbelly of the processes of reciprocal exchange on 
which they depend.  Another powerful example of the dark side of social capital is 
provided by the processes of demonization and even violence directed at women 
who do not toe the patriarchal line.  Here, the socially constructed values that 
dictate who has social capital and who does not can come to punish those who do 
not conform to conservative definitions of what is appropriate for their gender.  
 
This is a particularly important issue given the changing nature of the conjugal 
contract and the high levels of pregnancy in women outside the context of 
marriage.  Although fertility rates in South Africa are dropping, fertility rates 
among young African people are still quite high. At the same time, there are 
indications that fewer people are forming conjugal unions secured through the 
payment of lobola (bridewealth) and formal community recognition. These patterns 
have given rise to popular explanations which focus simply on the choices of the 
young women concerned - for example the notion that young women are having 
children to get access to the child grant. Such a choice would of course be 
profoundly irrational, given that the direct and indirect costs of childrearing are far 
greater than the grant income.  A more realistic explanation would centre on 
broader economic shifts and changes.  An important part of this shift flows from 
the collapse of formal unaccompanied male labour migrancy as it existed in the 
Eastern Cape in previous decades, and the closure of the economic path to 
manhood that it enabled.  A generation of young men are no longer able to 
constitute independent households, and large numbers of African women enter into 
relationships – and have children, with no legal or cultural sanction protecting their 
rights within the relationships.  Technically, of course, they are entitled to claim 
maintenance from the biological fathers of their children, but this right exists in 
theory only: even where the fathers were employed and could pay maintenance 
the women involved often seemed reluctant to press home their claims. 
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CASH TRANSFERS AND LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
 
In a few cases, interviews elicited detailed information about how grants were 
spent. In most cases, informants’ reports about grant expenditure were more 
general; but interviews also included information about the use of grants not only 
within the household but in the distant households to which they were linked.   
 
In most households grants clearly made a significant impact on day to day survival, 
allowing recipients to secure basic energy and food needs. As has been shown by 
other studies, grants were in many cases also used to benefit household members 
other than the primary recipient. In many cases receipt of a pension or a disability 
grant also made it possible for a recipient to do care work. In a significant number 
of cases grants played a role in other economic activities or investments, 
functioning as seed money for informal economic activity, facilitating involvement 
in agriculture, allowing them to acquire, build or improve homes, and in supporting 
offspring’s education or migrancy in search of work.  
 
Another important aspect of these case studies is the way in which they highlighted 
the extent to which the wise expenditure of a grant was a collective household 
endeavour; with careful co-operative decision making about the allocation of 
scarce monies.  It is true that how a grant would be spent would be an individual 
person’s decision – but that decision is taken in the context of the intra and inter-
household debts, obligations, expectations, claims and counterclaims involved in 
the practices of reciprocal exchange and the relationships and the social 
relationships these practices work to sustain. This should not be romanticised – 
clearly individuals do use grants selfishly or even inappropriately. How a person 
uses their grant will be partly shaped by their own history and their disposition and 
the extent to which they have themselves bought into familial, communitarian and 
domestic values. It will also be profoundly shaped by their social status and role.  
Gender plays a role here: both men and women can choose to invest heavily in the 
well-being of their families but they do so in very different ways. Two issues here 
are of particular significance to policymakers.   
 
(1) Social grants and the supra- and inter-household distribution of benefits. 
Some scholars have highlighted the possibility that social grant expenditure 
may lead to a reduction in private remittances, and have argued that if 
private donors give less as public transfers increase, the effect of public 
programs on beneficiaries would be less than originally intended. The 
considerations raised in this report helps put these concerns in context.  
The concern that cash transfers could crowd out social remittances is 
plausible only if one considers households in isolation. If a household is held 
to be a strongly bounded, independent, autonomous economic unit, the 
reduction of remittances in response to the receipt of a social grant would 
indeed be a zero sum game.  But this is not the case. So although in many 
cases it is true that grants reduce remittances, this is merely part of the 
larger process whereby resources are ‘moved around’ in the spatially 
extended networks created by practices of social reciprocity, migrancy and 
kin connections, and constituting a vital form of ‘distal’ or ‘private’ social 
welfare. 
 
(2) Gender, social capital, and marginalisation. Secondly, it seems that the 
receipt of social grants can help ameliorate some of the ways in which 
social exclusion results from the unequal and gendered workings of social 
capital.  In a context where women – particularly single household heads – 
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can end up marginalised and socially excluded, grants allow them to 
transact in their kinship network and can give them resources that make 
them empowered agents in processes of reciprocal exchange and 
accumulate social capital. 
 
The research findings highight the crucial role played by informal systems of social 
protection for people at the margins of the formal economy.  Crucial as these 
systems are, they have severe limits, and are very uneven and differential in the 
way they impose costs.  Evidence seems to indicate that social grants play an 
important role in sustaining these ‘coping strategies’ and allowing some economic 
and social capital. These benefits should be valued and preserved.  
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1 INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT… OR 
MANAGED POVERTY? 
 
1.1 The policy context 
 
This report sets out the results of an in-depth study of livelihood strategies and 
‘coping mechanisms’ among poor people in one very specific, but highly significant 
context of poverty in South Africa.  Its core concrete concern is with social grants 
and cash transfers, but this concern is embedded within a broader framework.  In 
the first place, social grants must be seen as only one of the forms of social 
protection more generally, understood as the full range of public interventions that 
can help people manage risk (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999). Secondly, this report 
will argue that the instruments of social protection and ‘social risk management’ 
need to be embedded in a better understanding of the ‘private’ strategies poor 
people themselves have developed to manage risk and survive. Thirdly, our concern 
with social protection is linked to a conviction that social protection strategies 
should be solidly integrated within a broader focus not just on alleviating the 
impacts of shocks and reducing poverty and ill-being, but also with supporting 
pathways out of poverty. 
 
This concern is especially relevant in South Africa at the time of writing.   
While growth has been strong, and there is evidence that monetary poverty may 
have been reduced (van der Berg  et al 2005) it is important to note that the 
reduction in poverty identified by van der Bergh et al is a reduction in income 
poverty and is largely due to the rolling-out of welfare spending.  In the first place, 
as van der Berg et al themselves point out, there are limits to the extent to which 
welfare payments on their own can accomplish further reductions in poverty. 
Secondly, reducing monetary poverty is not necessarily the same as attacking the 
underlying structural conditions that produce it.  Fundamental shifts in the nature 
of the South African economy mean that people with low asset bases, poor 
education and mostly manual skills are poorly positioned to participate effectively 
in the economy (Bhorat 2000; Bhorat 2004; Rodrik 2006).  While somewhere 
between 1.4 million and 2 million new jobs were created between 1995 and 2003, 
increases in labour supply mean that the overall unemployment rate also increased 
(Casale et al 2004; Burger & Woolard 2005). Real average remuneration rose, but 
this benefited mostly those in well-paid and skilled jobs, while unskilled 
employment declined (Seekings 2003, Seekings et al 2003). This has lead to a 
growing awareness of the extent and depth of structural poverty in South Africa, 
perhaps most prominently and explicitly recognised by government in the idea that 
many South Africans are caught in what has come to be called a ‘second economy’ 
existing alongside but disconnected from the economic mainstream and finding 
expression in high rate of unemployment (Mbeki 2003; Policy Co-ordination and 
Advisory Services 2006).  
 
If these underlying structural issues are not addressed, there is a very real danger 
that social protection, and social grants in particular, may end up contributing only 
towards ensuring what we might call ‘managed poverty’ – in other words, a 
situation in which poverty is not reduced or even increases, but is managed in the 
medium term by ameliorating its harshest effects.  In the long run, of course, such 
a situation is not sustainable, since sustained economic growth in South Africa 
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arguably requires much lower levels of inequality and a population with much 
higher levels of human and social capital.  In the longer run it is vitally important 
that social protection is designed in such a way as to not merely reduce ill-being 
and ameliorate the effects of poverty, but that it also supports pathways out of 
poverty. 
 
This highlights and contextualises the importance of ongoing debates about social 
protection and social grants in South Africa.  South Africa is unique among 
‘developing’ and middle income countries for having a relatively extensive social 
welfare system, including not only provision for child care and child foster care 
grants, but also provision for relatively generous ‘non-contributory’ pensions (Lund 
2002).  This system was essentially inherited from the previous regime, and 
expanded and deracialised by the democratic government (Sagner 2000); although 
government has remained committed to this system, it remains open to question 
whether there is a clear national commitment to the system or a broadly shared 
agreement on its role and contribution.  Debates around cash transfers have been 
lent extra impetus and urgency by massive increases in social spending. Driven 
principally by significant increases in the numbers of beneficiaries for pensions and 
child grants, social spending increased by more than R22 billion in real terms 
between 2000 and 2004 (Van der Berg et al 2005)); and this is planned to continue 
increasing at a similar rate in the near future (Department of Social Development 
2006). Though these increases have generally been welcomed, there are fierce 
debates about the direction of future policy (Makino 2004).  At the bottom of these 
debates are important questions about the extent to which social transfers enable 
or disable long-term escape from poverty. The effectiveness of social grants in 
reaching the poor and alleviating poverty is generally accepted (Ardington & Lund 
1995; Case & Deaton 1996; Barrientos & Lloyd Sherlock 2002). But while it is clear 
that social grants – especially pensions and disability grants – can technically lift a 
household above the poverty line, and while there is a wide acceptance that they 
can make a strong impact on child nutrition (e.g. Duflo 2003); it is not clear to how 
they fit into the broader picture of livelihood strategy and labour market 
behaviour.  Should grants be paid in the form of a cash transfer or in the form of 
redeemable vouchers?  Should grant pay-out be made conditional on other 
desirable behaviours such as school attendance or participation in preventative 
health care schemes?  And what about the impact of cash transfers on economic 
behaviour more generally?  What are the implications, for example, if pensions 
allow unemployed people to attach themselves to households that are situated in 
rural households far from labour markets (Klasen and Woolard 2005)?  Or, to take 
another example, do pensions result, as Bertrand and others have argued, in the 
withdrawal of people from the labour market (Bertrand et al 2003) — or do they, as 
Posel et al have showed on the basis of the same data, allow labour-seeking 
migration by younger female household members (Posel et al 2004; see also Inder 
and Maitra 2004)?   
 
These debates are often highly charged. Questions about whether grants create a 
culture of dependency are sometimes dismissed as narrowly ideological (see e.g. 
Makino 2004); and it is true that some interventions appear to be entirely inspired 
by free market doctrine rather than empirical evidence and that debates are often 
framed in moralistic terms that draw their persuasive power more from popular 
discourses (e.g. about the dangers of a culture of dependency, or ‘moral panic’ 
about the supposed sexual behaviour of young women) rather than from an 
dispassionate analysis of the realities of vulnerability. At the same time, it is 
important to note that such questions touch on an important underlying issue.  Can 
social grants have an impact on the underlying ‘structural’ conditions that lead to 
Section 1: Introduction  3 
 
 
people being trapped in poverty?  Can access to cash transfers be not only an 
effective means for reducing the effects of poverty, but also a means of economic 
empowerment?  Can they support pathways out of poverty?  And if the answer is — 
as it is likely to be — ‘sometimes’, or ‘it depends’, what are the additional factors 
or arrangements that need to be in place for cash grants to be optimally effective 
as instruments that can affect poverty reduction? 
 
Answering this question requires us to know a lot more about the actual livelihood 
strategies of people at the margins of the formal economy.  Much can of course be 
learned from economic models, but economic modelling — trying to explain labour 
market participation decisions in terms of reservation wages, for instance — 
depends on making appropriate assumptions about the key factors that inform 
people’s decisions; and those assumptions can not simply be deduced a priori.  
People are rational interest-maximising creatures, to be sure, but what is ‘rational’ 
in any particular context is highly situational and defined also by local realities, 
history, culture, identity and institutionalised practice.  Although the explosion of 
quantitative research in South Africa has meant that there now is more information 
than ever before about income, expenditure and other resources at individual and 
household level, it is still true that not much is known about how poor and 
vulnerable people actually make decisions on the ground.    
 
This report attempts to explore this picture in more detail.  Its key focus is on 
building a better understanding the strategies poor people use to cope with the 
daily realities of life at the margins of the formal economy (or, to put it in current 
discourse in the ‘second economy’).  What is the nature and parameters of the 
forms of vulnerability they experience?  How does this impact on them?  What are 
the strategies people have developed in order to reduce risks, cope with shocks, 
make a living, and perhaps even get out of poverty? Only once we understand these 
can we really understand, also, the role social grants and other forms of social 
protection play within this context.  
 
1.2 One piece of the puzzle 
 
These are large and complex questions.  As we shall argue in the pages below, it is 
not possible to answer them in terms of sweeping generalisations.  Livelihood 
strategies evolve in particular contexts: they are shaped by local economic realities 
and are informed by culture, history, local memory and the forms of embedded and 
embodied knowledge that circulate in local communities, that are transmitted 
through cultural practice and that are contained in identities.  
 
This is an important point to bear in mind for readers who are used to econometric 
or rational choice modelling.  Though models can help us think about the strategic 
options open to imaginary people in hypothetical situations, understanding the 
factors that constrain and inform behaviour in the real world requires us to go 
further, and to root our analysis in an understanding of the local livelihood 
formations that are actually in place at a given locality at a certain point in 
history.  And this means there is a price to be paid.  While a more fine-grained, 
situated account increases the depth and validity of our understanding, we have to 
lose some generality.  Any sufficiently detailed account of how people make 
decisions in a particular situation will always to some extent be limited to the 
context that is described.  
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This report, therefore, can at most provide one – albeit important - part of the 
jigsaw puzzle.  It looks at the choices and actions of one very specific group of 
poor and marginalised South Africans: poor people in two suburbs of the African 
township of Khayelitsha, and in three villages in a remote rural district of the 
Eastern Cape.  These places have been carefully chosen: they were selected 
because they have been shaped by the history of migrant labour — an institution of 
central importance in the economic history of South Africa.  For this reason, much 
of more general relevance can be learned from them.  But for the same reason, 
one has to be careful in generalising.  Some of the realities we describe in the 
following pages may be generally true for everyone surviving at the margins of the 
formal economy in South Africa; others will be true only for the livelihoods of 
people in migrant labour networks; and some will be specific to Khayelitsha and 
the remote Eastern Cape only.  For this reason we will need to be careful when we 
extrapolate from our research, and when we explore the implications for policy.   
1.3 Key findings 
 
With these caveats in mind, it can be said that the research cast important light on 
some of the key structural factors that contribute to the vulnerability and poverty 
people experience, revealed much about the ways in which people on the margins 
of the formal economy try to reduce this poverty and vulnerability, and illuminated 
the role cash transfers play in these survival and coping strategies.  These findings 
raise some significant issues for consideration by policymakers, and suggest some 
of the possible considerations that might influence policy decisions. 
1.3.1 Understanding structural poverty: beyond the ‘second economy’ 
 
One of the most important contextual findings of this report is that it is necessary 
to go beyond the limitations of the concept of the ‘second economy’ in explaining 
or accounting for poverty and vulnerability.  Although the notion of the ‘second 
economy’ has played a valuable role in creating space for recognising the structural 
nature of poverty and the limitations of ‘trickle down’, it is not a helpful way of 
understanding the nature of poor people’s structural disempowerment.  This is 
because most ‘second economy’ discourse pivots on the notion that people’s 
poverty stems from a ‘lack of connection’ with the ‘mainstream economy’. Very 
often, these assumptions lead to an analysis that supposes that poor people’s 
problem is that they are ‘excluded’ from the economy, and that getting out of 
poverty depends on them being ‘more integrated’ into that mainstream economy 
 
Research findings suggest that the picture is far more complicated.  This report will 
argue that far from poor areas being characterised by disconnection from the 
‘mainstream economy’, they seem in many ways highly integrated.  Rather than 
‘disconnection’ the key issue seems to be on what terms people are incorporated.  
The report argues that poverty and vulnerability seem to stem inter alia from the 
fact that people’s incorporation into the economy is on adverse terms and subject 
to unequal and adverse power relations.  One important axis of this kind of 
‘adverse incorporation’ involves the high degree of monetization of people’s 
livelihoods in a context where money is scarce.  In the Eastern Cape the decreasing 
availability of animal traction and the increased centrality of mechanical traction, 
for instance, means that ploughing can be more efficient: but it also means that 
those who do not have money cannot plough. Another axis is the depth of 
penetration of even the economy of so-called ‘deep rural’ areas by large 
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corporations that are able to ‘suck’ money out of local economies and crowd out 
informal entrepreneurs. 
 
This should not be taken to read that the report suggests that incorporation into 
the formal economy is necessarily bad.  (Clearly, for instance there are also 
advantages to rural people of the increased availability of cheaper consumer 
goods).  Rather, the report suggests that careful attention needs to be given to the 
details – to the precise ways in which people are connected into the economy, and 
the power relations that shape the nature of their connection.  Rather than simply 
trying to integrate people more tightly into the formal economy as an end in itself, 
interventions should be aimed at making sure that some of the existing 
disadvantages and power imbalances are addressed, ameliorated or removed. 
 
1.3.2 The marginal and fragile nature of self-employment 
 
The report also raises some important questions around the nature of self-
employment in South Africa.  It argues that self-employment (and in the rural 
areas, agriculture) is highly prevalent and plays a crucial in ameliorating poverty 
and contributing to food security – but these activities are also strikingly fragile 
and marginal.  
 
Here, the report suggests that much mainstream policy thinking about ‘small and 
micro’ enterprises, does not really confront the real difficulties faced by those 
engaged in truly ‘survivalist’ self employment.  Much writing on the informal or 
‘SMME’ sector plays some lip service to the recognition that most ‘micro’ 
enterprises in South Africa are survivalist in nature – but then persist in trying to 
analyse these activities, and prescribe solutions, as if their potential depends on 
them being able to grow into classical economic ‘enterprises’ that have a business 
identity separate from the domestic economy of the people who are involved in 
them.  The report suggests that this is not a useful frame for understanding self-
employed activity.  In the first place, these activities are not businesses ‘in 
embryo,’ needing only the right mix of entrepreneurship and enabling conditions to 
take off into growth and employment creation: rather, they are strategies whereby 
poor people seek to ‘reproduce resources’ and leverage more advantage of the 
resources they have, within the context of their broader ‘domestic economy’.  
They cannot easily be divorced or disconnected from the complex intra- and inter-
household relations within that they are pursued.  Secondly, the most important 
limitations and constraints faced by the self employed people interviewed in this 
project do not lie in a lack of training or entrepreneurship, nor did the research 
project find much evidence of a big pent-up and unmet demand for microfinance.  
Rather, a key issue appears to be simply the limited scope for viable businesses in 
the spatial poverty traps created by rural underdevelopment and the spatial legacy 
of Apartheid.  These keep poor people stuck in markets where money is scarce, so 
that a key issue they face is not so much getting  credit as giving it in an 
environment where one’s ability to call in bad debts depends on one’s social 
relations.  In addition, the presence of expansive and powerful retail chains further 
reduces the space in which poor people can compete economically.  
 
These considerations suggest that self-employment and ‘subsistence agriculture’ 
play a vital but essentially supplementary role in the livelihood strategies of 
people on the margins of the formal economy. On the one hand they often make an 
important difference to mere survival, and are sometimes crucial to people’s 
ability to put any food on the table at all.  But informal economic activities and 
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self employment often depend on access to other resources such as wages — or 
cash income from a social grant.  Thirdly, this suggests that self-employment on its 
own is an unlikely pathway out of poverty.  Not one of the better-off or less poor 
individuals or households that participated in this study had gotten to their 
relatively better-off position without reliance on the wages garnered from steady 
employment. Those who were deeply marginalised vis a vis the ‘formal economy’ —
those who could not call on the resources secured through steady employment or 
grant receipt on the part of a household member — were at great disadvantage in 
their self-employed economic activities as well.  These findings emphasise again 
the central place that job creation and formal employment plays in the prospects 
for real poverty reduction in South Africa.   
 
1.3.3 Private social protection: how people survive 
 
The report describes in some detail the strategies and strategic arrangements that 
participants in the study devised to deal with the challenges imposed by existence 
at the margins of the formal economy. It argues that if we are to understand how 
people use social grants and cash transfers, it is vital to first understand the 
‘coping behaviours’, plans and strategic arrangements of poor people, and of which 
the use of social grants is but one component.  These included the development of 
complex co-operative arrangements within and between households to bundle 
together and leverage a wide spread of different livelihood activities; the 
development of sophisticated and careful strategies for ‘lay accounting’ and 
financial management; and above all a heavy emphasis on investing in education 
and seeking formal employment.  In particular, the report deals in detail with what 
may be called ‘private social protection’ – the specific strategies informants had 
devised to reduce vulnerability and to cope with shocks and uncertainty.   
 
Here, careful attention needs to be paid to household composition and structure. 
Like many other studies, the report highlights the fluidity and porosity of the 
households that participated in the study.  As a number of scholars have pointed 
out, this means the assumptions about ‘households’ that one finds in mainstream 
development economics seem to be inappropriate.  Households are not clearly 
bounded and stable entities: instead, their membership changes from time to time 
and their boundaries are unclear.  Non-residents can be household members and 
can contribute significantly (and make significant claims) on households resources.   
 
This is partly due to the history of migrancy in South Africa.  Recent research has 
highlighted the persistence of labour migrancy in South Africa, and the report 
argues that dense and complicated rural-urban networks continue to exist, with 
some urban households continuing to remit and save heavily back into their rural 
homestead and even urbanised individuals relying heavily on rural networks.  These 
links connect even thoroughly urbanised individuals to the rural areas, and similarly 
create important urban connections even for those who have never left the rural 
areas.  A key role here is played by gendered care chains, networks constructed 
around care work and household work, whereby female kin play a central role in 
making up for the ‘care deficit’ experienced by urban households. The report 
argues that culturally shaped practices of reciprocal exchange help create complex 
and spatially extensive urban-rural networks, and that these networks play a 
central role in allocating, distributing and redistributing resources, opportunities, 
risks and burdens. Together, these networks and practices may even be seen to 
create a patchy but extensive system of ‘distal social welfare’ whereby wages and 
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money from cash transfers reach (and reduce poverty and vulnerability) even for 
many not linked to the formal economy or not in receipt of grants. 
 
1.3.4 The limits of ‘private’ social protection: the dark side of ‘social 
capital’ 
 
The report however argues that, as important as this system of ‘distal social 
welfare’ or ‘private social protection’ is, it has fundamental limits.  In the first 
place, it is limited by the scarcity of the resources that it tries to distribute.   This 
has important consequences.  The ability to rely on kin connections to ameliorate 
vulnerability and poverty makes a crucial difference – but it also imposes 
significant burdens on others who themselves are often also vulnerable and/or 
poor: the networks and reciprocal practices described in the report can act as 
cushions for some precisely because they also act to transmit shocks to (and share 
burdens) with others. This is a particularly serious issue given the grim and 
worsening macro-context: declining employment for unskilled and resource-poor 
people is imposing huge burdens on this network, and the growing crisis of 
HIV&AIDS and its accompanying ‘care deficit’ increases this burden even further.   
 
Secondly, these networks and practices work in very uneven ways.  Not everyone 
benefits from them in the same way.  Here, the report cautions against overly 
simplistic and over-optimistic assumptions about the role of ‘social capital’.  It 
argues that the term ‘social capital’ is often used in vague and unhelpful ways.  
Like the concept of the ‘second economy’ it is useful because it helps direct 
attention to an important social reality – but carelessly used it can often lead to 
fuzzy or simplistic analysis.  Analysis of ‘social capital’ needs to pay careful 
attention to the practices of reciprocal exchange that it is part of; the underlying  
material resources upon which these practices draw; the social relationships that 
shape these practices, and the systems of social meaning and the gendered 
ideologies that inform these relationships.   
 
Such an analysis shows that ‘social capital’ does not benefit everyone in the same 
way.  Some of the forms of exchange it relies on or enables are thoroughly 
unequal, and there are net winners and losers.  Practices of reciprocal exchange 
inevitably have a ‘dark underbelly’ of coercion, conflict, gossip, violence and 
accusations of witchcraft.  Even positive social capital thus has its dark side – and 
this has important consequences for social protection. Those who are not 
empowered within patriarchal ideology — particularly unemployed youth, single 
female household heads and women who do not toe the traditional gender lines — 
are more likely to be marginalized, ostracized, exploited or punished. 
1.3.5 Using social grants   
 
Within this context, the report describes the complex ways in which people made 
use of social grants.  Although the research method means that the report cannot 
report in great detail on exactly how grant monies are allocated (a difficult task 
anyway, given the fungibility of income), the report casts general light on how 
grant-receiving households spent their money, and on the ways in which people 
made decisions about grant income.  It also collected information about cases in 
which grants were received, not only within the households that participated in the 
study, but also by those (sometimes distant) households to which they were 
connected. 
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Findings offer support to other studies that have argued  that social grants — 
particularly pensions and disability grants — play a crucial role in enabling survival, 
not only for direct recipients, but also for other household members and sometimes 
even for distant connections.  Furthermore, it shows the wide range to which grant 
moneys could be put: in addition to improving food security, social grants were 
used as ‘seed money’ for businesses or as a subsidy to keep self-employed activities 
going; to support informal agricultural activity; to invest in acquiring or improving 
housing stock or property; and to invest in the education of household members.  
 
The report places particular emphasis on understanding how grant income figures 
in the broader systems of reciprocal exchange upon which people rely.  It recounts 
some case studies that show how grant income shared with a household member or 
kinsperson at one time forms the basis of an obligation that can be repaid or re-
invested later.  Social grants are important partly because they allow individuals to 
respond flexibly to situations as they change over time, and allow the 
accumulation of credit and the settlement of debts over long time spans.  The 
report argues that this should reduce concerns over whether cash transfers crowd 
out private remittances: this is a problem only if households are considered in 
isolation and crowding-out is a zero sum game.  Though there may be cases of 
crowding-out an understanding of how this is part of the dynamics of practices of 
reciprocal exchange allows us to see how how this re-allocation of resources works 
within the broader networks on which people rely.  In addition, receipt of social 
grants empowers those who would otherwise be marginalised in their social 
network, allowing them to ‘transact’ and accumulate ‘social capital’ on their own 
behalf.   
1.3.6 Some key policy considerations 
 
The current research does not allow the authors to make concrete policy 
recommendations: formulating policy is a consultative and reflective process well 
beyond the ambit of this report.  At the same time, the research produced a wide 
range of policy-relevant insights, questions and caveats.  Key among these is the 
following: 
 
The integration of social and economic policy 
 
(1) There is a need for a closer integration between policy on economic growth 
more generally, and that on poverty.  The research suggests that the persistence 
of poverty is not due to the ‘persistence’ of an undeveloped economy disconnected 
to the ‘first world’ economy, but due to the nature of the ‘First World economy’ 
itself and the fact that poor people are linked to this economy on disadvantageous 
terms.  This suggests inter alia that it is necessary to go beyond an approach where 
economic growth is the responsibility of one set of departments, and an entirely 
different cluster focuses on pro-poor policy.  Such a ‘Chinese wall’ between 
economic and social policies is likely to create a situation where policies on 
economic growth and on poverty reduction are not in synergy.  The report 
highlights a number of areas where there appears to be a discontinuity between 
economic and poverty-related policies. These need to be addressed in a more 
integrated manner. 
 
(2) Probably the most significant (if unsurprising) policy consideration arising from 
this is the notion that an effective pro-poor policy in South Africa needs a pro-poor 
job creation policy at its centre.  The poor cannot only be the responsibility of the 
‘social cluster’. Although the report argues extensively that cash transfers and 
Section 1: Introduction  9 
 
 
informal economic activity play a vital role in enabling survival for many poor 
people, it should be remembered that they seem only to play a supplementary 
role; and cannot reduce poverty on their own.  Employment creation in the 
mainstream economy must be the central platform of any sustainable poverty 
eradication policy in South Africa. 
 
(3)  Linked to this is the argument that policy talk about ‘eliminating the second 
economy’ is of limited utility in addressing the problems faced by those at the 
margins of the formal economy.  The policy measures, for example, contemplated 
in some of the ASGISA documents (RSA 2006) do not appear to take into account 
the real nature of the disadvantages suffered by those at the margins of the formal 
economy.  Rather than ‘eliminating the second economy’, steps need to be taken 
to ameliorate disadvantages poor people face in the broader economy.  
 
(4) Another key point to bear in mind in the design of ‘integrated’ pro poor policy 
is that the social wage plays an important role in reducing the disadvantages 
placed by poor people – but poor people should not pay unnecessarily for ‘social 
wage’ goods. One important way in which government can reduce the unnecessary 
disadvantages faced by poor people is by reducing the extent of ‘adverse 
monetization’ – policies that require poor people to spend their small monetary 
resources on essential services.  Free basic water and electricity make a vital 
contribution; but these gains are limited by the fact that there is still significant 
cost recovery in other sectors.  Research uncovered some evidence that many 
schools in the areas studies still require even very poor students to pay school fees.  
This is a particularly important issue for Government’s cash transfer programme, in 
that such practices in effect mean that the Department of Social Development is 
subsidizing the Department of Education, with little real benefit for intended 
targets of the grant. 
 
(5) Another key area where there needs to be better integration with pro-poor 
policy is in the broad area of housing policy and spatial development strategies.  
Poor people are disproportionately disadvantaged by being housed at great 
distances from business centres – particularly where public transport is expensive 
and dangerous.  Enabling poor people to closer to centres of business and making 
transport more accessible would play a huge enabling role for self-employed poor 
people.  The policies and practices that continue to perpetuate the spatial legacies 
of Apartheid need to be actively transformed. 
 
(6) There is not as yet an effective policy framework for supporting and enabling 
self-employment as it exists.  Here it needs to be recognised that SMME policy has 
for the most part not yet taken aboard either the importance of survivalist ‘sub-
micro’ economic activities or the nature of the constraints they face.  Policies to 
support survivalist economic activities are needed – but these should not ask self 
employed people to become ‘entrepreneurs’ – rather, it should be recognised that 
supplementary economic activities aimed at leveraging, supplementing and 
maximising the returns from other resources are of vital importance.   
 
(7) A key and complex set of policy questions relate to the factors that crowd out 
and undermine the viability of self-employed activity.  The report suggests that 
‘big retail’ is playing a key role in crowding-out small scale self employment.  
Clearly this is a complex issue and there are no simple solutions; but paths are 
needed toward better synergies between big business and micro or sub-micro 
retail.   
 




Vulnerability and cash transfers 
 
A second, more focussed set of policy considerations relate to social grants. 
 
(8) The research re-affirms the central role of cash transfers in mitigating 
vulnerability. Cash transfers played a key role in ensuring food security and 
contributing towards survival for many people, including many who are not the 
direct recipients of grants.  For many households with no employed members, 
pensions and disability grants are the only thing that stands between members and 
complete impoverishment and hunger.   The unequal distribution of care work in 
society, and gender roles that make care work and household reproductive tasks 
the automatic responsibility of women, massively increases the vulnerability and 
poverty of women and children and is not sustainable in the long term.  Women’s 
care work constitutes a massive economic investment in society, and that economic 
investment is usually unpaid.  Research showed the huge costs imposed on women 
and children by the failure of many men to care for their children; but the broader 
assumption that women will, and should do unpaid care work, is also reflected in 
social policy more broadly.  Given the huge ‘care deficit’ imposed on society by 
HIV/AIDS as well as other diseases like TB, this is probably not sustainable. 
 
The research offered support to the idea that social grants, besides simply 
allowing survival, also play an important socially and economically empowering 
role.  Cash grants allowed people to invest in their build environment, in their 
productive capacity, in the education of children and other household members, 
and allowed otherwise marginalised people such as the elderly and women, to 
accumulate ‘social capital’ on their own account.  These benefits need to be 
recognised as core contributions of the social grant system and should be valued 
and protected in policymaking and implementation.  
 
(9) The unequal distribution of care work, and unequal gender power relations in 
society, mitigate against the imposition of conditionalities e.g. school attendance 
by grant receiving children.  The report highlights the social marginality and the 
lack of ‘social capital’ on the part of those who are disadvantaged by gender 
relations and conservative social norms – such as single female household heads.  
Where children are truant, this seems to be part of a more general breakdown of 
household coherence, not a decision against child education on the part of the 
household head: stopping a child grant will in all likelihood do nothing to improve 
matters and may simply further disempower already vulnerable households.  
 
(10) The utility and effectiveness of cash transfers requires careful attention to 
the conditions on the ground for effective grant use.  Creating enabling conditions 
for effective grant use is one of the most important ways in which government can 
increase the impact of social spending. This relates in the first place to the point 
made on page 9 above about cost recovery and cross-subsidization between 
departments.  If cash transfers are used to pay for essential social services, their 
social utility for the recipients and those linked to them is limited. Secondly, the 
report recounts case studies that highlight the vital value added by additional 
social services – like effective support by social workers – in allowing effective 
grant use.  Thirdly, this point also relates to the general argument about the need 
for better integration between social an economic policy: policies and practices 
that increase vulnerability and volatility (for example the shift to more casualised 
and more impermanent work) undermine the ability for effective grant use by 
increasing the insecurity, strain and unpredictability of the conditions under which 
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grant recipient households have to survive and undermine the ability of grant 
recipients to form coherent and co-operative households.   
 
One key factor that undermines the effectiveness of social grants is the way in 
which administrative discretion and official inefficiencies impose costs on poor 
people.  The report suggests that the ‘poorest of the poor’ – those who are most 
dependent on cash transfers to reduce their vulnerability – are also least well 
positioned to absorb the transaction costs and opportunity costs of applying for 
grants and proving eligibility.  It highlights cases where people who are eligible for 
grants were not taking them up – not because they did not want or need those 
grants, but because of malfunctioning instruments of delivery.  Careful systems 
design and training needs to be aimed at ensuring the user-friendliness of these 
services and reducing their propensity to impose additional costs on poor people.  
This, of course, is another factor that mitigates against the imposition of further 
conditionalities upon existing grants.    Additional conditionality simply increases 
the ‘administrative intensiveness’ of the grant system and adds to the costs of 
applying and proving eligibility.  Where government itself does not function 
efficiently, such additional conditionality can easily result in poor people being 
sent from pillar to post – something that would impact disproportionately on the 
poorest and most marginalised.  
 
(11) Delivery systems also need to take into account the mobility of grant 
recipients.  Design aspects of some important cash transfer instruments (especially 
the pension) seem to assume sedentary and immobile recipients who permanently 
reside in one province.  The reality however is that migrant social networks require 
many people — including the elderly and disabled — to be mobile and to travel 
between provinces.  The fact that a pension is paid out only in a specific province 
is another factor that imposes unnecessary transaction and opportunity costs on 
grant recipients, and hampers their survival and coping strategies.  
 
(12) The empowering effect of social grants transfers appears to be linked to the 
fact that they are paid over as money.  Research highlighted the importance of the 
fungibility of grant income – the fact that it could become part of an income 
stream that could be deployed in a variety of different ways.  This should raise 
questions about proposals that grants should be paid over in a non-cash form, e.g. 
as vouchers. The research findings offer no evidence to support the notion that 
inappropriate spending (e.g. on alcohol and tobacco) is a major problem. Given the 
cash-hungry nature of poor households, making grants available at vouchers is 
likely only to produce a situation in which vouchers are exchanged for cash, 
perhaps even at a discounted price.  This would significantly reduce the 
effectiveness of social spending.  
 
(13) The research confirms  the importance for Government to continue the 
development of a comprehensive social security system, both to address the 
situation of those falling outside the present system and to remove perverse 
incentives and distortions – for example to use disability grants in the place of a 
basic income grant.  In addition, the report stresses that current ‘coping 
mechanisms’ are under severe stress and can probably not cope indefinitely with 
the severe strains imposed upon them by high levels of unemployment and the 
HIV/AIDS crisis.  
 
(14) Finally, although this report highlights the sophistication and the complexity of 
existing ‘coping strategies’ and strategic arrangements, and stresses the 
contribution they make in warding off destitution and ameliorating the effects of 
Section 1: Introduction  12 
 
 
poverty for those at the margins of the formal economy, this should not be taken as 
evidence that existing measures are adequate.  The systems and arrangments 
described in this report are not at equilibrium.  Rather, they are under severe 
stress, and they rely on key resources (faltering ‘subsistence’ agriculture, 
accumulated savings from a time of fuller employment, and a huge investment of 
unpaid care work often by marginalised and elderly women) which cannot be 
indefinitely sustained. 
1.4 Structure of the report 
 
We begin with a short theoretical and methodological chapter that outlines our 
overall approach to understanding poverty and vulnerability, specifies the 
empirical questions we tried to answer, and sketches the methodological approach 
taken. Section Three provides a brief historical background and a profile of what 
quantitative research reveals about poverty in the two target areas studied. This 
sets the scene for an initial overview of emergent patterns and themes emanating 
from the fieldwork, including a provisional typology of cases.  Section Five, 
Contextualising Vulnerability, sets these patterns in a structural context. In 
particular it looks at what the research data suggests about the nature of the 
relationship between formal and informal activity, and what this means for current 
ways of talking about the ‘first’ and ‘second’ economy. It also highlights the 
consequences of these structural conditions for poor people’s vulnerability.  
Section Six, ‘Vulnerability, agency and “social capital”’ focuses in more detail on 
what the data reveals about the strategies and arrangements informants made to 
cope with poverty and reduce vulnerability.  Section Seven looks in some detail at 
the roles played by grants within these coping strategies. The final, Eighth section, 









The previous section highlighted a core policy question: how can we ensure that 
social spending in general and grants in particular support pathways out of poverty?  
This is a complex issue, the response to which depends on a long list of further 
empirical and conceptual questions. A key task for the research team was to 
develop, on the basis of this policy question, a clear core research question (CRQ) 
from which, in turn, a series of more tightly defined and researchable list of 
research questions  - the questions that need to be answered in order to allow the 
CRQ to be answered - could be derived.  Methodological design in was informed by 
the need to ensure that field questions and approaches would elicit the kind of 
data required to answer the detailed research questions (see Figure 2).  
 
 
This is a very schematic and oversimplified picture of a process that is in reality 
much less linear.  In particular it should be stressed that none of the steps in the 
derivation is theory free. At each stage, decisions about the question to ask, 
decisions about the lower level empirical and conceptual questions they implied, 
judgements about the kind of data needed to answer those questions, and the field 
strategies required to elicit that data are informed by underlying theoretical 
frameworks and assumptions.  Although these issues can become very abstracted 
and academic, it is important for the purposes of this report to make some of the 




(underlying assumptions and knowledge about the nature of knowledge, 












Figure 2: a simplified and schematic sketch of the relationship between the underlying research 
question and the field instruments to be used 
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2.2 Understanding poverty and vulnerability 
2.2.1 Qual-quant integration in poverty studies 
 
Policy-oriented research on poverty in South Africa has been largely dominated by 
heavily economic, econometric and quantitative approaches.  In recent years, 
there has been increasing recognition of the need for a q-squared, (or ‘qual-quant 
integrated’) approach that combines the insights of quantitative approaches to 
poverty with those from qualitative research (e.g. Carvalho & White 1997, Kanbur 
2002; Appleton & Booth 2005).  A wide range of possible approaches exist, ranging 
from fairly traditional strategies in which qualitative and quantitative research is 
done relatively independently, and the findings of one approach are used to test, 
validate or ‘ triangulate’ the other (Thorbecke 2003) to much more integrated 
approaches in which qualitative and quantitative approaches are carefully 
sequenced and linked (Howe and McKay 2004). The present study falls somewhere 
in the middle of this range. On the one hand, merely qualitative research is not 
simply seen as an add-on, generating descriptive depth to an account of poverty 
the informational content of which is (as Thorbecke for instance imagines) 
essentially quantitative.  In this study we hold that insights arising from qualitative 
data are often valid in their own right, and may shape the way in which 
quantitative data is analysed and interpreted.  At the same time the quantitative 
and qualitative components of the study were essentially separate operationally, 
and were each conceptualised and designed in their own terms.  (At times this has 
led to shortcomings in the study, particularly at the moments in which it is 
necessary to account for discrepancies between what quantitative and qualitative 
work tells us: we will note these moments in the pages below.) In addition, no 
complex statistical analyses were run: where quantitative data is used, it is for the 
most part used quite descriptively, in order to illustrate general tendencies and 
distributions.  In this section we will focus briefly on sketching the theoretical and 
philosophical basis of the qualitative research design, and show how these have led 
us to ask the questions we did. 
2.2.2 Poverty 
 
This report is concerned with poverty in its broadest sociological sense.  There is a 
wide and complex literature about poverty definitions and poverty measurement 
(see e.g. Ravallion 1996; Atkinson 2003; Noble Ratcliffe & Wright 2004). We will 
not go into these debates in depth at all, except to point out that we take a very 
different approach from researchers who equate poverty simply with having an 
income below a (inevitably relatively arbitrarily defined) poverty line.  Although 
monetary and other factors can be useful indicators of poverty, one should not 
confuse the indicator with what it indicates.  Poverty is in this report seen as a 
complex, multidimensional state of material lack and ill-being of such a nature 
that it undermines basic social and economic agency - preventing the person(s) in 
question from being able to live even a minimally human life (see e.g. Sen 1999, 
Nussbaum 1999 for some of the theoretical underpinnings of this approach).  
 
This has consequences for analysis, and results in a much less cut-and-dried 
approach to the study of poverty than the angle usually taken by econometric 
approaches to poverty.  In this report, we do not try, for example, to divide the 
households we studied neatly into a ‘poor’ and a ‘non poor’ group.  This is partly 
because of the multidimensional nature of poverty, which means that people who 
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are poor in cash may (in principle, at least) not be poor in terms of access to other 
resources – and trying to aggregate multiple indices of deprivation into a single 
measure is a risky and messy business (Qizilbash 2002; Atkinson 2003).  
Furthermore, our analysis is in the first place not aimed at categorising a person in 
terms of whether they are above or below a certain deprivation line but at better 
understanding the complex strategic situation in which they find themselves in 
their struggle for survival – a strategic situation defined in part by the interplay 
between different kinds of lack or endowment. Endowment with a particular 
resource is not the same as the ability to use it to generate a livelihood. Much of 
that depends on other enabling contextual and relational matters.  What matters, 
therefore, is not simply whether a person lacks, for instance, sufficient access to 
water or land or some other resource – but the extent to which that lack, in the 
broader strategic and structural context in which that person exists, impacts upon 
their ability to achieve the ‘functionings’, as Sen (1999) would put it, of a 
minimally human life.  Poverty is not simply a question of the extent to which a 
person is below a certain endowment threshold; rather it is a question of power 
and enablement: a question of access to the resources that constitute the 
necessary conditions for personal agency in the social world.  And understanding 
this requires a careful analysis, not only of their income, their accumulated assets 
and so on, but also of the complex social power relationships within which they 
exist and which they have to take into account. 
2.2.3 Vulnerability 
 
Poverty, in this approach, overlaps withbut is distinct from the concept of 
vulnerability.  Here, it is important to move cautiously and to be careful and clear 
in the way we use words. Like so many other terms in the literature on poverty 
studies, the term vulnerability is often used in very divergent ways.  In fact, there 
is not one clear, unitary and paradigmatic interpretation of the concept; rather 
there are a number of rival approaches – and once again, economists and social 
scientists are prone to use the term in very different ways (see Alwang et al 2001).  
Economists and quantitative sociologists tend to talk about vulnerability as 
exposure to risk, and even as the simple likelihood that a particular individual or 
household might fall into poverty. Much of the literature on food security and 
vulnerability has however drawn on a very different approach to vulnerability - that 
contained in the literature on hazards and epidemiology.  This literature is itself 
very complex and diverse (for an in-depth discussion see du Toit and Ziervogel 
2004). But two aspects of this literature are particularly important.   
 
1. One is that the literature makes a careful distinction between risk (the 
chances of a hazard or event occurring), sensitivity (the likely response to 
or impact of the hazard) and resilience (the ease and speed of recovery 
from the hazard).  Vulnerability is not the same as the risk of being 
exposed to a hazard; rather, it is present when a system is highly sensitive 
(when an event is likely to have serious impact) and when recovery is likely 
to be neither easy nor speedy. 
 
2. Secondly, as should be evident from the previous paragraph, vulnerability is 
here defined within a systems approach. This is an absolutely crucial point: 
vulnerability and resilience are seen as properties of systems.  In some 
sense of course the entire social system is relevant here; but understanding 
vulnerability requires, in particular, a detailed exploration on the specific 
sub systems, networks, contexts and sets of relationships upon which 
people’s livelihoods depend.  It may also be worth noting that in this 
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literature, there is a much stronger emphasis on the complexity of systems:   
in ecological literature on vulnerability, resilience is seen as being due to 
redundancy in the system, or the presence of large numbers of mutually 
supporting feedback loops (for a more detailed discussion, see du Toit and 
Ziervogel 2004).  This is in strong contrast to economic approaches which 
usually focus not on complexity but on a reductionist, simplifying analysis. 
 
In this report, we take a ‘soft systems’ or relational approach to vulnerability. An 
assessment of vulnerability is a judgement about the likely response of a system or 
systems to a particular hazard or event.  People are judged to be vulnerable if 
they can be shown to be ‘living on the edge’ (Ellis 2003): at a ‘tipping point’ at 
which an otherwise minor event or hazard can cause a severe reduction in their 
welfare (in other words if the system is sensitive) and if recovery is likely to be 
slow and difficult (if the system is not resilient).  And, as in the ecological 
literature, livelihood strategies are seen as depending on intrinsically complex 
systems, with a multitude of interactions and feedback loops that elude 
reductionist modelling. These systems are however not seen as closed; social 
systems are nested (within each other), they are open, and interact with other 
systems in complex ways. In this report we will not talk about ‘the social system’ 
as if it can be completely and totally described; rather, we focus on particular 
concrete networks and sets of dynamic relationships. 
 
Using an approach to vulnerability that draws on the insights of the literature on 
hazards and ecological vulnerability brings some important advances, partly 
because it promises a much more nuanced approach to understanding vulnerability 
than the econometric literature, which sees vulnerability as an attribute of 
individuals; which distinguishes rather more poorly between vulnerability and risk; 
and which has very limited capacity to come to grips with vulnerability as the 
dynamic property of open, nested, chaotic systems.  Rather than look in isolation 
at a particular individual or even a household, it is important to look at the broader 
sets of social relationships within which they operate, and on which they depend. 
  
2.3 Research challenges 
2.3.1 Understanding Social relationships  
 
If understanding poverty and vulnerability requires an understanding of people’s 
social networks and the power relationships within which they are caught, this has 
important consequences for research.  Firstly, it requires that we look further than 
the extent to which a household is endowed with a particular resource, to the 
larger social relationships within which this endowment is used in particular 
livelihood strategies.  Access to land, for instance does not always mean the same 
thing: the extent to which land can be used depends on a whole host of other 
factors including the nature of the local economic context, access to markets, the 
nature of the social relations of labour, local commodity chain structures and so 
on.  
 
Additionally, social relationships cannot be captured purely through quantitative 
research, because social relations and power relations are meaning-ful realities – 
they cannot be grasped separately from the intersubjective frameworks of meaning 
within which they exist; and understanding them requires an exploration of the 
meaning-giving activities – the underlying cultural and discursive practices – that 
shape them.  Numerical distributions and patterns can still teach us a lot, but if our 
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aim is coming to grips with the ways in which poor individuals and groups on the 
ground make decisions, we need to engage with how they experience and 
understand their actions intentions and relationships, and the underlying meaning-
giving cultural and discursive frameworks that shape these actions and perceptions.   
 
This gives poses particular challenges for qualitative and work and for the 
enterprise of qual-quant integration.  In particular, it means that it is not enough 
simply to do standard econometric or quantitative analysis, supplemented with 
some local colour from a PRA or focus group.  Rather, the analysis of both 
quantitative and qualitative data has to happen in an integrated way, within a 
coherent theoretical framework. One of the most important strengths of a 
relational approach to understanding poverty is that it allows one to go beyond a 
methodologically individualistic approach that simply tries to understand the 
attributes of individuals or households, and challenges us to situate individual 
choices and actions in individual, household, community, regional and supra-
regional context. 
  
2.3.2 Research questions 
 
The policy question on page 13 (‘how can we ensure that social spending in general 
and grants in particular, support pathways out of poverty?’) requires answering and 
solving a wide range of political, technical, empirical and conceptual questions. 
Many of them lie outside the purview of this study. In particular, this study cannot 
definitively seek to on its own establish, for example, what strategies poor people 
actually should adopt to get out of poverty. In our analysis of the data we can 
develop some strong interpretations of these questions, particularly by situating 
research findings in a strong analysis of the social context. For the purposes of 
developing a field approach, however, a narrower definition of the research 
question seems appropriate: 
 
Core Research Question  
 
What is the impact of the provision of social grants on the strategies whereby 
people make a living and seek to escape poverty? 
 
 
This core research question, in turn, can be broken down into three subsidiary 
questions: 
 
1) What do people on the margins of the formal economy in order to survive?   
This requires us to look in detail at actual livelihood activities – and at the 
ancillary and supportive activities that enable them.   
 
2) How do people get into (and out of) poverty? This requires more than a 
simple empirical investigation.  Rather, it requires us to look at poverty 
careers and pathways, and to try to identify within them the triggers, ‘ 
maintainers’ and ‘drivers’ that seem to have played a direct or indirect 
causal role in their descent into (or ascent out of) poverty 
 
3) How do people use social grants, and what role do they play in the 
decisions that people make about strategies and activities that affect their 
prospects of getting into / out of poverty?  This requires a look at the 
particular ways in which grants are used, the consequences for the 
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livelihood activities and strategies mentions in question 1, and an attempt 
to identify the extent to which they enable (or undermine) that enable 
households to get out of poverty in the longer run 
 
These three themes are interlinked, and the detailed research questions derived 
from them often overlap. Furthermore not all of these would be empirical 
questions: some of them would be questions about patterns in / interpretations of 
empirical data.  Nonetheless, it is possible to specify in some detail the key kinds 
of empirical information that would be necessary to answer these questions (see 
Figure 2 below).  
 
Figure 3: an overview of key research questions and the empirical data required to answer them 




2.3.3 Challenges and trade offs 
 
This agenda poses a range of research challenges.  In the first place, many 
economic activities are of such a nature that they easily pass ‘under the radar’ of 
survey research.  Sometimes informants themselves don’t see their activities as 
economically significant: people may be economically active, and may indeed be 
earning significant amounts of money from an activity, and still deny that they 
have employment (see, for example, Adato Lund & Mhlongo 2004). Often, 
informants may also wish to hide their activities — and not just because they are 
illegal: in resource poor environments, being circumspect about one’s resources 
may be an essential way of ensuring that neighbours and family do not make claim 
on them.  One key challenge is therefore that research should allow such activities 
to be revealed and recognised.  
 
Secondly, the overarching questions we have posed here require us to understand 
linkages and relationships: the causal linkages that for example may bring about 
descent into poverty, the linkages between different kinds of activities, and the 
nature of the social relationships between people.  Often, research requires 
probing into painful histories, or exploring difficult conflicts within or between 
households.  The design of qualitative research tools would have to take all these 
challenges into account, for example using strategies that allow the building of 
rapport (e.g. planning for multiple visits that allow for the development of a 
relationship).  
 
A further decision in the research design was balancing, on the one hand, the 
power of qualitative research to surface huge amount of detailed and nuanced 
accurate information about the complexities of a particular situation with, on the 
other, the need to know how much of what was learned about particular 
households could be extrapolated more widely. This is important in the selection of 
households for qualitative study.  The danger that idiosyncratic aspects of 
individuals or households skews the analysis can be somewhat counter-acted by 
ensuring that a wide range of households and individuals are chosen; though the 
collection of case studies do not need to constitute a statistically representative 
sample, it does help to ensure that they span the range of typical variation.  One 
problem is that given limited time and resources there is a trade-off between 
depth and representivity: selecting a large number of case studies allows one to 
get a clearer sense of the nature and range of variation between case studies, but 
this reduces the time and opportunity of investing dynamics and complexities in 
great depth. Reducing the number of samples allows a closer and more detailed 
investigation, and what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz called a ‘thick 
description’ of these complexities (cf. Geertz 1973) — but focussing on a small 
number of case studies  increases the danger of analysis being skewed by the 
idiosyncrasies of the households or individuals that were selected. 
 
In the present study, some help was provided through the existence of a baseline 
study from which the households targeted for in-depth analysis could be drawn.  
The trade-offs between depth and reliability were dealt with through a ‘pyramidal 
design’ comprising a four-phase research strategy that progressively narrowed 








Figure 4: Phases of the research design 
 
The first phase of the research process was constituted by a 2002 in-depth 
household livelihoods survey conducted by PLAAS as part of its partnership in the 
CPRC in 2002. This provided a detailed quantitative profile of about 1358 
households in three impoverished South African contexts.   
 
The present research project built on this research process by selecting from the 
sample 48 households in two target areas for in-depth semi-structured interviews.  
From this sub-sample, 10 households were chosen for in-depth and detailed 
Household survey: 1358 households 
(Detailed income, expenditure, assets, health, access to services) 
Detailed case studies: 10 
households  
(Trends, key events) 
In-depth interviews: 48 households 























Figure 1: Research sites for the 2002 survey 
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investigation.  Emergent themes were checked through a small number of focus 
group discussions. 
 
2.4 The 2002 CPRC household survey 
 
The 2002 CPRC household survey forms the baseline and background for the present 
study.  This survey was originally conceptualised as the first wave of a small local 
area panel study, looking at aspects of poverty, well-being and livelihood activities 
in three sites. In the Eastern Cape the survey visited 733 households in selected 
villages in the remote area of Mount Frere, situated in the north-east of the former 
Transkei (the boundaries of the survey were initially defined in terms of the Mount 
Frere health district as it was in 1998; today these households fall in two 
municipalities; that of Thabankulu and Umzimbomvu: the villages visited included 
Luyengweni, Lancele, Lukangeni, Mkhemane, Mpoza, Mntwana, Tshungwana, 
Manqamzeni, Ndyobe, Lahlangubo, Mnxe and Maqwathini).  The survey also 540 
households situated in farm worker settlements in the rural farming town of Ceres, 
in the heart of the deciduous fruit export industry – here, households were in the in 
the ‘coloured’ townships of Op die Berg and Bella Vista and in the African township 
of Nduli and the Mooiblom informal settlement. Finally, the survey included and 
625 African households in and around the townships of Khayelitsha, Nyanga East, 
Brown’s farm and informal settlements near Kraaifontein in metropolitan Cape 
Town (De Swardt et al 2005).  The survey focused on traditional poverty measures 
such as income and expenditure but also included a detailed look at endowments 
of human capital, household durables, access to services and public goods, 
experience of shocks, reliance on social networks, nutrition, reported morbidity 
and child anthropometry. 
  
2.5 Qualitative Research 
 
The qualitative phase of the research started with a wave of in-depth semi-
structured interviews, each 90 minutes to two hours long. These interviews were 
aimed at eliciting detailed information about household structure, some historical 
background on the household, significant livelihood activities, and the nature of 
households’ reliance on social networks.  Some 48 households – 24 in the Eastern 
Cape, and 24 in Cape Town, were chosen randomly from the first and fifth income 
quintiles of the  household surveyed in 2002.   
 
Site selection was also carefully considered.  In the Eastern Cape, participant 
households were selected not from the entire sample, but from three villages. To 
ensure that case studies represented some of the important ‘livelihood ecologies’ 
in the Eastern Cape, three different villages were chosen.  ‘Kufutshane’1 was 
relatively close to Mount Frere; a second village, Akulyniwa, was further from 
town; a third, Phuzayo, was quite remote, more than two hours’ drive away over 
notoriously bad roads.  In Cape Town, households were selected from Sites B and 
Sites C in Khayelitsha, partly because these were relatively established areas with 
a diverse make up as far as household income was concerned.  
 
In all cases, interviews were held with the nominal household head; in many cases 
other household members were present and would contribute information. All key 
                                         
1 Place names have been changed to protect the anomymity of respondents. 
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informants signed ethical release forms certifying their voluntary participation in 
the study and allowing the research team the right to use their words and likeness.2 
(Field recordings have been archived at the University of Cape Town’s Centre for 
Popular Memory, where anonymised case studies are publicly available, and where 
transcriptions and recordings are potentially accessible for researchers upon 





From these 48 households, 10 were selected – 5 in each of the two main sites – for 
in-depth investigation.  Because of the importance of social grants for the study, 
one important criterion for selection was whether the household relied significantly 
on grant income.  Significant participation in informal economic activity was a 
second criterion for selection for in depth case study.  In addition the research 
team, rather than focus only on the poorest households, tried to ensure that there 
was a mix of better and worse off households.   
 
This more in-depth phase of the investigation consisted of a much deeper 
investigation of the livelihood activities of the household, and the exploration of 
their social networks.  Usually every significant adult member of the household 
(not only the nominal ‘head’) was interviewed, and interviews focussed in much 
greater depth on the history of the household, focussing particularly on key 
economic events: decisions to migrate, decisions to enter or leave the labour 
market, or to start or abandon informal activity.  In addition, for each of these 
households two participatory mapping activities were held: firstly, household 
members were involved in compiling a genogram, mapping the nature and 
                                         
2 See Appendices 
Figure 2: Participatory mapping of a kinship network 
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structure of their kinship networks. Given the limits of time, these genograms 
could not be very detailed, and usually focussed only on the immediate family of 
the household head.  They did however allow a much more accurate understanding 
of kin relationships, and revealed that many of the ways in which relationships are 
translated and summarised in surveys and even in-depth interviews are prone to 
great inaccuracy.  Secondly, in-depth case studies also involved the development 
of ‘social maps’, in which informants developed a map showing the other people 
and households on whom they depended, and who depended on them. 
 
Initially, this research phase was conceived as involving at most two or more 
further in-depth interviews with key household members, but as the research 
progressed an important addition was introduced.  Besides further interviewing key 
household member, researchers would also ‘follow the social network’ – identifying 
the most important other individuals and households upon whom they depended, 
and interviewing them about their livelihood strategies and their social networks.  
In some cases, it was even possible for the team to interview people in the distant 
households on the other ‘pole’ of migrant networks, and explore some rural-urban 
dynamics in much greater depth.  
 
The fieldwork period concluded with eight focus groups, four at each of the two 
sites.  These groups were stratified by age (under or over 35 years old) and gender 
viz. younger men, younger women, older men and older women.  Conducted 
towards the end of the research process, the focus group interviews sought to both 
expand on, and confirm, emergent findings from the study.  The semi-structured 
focus group interviews provided the opportunity for research informants to 
articulate their ideas on topics such as the nature of social capital, urban versus 
rural life, local socio-cultural mores and prevailing understandings of marginality.  
The utility of a focus group methodology is the degree of inter-subjective (i.e. 
between people) exchange it engenders (Kvale, 1996).  The resultant dialogue 
flowing between participants encouraged them to clarify points and articulate their 
positions in a naturalistic, ‘everyday’, conversational manner.  These narratives 
served to reveal the analytically-rich perceptions, positions, disagreements and 
conceptual dilemmas which make up the focus group participant’s collective 
experience. In this study, the focus group interviews revealed many of the implicit 
‘rules’ that govern social capital, along with its converse: pervasive attributions of 
jealousy and witchcraft.  As these levels of detail frequently remain beyond the 
conscious awareness (and articulation) of research participants in regular, 





A study like the present cannot rely simply on the in-depth narrative recounting 
and analysis of case studies.  While this is possible for studies that look at a small 
number of cases, attempting this for 48 case studies would simply see the analysis 
disappear under a welter of detail and make the distilling an analysis extremely 
difficult.  At the same time quantitative analysis of this data would be 
inappropriate.  Not only would it be an extremely blunt tool for revealing causality, 
contextual specificity and nuance, the (by quantitative standards) limited sample 
size would render it unsuited to much more than basic descriptive statistics.  Davis 
therefore (2006) advocates ‘medium n’ clustering analysis as an interpretive tool to 
analyse substantial numbers of case studies.  Indebted to Charles Ragin’s (cf. 2000) 
application of ‘fuzzy sets’ theory to the social sciences and his methodology of 
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qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin, 2003), this approach allows researchers to 
work with comparatively extensive data sets yet retain the detail and intensiveness 
that typically distinguishes case study derived data.  Davis’ stresses that the 
application of this methodology to household data also facilitates examination of 
causality in detail; he uses it to examine “events with multiple causation, ‘last 
straw’ threshold effects (events which lead to catastrophe due to a series of 
previous events), other cumulative trends, outcomes based on the ordering of a 
sequence of events, and complex interactions” (2006, p.2).  This report therefore 
relies on the technique of ‘medium n’ clustering analysis to aggregate and examine 
the patterns that recur within the data.   
 
Following Davis, household-derived case studies were analysed by grouping them 
together in terms of both the specific similarities and difference observed within 
them.  For the purposes of the analysis, case studies were written up and carefully 
ordered in terms of theoretically grounded criteria.  The resultant groupings were 
then used to cluster households and to develop typologies that could be used to 
explore the material.  This was a recursive process which entailed repeated, 
circular movement between the empirical specificity of the case studies and a wide 
body of theory.  The analysis was refined in dialogue between both the empirical 
material and the theoretical literature.  In this process of analysis attention was 
devoted both to the differences between cases and the thematic elements that 
linked together even households that could be grouped differently.  Individual 
cases could then be used to illustrate features that were salient to different 
groups, while remaining sensitive to the features that made each case study 
unique. The results of the coding were then used interpretatively, to find examples 
of particular themes and phenomena within the case study material.  This also 
facilitated the converse, actively seeking out disconfirmatory (or ‘disproving’) 
cases that disproved the emerging analysis.  This refined the analysis further.   
 
This ‘medium n’ approach applied to case studies therefore steers a middle ground 
between ‘large n’ panel (i.e. longitudinal) or cross sectional studies that are the 
staple of poverty research and, on the other hand, the micro, ‘small n’ qualitative, 
case study type work.  The former are often ill suited to understanding context and 
the complex causality of a phenomenon such as poverty or vulnerability.  While the 
latter methods with their intensive, micro-focus can be limited in terms of their 
relative lack of representativeness and broad generality.  ‘Medium n’ approaches 
therefore draw the two traditions together to affect qualitative-quantitative 
integration (Kanbur, 2002).  In the present study this integration is essential in 
order to be able to understand social networks, social capital and vulnerability in 





3 POVERTY IN MOUNT FRERE AND KHAYELITSHA: A 
PROFILE 
3.1 Labour Migration and underdevelopment 
 
The current research focuses on one very specific context of poverty – livelihoods 
in areas shaped by the history (and the collapse) of the Apartheid migrant labour 
system. The former Transkei, in which the rural component of the research project 
was conducted, is shaped by a specific set of historical and social factors.  Most 
notable of which is the fact that despite its predominantly rural character, and 
geographical distance from the major metropolitan areas, the region has been 
integrated into the urban economy of South Africa for over a century.  These 
features, and the areas history as the first and largest of the Apartheid-era 
independent ethnic homelands, are specificities which need to be comprehended 
to understand the region in present day.   
 
3.1.1 The former Transkei 
 
The Eastern Cape was historically the site of often violent encounter between the 
expanding British Cape colony and Xhosa agro-pastoralists in the nineteenth 
century.  The resultant series of mid-century wars saw the frontier pushed 
backwards and forwards between these polities.  Unlike the colonial encounter 
between British and Zulu in Natal, ultimate military defeat of the Xhosa by 1870 
was not characterised by the preservation of coherent ethnic kingdom but by 
thorough colonial subjugation.  Colonial rule brought a variety of policies which 
imposed poll and hut taxes in order to make Africans pay for their own 
administration and encourage the supply of male migrant labour to industry 
(Redding 1993).  Particularly with the labour shortage that followed the ‘mineral 
revolution’ discoveries of diamonds and gold.  The colonial project was variously 
received by its subjects, and a distinction often made between the ‘reds’ (i.e. 
traditionalists, after the ochre clay and blankets they wore) and ‘school’ (i.e. 
Africans who embraced formal schooling and Christianity) (Comaroff & Comaroff 
1991).  This division between ‘townsman’ and ‘tribesman’ (Mayer 1971), urban and 
rural, tradition and modernity, was the staple of academic and official discourse 
concerning the Transkei and its inhabitants for much of the twentieth century 
(Bank 2002).  Although it is a dated and overly dichotomous distinction, the region 
continues to be characterised by convergences and divergences between 
traditionalism and modernity (Bank & Minkley, 2005).  The focal research site 
straddles an area in the north of the former Transkei, occupied by amaPondo clans 
to the east and Bacha in the west.  Even in the urban townships to which they have 
migrated for almost a century, the Bacha continue to be popularly known for their 
traditional proficiency with ‘muti’ (magical and medicinal herbal potions).  Some 
of the ambiguities of traditionalism and modernity associated with areas such the 
former Transkei are reflected in the institution of the chieftaincy.  Despite its 
rhetorical appeal to pre-colonial times, it was co-opted by the British colonial 
system of indirect rule and hereditary traditional leaders usually became state 
functionaries within the ruling bureaucracy.   
 
The late nineteenth century process of ‘enforced monetization’ continued with the 
promulgation of the Glen Grey act of 1894, which saw increased taxation, the 
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surveying of plots and allocating of quitrent title deeds (land renting from the 
state).  Reflecting a mounting late nineteenth century imperial belief in the 
impossibility of culturally assimilating Africans (Dubow 1987), the act also provided 
for separate political representation through district councils and a general council 
(or Bunga) in Umtata (Redding 1992).  After 1910 black South Africans became 
increasingly politically subservient within the post Boer War compromise of Boer 
and British that ushered in a unitary South African state.  The mid 1920s passing of 
the Native Administration and Development Act saw all adult men become 
taxpayers, in order to supply migrant male labour to the rapidly expanding urban 
industrial economy.  It was also at this stage that agrarian crisis began to set in 
within the Transkei.  Increased population pressure began felt following the Natives 
Land act, which ultimately allocated 13% of South Africa’s land for black South 
Africans.  The inter-war years also saw the advent of ‘betterment’ planning which 
sought to rationalize ‘inefficient’ native agriculture, by demarcating land use zones 
(residential, pastoral, cultivation etc), and control the ‘environmental degradation’ 
caused by overstocking.  Spanning several decades, the dispossession inherent in 
much betterment (particularly the culling of livestock) provoked fierce episodes of 
rural resistance, and stopped the process in several locales (such as Pondoland) 
(Beinart & Bundy, 1987).  The 1950s also saw the Tomlinson commission investigate 
native agriculture and land holding.  It proposed a two stream model whereby 
‘improved’ native farmers with access to economically viable land units, would 
displace non-productive rural residents.  The commission’s recommendations were 
never implemented, in part to avoid encouraging the urbanization of Africans into 
apartheid’s white urban spaces.  
 
‘Self-government’ in 1963 was followed by the Transkei becoming the first of the 
‘independent’ ethnic homelands in 1976.  The Transkei state was an ambiguous 
entity, both in terms of its inner political logic and its relationship to Pretoria.  In 
common with Bantustan governments elsewhere, the Transkei relied on the support 
of an amalgam of interests: the local business elite, civil servants and the co-opted 
traditional authorities.  Peires (1991) characterises the homeland state as 
‘patrimonial’.  In common with much of neo-colonial Africa, patrimonial homeland 
leaders dispensed patronage within elite clientalist networks, in exchange for 
political loyalty.  Homeland governments also displayed complex and equivocal 
relationships with the Apartheid state: simultaneously subordinate to, yet 
exercising relative autonomy from it.  Homeland rulers were therefore a mediating 
link between the Apartheid South African state on one hand, and local middle class 
elite on the other (Peires 1991).  By the late 1980s the Transkei’s ruling 
Matanzimas were weakened by their rapacious corruption, mounting popular 
opposition and - most significantly - the dissipation of middle class and military 
support.  The early 1990s waning of the apartheid state sounded the death knell of 
the homelands, and precipitated their turbulent reintegration into a unitary South 
Africa.   
 
Political reincorporation into the post-apartheid state has done little to alleviate 
widespread in the former Transkei, especially in rural areas where the majority of 
the Eastern Cape’s population live.  Efforts to effect market led rural growth 
continue to be hampered by a lack of a comprehensive provincial or national rural 
development policy, along with a range of planning, integration and institutional 
weaknesses that reflect the region’s chequered and often clientalist administrative 
history. Amidst the decline of the little regional industry that formerly existed in 
the region, and the inexorable process of de-agrarianisation (cf. Bryceson 1996) 
colonial and Tomlinson-era debates concerning the place and viability of 
smallholder agricultural production persist in the present.  The bulk of rural 
Section 4: Migrant livelihoods – an outline  27 
 
 
incomes in the former Transkei now derive from non-agricultural sources, mainly 
remittances and increasingly state welfare grants.  Notwithstanding the centrality 
of land based resources to the livelihoods of the rural poor, market liberalization 
and the complexity of modern agro-commodity systems effectively preclude 
smallholders from engaging in market-orientated agriculture.  Reflecting on the 
long history of efforts to extract industrial labour form the rural Transkei, Bank and 
Minkley summarise that “the main dynamics in the post-apartheid era at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century is that rural labour – once so eagerly desired – 





With an estimated population of between 500 000 and one million people, Cape 
Town’s African township of Khayelitsha is particularly noteworthy for two reasons.  
Firstly, it is a mere two decades old; secondly, it was never really supposed to exist 
in the first place.  Although African migration between the Eastern Cape and Cape 
Town has endured for a least a century, Cape Town (and much of what is now the 
Western Cape) was decreed a ‘Coloured Labour preference area’ in 1955.  Apart 
from passbook arrests and repatriation back to the homelands, the Apartheid state 
further tempered migration by building no new housing stock for much of the 1960s 
and 1970s.  The existing hostel accommodation was intended for unaccompanied 
migrant workers, in order to discourage the migration of entire African families to 
Cape Town (Cook, 1985).  Through the 1970s into the early 1980s population 
densities in the smaller, established African townships such as Nyanga, Langa and 
Guguletu rose with increasing numbers of ‘backyard’ dwellers (who filled in 
existing residential sites with shacks).  Housing was a decades-long source of 
dissatisfaction amongst an increasingly politicised African populace, and housing 
riots occurred intermittently from the mid-1970s onwards.  The 1983 proclamation 
of the new township of Khayelitsha therefore reflected the waning of apartheid 
influx control, and its efforts to stem African migration into Cape Town.   
 
Located 39 kilometres from the Cape Town city centre, abutting a military base 
and extending to the coast, Khayelitsha was intended to be far removed from any 
axis of future white residential growth.  In accordance with apartheid urban 
planning it was ringed by a buffer zone of low income (‘coloured’) housing and 
waste or industrial land.  Sandy, low-lying and subject to seasonal flooding, this 
difficult topography rendered the provision of water borne sewerage an ongoing 
difficulty, even to the present day (Morris, Leyland and Berthon, 1996).  Although 
the intention was to ultimately relocate all of Cape Town’s African residents to 
Khayelitsha, this grand segregationalist ideal proved untenable.  It was undermined 
by a combination of the strenuous resistance of the residents of established African 
townships (who fiercely resisted removal to far flung Khayelitsha), ceaseless in-
migration into Cape Town along with the waning resolve and coercive power of 
apartheid’s proponents. 
 
In 1983 initial projections were that 220 000 Khayelitsha residents, would be 
provided with ‘core housing’ on 99 year leasehold, and more commonly ‘site and 
service’ stands where they would build their own shacks (Cook, 1985).  One of the 
earliest of these shack spaces was Site C, which was a locale for many of 48 000 
people displaced from Crossroads township during the mid 1980s, and those not 
legally resident in Cape Town.  The contradictions that accompanied the birth of 
Khayelitsha and waning of apartheid influx control are starkly evident here: 
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Khayelitsha was for those prepared to move to it, irrespective of their legal 
entitlement to actually be resident in Cape Town.  Although the apartheid state 
machinery of influx control has now long since been dismantled, the corrugated 
iron, wood and plastic shacks of Site C remain.  As do their residents of over 
twenty years.   
 
If Khayelitsha represented the failure of apartheid policy to prevent African labour 
from becoming a central part of the Western Cape economy, it perversely 
succeeded in other ways.  Planned and developed as a racial enclave; Khayelitsha 
continues to be a dormitory town peopled almost exclusively by Xhosa migrants.  
The original early 1980s township planning made very little provision for 
commercial activity, merely a complex ‘with 3-4 shops, a mini market, a post 
office and a bank agency’, and earmarked no sites for industrial purposes (Cook, 
1985: 62).  But even in the post-apartheid era Khayelitsha continues to be a 
satellite settlement, with no discernable economic centre of its own, few 
employment prospects and far removed from the manufacturing and commercial 
hubs of Cape Town  
 
This historical background of the two research sites explored is of considerable 
importance in understanding the realities encountered in the research process.  
The individuals we interviewed, the households and communities they live in, exist 
in the aftermath of the collapse of a centrally important migrant labour system.  
With the foundation of livelihood strategies developed in response to the economic 
realities of the late twentieth century eroded beneath them, even those who had 
been partially incorporated into the labour economy of South Africa are now even 
more marginalised. 
3.2 Rural and Urban poverty: a snapshot 
 
The 2002 PLAAS CPRC survey provides some general insights into the implications of 
this history of underdevelopment.  The most important findings of this survey with 
regards to the depth and multidimensionality of poverty have been published 
elsewhere (De Swardt et al 2005; du Toit 2005; Skuse, Cousins & du Toit 
(forthcoming).  Some of this data can help to provide a useful snapshot of the 
depth of poverty and deprivation in these areas. 
 
Table 1: Some key monetary indicators of poverty in the research sites (Source: 2002 
PLAAS/CPRC survey). 
Site 




‘poverty line’ of R5604 
Proportion of 
households spending 
more than 40% of 
expenditure on food 
‘Mount Frere area (n – 733)5 
Entire Area R160 97.6 % 92% 
‘Kufutshana’ R231 92.9% 90.9% 
‘Akulinywa’ R132 100 % 92.3% 
‘Phuzayo R118 100 % 96 % 
                                         
3 See above footnote. 
4 The CPRC study used the UNDP 1995 ‘food poverty line’ of R352 per adult equivalent 
adjusted for inflation (UNDP 2003.  South Africa Human Development Report 2003 – The 
Challenge of Sustainable Development in South Africa: Unlocking People’s Creativity. 
Oxford University Press: Cape Town 
5
 Valid n differs somewhat from measure to measure.  For simplicity’s sake, the overall n of 
the households surveyed is given. 
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African settlements in  Urban Cape Town (n=625) 
Entire Area R250 91.8 % 94 % 
Khayelitsha 
Site B 
R229 93.4% 97.4% 
Khayelitsha 
Site C 
R243 92.2% 94.3% 
 
 
Table 2: Indicators of agriculture and employment in Mount Frere and in the Cape Town study 
(Source: 2002 PLAAS/CPRC survey).  




Percentage of households with access to land for food 
gardening 
97% -  
Percentage of households owning livestock 83% 13% 
Percentage of households reporting cash income from land-
based production 
6% 3% 
Percentage of adults with paid work 25% 36% 
Percentage of households where no adults have paid work 40% 28% 
Percentage of individuals in permanent employment 14% 22% 
Percentage of individuals reported to spend more than an 
hour a day in self-employed activity 
3% 2% 




The statistical data reflect many of the important implications of the legacies of 
migrant labour and underdevelopment.  In the Mount Frere area, the survey 
revealed significant levels of access to land: some 87% of households reported 
access to land in some form or another.  For most of these households, agricultural 
activity is however limited to kitchen gardening.6 Though most households owned 
livestock of some kind, only a very few households owned significant amounts of 
cattle (see the table on page 77 below).  The survey seemed to indicate that 
agriculture played a relatively supplementary role in households’ livelihood 
profiles.  Some 87% of Mount Frere households in the survey reported relying on 
bought maize meal all year round, while less than 2% of households could provide 
for their own maize meal needs for three-quarters of the year (see below).  Almost 
95% of households reported that more than 40% of their household expenditure had 
gone on food (the Eastern Cape survey was held in the winter months, reflecting a 
time when own stores of maize would have been at a minimum).   
 
Poverty in Cape Town’s African suburbs was differently configured but seemed to 
produce similar levels of hardship.  In many ways monetary poverty in Khayelitsha 
was much less desperate: a significantly larger proportion of adults (36%) reported 
doing some form of paid work.  Although employment was better than in the 
Eastern Cape survey, it was still low, with 28% of Cape Town township households 
reporting that no adult in the household had any form of paid work; there were 
                                         
6
  Reliable numbers cannot be provided here. The 2002 PLAAS CPRC survey does not allow an 
accurate estimation of access to larger, ploughed fields as opposed to garden agriculture.  The survey 
asked informants to distinguish between ploughed fields and grazing lands.  But because  of the 
practice of letting cattle graze on ploughing fields after the harvest, fenced fields were called grazing 
lands by field workers and translaters.  Survey data of possession of  grazing lands vis a vis poughed 
fields is therefore not trustworthy. 
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also very low levels of reported involvement in self-employed activity:  only 2 % of 
individuals were reported to spend time in self-employment.  Some 83% of 
households in the Cape Town study (compared with 92% of households in Mount 
Frere!) reported no income at all from self-employed activities; the median income 
from self-employment for households in the Cape Town study reporting some 
income was R200 per month.  The survey also highlights the vulnerability of 
employment: 32% of households in the Cape Town study, and 27% in Mount Frere, 
were reported to have suffered the loss of income by a breadwinner in the previous 
year. 
 
Table 3: Reliance on bought maize meal by households in Mount Frere (Source: 2002 CPRC 
survey) 
  





1 month per year 1.5 1.5 
2 months per year 0.4 1.9 
3-5 months per year 2.6 4.5 
6-8 months per year 5.2 9.7 
9-11 months per year 3.1 12.8 
All year round 87.0 99.9 
‘not applicable’ 0.1 100.0 
Total 100.0  
 
 
The survey also highlighted the central role of social grants and cash transfers in 
the local economies of these areas.  The data reflect the greater reliance of 
households in the remote Eastern Cape on grant income (see table below) as well 
as the significant contribution made by grants to the income stream of grant 
receiving households.  The survey also highlighted that large numbers of people fall 
outside the net of the social welfare system, with almost three-quarters of people 
reported to have ‘no paid work’ in Mount Frere, and four out of five of such people 
in Cape Town, also being reported as not being in receipt of any social grant. In 
Mount Frere, 28% of households where no adult had paid work also received no 
grant; in Cape Town this figure was 53% - which indicates that individuals without 
paid work and without grant income may be more prevalent in households where 
someone else has an income.   
 








Percentage of households receiving grants 64% 41% 
Mean contribution of grants to income in grant-receiving 
households 
79% 56% 
Proportion of adults reported as having ‘no paid work’ and as 
being in receipt of no social grant  
74% 81% 
 
Finally, the survey also shows differences in the levels of subjective and ‘lived 
poverty’ indicators.  Although the proportion of households reporting experiencing 
food shortages in the previous year were broadly similar, Mount Frere reported 
much greater deprivation in some areas (e.g. drinking water); while respondents in 
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the urban Cape Town study were more likely to report deprivation relating to 
housing and shelter.  
 
 




Interestingly, subjective overall poverty assessments differed less, perhaps because 
such self-assessments often involve a relative, comparative element within 
communities: In both the Cape Town and the Mount Frere study, only 2% of 
households asked to assess their degree of ‘chronic’ poverty, indicated that they 
‘always’ had enough; a further 5% in Cape Town (and 3% in Mount Frere) said that 
they ‘mostly’ had enough. Some 17% of Cape Town households (and 13% in Mount 
Frere) said they were ‘often’ poor; 12% in Cape Town (8% in Mount Frere) said that 
they never had enough or were ‘always poor; while 4 % in Cape Town (3% in Mount 
Frere) said they were ‘dying’ of poverty.  
 
This section has provided a brief overview of some of the main quantitative 
outlines of monetary poverty and deprivation in Mount Frere and in Cape Town’s 
African townships.  For most of the rest of the report, we will be exploring in more 






Percentage of households reporting going hungry in previous 
year 
83% 80% 
Households with food expenditure more than 40% 93% 94% 
Households reported as ‘often’ experiencing:   
Going without sufficient food 23% 31% 
Going without medical care 16% 12% 
Going without clean drinking water 40% 9% 
Going without sufficient fuel for heating or cooking 5% 20% 
Going without sufficient shelter 13% 38% 
Feeling unsafe due to crime 2% 9% 





4 LIVING IN THE MIGRANT SYSTEM: AN OVERVIEW 
4.1 Introduction: a poor urban household 
 
 
Learning from and presenting the findings of qualitative research as opposed to 
quantitative poses distinct challenges.  This is partly because the strength of 
qualitative research lies in its ability to highlight the complexity of interactions and 
the diversity of their range of variation.  A challenge of qualitative research lies in 
the fact that each case — each individual, household or event — is unique, and 
presents a never-to-be repeated constellation of particular circumstances and 
distinctive features; while at the same time each case can be seen to be 
illustrating patterns, truths, and processes which are broadly shared. This 
complexity can be summarised in heuristic models: frameworks that highlight some 
of the key relationships and processes at stake.  But eventually it can only be fully 
grasped by a careful exploration of the key themes, similarities and divergences 
that emerge in the full range of case studies. 
 
The pages that follow seek to strike a balance between, on the one hand, 
highlighting the complexity, diversity and uniqueness of the cases that the research 
explored and, on the other hand, stepping back to highlight broader similarities 
and themes as they occur.  This report thus deals with the case study material in 
two ways. In the first place, it simplifies the complexity of the case study material 
by clustering case studies and developing a typology of strategic livelihood 
configurations.  This will focus attention on some of the broader patterns that are 
seen to be emerging.  Secondly, particular case studies and events are used as 
examples illustrating our arguments.  Sometimes such illustrations will be cursory 
and brief; and sometimes particular events and stories will be highlighted in more 
detail. We start, however, with a relatively detailed picture of one household – the 
story of one 60 year-old woman in a shack in Site C, Khayelitsha.  With this 
introductory case study description, we will be doing three things.  In the first 
place, this depiction is aimed at highlighting the richness of the detail and the 
density of the information that in-depth qualitative research can reveal.  Secondly 
and partly linked to this, the analysis will show the power of qualitative research to 
‘reveal aspects of people’s lives that would ordinarily disappear in a quantitative 
analysis.  Thirdly, we will explore how this case study, while unique, illustrates 
much that is more generally true for the livelihood situations of all the people 




Case Study 1: One woman’s story - Vuyiswa Magadla, Khayelitsha Site C 
 
Vuyiswa N lives in a tiny shack set well off the road in M*** crescent, in Site C, Khayelitsha. 
Her home would be hard to find for outsiders: to reach her front door, you have to find your 
way between the homes with street frontage and proceed through the narrow alleyways that 
branch between the shacks behind them.  This is a part of Khayelitsha that has been settled for 
almost twenty years; it is densely populated and, to the practiced eye, therefore also highly 
regulated.  Vuyiswa and her neighbours have been living alongside one another for years, and 
not much happens on the street or in the alleyways without someone noticing.  Though the 
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main street is littered with the detritus of poverty – cans, bottles, and plastic canisters leaking 
drained engine oil into the gutter – the alleyways are neat and quiet, and on sunny days 
laundry will be drying on lines strung between shacks and Port Jackson trees. 
  
 
Vuyiswa’s shack is some way along one sandy little alleyway.  It is guarded by a fairly solid 
looking metal gate but this rarely seems tightly closed – not in the daytime, anyway. To enter 
one simply pushes it open with the customary call of ‘nqo nqo nqo!’ (knock knock!) to let the 
residents know you are there.  Rather than sitting in the middle of its plot, the way many 
Khayelitsha shacks do, it appears almost to mimic an Eastern Cape compound, in that there 
seem to be a collection of buildings; these face each other around a tiny central courtyard. 
There is a small structure on the left with a carefully locked door (this belongs to Vuyiswa’s 
elder sister’s daughter, Nolusindiso); directly opposite the gate is the main structure, built of 
ancient wooden beams and rusted corrugated iron.  The little patch of ground between them is 
hilly and uneven, carefully shaped into little hills and dales, and covered in ancient, weathered 
carpet — testimony to Khayelitsha residents’ ceaseless battle against the vagaries of 
stormwater and the ever present sand.  The kitchen is threadbare and damp, the concrete floor 
covered with ancient linoleum; and papier maché-like wrinkled paper covers the walls, 
carefully glued there with flour porridge in the practice called ukuplaga ngamaphepha or 
ukuqaba amaphepha. The place is sparsely furnished: an weathered, plain wood bench stands 
along one wall; another, tiny little stool along another; a table with a paraffin stove, and an 
ancient kitchen dresser with dented but meticulously clean pots and pans.  Through the 
kitchen door one glimpses a dark, empty lounge containing a fireplace which seems unused 
even on cold days. 
 
Vuyiswa is a diminutive, wizened woman with what appear to be cataracts in her eyes.  She 
moves slowly and initially appears guarded and reserved; as time passes what strikes the 
visitor is that this reserved manner does not seem to flow from timidity but from a carefully 
cultivated comportment.  Though poor, Vuyiswa has what in Xhosa is known as isidima 
(dignity) and this is evident both in her careful, traditional dress and in her almost courtly 
Figure 3: Vuyiswa and Thandiwe 
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insistence on formalities.  On most winter days one will find Vuyiswa and some of her kin 
sitting in the sun outside her house, escaping from the cold and damp inside; in the time of the 
research, she would usually be tending to Thandiwe, Nolusindiso’s child, at this time less than 
a year old.  
 
The household is composed of Vuyiswa, a widow, aged 60; her elder sister Nombeko’s 37-
year old daughter – also widowed -  Nolusindiso, who works as a domestic worker in 
Constantia; Nolusindiso’s infant daughter Thandiwe, and Vuyiswa’s grandchild Noluntu, 
aged 20.  Alongside this core of residents, there is also a shifting cast of other visitors – in fact 
there is so much flux and fluidity in the household that the researchers tended sometimes to be 
confused. One person, for example who had been listed as a permanent household member at 
the time of the 2002 survey was Vuyiswa’s elder sister (and Nolusindiso’s mother) 
Thembheka.  Though Thembeka regularly visited Vuyiswa’s house for extended period 
(partly because, as she told the research team, the Cape Town doctors were stronger than their 
counterparts in the Eastern Cape), her real home - and the place where she collected her 
pension - is in fact in Krancolo in the Eastern Cape, where she (nominally) takes care of 
Nolusindiso’s other children, Zandile (13) and Sipho (6) —  nominally, because in actual fact 
it appears to be Zandile who looks after her brother Sipho and her grandmother.  In addition 
to her pension Zandile’s father (whom Nolusindiso never married) pays R300 maintenance on 
Nolusindiso’s behalf to Thembeka; this helps her take care of the children.   
 
Also in the Eastern Cape were Vuyiswa’s daughter (and Noluntu’s mother) Nomsa, who as it 
happened had also recently become a widow, and was living in Qumbu along with her other 
daughters Lindiwe and Thandiwe; at the time that the team visited, Nomsa’s son Welile was 
also living in the Eastern Cape, schooling there and only visiting his mother during the 
holidays.  Later in the year Lindiwe and Thandiwe, in turn, visited the shack in M*** street 
for their holidays – and were very helpful in piecing together aspects of the household’s 
Eastern Cape network (see map below). 
 
Vuyiswa herself had come to Cape Town in 1979, shortly after the death of her husband. 
Initially she stayed in the house of her brother, Madoda Simani and for a while survived doing 
domestic work in Cape Town’s coloured suburbs.  This was a time of hardship – she seemed 
to suffer from her employers’ racism (in her daughter’s words, they were ‘very Apartheid’); 
the job also involved lots of ironing and her lower back hurt. She lost that job after an 
extended visit to the Eastern Cape, and subsequently found employment as a domestic worker 
in Newlands. At some point in this period – she is not clear about dates – she moved into her 
present shack in Site C. In 1989 she broke her leg after a fall down stairs, was unable to do 
her work, and was replaced. For a while she sold ‘smilies’ (cooked sheeps’ heads), which was 
very hard and difficult work.
7
 After a while she switched to selling fruit and vegetables: her 
brother Madoda gave her the R100 with which she started the business.  She says the money 
was not a loan but a gift given in gratitude for all the times many years ago that she had 
helped him, buying him shoes when he had no money, and paying a village tax on his behalf.  
 
In about 2000 (her recall of dates is uncertain) she also got diabetes and was awarded a 
disability grant.  Ever since then she has been living in her shack with her sister’s daughter 
Nolusindiso, using her disability grant to supplement Nolusindiso’s income – and also using it 
to help keep her business going.  She would use R300 or R400 of her grant to buy fresh 
vegetables from a place in Nyanga East – even though it was quite far, she preferred to buy 
there rather than from Mabhela’s wholesale closer by, whose stuff was as cheap but not as 
fresh. Fortunately for her the taxi driver would not charge her extra for the box of vegetables 
she carried on her lap. She could not sell the fruit and veg from her own place, which was 
situated off the road, so she would use her brother Madoda’s house. One of the advantages of 
the fruit and veg business was that it was not too demanding on her injured leg, and she could 
                                         
7 For a description of the unpleasant and hard work involved in making smilies, see p.98.   
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do the work sitting down. She also says that though she has trouble seeing, she can see well 
enough to count the change. She did well out of the fruit and veg business, reporting that she 
made more money than the white family in Newlands had paid her.  She also helps out her 
brother’s wife, Nombula, with the dressmaking business she ran from a stall near Site C 
terminus. Madoda moved to the Eastern Cape some time ago, and whenever Nombula leaves 
to spend some time with her husband, Vuyiswa helps mind the business. 
 
Another important source of income are Nolusindiso’s wages as a domestic worker. 
Nolusindiso never married, and had initially only planned to visit Cape Town for a short 
while (her daughter Zandile had been ill and she had come to see the Cape Town doctors, 
apparently sharing her mother’s prejudices against Eastern Cape medics).  She, too, stayed 
with extended family (in this case, another sister of Vuyiswa’s called Sinomvuyo, who had 
died the year before the study.  She had better luck with employment than Vuyiswa and soon 
found work as a domestic worker in wealthy, white Constantia. At the time of the research 
project, she was bringing home in the region of R1200 per month.  
 
At the time of the research team’s visit, Vuyiswa had given up her fruit and veg business.  She 
explains that this is partly as a result of the birth of Thandiwe.  In the first place, Thandiwe 
put more pressure on the household income, so that according to her there would often not be 
extra money left to buy fruit and vegetables for selling.  Secondly, caring for Thandiwe, while 
Nolusindiso worked as a domestic worker was also more demanding in terms of time.  
Thirdly, it also seems that it was at this time that her daughter Nomsa’s husband died, and at 
the time of research Vuyiswa was managing to save (she said) between R300 and R400 a 
month from her disability grant towards her Nomsa’s izila (coming out of mourning) 
ceremony.  Nolusindiso was covering the bulk of domestic expenses (what Vuyiswa calls the 
‘big things’), buying groceries from the Somalian run shop down the road while Vuyiswa 
contributed by taking care of Thandiwe and covering the ‘small things’ – beef stock, soup, 
extra paraffin, and train tickets for her granddaughter Noluntu, who is schooling in Langa. 
When Amandhla is big enough Vuyiswa hopes to return to selling fruit and vegetables from 
Madoda’s home.  She said that she plans to keep the business small, since if it gets too big, it 
will attract the attention of the tsotsis. 
 
Crucial to Vuyiswa and Nolusindiso’s survival is their connection to a broader social network.  
Some of this network is relatively easy to identify: her shack is visited by a steady trickle of 
visitors, most of them family.  Her brother’s sister in law (in other words, Nombula’s sister) 
Unathi is a particularly regular visitor. Often these visits are only the occasion for 
conversation and gossip, but a social map of Vuyiswa’s household and the households it 
depends on reveals that these familial links are also the conduits of significant other resources 
(see map below). A look at the network formed by these lines reveals something important: 
that Vuyiswa’s household, though in one sense  a relatively independent unit, is also part of a 
number of households all connected through lines of kinship and alliance to that of her 
brother, Madoda Simani.  
 
Although Madoda is currently living in the Eastern Cape, tending to his cattle and his 
compound, he plays a central role in the organisation of this larger network (as Nolusindiso 
explains, he is the only man, so he is supposed to look after them all: the women in his own 
family as well as the women in his wife’s family).  Madoda is a formidable but rather 
shadowy figure, and much about his past was not uncovered by the research team; partly 
because key moments in his history are passed over in silence by his relatives.  It is fairly 
clear that he spent a while working on the mines in the 1970s before being injured in an 
accident that cost him his toes on one foot.  After spending some time in the Eastern Cape 
recovering he migrated to Cape Town and found work in a cement factory.  It may be that he 
spent some time in prison - when the team visited him in the Eastern Cape his arms bore the 
tattoos typical of Cape Town’s ‘numbers’ gangs: this, and the tough, streetwise hauteur with 
which he received the team, seemed to suggest to the translators that he had spent at least part 
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of his life as a ‘tsotsi’ (gangster).  But none of this is mentioned in the descriptions of him by 
his wife Nolusapho or his sister, who both paint him as a paragon of respectability and virtue.   
 
Certainly it is clear that his shack in Site B played a key role as an urban ‘beach-head’ for kin, 
clan members and other villagers seeking to migrate; according to his wife there were at one 
stage 14 different people all living in the tiny property.  It is also clear that his injury did not 
cripple the household financially.  A key role was here played by Nombula and her sisters, 
who had started their own dressmaking business.  It is this dressmaking business that is 
credited for the fact that when Madoda’s shack burned down in 1998, the household was able 
to recover relatively quickly.   
 
Dressmaking is not the only activity in Madoda’s Cape Town household.  His eldest son was 
also in the process of establishing himself in business: among other things he was the owner 
of a prominent container-based business perched on the side of T*** crescent road not far 
from Vuyiswa’s home – a blue container prominently signposted as S*** Internet Café. (The 
team had in fact already noticed this structure and visited it (see Figure 4), wanting to see who 
was making use of internet services in impoverished Khayelitsha. The business’s name had 
proved to be rather misleading, though; as the impeccably dressed young men who were 
employed to run it explained, it once did have an internet connection but this proved to lose 
money – the dialup connection was too expensive and there were too few customers. Though 
the business kept its 21
st
 century name, it now sold hair extensions and shampoo.)   Another 
important connection – about which Vuyiswa did not reveal much until well into the research 
process, is her relationship with Andile Mathole, her boyfriend (or ‘steak and kidney pie’ as 
her sister’s daughter termed it), a grizzled shebeen owner who lives down the road from her, 




Figure 4: Vuyiswa's nephew's failed foray into the information age: an internet shop that now 
sells hair products.  





Without these connections, Vuyiswa’s household would be a lot worse off.  It is clear that 
they are substantially cushioned, and their poverty is significantly reduced, by the fact that 
they are part of this spatially extended and tightly knit network of kin.  But at the same time, 
one should not make the mistake of seeing these relationships only as harmonious. In some 
ways, Vuyiswa’s position should be seen as relatively precarious.   
 
The situation described here is the outcome of a long and complex ‘back story’ relating to 
Vuyiswa’s life before she came to Cape Town.  She did not share much of this story with the 
team, but it is known that the death of her husband in 1983 was a major blow.  She was still a 
young woman at the time of his death. By marrying him, she had in effect abandoned her 
family and had no real claim on their support; as his widow she was expected to continue 
living in his compound and raise his children. It appears that her relationships with his family 
went sour, and that there was a sustained campaign of attrition against  her on the part of a 
‘jealous’ aunt which steadily made her life more and more impossible.  A key role was played 
through her friendship with Nombula, her brother’s wife, and Nombula’s sister Unathi, who 
interceded on her behalf with Madoda and entreated him to take her back in the family fold.  
There is no strong cultural obligation for an elder brother to receive back into the family a 





Figure 5: A map of some of the people in Vuyiswa's social network 
  
 




Similarly, though there clearly is a strongly co-operative element to the domestic 
arrangements in Vuyiswa’s household, there are also limits to what is shared.  The threadbare 
interior of Vuyisewa’s house contrasts sharply with what is behind Nolusindo’s carefully 
locked door.  Her tiny room contains a new, glossy, fake pine veneer wall unit displaying hi fi 
and small television, all new; as well as a sturdy bed with a brightly coloured modern duvet.  
Vuyiswa does have access to the room, and is allowed to watch TV or listen to the radio (as 
long as she does not touch Nolusindiso’s cosmetics!)… but even so it is clear that 
Nolusindiso’s contribution to the household is limited to the groceries and daily running costs, 
and that Vuyiswa is not able to use the income to accumulate household durables for her 
rooms. In fact, Nolusindiso confessed to the team that she would much rather stay on her 
own. She can’t buy any more things because her little shack is too small, and convenient as 
Vuyiswa’s child care is, Thandiwe will soon be old enough to be sent to a crèche.  The most 
important reason why she has not moved out, it appears, is that were she to do so, she would 
have to be located in Enkanini or Kuyasa, the most far-flung settlements in greater 





Figure 6: One house - different worlds: the interiors of  Nolusindiso's room (left) and Vuyiswa's 
(right) 
 
So although Vuyiswa seems to be comfortable in her role as one of the female elders in this 
loosely organised kinship structure, it should be notable that her position is rather fragile. The 
co-operative household arrangements she and her sister’s daughter have come to are limited 
in their scope and to some extent a compromise forced on them by necessity.  During the 
interview process, Vuyiswa hinted that Andile’s children were not happy about her 
connection with him. Were she not to play the role of gracious gogo, dignified but also 
knowing her place; were she to be cantankerous and ‘difficult’, the fragile relationships upon 
which she depends might be strained.  Her dignity seemed to be in part a personal attribute, 
but it is also a socially required role.  It is no coincidence that she was so reluctant to 
revealing the existence of a boyfriend; it seems to flow not only from personal reticence but 
also because a woman with isidima is not expected to have such liaisons; or if she does, not to 
flaunt them.  To the team, Vuyiswa’s graciousness and respectability seemed genuine: it was 
not adopted instrumentally; but at the same time, it seemed clearly to be an expression and a 
corollary of her marginal and vulnerable place as an elderly, partially disabled woman 
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4.2 A household in context: livelihoods in post-apartheid migrant labour 
networks 
 
The previous pages provide a glimpse into some of the details that have been 
collected about one of the households surveyed in 2002.  If one compares the 
picture that emerges here with the basic facts that were collected in the 2002 
survey it is clear that it enables us to understand much more about the real 
livelihood situation barely hinted at in the numbers.  In fact, some interesting 
discrepancies seem to emerge. The survey lists five adult members: in addition to 
Vuyiswa and Nolusindiso, Vuyiswa’s boyfriend seems also to have been included in 
2002 as a household member, as was her Eastern Cape-based sister (who it seems 
likely was then on another long medical visit to Cape Town).  It is important to 
note that this discrepancy is neither the result of Vuyiswa misrepresenting her 
household to the enumerator nor of the enumerator simply making a mistake: even 
though we now know he keeps his own household, Andile could very well fit in with 
the survey definition of a household member;8 and Thembeka and her daughter 
would have been household members if only for the duration of their stay.  Another 
interesting point is that although the number of children recorded in 2002 is the 
same as those encountered in 2005, there has been an almost complete change of 
cast.  Welile (7 years old at the time of the 2005 visit) was indeed recorded as a 4 
year old household member in 2002, but Sipho (now living with Thembeka in the 
Eastern Cape) is also listed as a household member (the child grant due to him is in 
fact listed as part of the household income); and so is Lindiwe (now living with 
Nomsa in the Eastern Cape). Of Noluntu, very much an established household 
member at the time of the 2005 research, there is no mention in the 2002 survey. 
The survey lists the grant income and reflects the wages from Nolusindiso’s 
domestic work, but it lists no other income even though it appears from interviews 
that Vuyiswa was at the time of the survey making more from selling fruit and 
vegetables than she had made as a domestic worker.   
 
There is much to learn methodologically from these differences. Clearly the 
discrepancy in the household description is cause for thought.  The 2002 survey 
makes it hard to distinguish between ‘core’ household members who are 
permanently resident, and those members who are important to the household but 
who may share resources at a less intense level, belonging to a kind of second tier 
(Andile, in this case); or those (like Thembeka) who are not permanently resident 
but who may be temporary household members for an extended period of time.  As 
important is the invisibility of Vuyiswa’s informal economic activity.  In-depth 
interviews with Vuyiswa and her connections (the case study of Vuyiswa’s 
household involved 11 separate in-depth interviews with her and her family 
members and probably as many additional informal visits and house calls) are 
clearly able to allow a much more accurate and nuanced picture – and illustrate 
the complex relationships and nuances of meaning broadly reflected in the data 
the survey records. 
 
But adding colour and detail is one thing, and using this detail to deepen a 
scientific, sociological, systematic understanding of livelihood dynamics is another.  
One important place to begin building this more systematic analysis – one that 
connects particular details with more general trends and patterns – is to highlight 
the extent to which many of these details illustrate more general truths about the 
households surveyed in this research project.  Above all, Vuyiswa’s story has many 
                                         
8
 The 2002 survey defined a household as a group of people who eat together and share resources. It 
did not make co-residency a strict requirement. 
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particular features typical of the livelihoods of poor people living in the context of 
the networks that were created by the Apartheid-era migrant labour system, and 
that have persisted in changed and mutated form, deep into the post-Apartheid 
era.  We move therefore to a discussion of some of these broader patterns – 
patterns and issues that we will be discussing in more detail in the subsequent 
sections. 
4.2.1 Social networks and ‘social capital’ 
 
One important theme in Vuyiswa’s story which is particularly crucial in 
understanding the situations of people living in post-Apartheid migrant networks is 
the important role of reciprocity and social connection.  Although her household is 
in monetary terms quite poor, reciprocal arrangements with neighbours and kin 
allow them a measure of security — helping, for example, to ensure access to food 
when they run short of money — and ease the harshest aspects of their poverty.   
 
These networks of course also involve claims on her and she may be called to make 
quite significant ‘investments’ on her own part – looking, for example, after her 
sister’s daughter’s child, tending her sister-in-laws’ shop when she is in the Eastern 
Cape, and contributing towards her daughter’s ceremony.  These forms of help are 
particularly difficult to quantify, and often are quite invisible to standard income 
and expenditure surveys – yet they make a very real difference to a household’s 
ability to survive at the edges of the formal economy. 
 
This is of course a well-known feature of life among South Africa’s poor.  In recent 
years, ‘social capital’ has become a key buzzword in policymaking in development 
circles – to the extent that in the Western Cape provincial government, 
departments are required to have ‘social capital formation strategies’ (City of Cape 
Town, 2005)   But long before ‘social capital talk’ was popular, scholars had noted 
the importance of social networks, linked to cultural practices and normative 
belief systems around the importance of reciprocity and mutual aid (Spiegel et al 
1994, Spiegel & Mehlwana 1997; see also Sagner 2000).  The anthropological 
literature seems to suggest that these practices are not everywhere as deeply 
embedded: where communities have been affected by displacement and 
fragmentation, people are much less able to rely on social networks to cushion 
shocks and alleviate hardship (Spiegel et al 1994).  In the communities studies for 
this research report however, this was not the case.  The eastern Cape villages that 
constituted the rural context of the research have not been hit hard by 
dispossession and removal; while many of the households visited in Sites B and C in 
Khayelitsha have been settled at their present addresses for ten years or more: 
enough time for dense local social networks and interconnections to come into 
being.  These connections play a vital role in the strategies people develop to 
combat the effects of poverty and vulnerability.   
 
In a later sections we will explore some of these dynamics in greater depth – as 
well as looking critically at the concept of ‘social capital’ itself and how best to 
understand its role in social relationships.  For now, we will simply note that the 
workings of social capital in the Eastern Cape and Khayelitsha are profoundly 
shaped by the very particular social and spatial legacy created by migrancy, and by 
what this legacy means for household structure and kinship relations. 
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4.2.2 ‘Domestic fluidity’, stretched households and circular 
migrancy 
 
Vuyiswa’s story powerfully illustrates some key features that have been remarked 
on in the broader literature — the fluidity, porosity and spatially ‘stretched’ nature 
of African households within the context of post-Apartheid migrant networks (see 
e.g. Ross 1996; Spiegel 1996; Spiegel & Mehlwana 1997; Ngwane 2003; Robins 2002; 
Ross 2003; Russel 2004).  Although the concept of the household is not quite 
meaningless — it is clear that for the purposes of day to day resource sharing, 
Vuyelwa’s household does constitute a coherent and somewhat distinct ‘unit’ — it 
is clearly both fluid and porous: changing in composition over time, and intimately 
and strongly connected to other places and people through the links of kinship and 
alliance.  
 
A comparison between what the qualitative research revealed about household 
structure and composition with the results of the 2002 survey seems to indicate a 
fair amount of flux and change.  Of the 48 households in the 2005 study, only two 
appear not to have changed in membership at all; and in only three of the 
remaining 46 cases are the changes purely due to births and deaths.  Unfortunately 
limitations in the research design do not make it possible to establish definitively 
whether the differences between the members listed in 2002 and those listed in 
2005 for the remaining 43 households are simply the result of measurement errors 
and artefacts (members being omitted and non members being listed).  In the case 
of the ten in-depth case studies it is clear that the differences result both from 
probable measurement artefacts (for example, Vuyiswa’s ‘boyfriend’ being listed 
as a household member in 2002, and being all but invisible in 2005) and from real 
change (Noluntu joining the household, for instance).  In general, the data 
strikingly illustrates the extent to which household composition is subject to 
change, and their porosity – the extent to which the sharing of resources is not 
neatly confined to a stable core or conjugal residents, and their boundaries may be 
ill-defined and shifting. 
 
These issues are closely related to the need to better understand the nature of 
circular migrancy. As a growing body of scholars have argued, research on migrant 
livelihoods challenges the idea that the stretched household systems that evolved 
during the Apartheid era would disappear, and make way for a nuclear Western 
model. This has not happened.  The economic structures that have enabled the 
classic pattern of unaccompanied male circular migration have been undermined; 
but other forms of migration have continued; have become more complex and 
diverse in their configuration and may even have intensified (Lurie et al 1997; 
Posel 2003; Posel & Casale 2003; Collinson et al 2003; Posel Fairburn & Lund 2004; 
Statistics South Africa 2006; for a discussion of some of these patterns in 
Zimbabwe, also see Potts 2000).  
 
As Vuyiswa’s story illustrates, strong links remain with distant locales in the 
Eastern Cape, and for many urban residents, the Eastern Cape, remains in 
important ways the cultural and economic centre of their lives.  This is reflected to 
some extent in the ways in which both people in the rural and the urban contexts 
tended to idealise certain aspects of life in the Eastern Cape, representing it as a 
site of harmonious social relationships and easy living on the land (see Box 1) – a 
depiction belied by their decision to migrate!  But although these representations 
of the Eastern Cape are strictly speaking idealistic, they do convey the extent to 
which many respondents in the PLAAS study, particularly the older ones, continued 
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to experience the urban areas – even 
the African townships – as essentially 
alien, whereas for them the Eastern 
Cape was not simply a regional 
denominator, a province of South 
Africa; it was Emaxhoseni, the land of 
the Xhosa, a place of real belonging.  
 
This is linked to a broader point about 
the central role played by social 
hierarchy and status.  Even among 
quite poor people, decisions about 
how to allocate expenditure do not 
seem simply to be guided by the 
imperatives of material survival.  One 
of the striking features of the social 
worlds revealed by the data both in 
the Eastern Cape and Cape Town is 
the great emphasis on hierarchy, 
status, social form and due process.   
 
The importance of respectability, 
status and isidima (dignity or esteem) 
shape many choices, including the 
massive investment in funeral cover 
and the significant expenditure on 
male initiation (‘buying’ masculine 
personhood) and the importance of 
investing in homesteads and cattle.   
For many informants, their long term 
hopes for economic accumulation took 
a distinctive form: it was about the 
accumulation not simply of wealth as 
such, but of forms of wealth that 
involved very specific and culturally 
shaped values. For them migration to 
the Cape Town was a temporary 
affair, part of a much longer term 
accumulation strategy that saw 
participation in the urban economy as 
a temporary means to the ultimate 
end of investment into the rural 
economy of the Eastern Cape 












 “..it is harder to live in Cape Town than in Emaxhoseni – 
people are suffering more here. In Emaxhoseni people are 
planting and have livestock  - whereas people are unemployed 
and sick in Cape Town.  It is easier for people to help each 
other in the Emaxhoseni than here. The only reason people 
come [to Cape Town] here is because the doctors are stronger 
here.”  (Khumbuza Nkonjane, a lay preacher, Ky 068) 
 
“Cape Town is worth staying in if you can find employment but 
if you are unemployed Emaxhoseni is better because in 
Emaxhoseni you can be buried. It is not just all about money in 
Emaxhoseni. And there are ways of making a living – you can 
maybe transport wood to people with a donkey and sell them 
wood for R20.  Here it is difficult if you are unemployed – a 
whole day can go by and you are not even able to have a 
cigarette.  In Emaxhoseni people know you and they will be 
willing to give you food or share a smoke with you.  Here in 
the Cape people don’t know you, and they don’t help. It is 
also better for children to grow up in Emaxhoseni – here they 
get naughty.  So many children are drinking in the Shebeen at 
a young age, and they don’t want to go to school.  Here they 
want money to go play the jukebox & they want to go 
experience attractive things.” (Vusi Ndzumeka, a shebeen 
owner, Ky 071) 
 
 “In Xilinxa everyone is my family and they all help one 
another” (Phumzile Cekiso, Ky 157) 
 
“The reason why it was better for [her grandchildren] to be in 
Emaxhoseni, even when she was not there to look after them, 
is that life is easier there. Food is easier to get. It is not hard 
to plant the veg there. Here in Cape Town there is no land to 
plant. In  Emaxhoseni they have land to plant…   [In addition]  
people in Cape Town are much ruder than in Emaxhoseni; that 
here it is necessary to be rude. She thinks one of the reasons 
why people are rude in Cape Town is that they are mixing with 
the Coloureds. In any case, when people are being rude they 
use a lot of the words the coloureds use. Perhaps the reason 
why [her daughter] Nosikhumbuza is so sweet is that she grew 
up in Emaxhoseni, not here” (visiting relative, Ky 164) 
 
 
“He says that it is hard to maintain a household in Emaxhoseni 
and in the Western Cape but it is a must.  You cannot close 
your home there.  Your ancestors are there.  So you have to 
open that house. This house here in Cape Town is not a home… 
Emaxhoseni is a much better place than the Western Cape. 
There are many ways to succeed. You can plant tomatoes and 
wheat and so on especially if you have money. When he gets 
his package he plans to start something.  He  wants  to get 
livestock and to have grazing land.  If he could, he would even 
retire and take the pension now. But he has to wait till he is 
60” (Municipal worker, Ky 169) 
 
“When asked about the differences between the city and here, 
G*** said the villages were better even though it is difficult to 
get a piece job, as this is the place where he was born.  He 
reported that it is nice being in the place where one is born” 
(Retrenched worker in Phuzayo, eastern Cape [ref] 
Box 1: Some representations of life in the Eastern Cape 





Case Study 2:  Going hungry to build the homestead - Nontuthuzelo Mbada, Site 
B, Khayelitsha 
 
Nontuthuzelo Mbada is a woman in her early thirties who, unlike many of her contemporaries 
in Khayelitsha still wears the German print skirt and headcloth of the respectable married 
Xhosa matron. In the CPRC 2002 survey, her household is reported to fall into the poorest 
expenditure quintile in Khayelitsha. It is recorded as being composed of Nontuthuzelo, then 
28, her much older husband Xolile Mbada, 39 years old at the time of the survey, and their 
three children Themba (9), Wathabile (7) and Asa (4).  The survey records that only the 
youngest child, Asa, is in receipt of a child grant; though Xolile is listed as having full time 
employment their wage income in the month of the survey was reported to be  only R400, 
bringing their reported income to R530.  They are recorded as reporting food insecurity in the 
previous year, recording two ‘hungry months’; in addition they have very few assets, and are 
recorded to be living in a shack made of wood and plastic.  Interestingly they do not see 
themselves as excessively poor: their subjective poverty assessment says merely that they 
‘sometimes do not have enough.’  
 
Again, the research team’s 2005 visit reveals a very different picture – some of it due to 
change.  The shack is still noticeably threadbare and empty, devoid of the usual 
accoutrements (wall units, lounge suites, electronic consumerware, porcelain dolls and 
gimcracks) that signal that its residents have been able to do more than just survive.  It has 
been upgraded though; not only is it now constructed of corrugated iron rather than plastic, 
but it also has a neat pavement of brickwork in front of it.  There have been some other 
changes – there is a new family member, Sibongile, just three weeks old, and Asa has lost her 
grant – Nontuthuzelo and Asa having spent more than three months visiting their homestead 
in the Eastern Cape in the previous year, as a result of which it was forfeited.  Further light on 
the 2002 survey is cast by the revelation that Xolile works for a company that constructs 
swimming pools (hence the neat brickwork paving in front of the shack).  Although he is 
technically employed year round, inclement weather during the winter can sometimes mean 
that weeks go by without him earning any money: clearly the 2002 visit caught them at one of 
these poorer times.  In a good month, she says Xolile can bring in R1600.  
 
Nontuthuzelo’s life history reveals the broader temporal and strategic landscape of which 
their Cape Town household is but a part.  She is from a village near Cofimvaba, where she 
lived until she was 17, at which age she was married off to Xolile, who is from a village near 
hers. Although the families know each other she never knew him, she says: his parents and 
hers got together in 1991, she was asked to go to another house while they talked; it was 
decided that she should marry him, and she was taken off to Cape Town (it was not nice, she 
says, but with time she got used to it, and even got to like Xolile).  
 
In some ways, in fact, Nontuthuzelo hardly seems to inhabit Cape Town.  She spends 
extended periods at Xolile’s compound in his village, going back there not only in December 
but also throughout the year:  in the previous year, in fact, she spent the entire year there.  
When she can’t be there, they lock the place and get Xolile’s brother to look after it, and after 
Xolile’s cattle.  
 
Nontuthuzelo says she prefers to stay in the Eastern Cape. Whereas in Cape Town, one gets 
lazy because there is nothing to do except to stay around the house, there are many things to 
do at their place in the Eastern Cape. They are building their own house there – a ‘four room’ 
and a ‘rondawel.’  When she is there, she makes the mud bricks and they employ a builder; 
but sometimes they also employ other people to make mud bricks for them, paying R100 for 
100 bricks. They have spent a lot on that house, putting cement both inside and out; they have 
Section 4: Migrant livelihoods – an outline  44 
 
 
not yet put in furniture but will do so soon, depending on the money.  So there is a lot of work 
to do in the Eastern Cape, whereas in Cape Town there is nothing to do but to sit in the sun. 
She prefers to work. Another reason why Nontuthuzelo prefers the Eastern Cape is that she 
says she has more status there. They have grazing land and a garden plot, and they have cattle, 
and she gets on well with her family.   
 
In contrast, her existence in Khayelitsha is circumscribed. She says she has never been outside 
Khayelitsha, and has hardly ventured even outside Site B.  She gets on well with her 
neighbours chatting with them and lending or borrowing small items of food, but she does not 
have any important friends here.   
 
Interestingly – even though she depicts them as making significant investments in their rural 
homestead – Nontuthuzelo also says that Xolile’s salary is barely enough for them to eat on; 
and that she can see the ‘gap’ caused by the fact that she is not receiving any child grant. The 
children do not have socks, and they do not have underclothes.  The reason she has not yet 
applied for the grant to be renewed – and for a grant for her three-week old newborn – is that 
the application procedure is so onerous.  The social workers say you must bring this 
document, and when you go to bring it to them, they say the other document has expired.  
They just complicate things, she says: they are not nice, they are rude; as she puts it, they 
make you feel you resent the grant.  So she does not like to go and apply for a grant.  
 
Although Nontuthuzelo presents herself as the dutiful Xhosa wife, devoting all her energy to 
building her husband’s homestead and looking after his children, it seems that this is not the 
whole picture.  Towards the end of the interview she told the team that she feels that she is 
struggling:  that life has grown harder as she has grown older. She has thought about starting a 
small business of her own but she does not know what she will do. If she could find work in 
Cape Town, she would not even consider going back to the Eastern Cape.  She might find 
work as a domestic worker. She would do domestic work for either white or black people. 
 
 
The story of Nontuthuzelo Mbada highlights a number of key issues that we will 
return to later in this report. In the first place, it powerfully illustrates a very 
particular long term strategy — that of ‘building the homestead’ (McAllister 2001), 
investing significant amounts of money not in an urban property but in a distant 
rural one, and limiting consumption expenditure in Cape Town. It shows the very 
high rates of saving and investment back that can be found even in households 
without very much spare income — to the extent that they have reported going 
hungry, and Nontuthuzelo admits not being able properly to clothe the children. It 
highlights some of the reasons why this strategy might make sense in the long run; 
representing as it does an investment in rural respectability, status and isidima 
that would elude Nontuthuzelo and Xolile in Cape Town.  And it also highlights 
some of the costs of this strategy, in the hints that Nontuthuzelo’s accommodation 
to the role of respectful Xhosa wife may not be that easy, and highlighting the 
costs (for example, in the lost child grant, and the loss of her own personal hopes 
and dreams) of her massive investment in her husband’s long term economic 
project. 
 
Even households that were not actively building or remitting still spent huge 
amounts on maintaining urban-rural connections, spending what must be a 
significant amount on travel and communications (see, e.g. Skuse & Cousins 2007). 
As this report shall show, rural connections often function to help urban workers 
absorb shocks, and rural kin often play a significant child care role. It should 
however be remembered that the path of circular migration is one that is not true 
for everyone.  It is a thoroughly generational phenomenon (Spiegel, 1996; James, 
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2001). There are many who do not intend to return to the rural areas, and in the 
rural areas, there are many who never leave.  
 
The result is a spatial configuration of livelihoods that cannot be captured in terms 
of any idea of unidirectional flow.  Even the notion of circular migration 
oversimplifies things somewhat. What is important to note is that while at the 
level of the individual, a wide range of different migration paths are possible, at 
the supra household level migration has created an elaborate network of 
connections that link individuals and households together across vast distances. 
This has important implications for understanding how livelihood strategies develop 
in this context and is often something not taken into account by economic 
modelling that assumes that decisions are taken by stable, self contained 
households.  Households should not be seen as atomized, practically independent 
units.  Even the notion of households as ‘fluid’ or ‘stretched’ does not quite 
capture it.  Du Toit, Skuse and Cousins (2006) have proposed that households in this 
context should be conceptualised as existing within a ‘rhizomic’ structure – in other 
words a network that, like a rhizome, does not one have one central tap-root or 
centre but which, over time, takes on a multi-nodal, multi-centred aspect: in just 
this way, migrant connections work to create a system of interconnected outposts 
of which both the urban and the rural aspects play very different, but equally 
important roles.   To a very large extent understanding the choices of individuals 
and households requires that we grasp that they form part of livelihood strategies 
that involve investments, exchanges, and distributions of resources, people and 
risks within such larger spatially extended networks.   
 
In the first place, the notion that a household can tightly be defined simply in 
terms of the people who are ordinarily resident needs to make space for the 
recognition that households can have non-resident members (Posel Fairburn & Lund 
2004).  Secondly, beyond the obvious case of remittances, linkages between 
households can involve a significant transfer of other resources such as household 
durables, gifts, loans and exchanges – and also human capital.  As Vuyiswa’s story 
indicates, there is a significant traffic in people and human bodies between the 
Eastern Cape and the metropolitan areas.  Children are sent from the urban to the 
rural areas to be cared for by family members; or similarly, they are sent to stay 
with city relatives, often for purposes of schooling; and part of the very significant 
impact these exchanges may have on the domestic economy of ‘sending’ or 
‘receiving’ households is the  fact that children (particularly female children) from 
a relatively early age are also units of instrumental value, playing an important 
role in household reproductive activities and care work.    
 
One person’s story shows how a life of migrancy helps create spatial networks that 
become a strategic resource in their own right. 
 
 
Case Study 3: A ‘spatially distributed’ cottage industry: Phumzile Cekiso’s 
dressmaking business, Site B Khayelitsha 
 
Phumzile Cekiso is one of the better-off individuals in the sample of households selected for 
study in Cape Town’s African suburbs, reporting a monthly income of almost R4000 in 2002.  
Originally from a small village near Inqamakwe, he worked as a machine operator in a coal 
mine near Witbank until 1987 when he and his colleagues ‘toyi-toyied’ for more money and 
he was fired and sent back to the Eastern Cape. He did not stay there long: he says it was not 
easy being in the Eastern Cape after spending time in Johannesburg – your mind is broader 
and you ‘see things.’  He decided he was a businessman, and he realised that there were more 
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people in Cape Town than in his village; in the Eastern Cape you are selling to pensioners and 
the pension money does not come quickly.  So he moved to Cape Town.  Initially he worked 
as a security guard but the money was poor so he left. For a while thereafter he had a small 
business selling women’s things – earrings, lotions and shoes. (Selling women’s stuff makes 
better business sense, he explains: men do not want to pay, and when they buy shoes they buy 
only one pair, while women will always buy fashion shoes). After three months he found 
work in a plastics factory, where he has been working ever since.  Recently the factory has 
been making workers redundant, and he is in fact working on half time, which is difficult: 
although the subtractions from his wage slip are the same, the salary has halved, so his wage 
income has really diminished.   
 
To make ends meet, Phumzile is selling dresses: he makes the traditional German-print 
dresses.  He knows how to sew – his sister taught him how to do it in Johannesburg.  She 
never went to school: she taught herself how to sew; and then she taught him. As far as he is 
concerned, sewing is not a woman’s job. He has noticed that other men see him sewing and 
also want to learn – the only time a man tells you sewing is a woman’s work is when he is 
drunk.   
 
Initially in the interview, Phumzile is reticent about the dressmaking, and indeed is a lethargic 
interview subject, lounging in his easy chair and answering questions in a languid manner.  
He emphasizes how little money he has and what a big blow the half-time work is to him; and 
he merely says that he does some sewing when he gets a chance.  At the same time it is clear 
that he does not experience himself as poor, and that, like Nontuthuzelo’s husband in the case 
study above, he and his family are investing significant amounts of money in building their 
Eastern Cape homestead – paying people to make bricks (he has instructed a builder to build a 
beautiful house there), and planning to increase his herds (he has 10 sheep already, and says 
he wants to get lots of livestock).   As he speaks about these plans, he becomes visibly more 
animated, gesturing intensely as he describes how his dressmaking business works – a 
business which relies implicitly on the spatial connections created through migrancy. 
 
At the moment his wife Babalwa and several of his children are in the Eastern Cape looking 
after the property.  It is she who is maintaining the homestead and supervising the building 
there.  So essential is her presence there that when she comes to visit Cape Town, she and her  
Cape Town based daughter ‘swop’ places, with the daughter travelling to the Eastern Cape so 
that her mother can visit town.  She also plays an important role in the dressmaking business.  
Babalwa collects orders from women who want dresses. They have to give half the money as 
a deposit.  She puts the money in their joint bank account.  He uses the money to buy material 
in Cape Town and spends his evening sewing.  He will cut the dresses one evening, and then 
start sewing them the next.  He estimates that when there is lots of demand he can make 15 
dresses a week. Then he posts them back to Babalwa, who sells them to her customers at 
R180 per dress.  He says he wishes the factory would make up their minds about retrenching 
him.  If they retrenched him, he would use the package to get a business going – he is 
thinking of getting a large paraffin tank and selling paraffin, and he will be able to devote 
more time to his dressmaking. 
 
 
In a very important sense, Phumzile Cekiso’s household (and that of Madoda 
Simani’s in Vuyiswa’s story, who employed a very similar strategy) is not so much a 
‘stretched’ as a ‘distributed’ one – a fairly tightly integrated network in which both 
the Cape Town and the Eastern Cape nodes play a vital economic role, and which 
allows him to exploit a strategic advantage at each end (buying cheap material in 
Cape Town, and selling it in the Eastern Cape). It is not only multinational and 
global corporations, it appears, who can advantageously deploy their economic 
activities in a larger distributed framework – Phumzile B and his family members 
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are able to use the rural urban spatial connections they have created to create a 
business that depends for its success partially on its ability to exploit space and 
distance. 
 
An important point to note here is that the flows are not simply unidirectional.  In 
some fascinating cases, the team also found instances where households deep in 




Case Study 4: Kwanele Ngubane: using savings to support urban relatives 
 
Fifty five year old Kwanele Ngubane, who was recently retrenched from good formal sector 
employment, supports 13 dependents.  These dependents include his wife, two of his adult 
brothers, five children and a grandchild at his rural Transkei homestead, along with four 
children away from home in urban centres.   
 
The four children away from home are geographically dispersed across the regional centre of 
Mthatha and Gauteng.  Of his offspring away from home two sons are currently in matric: one 
at a former religious order school in Mtatha, the other is at school in Sebokeng. The son in 
Sebokeng lives in a hostel and originally joined Kwanele there when Kwanele was still 
employed and resident in Sebokeng   A third son, also resident in Sebokeng, has recently 
completed his N6 certificate in ‘mechanics’ (they were unsure precisely what the qualification 
was, but said it was comparable to the old ‘fitter and turner’ qualification) at Vaal Technikon 
and is seeking employment.  To improve his employability he has further completed a code 
10 driver’s license.  The final and fourth son is at ‘Pretoria Technikon’ (Tswane University of 
Technology).  He was supposed to finish his four year long qualification last year, but failed a 
subject and currently repeating it.  With only a standard 6 level education themselves, his 
parents were unclear on his precise field of study, although they though it might be marketing 
or commerce related.   
 
Living in the rural Transkei, engaging in agricultural production and living the fixed income 
of a retrenchment package Kwanele makes the following remittances to his sons every month.  
He sends R650 to the son in Pretoria, R550 to the two sons in Sebokeng and R450 to the son 
in Mthatha: a total of R1650.  However this amount represents the minimum amount for 
subsistence, which sometimes needs to be augmented for specific expenses.  For instance 
Kwanele, sitting in his homestead in the deep rural Transkei, was utterly incredulous at the 
cost of the textbooks required by his son in Pretoria. One book cost almost R500, ‘net een 
boek!’ (‘only one book’) he emphasised in Afrikaans.  When asked why his children were 
schooling in such disparate locations (the children in Sebokeng and Mthatha are both doing 
matric, for instance), Kwanele and his wife explained that the son in Sebokeng was unable to 
enroll in Mthatha.  They also explained, in a somewhat bemused and tolerant way, that the 
children can always find many good reasons why they ought to go to a particular school or 
tertiary education institution.  Kwanele explained that at Christmas time, when the whole 
family gathers together in the village, there is often a bantering competitiveness about who is 
going to the better institution.   
 
Finally, when asked about how optimistic they were that their children would find good 
formal sector jobs (thereby justifying the substantial expenditure in education) in light of the 
fact that their son with a N6 is sitting unemployed.  Kwanele and his wife said they remained 
optimistic.  One can’t find a good job nowadays without a good education, they explain. 
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4.2.3 Informal economic activity 
 
The second way in which Vuyiswa’s story illustrates broader themes is in the 
significant and complex role played by informal economic activity.  This is a crucial 
aspect of livelihoods among the households in the study.  In some households – as in 
the case of Vuyiswa, informal economic activity plays a supplementary role: one 
component of a picture of which a formal or quasi-formal job (such as Nolusindiso’s 
domestic work) or a social grant can be the other components. The nature and role 
of informal economic activity will be discussed in much more detail later in this 
report. Here, we will only note three key points: the informal economic activity is 
ubiquitous; that it is elusive; and that it is marginal and fragile. 
 
In fact, the study seemed to indicate that informal economic activity may be more 
prevalent than surveys often suggest.  According to the 2002 survey, only 4.7% of 
adults in the urban sample and  4.1% of the rural sample listed themselves as self-
employed (among the subset of households drawn for qualitative investigation 
those proportions were roughly the same: 4 of the 76 urban adults and 5 of the 89 
rural adults reported self employment.  In the rural sample only 7%  of the 
households (and only one of the households drawn for the qualitative investigation) 
reported income from non-agriculture informal economic activities; in the Cape 
town sample income from self-employment was reported by 16% of households (and 
by four of the households subsequently drawn for qualitative investigation).  
 
The 2005 research phase showed a very different picture. Qualitative interviews 
indicated that 29 of the 49 households for which we have data were involved in 
some form of informal economic activity (admittedly in some cases quite 
marginal). Of the 10 Eastern Cape households that did not report informal 
economic activity, seven devoted energy to informal ‘subsistence’ agriculture.  
Two households that did not report any informal economic activity seemed to be 
devoting all their energy to seeking work; in two more cases the research team 
noted that the informants seemed reticent and disinclined to disclose economic 
activities. 
 
Some of the differences between the 2002 survey and the 2005 interviews may be 
due to changes over time; though in many cases the informal activities listed by 
informants were said to have been in place in 2002 as well.  Further differences 
may be due to inappropriate phrasing of questions in the 2002 survey – not 
everyone who is involved in informal economic activity may consider themselves to 
be ‘self employed’ (Adato, Lund & Mhlongo  2004).  But in most cases households 
that plainly had been dependent on informal economic activity for a significant 
part of their livelihoods were recorded as having ‘no paid work’ and also did not 
report any income from other activities.   
 
This raises an important methodological point. One of the strengths of qualitative 
research is that it may bring to light aspects of social and economic existence that 
may elude survey research. This is partly because qualitative research methodology 
places much greater emphasis on the flexibility and inquisitiveness of the 
researcher, who is enjoined not merely to work through a predefined list of 
questions and mechanically record the responses, but to prompt and probe, to 
notice and follow leads.  In addition, the development of greater trust and rapport 
between researchers and informants in the course of a number of visits may lead to 
informants ‘lifting the veil’ on aspects of their livelihood activities previously not 
revealed. The following four case studies illustrate the complexity of ‘what is 
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revealed’ in the research encounter and some of the challenges of engaging with 




Case Study 5: Supplementing the pension: Mamzoli Mashiye, Phuzayo, Eastern 
Cape 
 
The 2002 PLAAS survey’s account of Mamzoli Mashiye’s household survey paints a picture 
of a very poor household scraping by in the poorest income quintile of the Mount Frere 
sample. Mrs Mashiye reports that she does ‘no paid work;’ the survey records that no-one is 
self employed even on a part time basis, and indeed a month by month recall question of 
income over the past year lists no income other than her pension and R200 worth of wage 
income in the previous month (this in fact is likely to have been a remittance contributed by 
her son Simpiwe – see below).  There are some indications that although Mamzoli is 
monetarily poor, she has been able to invest in some household durables and assets: the 
household is listed as owning a refrigerator and has a moderate endowment of livestock 
(seven goats, 19 chickens, two geese and one pig). 
 
This picture becomes more complex when one visits Mamzoli in her large compound situated 
on a steep slope above the road through Phuzayo.  She receives visitors in a ‘flat’ (a 
rectangular structure) with a corrugated iron roof, and interviews take place on modern chairs 
at a kitchen table neatly covered with a table cloth advertising an exotic liquor product.  There 
is also a large, comfortable and clean wood-and-red-velour lounge suite. The refrigerator 
listed in the 2002 survey turns out to be a large gas powered fridge freezer, with a number of 
9 kg LPG gas bottles lined up along the wall next to it.  All these material artefacts are 
indications that Mamzoli is not among the very poorest of the poor.  
 
Interviews reveal that Mamzoli relies greatly on her adult children, some of whom have work 
in the urban areas: in particular her son Simpiwe, who is a bakery manager in a nearby town, 
sends her about R400 per month (his story is told on p. 145 below).  She also indicates that 
she sells meat. She was struggling to survive with her many grandchildren, and Simpiwe 
bought her the large gas powered deep freezer so that she could go into the meat selling 
business.  It is therefore clear that she had already been involved in selling meat at the time of 
the 2002 survey.  She reports making about R500 profit from the meat per month; this money 
mainly goes to support the children’s schooling.  
 
The interview process also reveals other things.  When the team visits Mamzoli the second 
time, they notice a number of beer crates piled next to the house, several of which contained 
empty, refundable quart bottles.  During the interview an elderly man silently enters the 
house, seats himself on the lounge suite, and is handed a cold bottle of beer which he 
wordlessly sips during the course of the interview.  Only when Mamzoli is jokingly asked 
whether she provides beers for her guests for free does she reveal that, yes, indeed, she does 
also sell beers. While she gets the meat from nearby Matatiele, she gets the beers 
(approximately 7 cases a week) from a local bottle store. Her two grandsons, aged 11 and 14, 
are an integral part of the business, buying the beers from a local liquor store and also taking 
care of selling when she is not around. She estimates she makes about R600 from the beer per 
month.  In addition, she stores food for other villagers in her freezer, a considerable favour in 
an unelectrified village.  
 
In–depth interviews thus reveal a picture very different from that reflected in the survey - 
rather than a household reporting no income beyond a single pension, it reveals a household 
held in a web of family relations – and which more than doubles its pension income through 
informal economic activity. (She noted, incidentally, that the pension helped her with her 
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business, allowing her to buy stock; and clearly it made it easier for her to supply credit to her 
customers – which as we will show later, is a key issue). Furthermore, it is clear that Mamzoli 
was involved in these activities at the time of the survey. In part the discrepancies are the 
result of the fact that, rather than implement the survey in a linear way, the team followed up 
and prompted on the basis of a number of clues.  In addition Mamzoli only revealed the extent 
of her informal economic income once some rapport had been established. 
 
 
Case Study 6: The poorest man in Khayelitsha? Khumbuza Nkonjane , Site C, 
Khayelitsha 
 
If the 2002 survey is anything to go by, Khumbuza Nkonjane must be one of the poorest men 
in Khayelitsha.  The survey records a household of some seven adults, none of which has any 
paid work.  In the month in which they had been visited, they reported earning a paltry R362 
of which R12 came from ‘food production’, R100 from a ‘friend’ and R250 from unspecified 
‘other’ sources. Monetarily speaking, income per adult is therefore a little more than R50 a 
month (using expenditure rather than income as a figure oddly delivers an even smaller 
amount).  They reported few assets (although they are, interestingly enough listed as owning a 
radio, a television set, a cellphone and a Telkom line) They describe themselves as ‘often’ 
going without food (every month in the preceding year is reported as a hungry month), and 
their own assessment is that they ‘never have enough’ - that they are ‘very poor’. 
 
Initial impressions confirm this overall picture.  When the team first visits Khubmuza at his 
large and ramshackle and sparsely furnished shack in Khayelitsha Site C on a cold day in 
June, he is a picture of ill-being; lying on a dirty mattress on the cold, slightly damp floor, 
wrapped in a ragged blanket, coughing unhappily.  At the same time it is hard to ignore the 
fact that he is speaking rather testily into a late-model Nokia phone.  The picture that emerges 
in the subsequent interview (in which Khumbuza is joined by his sons and a visiting elderly 
gentleman with a dignified demeanour, impressively polished shoes and an equally new 
cellphone) largely confirms the picture painted in the survey three years before.  He has been 
working and living in Cape Town on and off since 1969, working initially in manufacturing 
and later in retail. His wife and sons joined him in the early 1980s and they moved to 
Khayelitsha in the mid-1980s at the time of the ‘Witdoek’ (political vigilante group) troubles.  
Since then they appear to have been leading an existence divided between Khayelitsha and 
their home in the Eastern Cape (they have a small homestead, with no livestock and fields, but 
with a garden and some chickens), spending half the year in town and half the year at home in 
their village near Cofimvaba. In fact, at the time of the team’s visit, Khumbuza’s wife, 
Nomazikhizi – listed as a household member in 2002 was in the Eastern Cape, and Khumbuza 
was due to join her shortly afterwards.  It appears that Khumbuza had a disability grant for a 
while, but he lost it in November 2004 when it was cut off by ‘the people in Bisho’.  At the 
moment they survive on the salary of their son Zolile, who recently managed to get a job at a 
restaurant in the Grandwest Casino complex. This income they supplement with a fruit and 
vegetable business which they insist is ‘not working:’ turnover is about R60 – R70 a week but 
they cannot say what the profits would be.  In addition, they also sell smilies (sheep’s heads) 
and walkaways (chicken feet). 
 
So far, so good.  But what, however, is one to make of Khumbuza’s nice looking cellphone?  
Why is the shack so large? The reception room, indeed, seems to be easily 40 square metres, 
and is the largest room the team has ever seen in a corrugated iron structure; so large is it that 
there are poles in the middle of the room to prop up the ceiling.  Interestingly enough, it is 
painted a very pleasant shade of light blue, and a variety of cowhide drums and large blue 
plastic tubs adorn the walls.  A clue is provided by a table at the end of the room, covered 
with a blue tablecloth, on which stand, among other things, a large iron candelabra and what 
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appears to be a 30cm long toy plastic lion. All these accoutrements suggest one question: is 
the room used by a church of some kind? 
 
It appears it is.  Khumbuza gets up with some difficulty and he and his gentleman visitor 
unfurl a large blue banner that has been furled in the corner, on which meticulously sewn 
white lettering spells out ‘Africa Apostolic Asiria Church in Zion.’  Khumbuza is one of the 
founding members, and his friend, Mr Tole, is the Archbishop.  They founded it in 1982, and 
there are two branches – one in Nyanga, and one in Site C Khayelitsha.  Each branch has 
about 50 members. They have services on Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays and Sundays. 
They do not collect money, Khumbuza says, but people do contribute R2 or so to the church 
when they can.  Khumbuza claims to be able to heal people: he cures them through his 
prayers, and he also blesses and purifies water, that people can drink to become well.  They 
do not pay him for these services, but people who have been cured buy him airtime for his 
phone to show their gratitude.  People also donate groceries to the church; the two pots of 
sheep’s heads cooking slowly in the corner are in fact for the church – people are thanking 
God, not him.   
 
How poor is Khumbuza and his family?   From the sparseness of their furnishings and the fact 
that they sell smilies to survive (hard and laborious work that does not pay well) it is indeed 
clear that they are struggling and that money is scarce.  But with 50 people congregating in 
the home several times a week, making donations of money, food and airtime, it is also clear 
that this household as far from being the poorest and most marginalised in Khayelitsha.  How 
well they do is hard to establish, since Khumbuza is reluctant to disclose anything more, and 
is at pains to keep on pointing out how little they have and how much they suffer.  All the 
team knows is that the picture presented to the survey team in 2002 is but one aspect of a 





Case Study 7: Surviving with some style: Vusi Ndzumeka, Site C Khayelitsha 
 
Vusi Ndzumeka is an ebullient man of about 50 distinguished in equal measure by his 
friendly easygoing manner, his impeccable presentation (the team usually  found him in a 
smart leather cap, wearing neatly washed and pressed jeans and check shirts toying with a 
large bunch of keys hanging from his neck on a lanyard), and his deep gravelly voice – the 
legacy of years of breathing in corrosive fumes at  W***  timbers where  he (apparently) 
made creosoted wooden poles for construction and fencing.  Probably as a result of his 
employment in the timber industry, his home must be one of the most neatly finished shacks 
in Khayelitsha, covered entirely on the inside with varnished tongue and groove panelling, 
into which light fittings have neatly been recessed.  
 
The furnishings are poor – again, there is none of the lay-bye furniture one would expect in a 
household where someone has held down a steady job for some years — but well looked 
after. The table in the middle of the room, the threadbare couch, the battered kitchen unit in 
the corner, and a massive and ancient refrigerator in the lounge all seem to be ancient, warn 
with use, but meticulously clean and well maintained. A sign on the wall announces in Xhosa 
that ‘we close at 9 PM’; on the wall hang a wooden African mask and some pictures (of 
elephants, meerkat and of Nelson Mandela) cut from old magazines and carefully framed. In 
the corner stands a truly enormous and rather battered wood-veneer valve radio, apparently 
still in working order.  A picture by the kitchen door shows a much younger Vusi, sporting an 
Afro and stylish clothes, perched on that same valve radio, which in the picture looks 
gleaming new.   
 







At the time of the 2002 survey, the household was composed of Vusi, his girlfriend 
Nomakhazi (he calls her a girlfriend now, but she described herself as his spouse in 2002) and 
their one year old daughter Noxolo.  According to the survey Nomakhazi (who was the 
informant) reported Vusi as being permanently employed, bringing in on average about 
R1500 per month; she also reported high levels of food insecurity.  Since then a number of 
things have changed.  For one thing, Vusi and Nomakhazi have split up.  Nomakhazi has 
moved out, taking Noxolo with her, and Vusi currently shares the shack with Xolile, whom he 
describes as his half brother (in actual fact they seem to be much more distantly related).  
Nomakhazi currently works in Uitenhage, and Noxolo is in the care of Vusi’s mother in 
Middeldrift, who is also looking  after his sister’s child while the latter works in canning 
industry, ‘making pineapples’ as Vusi puts it.  
 
 It appears that Noxolo is not Vusi’s only child; he also has another son, 15 years old, by a 
woman from his own village, Nomsa.  Vusi never married Nomsa: he says that when he got 
her pregnant he decided to leave so that he could save up enough money to marry her – but as 
it happens he never managed to get together enough money to do this. Nomsa is also in the 
Eastern Cape, also in Middeldrift. Interestingly it turns out that Nomsa and Nomakhazi have 
met, and it appears that at the time of the interview both of them were suing him for 
maintenance: Vusi shows one of the summonses to the research team, appearing untroubled 
by the prospect of having to appear in an East London magistrates’ court in a few weeks time. 
 
One reason why he is not particularly worried is that he has a perfect defence: he has lost his 
job.  He and Xolile (who worked at the same company) were retrenched in August 2004, 
along with everyone in the pole-making operation.  At the time the team visited them, they 
said that they were surviving on their remaining UIF moneys, an amount of R600 per month.  
Figure 7: Vusi in his front lounge 
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Xolile does casual work in the building industry, going every day to stand at the side of the 
road; from this he makes between R120 to R400 a week, depending on how much work he 
gets. Vusi’s chest is too weak to allow him to do manual work, so he runs a little shebeen, 
selling beers in the summer, paraffin in the winter, and cigarettes all year round.  
 
How does Vusi’s business work and how much money does he make from it? This is 
surprisingly difficult to find out.  With regard to the paraffin, he buys a 25 litre container at 
the Trek garage which is some way up the road; he borrows a trolley to get it here or he and 
his half-brother put a knobkerrie through the handles and carry it together. A 25 litre container 
costs about R80; they sell it at R4.50 per litre or R3.00 for 750 ml.  Apparently many who are 
unwilling to walk far for small amounts of paraffin are willing to pay the mark-up.  During 
the summer he sells about 5 cases of beer a week at (he says) profit of about R110 per week.  
The shebeen was not really working, Vusi told the team; should he not have found a job by 
the time the UIF ran out, he would have to leave Cape Town and return to his family in the 
Easter Cape, where survival is not so expensive.  
  
The problem is that it is not easy to tell whether this is the whole picture.  If Vusi was 
struggling financially, how did he manage always to be so neatly presented?  Certainly he and 
Xolile showed no sign of leaving when the UIF did run out.  It is clear that Vusi’s lounge is 
not a large and flourishing shebeen (there would not be space, for one thing) but it is clearly a 
hub of community activity.  Interviews, in fact, are hard to conduct partly because of the 
ceaseless stream of visitors and people  popping in and out:  a neighbour offering a plate of 
afval (offal) for sale; someone else asking for a donation;  a young girl coming round from 
next door, asking to borrow a needle; people dropping in to listen to (and even contribute to) 
the interview.  Vusi fields all these visitors with equal aplomb – welcoming and carefully 
confining them to his lounge, popping into his carefully locked bedroom to fetch paraffin or 
cigarettes but not allowing anyone else access.  He appears to be doing well – far from a 
retrenched factory worker looking either for work or to return to the Eastern Cape, he comes 
across as a well established urbanite with a clearly defined economic niche in the local 
market.  Indeed, in one of the team’s last visits, when he was asked whether he would take up 
his old job again if it was offered to him, he said he would not: the work was too dangerous 
he said, coughing asthmatically to illustrate the damage to his lungs; and he would have to 
travel all the way out to Kuil’s River.  He would much prefer running his shebeen to working 
at W*** again – his main problem was that his shack was too small for his business; if he had 
more money, the first thing he would do would be to extend it.   
 
Indeed, as the months wore on, the research team became increasingly frustrated at its 
inability to penetrate beyond the urbane surface presented by Vusi.  Although he always 
seemed happy to see the team, he would always just be on his way out when they visited; and 
when interviews were held, they degenerated into silly joking before too long.  In the course 
of a year of visits to Khayelitsha, he managed to unveil very little beyond what the team 
learned in its first visit – without ever obviously refusing to answer a question or to be 
interviewed.   
 
 
Case Study 8: Making 10c work for me: Mam Thandi's spaza in Site B 
 
Mam Thandi lives alone with her daughter Didi in the bend of a side street off one of the busy 
roads that snake into Site B Khayelitsha.  She is another person whose economic existence is 
all but invisible in the 2002 Survey.  According to the record of her responses, she had no 
employment at all during the time of the survey, not even self employment; she reports no 
income in any of the surveys income categories, and her responses to a twelve-month recall 
question suggest that she had no income at all in the past year.  A visit suggests that she was 
either revealing only part of the truth, or her circumstances have radically changed: far from 
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the emaciated or malnourished and desperate person the figures one would expect one to 
meet, the person who opens the door is solid and friendly — even jolly — with an easygoing, 
neighbourly manner.  Her child, Didi, is clearly a well-cared for child, with a huge head of 
lovingly tended hair; though she is not expensively dressed, her clothes are well made clean, 
and far from threadbare.  A Coca Cola sign is affixed to the wall above the door, and crudely 
painted lettering on the corrugated iron fence around the property announces that this is ‘Mam 
Thandi Spaza’ and advertises the goods on sale: sausages, fish, cool drinks, sweets, biscuits.  
Inside, the house is bare of luxuries and the walls are unpainted but everything is clean and 
well tended: an old wooden fashioned kitchen dresser bears an assortment of carefully 
polished pots and dishes as well as a little Tupperware box full of money; a two plate burner 
stands on a kitchen counter; a couple of big wholesale bags containing smaller packets of 
goods – chips and biscuits – hang from a nail on the wall.  
 
As the team gets to know Mam Thandi she slowly reveals some of the complex realities of 
her life story and her current existence.  Her ebullient, jolly exterior appears to belie some 
pain; even in the first interview she breaks down in tears as she explains how she never knew 
her father (her parents got divorced when she was still very young) and how bereft she felt at 
the death of her grandmother, who was the person who was like a mother to her. In later 
interviews the tears come again when she remembers having to bury her sister with little help 
from her family, and when she talks about how she struggles to feed Didi without access to a 
child grant. She appears to have survived almost on her own for most of her life: she has 
never been married, and she suggests that most of her relatives turned their backs on her and 
did not support her.  Large areas of her past – having to bury a sister with little help from her 
family; the violence that drove her out of KTC camp – appear to be painful for her to revisit, 
and she tells the team that even today she does not like to go back to Lower Crossroads where 
some of her remaining relatives live: she does not like to be reminded of the past.  She 
emphasises her isolation and denies that she has any friends of significance, telling the team 
that her grandmother on her deathbed had warned her to beware of friends: friends are 
jealous, she says, they will gossip about you and they will betray you.  So she stays away 
from friends. 
 
At present, she tells the team, she is running a small spaza, selling mostly sweets and biscuits; 
most of her clients are children.  Her daughter Didi, who (she confides in the team) is loved 
by everyone in the street, is one of the reasons why children come to her store; they come to 
play with Didi and then they also buy things.  With time it also becomes clear that Didi also 
plays an important economic role, taking care of the shop and efficiently helping customers 
when her mother is unable to attend to business.  During the team’s first visit, a toddler 
appears at the door with a tiny fist full of bronze coins, apparently intent on buying a single 
piece of chewing gum (a Chappie).  The money is counted out, and Mam Thandi explains to 
the child that this is not enough: a Chappie is ten cents.  The child turns around angrily and 
silently and walks out.  Mam Thandi explains to the team that some spaza owners, if they are 
sleeping, and a child wakes them wanting to buy a single sweet, might complain at being 
asked to wake up for ten cents.  ‘I will wake up for ten cents’ she says ‘because when I have 
that ten cents, it will work for me’.  She indicates that she does not believe in either giving or 
asking for credit: if you cannot repay a debt, you will make enemies, she says; and if someone 
is indebted to you and can’t pay, they will become your enemy too.   
 
The team visits mam Thandi many times in subsequent months.  Sometimes they come for a 
formal interview; sometimes they drop by to offer a small gift – some hair conditioner for 
Didi – or to offer a lift to Mam Thandi’s oldest daughter who lives in Mfuleni.  Sometimes 
they just drop by to make conversation and sit idly chatting while they are courteously served 
food, juice or tea by the solicitous Didi. Slowly, as time passes, Mam Thandi also reveals 
more and more of her social and economic life.  The team discover that in spite of her 
disavowal of ‘friends’ Mam Thandi does in fact rely on a small network of trusted and valued 
connections.  They also find out that Mam Thandi (contrary to what the survey says) has 
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always had a spaza, and in fact had a very successful business when she was still living in the 
older settlement of Crossroads, from where many Khayelitsha residents hailed in the mid 
1980s.  Now it is just a small business, she does not want to attract the attention of the tsotsis.  
The spaza business appears to fluctuate heavily from week to week. One week, her kitchen 
contains a deep fryer (acquired from the mother of the child of a friend of Didi’s) as the 
winter gets colder she starts selling fried sausages. A week or two later she discloses to the 
team that she has not been able to replenish her stock, since she has no money, and people 
who have bought sausages on credit are not repaying her.  The team also becomes aware of 
other activities. One morning the team arrives to find a man’s clothes hanging from a clothes 
line in Mam Thandi’s yard.  Sibongile, the field worker, jokes with Mam Thandi and asks 
whether this is her boyfriend’s clothes.  No, Mam Thandi explains, this is just laundry she has 
been doing for some neighbours; they will pay her a little money for this favour.  
Furthermore, when they visit in the mornings or early afternoons, the team are as likely to 
find Mam Thandi or Didi taking care of Vuyo, a six month old boy, left at the house by the 
mother of another friend of Didi’s.  After a while it transpires that Mam Thandi is being paid 
(about R300 a month) for this service by Vuyo’s parents.  Another much younger ‘friend’ of 
Didi’s, also there almost every afternoon, turns out also to be there not simply as Didi’s friend 
but as a recipient of Mam Thandi’s care.  Her parents have not made a concrete and definite 
monetary arrangement; but at the end of the month they will usually give ‘something’.  How 
did Mam Thandi get into the childcare business? She explains that her neighbours know she is 
a respectable woman: they can also see that Didi has been well brought up so they feel safe in 
leaving their children in her care.   
 
By the time the fieldwork period ends, there are still many questions for the team, and they 
are not convinced that they have a complete financial picture.  Near the end of the fieldwork 
period, for instance, Mam Thandi buys curtains on lay-bye from a shop: curtains which cost, 
according to her, several hundred rands.  How can she afford that? She does not say. But 
patience and the long building of trust has revealed some aspects of Mam Thandi’s economic 





It is no wonder that the 2002 survey was so poor at picking up very much additional 
informal employment.  For one thing, these activities often have a part-time and 
marginal nature: it is possible to understand why neither Vuyiswa’s fruit and veg 
business nor Khumbuza’s tribute income from the church would have been reported 
to enumerators as ‘self employment.’  Even more significant is the reluctance of 
informants to completely disclose the extent of their informal economic activities 
and how much money they make from it.  In some of the above cases it was only 
probing by the research team, prompted by visual and other clues, which led to 
activities being revealed.  Sometimes even a significant investment of effort, time 
and rapport building was not enough to penetrate beyond the façade informants 
presented to the team.  
 
An important point needs to be clarified here: the ubiquity of informal economic 
activity does not mean that township business is flourishing.  All the businesses 
described above other than the dressmaking enterprise are marginal: they 
represent people eking out a living and managing to make very tiny margins go a 
long way. These activities seem to make a vital difference to survival, but they 
represent very fragile attempts to survive on the part of people who have to 
combat not only economic marginality but also bodily frailty.  Later, these issues 
will be explored in more detail. The report will highlight some of the factors that 
may underpin this reticence; and will discuss in more depth what the research 
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surfaced about the nature of informal economic activity, the role it plays, and 
some of the constraints people face in pursuing them.   
4.2.4 Gender, invisible work and ‘social value creation’  
 
A third key feature of Vuyiswa’s story which will be encountered again and again in 
the pages that follow is the central importance of care work and household 
reproductive activity. Even those who were not economically active (and many who 
were) still laboured – usually unpaid - in the private domestic economy of the 
household and kinship network, looking after children, sick people and the elderly, 
and engaged in the many time consuming tasks that were essential simply for 
household maintenance.  This is a complex issue (see e.g. Bozalek 1999, 
Sevenhuijsen et al 2003, Hunter 2006); here we will make only four key points.   
 
1) Poverty and the externalization of care work. Firstly care work and 
household reproductive labour impact particularly heavily on those in the 
poorest sections of society.  The better off can externalize the time and 
labour costs of care work and household reproductive activity, paying others 
to cook their meals, and do other maintenance and care activities.  In both 
the Eastern Cape and in Khayelitsha there were particular factors that 
played a particularly strong role in adding to the burden of care and 
reproductive work; but these factors seemed particularly onerous in the 
Eastern Cape, as children orphaned by HIV and AIDS as well as sick adults 
are often sent to the Eastern Cape to be taken care of.  The rigour of rural 
life also played a role.  The burden imposed on rural women by the need to 
fetch water and wood is widely recognised, but the built environment is 
also a factor: ‘Mud huts’ in the eastern Cape are living structures that need 
a ceaseless investment of time and labour and maintenance. ‘Upgrading’ to 
brick structures and corrugated iron significantly reduces labour time – but 
it is expensive: this meant that the poorest people also had to spend the 
greatest amount of effort and energy on simple domestic maintenance 
tasks. 
 
2) The gendered distribution of care work.  Though it is in practice not the 
sole preserve of women (men did do household reproductive tasks), the 
2002 survey shows the gendered distribution of adults who were listed as 
spending upwards of an hour on given tasks. Women predominated in almost 
all these activities except for service sector self-employment, agricultural 
work, and (interestingly) fetching wood.   
  
Table 6: Gender distribution  for adults who were involved in a task for more than one hour a 
day (source: 2002 CPRC/PLAAS household livelihood survey). 
 
 






   
Fetching wood 64.77% 35.23% 
Searching for work 64.58% 35.42% 
Self-employed in non-agricultural related activities 61.84% 38.16% 
Agriculture/ food production for someone else 56.50% 43.50% 
Caring for sick people 49.72% 50.28% 
Caring for disabled persons 49.18% 50.82% 
Studying 42.94% 57.06% 










Shopping 41.96% 58.04% 
Other 25.23% 74.77% 
Work in garden to produce food for householders 22.22% 77.78% 
Self-employed in agriculture/ food related activities 20.83% 79.17% 
Caring for senior citizens 20.59% 79.41% 
Fetching water 19.24% 80.76% 
Caring for children 13.15% 86.85% 
Homework/ Domestic Work (Cleaning and Cooking) 13.01% 86.99% 
 
 
3) Care work and social value creation: Thirdly – and this is a conceptual 
point – care work and household reproduction should be seen as a 
significant economic activity.  This is a point often missed by economic 
attempts to model labour supply decisions in terms of the proverbial notion 
that people essentially face a choice between waged work and leisure. The 
story of the way in which Vuyiswa has had to give up her informal economic 
activity in order to care for her sister’s daughter’s child shows that this is 
not correct. In fact, people continually are faced with a wide range of 
value-creating activities in which they can invest labour time; and paid 
work or informal economic activity is only one of them.  Though care work 
and household reproductive labour is not paid, it is vital, and requires 
significant investments of labour time, and should be recognised as a vital 
form of ‘social value creation’ that is absolutely central to households’ and 
kinship networks’ resilience. Much of our argument later in this report will 
focus on what we might call the forms of ‘shadow accounting’ and 
reciprocal exchange that shape how care work and household reproductive 
work are traded and distributed within and between households. 
 
4) Migrancy and care chains:  Finally, we will note that these caring 
arrangements become particularly crucial in contexts of migrancy. Here, a 
very useful organizing concept is what Hochschild (2000) calls a ‘care chain’ 
-   a series of spatial links between people across the globe based on the 
paid or unpaid work of caring: as when, to use in Hochschild’s famous 
example, ‘an older daughter from a poor family […] cares for her siblings 
while her mother works as a nanny caring for the children of a migrating 
nanny who, in turn, cares for the child of a family in a rich country’ 
(Hochschild 2000:131; see also Yeates 2005).  Understanding how care 
chains work will be crucial to our understanding of the organization of 
‘stretched households’ in the Eastern Cape and Khayelitsha, because they 
play a key role in shaping the way shocks are transmitted, burdens 
distributed, and vulnerability is managed in the contexts we have studied.  
 
5) Caring labour and livelihood decisions: All these factors have to be 
considered when we are trying to understand the ways in individuals and 
households (and people in kinship networks) make decisions.  The decisions 
individuals make when they decide to enter or leave the formal labour 
market are not simply the classical economic choice between labour and 
leisure.  Rather, there is also a very wide range of activities that are neither 
formal nor informal employment, but investments in the domestic economy 
of the household(s) of family and kin.   Understanding this, and how it 
impacts on the choices of both women and men, is crucial if we are to 
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understand who is vulnerable, and who benefits or loses from the complex 
transactions involved everyday livelihood decisions. 
4.2.5 Summary 
 
These general points have important consequences for understanding vulnerability. 
People’s situation cannot be understood by concentrating atomistically on the 
household or the individual as a unit; cannot be understood outside of a larger 
trans-temporal and cross-generational timespan, cannot be understood narrowly 
and economically without reference to the shaping influence of culture or identity.  
These dimensions are absolutely essential when assessing the vulnerability and the 
well-being of any individual.  Rather than looking at their income stream or their 
expenditure, or even the assets over which they dispose in any given month, we 
should look at where they fit into the broader network of social relationships of 
which they are part, their connections to often distant places and family members, 
and the agendas which unite and divide the various players and stakeholders in this 
wider network. 
 
Here, our caveat about the ambit of this study needs to be repeated.  The 
livelihood strategies of all the households in the study are shaped by the fact that 
they are part of a very particular South African experience, namely that of the 
migrant labour circuit between the distant rural Eastern Cape and Urban Cape 
Town.  The findings of this study are to some extent therefore distinctively linked 
to the particular ‘vulnerability context’ created by the legacy of the Eastern Cape 
migrant system. Other contexts will be characterised by other dynamics. Yet labour 
migrancy in one form or another touches almost every context of urban and rural 
poverty in South Africa, particularly among African households.  Though many 
details will differ, the choices and challenges faced by the people surveyed in this 
study will arise elsewhere in similar ways. Understanding how people deal with 
them will have significance well beyond the particular cases of Khayelitsha and 
Mount Frere. 
 
A second point should also be remembered.  Vuyiswa’s story is in one sense typical 
of many of the people and households visited in the study.  But in another sense it 
is quite distinctive.  Even among migrants and migrant households there are 
important distinctions.  Although Vuyiswa’s case is typical, not every feature of her 
story can be generalised to every individual and household in the study. As 
important as showing how her story typifies migrant livelihoods, it is also important 
to develop a more disaggregated picture and to highlight the important features 
that distinguished the people in the study and that set them apart from one 
another.  
4.3 Distinguishing among and clustering households: key 
criteria 
 
The livelihood strategies of households within the study were varied and complex.  
This complexity is one of the reasons why the assessment of vulnerability cannot 
depend on a once-off quantitative assessment of the household.  Instead, the 
analysis had to be able to capture the complexity and diversity of household 
livelihood strategies.  Although a qualitative assessment of a household is better 
suited to capturing the complexity, nuance and subtlety of a households livelihood 
strategy it simultaneously evokes another set of challenges.  One of the challenges 
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becomes aggregating a mass of qualitative data to extract patterns and discern 
differences. 
 
One way of reducing the complexity and diversity of the households studied 
mentioned is by adopting a ‘medium n’ clustering approach (Davis 2006).  This 
approach retains the capacity of qualitative research to capture nuance, yet 
aggregates qualitative material into useable categories to be able to see some of 
the convergences in the data.  Although many approaches to clustering analysis are 
possible, for the purposes of this study clustering criteria were developed that 
focused on making explicit household’s economic activities and social relationships. 
Understanding the complexity of the livelihood strategies of the research 
participants, and contextualizing this understanding within the broader history of 
migrancy between the rural Eastern Cape and urban Cape Town allowed us to 
develop very specific criteria for clustering.   
 
In developing a typology of households four key dimensions of differentiation 
between households were identified: 
 
1) Firstly, households can be differentiated on the basis of the nature and 
extent of their insertion into the formal economy 
 
2) A second dimension of differentiation is household engagement with and 
reliance on informal sector activity 
 
3) A third dimension of differentiation is the reliance of households on local 
agrarian production 
 
4) A fourth dimension along which households were differentiated was the 
quality of the kinship and social networks in which they were embedded  
 
5) A fifth and final dimension of differentiation was the degree of well-being 
collectively experienced by the members of the household.   
 
Within each of these five areas, the study reveals a high degree of differentiation.  
For the purposes of developing a reliable approach to clustering households, we 
need to achieve two things: 
 
Firstly, it is important to understand, and be able to communicate, the full range 
and diversity of differentiation along each of these dimensions.   
 
Secondly, it is important to develop fairly clear criteria on the basis of which 
households can be clustered.  It cannot be assumed that households are simply 
linearly distributed in relation to these criteria.  For example, one cannot 
adequately gauge the nature of people’s insertion into the formal labour market on 
the basis of a quantitative assessment of their wages.  As important as wages as a 
structural conditions of people’s employment, this metric would tell us little of the 
certainty or other conditionalities associated with a wage entering a household.  At 
the same time, criteria for positioning households on any dimension should be 
relatively objective and straightforward.  These are considered below. 




4.3.1 Insertion into the formal labour market 
 
There was a very wide range of ways in which households were inserted into the 
formal economy.  There was a continuum, ranging from households where one or 
more members were in full-time salaried employment, to situations where no 
member had formal employment of any kind.  It is important to note that insertion 
into the formal labour market had an important spatial component.  Even 
households that had no direct link with the formal labour market often received 
remittances; and sometimes even the situation of households that currently had 
neither direct links to formal employment nor were in receipt of remittances, 
could still be fundamentally affected by past links with the labour market.  Several 
households were in receipt of work place pension and a slightly larger proportion 
received defined benefit retrenchment or retirement packages.  For this analysis 
these were deemed products of the formal labour market insertion. 
 
For the purposes of clustering we deliberately rely on schematic and basic 
distinctions.  We distinguish between three levels of involvement with the formal 
labour market. 
 
1) Firstly, households can have one or more members in formal employment.  
Formality is here defined expansively and in relation to either the sector or 
the nature of the employment.  For example, a Cape Town domestic worker 
working for a middle class family would fall into this category.  So too 
would a sub-contractor working on the building site of a formal sector 
construction company. Although their wages may not be very high and their 
employment insecure, they are still linked to the economic circuits of the 
formal economy.  
 
2) Secondly, households could have a more distal connection to the formal 
economy.  A more distant family member, with a foothold in the formal 
sector may for instance be a benefactor to the household, e.g. through 
sending remittances.  In some cases households have formerly had a 
connection to the formal economy which had now been severed, but are 
still in receipt of retrenchment, UIF (Unemployment Insurance Fund), 
provident or pension fund benefits.  These households (but not those merely 
in receipt of a non-contributory state social grant) were counted in this 
category.  
 
3) Thirdly, households could have a very weak or non existent connection to 
the formal economy, not receiving provident fund benefits, other private 
benefits or remittances. 
 
Households are classified according to the highest and most formalised form of 
employment they are linked to. So a household in which three people do casual 
labour, and one has access to a formal job, is put in the first category. 
 
Almost half the households in the Western Cape were at the zenith of the scale, 
having a household member in full time formal employment.  In the Eastern Cape 
only a fifth (i.e. 20%) of households had a household member in formal 
employment.  With the exception of two cases (a remunerated traditional leader 
and local teachers) these household members were invariably working in distant 
urban area, but were considered members of the households interviewed.  
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Unsurprisingly then, households with a family member in formal employment were 
far more common in the urban Cape Town.   
 
With regard to the second category of either more distant kin benefactors in formal 
employment, or household members formerly (i.e. historically) engaged in formal 
employment, roughly half the households in the Eastern Cape and a quarter of the 
households in the Western Cape fell into this category.  The Eastern Cape sample 
included several pension receiving breadwinners who had exited formal 
employment.  
 
In terms of the final category of households that are minimally connected or 
entirely disconnected from the formal economy, approximately a quarter of the 
households at both sites fell into this category.  Anecdotally, the Western Cape 
sample contained at least two households where the breadwinner had recently lost 
a formal sector job (i.e. level three – no formal employment recorded) only to 
regain formal sector employment towards the end of the fieldwork period.  
However the research design was not orientated to comparing or tracking these 
kinds of dynamic changes.  Finally a comparison with the 2002 data also suggested 
that roughly a quarter of households had experienced changes in labour market 
status.  In several cases it appears as though formal employment had been lost.  
  
4.3.2 Informal sector activity 
 
There was a very wide range of informal or self-employment sector activities.  
They ranged from fairly well remunerative forms of self employment (e.g. running 
a well established shebeen or spaza, driving a taxi, dressmaking) to much smaller, 
survivalist enterprises (home based fruit and veg, preparing smilies) the provision 
of services and care work (child minding, laundry, etc).  At both ends of the scale, 
the boundaries were often blurred: some forms of formal employment are 
increasingly becoming informalised; on the other extreme there are forms of work 
and labour that are all but indistinguishable from unpaid domestic care work. 
 
Clustering households entails a process of oversimplification, households are again 
classified according to the most lucrative, most remunerative category.  Although 
there are often household level synergies between formal and informal activity this 
measure of informal sector activity was coded independently of the previous one 
(viz. ‘Insertion into the formal labour market’).   
 
1) One or more household member is self-employed in an informal business 
with significant turnover, or in a specialised sector that requires significant 
skills (e.g. dressmaking, taxi driving or a successful tavern) 
 
2) One or more household member is self-employed in a ‘nano’ enterprise 
which is often poorly distinguished from the domestic economy of the 
household, or is involved in informally providing services or labour (child 
care, laundry, mud brick making, sex work etc).  In terms of 
operationalizing this category, informal economic activity had to be 
remunerated (even poorly).  Hence unpaid favours or exchanges were not 
included in this category. 
 
3) No household members are involved in any remunerated (however poorly) 
informal work whatsoever.  This category does not include food grown for 
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household consumption, which is the subject of a separate metric 
altogether. 
 
There were higher levels of larger scale, potentially lucrative, level one, informal 
economic activity in urban Cape Town (roughly 17% of households).  In the rural 
Eastern Cape only a single respondent (approximate 5%) could be judged to engage 
in significant, lucrative self employment.  More survivalist level two ‘nano’ 
enterprise type informal economic activity was relatively common, with 
approximately 60 % of households in the Eastern Cape and 38% of households in the 
Western Cape falling into this category.  
 
With regards to the third category of no or negligible levels of informal economic 
activity at all roughly 35% of households in Mount Frere and 45% of those in 
Khayelitsha fell into this category.  In the rural Eastern Cape there was evidence of 
varying degrees of agrarian production which for the purposes of this definition are 
not classed as informal economic activity.  Of the large proportion of households 
falling into this category in the urban Western Cape, many had a household 
member engaged in the formal economy (e.g. working as a building sub-contractor 
or domestic worker etc).  
4.3.3 Links with the agrarian economy 
 
Households differed widely in the nature of their reliance on the agrarian economy; 
this differentiation was marked in the Eastern Cape households.  The survey 
indicated that a large number of households were involved in agrarian activities of 
some kind.  Even poor households could still invest significant amounts in livestock.  
Often these agrarian activities were quite marginal, but on occasion they would 
represent significant investments of time and money.  Criteria for clustering 
differentiate between three categories as follows: 
 
1) Households with significant investments in agrarian activities, in other 
words, they still plough the ‘intsimi’ (large planting fields, seldom adjacent 
to the homestead) either with a tractor or with cattle, or that have 
significant numbers of cattle (5 or more).  
 
2) Households which have less than five bovine LSUs (livestock units), but have 
smaller livestock, and that do limited planting in a garden plot (often 
fenced and adjacent to a homestead).  This category is not only defined by 
assets, but also activities.  A few households owned neither livestock nor 
had access to a fenced garden plot, but were regularly involved in co-
operative work parties or community agricultural projects.  If these 
activities generated solid outputs these respondents are included in this 
category    
 
3) Household which are not directly involved in agriculture at all. 
 
Agricultural production was recorded only amongst the households in the Eastern 
Cape.  Although a single householder in urban Cape Town reported some 
agricultural activity, it was insufficient to satisfy the criteria of category two 
above.  Of the Eastern Cape households a quarter (6 of 24) reported substantial 
levels of agricultural activity, they possessed more than 5 head of cattle or, more 
commonly, cultivated the expansive planting fields.  Almost half (11 out of 24 
households) reported some level of agricultural activity (as per definition two), 
with fewer than five livestock or cultivation limited to a homestead garden.  
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Finally almost a 30% of households (7 out of 24) reported no or negligible levels of 
agricultural activity.   
 
4.3.4 Kinship networks and social capital 
 
Households showed a striking range of differentiation in terms of their insertion 
into kinship networks and the degree of social capital they were able to mobilise.  
Households can be distinguished in terms of the extent to which they are linked 
into broader and expansive kinship and social networks, or alternately marginalised 
within them.  Criteria for clustering households sought to distinguish between those 
households that are well located within social and (often primarily) kinship 
networks and those that are disconnected, more isolated or atomised. 
 
1) These households tend to be well located in terms of social and kinship 
networks.  They report the existence of these links and could readily 
describe exchanging benefits (material and otherwise) within them. 
 
2) Secondly these households are slightly less well positioned in kinship and 
social networks.  In a few cases households have either been excluded or 
opted out from the circuits of kinship based patronage.  These households 
have generally then either constituted themselves in relationships of 
modernity, forging friendships and non-familial based alliances, or they 
would have descended into the third category below. 
 
3) Thirdly, these households presented as relatively atomised and 
disconnected either from kinship or other kinds of social networks.  The 
research turned up few linkages and limited evidence of help received from 
others. 
 
Approximately equal proportions of Eastern and Western Cape households fall into 
categories one and two above.  Half of the rural Eastern Cape households and 42% 
of the Western Cape households are comparatively favourably located in kinship or 
social networks.  A similar weighting of households fall into category two, the 
‘slightly less well positioned in kinship and social networks’ category, with 41% and 
47% of Eastern and Western Cape households, respectively.  It is perhaps the third 
category of households that is the most interesting in terms of vulnerability.  These 
are the 2 households in the Eastern Cape and 2 households in the Western Cape 
(i.e. >10%) that are relatively atomised and disconnect from both social and kinship 
networks. 
4.3.5 Household well-being  
 
A final measure of differentiation that was developed and applied was a measure 
of household level well-being.  Well-being is a complex concept and often defined 
in quite disparate disciplinary terms.  For the purposes of this measure, well-being 
was judged in rather broad terms, as a composite value encapsulating the material 
conditions and assets of a household and, importantly, the absence of conspicuous 
deprivation in terms of basic human needs such as shelter, food and medical care.  
This somewhat subjective measure of household well-being is by no means 
unproblematic, but its usefulness in identifying vulnerability at household level far 
outweighs its definitional problems.   
 
Section 4: Migrant livelihoods – an outline  64 
 
 
Two further clarifications are in order there.  The first is that, within the 
pragmatic limits of the fieldwork, household well-being was judged holistically at 
household level.  Each household was rated as a unit by the research team, with 
care not to loose sight of the most marginal or vulnerable members within it (i.e. 
children, the elderly, the infirm, women).  Secondly, the well-being measure is, to 
a larger extent that other measures, a norm-referenced and relational metric.  
Extensive fieldwork made it possible to judge households relative to a local norm. 
 
1. The members of these household experience, relative to local standards 
(and bearing in mind the households inclusion in a sample of poor 
households), a comparatively solid level of collective well-being.  The 
household has access to sufficient material resources to satisfy its member’s 
basic human needs.  Household members at this level were generally free of 
gross material deprivation or conspicuous, curable medical ailments.   
 
2. The members of the second, middle, category experience more marked 
deprivations that the members of the preceding group.  In most cases there 
are fewer material resources than the preceding group, but in few specific 
cases adequate material resources (relative to a local norm) are not 
necessarily translated into household level benefits in terms of absence 
from gross material deprivation.  Household members at this level would 
sometimes have most their material needs satisfied, but be the subjects of 
insecurity, criminal victimisation or violence. 
 
3. The third and final level of well-being includes those households that were 
judged to be amongst the most grossly materially deprived.  They may in 
many cases also suffer from ill health or be the victims of violence but their 
gross material deprivation was often the most salient criteria. 
 
Approximately a third of households in the Eastern Cape and a fifth in the 
Western Cape were judged to be on the highest tier of household well-being, as 
operationalised above.  Approximately 45% of Eastern Cape households and 63% 
of Western Cape households experienced some form of deprivation which 
prevented them from being classed on the high rungs of the well-being ladder.  
Four households in either site (constituting approximately a fifth of the sample) 
were judged to be conspicuously materially deprived or experiencing factors 
which significantly eroded individual well being at the household level.   
 
4.4 Clustering households and identifying vulnerable groups 
 
Clustering household on the basis of these criteria reveals a significant amount of 
spread.  Variables are not very tightly correlated.  Yet at the same time, there 
seems to be some correlation between households’ overall well-being, the extent 
to which they benefit from connections to the urban economy, and the extent to 
which households are part of a well developed, well connected and co-operative 
kinship network. The clustering of variables suggests that it is possible to create a 
broad typology of the households in the study.  These are discussed in what 
follows, along with illustrative examples. 
 
 
Section 4: Migrant livelihoods – an outline  65 
 
 
4.4.1 Urban-disconnected rural households 
 
Firstly, a small number of households in the rural Eastern Cape were what we could 
call urban-disconnected rural households. These are households that have not 
managed to successfully use migrancy to find connections with the formal 
economy.  These are often households where attempts to use migrancy have failed, 
or where urban connections have been lost.  Such households were typically female 
headed, and were typically quite poor, with minimal participation in agriculture, 
and were often not linked to any broader kinship structure that provided them with 
entitlements to remittances or other resources.  Often they relied very heavily on 
pensions, and did not dispose over the resources (labour or monetary) required for 
heavy investment in agrarian activities. 
 
 
Case Study 9: Chuma Mfako  - let down by her urban kin. 
 
Chuma Mfako’s household was amongst the poorest and most marginalised in our sub-sample 
of Eastern Cape Households.  Resident in a ‘location’ or (sub-village) of the deep rural village 
of Phuzayo, it is in an area where the scrubby grassland of the main village makes way for a 
drier and less hospitable landscape, densely strewn with rocks.  Chuma’s home in this 
location consists of two small mud block structures (a cooking hut and sleeping hut) 
unbounded by a fence and sparsely furnished with old furniture.  Alongside these two 
structures are the ruins of a third collapsed rondavel.  Chuma’s sole source of regular income 
is a single child support grant, which she augments with laborious and low paid informal 
work within the village.  Her small income and the absence of any urban remittances, 
positions her amongst the poorest households in our sample. 
 
Chuma was also noteworthy for another reason.  Most respondents, once their initial 
apprehension and suspicions dissipate, warm to the task of relating their personal narratives.  
Despite the social distance between the research team and interviewees, the mere presence of 
visitors who travelled far, sought them out and proceeded to listen with rapt attentiveness, 
usually elicits surprisingly candid and detailed narratives.  Chuma however proved to be a 
reticent interviewee; she retained an impassive and distant demeanour over the course of 
several visits.   
 
This passivity seemed to infuse other aspects of her life.  It was manifest in incidents such as 
her inaction after a tractor struck her hut.  While obstinately waiting for the owner of the 
tractor to repair damage that she herself could repair, livestock gradually entered the hut and 
consumed her entire maize store.  A similar indifference was reflected in her unwillingness, 
quite uncommon in the area, to do any preparation of the house in anticipation of a Christmas 
family reunion.  However, understanding the micropolitics of Chuma’s place within her 
kinship network made this resistance and her inaction far more comprehensible.  
 
In terms of the history of the household, there was little continuity between the 2002 survey 
and our 2005 return.  Chuma was absent from the household in 2002, which was documented 
as consisting only of Chuma’s three year old daughter, a 15 year old nephew and 69 year old 
grandmother.  By 2005, Chuma’s grandmother had died (shortly after the 2002 survey) and 
nephew had relocated to Cape Town.  The sole continuous member of the household was 
Chuma’s preschool aged daughter.  By 2005 this young child was joined in the house by 
Chuma (i.e. her mother) and two of Chuma’s children other small children (a nine year and 
one year old infant).   
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The 2002 death of Chuma’s grandmother was followed by the 2004 death of Chuma’s 
mother.  These successive deaths were the catalyst for her occupation of the house.  The 
decision for her to move in was reportedly taken at a family gathering, with her three Western 
Cape based brothers.  Chuma, however, readily admits to not liking village life, finding it 
difficult and tedious.  Yet she is already burdened with three young children to look after and 
with slim prospects of urban employment or marriage, her designated role was to look after 
the house.  Maintaining the family’s foothold homestead in the village, Chuma’s brothers 
were to remit money from their urban employment.  It is in the terms of this pact that the 
seeds of her current predicament were sown. 
 
Over the course of several interviews, from a range of sources, two facts gradually became 
apparent.  The first is that her brothers are not strictly speaking her brothers, but rather 
cousins.  The second is that her ‘brothers’ have reneged on the agreement and are not sending 
back any remittances.  It is unclear to what extent these two elements are intertwined: 
Chuma’s more distant kinship may well be undermining her claims to support. 
 
Chuma is therefore in a position where apart from the sole child support grant received for 
one of her children (she lacks documents for the other children), she manages to subsist 
through difficult physical work, and network of village based benefactors.  Chuma’s manual 
work consists of either making sun dried mud bricks or plastering structures with a mixture of 
cow dung and mud.  These two services have a readily quantifiable monetary value.  Chuma 
charges R100 for 100 mud bricks and R200 to plaster an average sized ‘flat’ (rectangular hut) 
or rondavel.  (Although the price for plastering often appears negotiable downwards).  She 
also occasionally does domestic work within the village or brews beer on request.  Including 
the child support grant, it is unlikely that Chuma’s income exceeds R400 a month.  Instead it 
is her small network of benefactors within the village, all of whom are female and have 
longstanding linkages to her household which help sustain her and her children.  
 
The first is the 61 year old Siphokazi who is distantly related to Chuma’s family via marriage.  
In terms of village level stratifications Siphokazi’s family is relatively prosperous, her 
husband having toiled for his entire working life in the formal economy (a long service 
certificate from AECI is proudly displayed in their reception room).  Siphokazi was a 
contemporary of Chuma’s deceased grandmother and her family has historically been an 
important set of benefactors to Chuma, her mother and grandmother.  When questioned, 
Siphokazi explained Chuma’s family have ‘always been poor’.  She attributed this to the early 
death of Chuma’s grandfather and recalled how by the late 1960s Chuma’s grandmother was 
already widowed and struggling to raise her two children.  Siphokazi and her husband paid for 
the initiation ceremony of one of Chuma’s brothers, she recalled.  They also gave up the small 
homestead currently occupied by Chuma to Chuma’s grandmother, when she was one of the 
last households to move into the current village in the 1960s under ‘Betterment’ (compulsory 
villagisation).   
 
The second important set of benefactors to Chuma is the household of the late chief.  The 
chief’s widow, a 77 year old member of the village elite lives in a sprawling eight structure 
compound.  Fluent in English, and having worked as a professional nurse (she established the 
villages clinic in the 1950s), the chief’s widow was friendly with Chuma’s late grandmother.  
These circuits of patronage have been retained and Chuma occasionally does domestic work 
for her, or helps in preparation for traditional ceremonies.  These exchanges are not strictly 
remunerated and defy easy description.  Sometimes Chuma is paid for a specific task, but 
more usually her labour is met by the charity of food, household consumables, clothes (old 
and new) and even an old cell phone.  This beneficent network extends to the daughter of the 
late chief, who resides in Durban.  Holding a senior managerial position and a PhD, she spoke 
approvingly of Chuma as a ‘diligent worker’ and wryly noted that ‘Chuma know all of my 
mother’s tricks’.  The chief’s daughter explained Chuma’s reluctance to repair the house by 
explaining Chuma’s eldest brother would have first claim to it anyway.  It is for this reason, 
Section 4: Migrant livelihoods – an outline  67 
 
 
the late chief’s daughter explained, she has been encouraging Chuma to build her own home.  
She has even offered to buy the corrugated iron roofing if Chuma would erect the walls.  
Marginalised within her kinship network and poorly placed to contest her marginalisation, 
Chuma has hence abandoned the ceaseless labour of maintaining the homestead.  
 
The final benefactor to Chuma’s household are a female cousin and aunt, related to Chuma by 
marriage.  They clarified that Chuma’s biological mother was not the woman who died in 
2004, but rather died many years ago and suffered the terrible indignity of an anonymous 
pauper’s burial in KwaZulu Natal.  Chuma’s cousins in the Western Cape, they explained, do 
not help.  These women assist Chuma with child care, or by giving her mielie meal and 
candles.  She reciprocates by going to the shop for them or disseminating news of their 
traditional ceremonies.  They render no other assistance for they are poor, they explained.  
Although, the aunt dimly recalled, Chuma did give birth to her last child in this very rondavel.   
 
4.4.2 Urban-connected rural households 
 
Secondly, a significant number (roughly 60%) of Eastern Cape households were what 
one could call urban-connected rural households.  These were households that, 
while being situated in the deep rural areas, either have a long history of urban 
connection in the past, or had connections with kin in the urban areas in the 
present.  Such households were typically better off, and could at times invest 
significantly in agrarian activity: every household that was heavily involved in 
agrarian activities was also well connected to the urban centres or had a strong 
connection to the urban economy.  Such households were also typically organised 
under the domination of a strong patriarch (or, more rarely, a widow/ matriarch). 
 
 
Case Study 10:  Rural wealth built on urban wages: Kwanele Ngubane, Phuzayo 
village 
 
The village of Phuzayo is a distant two hour drive on unpaved roads from its nearest town or 
tarred road.  In the village one finds the neatly fenced compound of Kwanele Ngubane and his 
extended family. Tall, bearded and with the countenance of a biblical patriarch, the dignified 
Kwanele welcomes visitors into his residence.  The homestead consists of two sturdy zinc 
roofed hexagonal huts and a large, rectangular multi-roomed house.  The verandah and front 
façade of the house is clad in red face brick, offering visual respite from the raw mud or the 
dusty pastel shades that often adorn homesteads in the former Transkei.  The expensive clay 
brick, rather than economical concrete or even cheaper mud blocks, proclaims the home 
owner a person of above average means within the village.  The busy compound is marked by 
signs of agrarian activity – a livestock pen with fresh manure on the floor, a fowl run of 
chickens, big leafed spinach, creeping pumpkin plants and a well fenced field with tall green 
mielies.  At the far side of the homestead a rock (about the size of a microwave oven) is 
suspended from the stout branch of a tree, twisted at the bottom of a mass of leather strips (or 
‘riempies’).  It is testament to a seldom practiced craft, rendered increasingly redundant by 
inexpensive nylon rope. 
 
In the lounge-like reception room, furnished with modern furniture and a small TV and DVD 
player powered by solar panel charged batteries (as the village is not electrified), Kwanele 
and his wife recounted the history of the household.  Kwanele left the village in the late 1960s 
and worked in a gold mine before, like many in the village, joining Iscor in Vereeniging.  
Successive one year contacts made way for a permanent position at Iscor in the 1980s.  An 
engaging interviewee and speaking mostly in the Afrikaans he learnt at Iscor, Kwanele 
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recounts how his employment prospects changed after 1994.  He was promoted to a ‘process 
controller’ (essentially a skilled machine operator) and no longer laboured manually on the 
factory floor.  However his upward employment trajectory was limited by his standard 6 
education, and finally dashed in 2004 when the 54 year old was retrenched. 
 
Kwanele and his wife reminisce over how he used to remit R40 a month in the mid 1970s, an 
amount which became several hundred rand a month and payment of all the bills towards the 
end of his employment.  During this time they built the two rondavels and the large house.  Of 
his comfortable final salary (his monthly salary peaked sharply at around R12 000 a month) 
and retrenchment package, Kwanele has invested heavily in the education of his nine 
children.  Two children are currently in matric and another two are studying for tertiary level 
diplomas, either in the regional centre of Mthatha (Umtata) or in Gauteng (where one son 
joined Kwanele for his secondary schooling).  From his retrenchment package Kwanele sends 
a total of R1 650 for subsistence to his various children every month, apart from the other 
expenses.   
 
Resident at the homestead is a fifth adult son, with learning difficulties and little formal 
education.  Kwanele attempted to establish this son in a shoe repair business, a venture 
interrupted by the son’s recent unsuccessful work seeking migration to Cape Town and 
Johannesburg.  Also resident at the homestead are four, younger teenage children, along with 
a grandchild born to one of these children.  Finally also included in this household of thirteen 
dependents, are two of Kwanele’s adult brothers (one in his mid thirties and the other middle 
aged).  Kwanele characterised one as a dissolute drunk, and the other as mentally ill, but he 
has resigned himself to supporting them.  After all, Kwanele explained, they are his brothers; 
he cannot withdraw his support from either of them.   
 
Dynamic and hardworking Kwanele has busied himself with agricultural production since his 
return to the village.  (He was frequently toiling in his garden during our visits). He 
recounting harvesting over twelve bags (50kgs) of maize last year and has seven head of 
cattle, along with 10 sheep, 14 goats and chickens.  Kwanele nurses further agrarian 
ambitions.  During the course of our fieldwork he planned to travel to Kokstad to confer with 
a white commercial farmer about improving his bovine bloodstock and expanding his herd of 
cattle.  
 
Kwanele’s recent relocation to the village has not however been without its tensions.  
Producing a tidy surplus of vegetables that he is keen to sell (we bought spinach from him a 
few times); Kwanele’s intention to earn a little income from his agrarian efforts runs contrary 
to a logic of village communalism and reciprocity.  So when villagers report being unable to 
pay his price for his large bunches of spinach, Kwanele retorts by asking what they are 
willing to pay - in what is often a mutually unsatisfying exchange.  Kwanele is highly critical 
of what he describes as dependency and idleness within the village.  Furthermore like many 
local elites, he is deeply moralistic.  Holding a prominent position in the local Zion church, 
Kwanele’s opposition to drinking and drinkers, his disappointed at his unwed daughter 
bearing a child, his old testament disavow and disgust of pigs (when enumerating his 
livestock), all pointed to this.  At the conclusion of a two hour interview, than stretched well 
past sunset, we asked to what Kwanele attributed his success.  Kwanele described at some 
length his religious faith, his eagerness to learn, his mastery of Afrikaans (and some English) 
at Iscor and the fact that he never squandered his earnings on costly urban ‘girlfriends’.  They 
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4.4.3 Rural-connected urban households 
 
Thirdly, in the urban context, some households can meaningfully be grouped under 
the heading of rural-connected urban households.  These are defined by the fact 
that they continue to have strong connections to rural areas. Some such households 
would be remitting money to rural connections or investing in rural land, housing or 
cattle; there could be a significant exchange of resources with rural kin and 
significant amounts of travel to and from the Eastern Cape, with close family 
members (particularly children) often spending significant amounts of time in the 
care of rural kin. Indeed, the provision of care and care networks by rural kin for 
urban dwellers was a surprisingly strong theme.  Such households typically also had 
a strong patriarchal structure and were almost per definition part of a strong and 
extended kinship network.  They would often be moderately well off and never be 
desperately poor. Together, the second group of households and this group seemed 
to constitute the urban and rural ends of a well developed internal migration 
strategy, the end purpose of which was investment back into rural status. The 
households of Madoda Simani and that of Vuyiswa Magadla, both described in the 
first case study in this section, are both cases in point. 
4.4.4 Rural-disconnected urban households 
 
Finally, there were what we could call urban based, rural-disconnected households 
– households characterised by the lack of strong connections to the rural areas, for 
whose livelihood strategies rural connections were not particularly important, or 
who had lost or turned away from their rural connections. This was a very 
variegated group. Some of the households in this group could be successful urban 
immigrants, who had established a foothold in the urban economy and who had no 
intention of returning to the rural areas. Their rural hinterland was important to 
them insofar as they still had strong sentimental connections to kin, and they might 
sometimes still remit money or visit (usually for Christmas or funerals), but they 
would not be making significant investments back into the rural areas, and they 
would not rely heavily on the social support (child care, etc) of rural connections.  
(The study contained no very strong examples of such households partly because 
Khayelitsha Sites B and C are settled primarily by recent migrants. Households of 
this kind would be more prevalent in areas like Gugulethu and Langa. The research 
team’s local fieldworkers, Sibongile Mtini and Zuko Ndamane, both belonged to 
good examples of such households). Other households were in an entirely different 
situation: typically female headed, they seemed to be ‘caught between a rock and 
a hard place’ – households characterised by the fact that their heads or 
breadwinners had not managed successfully to find good employment or a strong 
foothold in the urban economy – but who had scant opportunity to return to the 
rural areas, and could not rely on an extensive kin network to buffer them.  Along 
with the rural ‘urban-disconnected’ households, these households were among the 




Case Study 11: Living with few allies in Khayelitsha: Nomsa B, Site C 
Khayelitsha 
 
Two things stand out above all about Nomsa B’s household. Firstly, that she is clearly one of 
the most marginalised and impoverished of the informants visited by the team in 2005 – and 
secondly, that it is very hard to find out anything except the most basic facts about her life and 
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her situation. Both these features seem to be related in some way to another important fact 
about Nomsa – her deep, indeed troubling, passivity. 
 
Nomsa (43 at the time the team visited her in 2005) is the head of a household composed of 
herself and her children: Lulama, about 26 years old, one of her children  from her partnership 
with her first boyfriend, one Robert ‘Tshepo’ Memela (who was apparently shot dead in the 
street in a mistaken hit in 1990 as part of a taxi conflict – even though he was not involved in 
the taxi business during the taxi wars) and Vusumsi (10) Thumi (6) and Andile (2), her 
children from her current boyfriend Themba.  In both the 2002 survey and during the 2005 
project she presented as extremely impoverished, getting by on child grants for Thumi and 
Andile and on the income she makes from cooking and selling smilies (see the case study on 
p. 98 below for a more detailed description of her informal business).  In the 2002 survey she 
is recorded as reporting serious food insecurity, going hungry for nine months in the year, and 
owning no listed assets other than some chickens (there in 2002, gone in 2005), a primus 
stove and a radio. 
 
A visit to her extremely dilapidated shack confirms this impression and presents the visitor 
with a picture of extreme degradation.  Nomsa’s shack is invariably dirty and untidy, smelling 
strongly of unwashed bodies, paraffin, wood fires and raw meat: piles of sheep’s heads and 
goat’s feet are often as not piled in unsanitary heaps on a disused kitchen dresser outside.  
Food particles are thickly strewn over the floor; ‘umqhomnboti’ (traditional sorghum beer) is 
brewing in unsanitary-looking plastic containers; Nomsa herself is wearing dirty and ragged 
clothes.  So is her two-year old son Andile, who is usually dirty and unkempt, his nose 
running, and his face encrusted with mucus, often disconsolately wailing for attention (which 
is apparently the source of  her rather harsh nickname for him - Konstina, meaning 
‘Concertina,’ an appellation that earns much mirth from the other children in the street).  
 
Below this surface it is uncommonly hard to penetrate.  Nomsa is a difficult subject to 
interview, failing to keep appointments for interviews time after time – sometimes she’s 
simply not at home; at other time she is home, but with her drinking friends – and when she 
does participate in an interview she does so with single-word or one-sentence replies.  She 
strikes the team as reticent; sometimes shy and sometimes sheepishly evasive; and when she 
recounts traumatic incidents, such as the death of Robert, she does so without any obvious 
affect or emotion.  When her female friends are present, she seems happy to let them answer 
on her behalf – sometimes with confusing results. During the first interview in 2005, for 
instance, her friend Vuyelwa, who runs a nearby crèche ‘helped out’ with the interview at 
great length, explaining to the team how not only Robert had been shot in the taxi wars, but 
how Nomsa’s second boyfriend Themba had died recently of multiple-drug resistant 
tuberculosis (she pronounced the acronym, MDR TB, with convincing authority).  It was only 
much later that the team realised that Themba was in fact alive and well and living in Site B. 
When asked why Vuyelwa could get things so wrong, Nomsa later simply replied that she did 
not know why Vuyelwa was so confused, and did not explain why she made no attempt to 
correct her.  This is not an isolated misunderstanding: many crucial details of Nomsa’s 
existence seem to disappear in a fog of unclarity. In the 2002 survey, for instance, she did not 
report any informal economic activity, declining to list herself as self employed and failing to 
mention any income from informal economic activities, even though the team was able to 
establish in 2005 that she had been selling smilies at the time.  Also omitted from her account 
of herself in 2002 and 2005 is the fact that she does seasonal work as a farm labourer. Other 
facts are even harder to fathom.  There are indications that Nomsa is HIV positive: pamphlets 
litter her house from a herbalist who professes to be able to help with the disease; and when 
she can pay, Andile sometimes spends time at Vuyelwa’s crèche for children with HIV 
positive parents.  But when Nomsa talks about the times that she has been sick, she does not 
wish to say what is wrong with her, and Vuyelwa is at pains to point out that Andile comes to 
her crèche as a special favour, not because of his mother’s HIV status.  
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Perhaps most surprising is the fact that Nomsa appears to be part of a family that is not nearly 
so badly off.  Her family in the Eastern Cape has a big homestead; they own livestock (five 
head of cattle, 20 sheep, more than 20 chickens and three pigs – an accumulation of livestock 
that would put them into the upper decile  of livestock ownership in Mount Frere), and 
ploughing fields, and have enough money to pay for a tractor to plough those fields.  At the 
time of the project, in fact, Nomsa was worried about her son Vusumsi, who was starting to 
‘run wild’, staying away from school and getting into trouble.  She was making plans for  her 
mother to take Vusumsi away frm Khayelitsha to stay with her. But Nomsa herself said that 
she did not visit the Eastern Cape any more, and that she did not really keep in touch with her 
family.  In fact, other than her relationships with her two friends with whom she ran the 
‘smilie’ business Nomsa appeared quite isolated.  Unmarried, with six children, one dead 
partner and one apparently estranged one; she has no prospect of ‘marrying into’ a household 
where she will be taken care of.  Her parents could help her by taking care of her children, but 
other than that she has burned (or simply lost) her rural bridges – while establishing only the 
most fragile beach-head in the urban economy, leading an existence apparently plagued by 
illness and a dull passive depression, eking out a living doing some of the most menial and ill-




It is interesting to note the similarities between Nomsa and Chuma’s situation.  
Both are female headed households marginalised within kinship structures and with 
multiple children.  They also presented themselves to the research team in 
strikingly similar ways.  Over the course of several visits Nomsa and Chuma both 
appeared passive, emotionally blunted and even fatalistic.  Both case studies 
suggest these traits were displayed not only in relation into the research team, but 
also infused other aspects of their lives.  Their passivity poses at least two complex 
research problems.  
 
In the first place their reluctance to fully co-operate with the research team made 
it hard to delve deeply below the surface, and fully understand their lives and 
livelihoods.  Although neither Nomsa nor Chuma explicitly declined continued 
participation in the research project, their passivity, vagueness and perfunctory 
engagement with the research team was strikingly different from the norm of other 
research participants.  Their litany of unkept appointments, deferred meetings and 
perfunctory monosyllabic answers recalls the title of J.C Scott (1985) “Weapons of 
the weak” and the often implicit (rather than overt) tactics the marginalized 
sometimes use to resist power.  This passivity and disengagement is of 
methodological interest because it potentially points to the limits of the life history 
methodology, particularly when dealing with extremely marginalised research 
participants.  It is also reminds researchers (such as ourselves), of the need to 
remain attentive to the steep gradient of power and authority that exists between 
researcher and researched – and its possible impact on research findings.  
 
Secondly, there is the challenge of explaining the exact nature of the link between 
Nomsa and Chuma’s passivity and their poverty.  It is tempting to see passivity as 
playing a causal role – to understand these two women as the authors of their own 
marginality.  However the converse is equally plausible: it is as possible that their 
disengagement and passivity could be a result of their rather dire material 
circumstances and meagre kinship connections.  Although it is perilous undertaking 
to ascribe clinical labels to people in the absence of a formal assessment, one of 
the research team (who is trained as a psychologist) noted both women appeared 
to display several of the characteristics associated with depression.  Yet once 
again, this label obscures more than it reveals.  Depression, like most mental 
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illness, is the product of a complex interplay of individual pre-disposition, life 
experiences and adverse environmental factors.  We know, with confidence, the 
later two are present in these cases.  And even though their passivity and lack of 
cooperation cannot be said to be the cause of their marginality, the immobility 
brought by such depression may very well harm their chances of getting out of 




In this chapter, we have started the process of uncovering some of the complexity 
of the livelihood strategies explored for this project.  Starting with a brief 
discussion of one case study, we highlighted some of the crucial general features of 
livelihoods of people living in migrant networks in Khayelitsha and the Eastern 
Cape.  This discussion also touched on some methodological issues, highlighting 
how the research strategies used had helped the team get beyond the limitations 
of a purely quantitative survey.  The latter section of the chapter discussed in 
some detail some of the important differences between households and developed 
a proposal for how these households could be clustered.  In particular, it 
highlighted the importance of paying attention to the networks that connect 
households to distant localities, and the ways in which disconnection, or 
marginalization within connection, can be linked to vulnerability. 
 
This clustering obviously has some clear implications for the consideration of 
vulnerability.  Most obviously, it suggests that we should look particularly closely at 
the situation of households that are ‘urban-disconnected’ and ‘rural-disconnected’ 
along with the factors that shape their situations.  It also provides some initial 
pointers for key issues that need further investigation. 
 
In the first place, it highlights the importance of intra and inter-household 
relationships and the ways in which these function to organise overall livelihood 
strategies.  Here, kinship is absolutely central.  Kin connections of one kind or 
another – especially close kin - are the links that join rural and urban households to 
one another both within and between regions.  Secondly, the social organisation of 
kin relations also plays a central role in underpinning – or undermining – livelihood 
choices within households.  This is not merely a point about the distribution of 
resources or the organization of labour.  One key component of success for 
successful households was the way in which the structures of authority and co-
operation within a household functioned to make it possible for a household to act 
in a relatively organised manner, leveraging their resources in ways that sometimes 
made the whole more than the sum of its parts. We shall consider this in more 
detail later.  Kinship entitled people to resources within a household, but it was 
also a connection on the basis of which claims could be made.  Part of the power of 
a rural patriarch or a matriarch was their ability to have a significant say about 
who did what within a particular household.  A significant part of our exploration of 
vulnerability therefore has to include a very careful look at the internal politics of 
this process –and at who is empowered, and who is disempowered within it. 
 
Secondly, this broad typology should highlight the importance of understanding 
livelihood strategies within a long term strategic contexts. The livelihood activities 
we consider here and the broader strategies, of which they are part, are in an 
important sense not merely focussed on day to day survival or even on coping with 
risk, smoothing consumption and so on.  They also involve an attempt to strategise 
at a life span, generational and even inter-generational level.  It is important to 
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remember that livelihood strategies unfold over time; that different people are at 
different points in the overall trajectory of migrancy and household development 
(and that their interests and needs will therefore differ); and that strategies can 
fail at various points.  As Spiegel et al point out, it has long been established that a 
vital role is played by where people are in what they call the ‘domestic 
developmental cycle’:  
 
… the behaviour of people at every phase of the cycle indicates the extent and 
way in which they are locked into reciprocal networks of mutual long-terms 
support – either as providers of remittance income or dependants on it in 
return for access to rural resources that are both material and social and that 
are understood to form the basis of post-employment reciprocity. The residents 
of newly established… housing areas that we interviewed were not immediately 
concerned to ‘massage’ such networks.  But there was a sense in which they 
themselves saw their apparent individualism as just temporary: once they had 
indeed secured themselves reliably they expected to open their doors more 
readily to others.”(Spiegel et al 1994) 
 
But the point is not only that livelihood strategies unfold (and sometimes fail) 
across the span of lifetimes.  It is also that they happen in history. This raises a 
troubling reality – for it seems that the economic underpinnings that sustained 
circular migration are gone.  Recent scholarship seems to indicate that the 
character of migration is changing, that remittances are declining. While for some, 
‘circular migration’ in the classical sense – a stint in the urban areas followed by 
retirement in the rural areas – is still possible, but for many that possibility is 
receding.  Many of the Eastern Cape households in the study that had access to 
some resources were essentially living off past savings – either in the form of 
accumulated cattle, or in the form of a rapidly consumed retrenchment or 
provident fund package payouts.  There is no evidence that young people in search 
of work have any chance of duplicating the ‘back investment’ strategy of their 
parents.  This has troubling long term implications for both economic and social 
policy.  Many of the difficulties experienced by rural and urban disconnected 
households will only become more extreme, and the ability of agrarian economy to 
subsidise urban livelihoods and cushion vulnerability will decrease. 
 
These points together highlight the stakes of the debate around social protection.  
It helps provide the social context for the vulnerability of some of the groups (e.g. 
female headed households).  But more importantly, it raises some urgent questions 
about the interactions between social grants on the one hand, and broader 
questions about economic development and poverty alleviation on the other.  On 
the one hand, it is clear that in the context of declining remittances and the 
collapse of institutions like traditional marriage, pensions and child grant play an 
important palliative role, reducing the severity of poverty and ameliorating its 
worst impacts.  But for poverty to be reduced in any real sense, economic 
development has to create jobs that allow people to get out of poverty and 
participate effectively in the economy.  We need better to understand what the 
contribution of social grants in that context is, and what the other factors are that 
need to be taken into account if grants are to be anything more than a temporary 
way of making poverty sustainable.   
 
This raises some important questions: 
 
1) What is the nature of the broader economic context that enables or disables 
livelihood strategies in these areas? 




2) What are the forms of vulnerability that people encounter in these 
contexts? 
 
3) How do people deal with these forms of vulnerability? 
 
4) What is the role of social grants and transfers within these networks? 
 
5) What are the factors that impact on how people make decisions about key 
issues, e.g. grant use, investment in education, which could impact on their 
ability to escape from poverty? 
 
Answering these questions requires that we step back from the characteristics and 





5 CONTEXTUALISING VULNERABILITY 
5.1 Beyond the ‘second’ economy: understanding life at the 
margin 
 
Much of the remainder of this report will be devoted to a detailed exploration of 
the strategies that people have developed in order to survive, reduce vulnerability, 
and even get out of poverty when they exist outside or on the very edges of the 
formal labour market.  First, however, it is important to better understand the 
most important features of what in ‘livelihoods framework’ parlance is called the 
‘vulnerability context’ – the meso and macro level structural features that shape 
many of the choices that are open to individuals and households in their pursuit of 
a livelihood.  This section therefore sets out some of the key economic realities 
facing the economically marginalised in Khayelitsha and the Eastern Cape. 
 
In recent years, the issue of structural poverty — for a while rather disregarded — 
has again entered the mainstream of South African social policy debate.  There has 
been increasing attention on the prospect that, while the economy as a whole as 
shown significant growth, certain groupings may have ended up being ‘socially 
excluded’, unable to benefit from the opportunities that arise.  Some scholars have 
even raised the prospect that sections of South Africa’s unemployed may constitute 
an ‘underclass’, so thoroughly disadvantaged by poverty, educational neglect and 
the lack of significant assets that they risk being permanently left behind (Seekings 
2003, Seekings et al 2003).  
 
Since 2003, these concerns have also been articulated very strongly by government.  
The dominant way in which these issues have been framed is with reference to the 
notion of a ‘second economy’ – the notion that the persistence of poverty for many 
in South Africa is explained by the fact that they are excluded from the ‘first world 
economy’ and subsist in a underdeveloped, informal economy, existing alongside 
but disconnected from the economic mainstream (Mbeki 2003, PCAS 2006).  
 
This should be seen as an important advance in official policy discourse  - a 
recognition that left to itself, the economy will not necessarily allow benefits to 
‘trickle down’ to all, and that there may be important  structural  aspects to 
poverty that make it impossible for the poorest and most marginalised to lift 
themselves up by their own bootstraps.  At the same time, some scholars have 
pointed out a need for caution.  There is a risk that ‘second economy’ talk could 
herald a slide back into the economic dualism that characterised 1970s South 
African liberalism – a tendency to conceive South Africa in terms of a ‘successful’ 
mainstream and a problematic periphery, coupled with a failure to see how the 
two are in fact intimately connected.  As a matter of fact, pointing out this error 
was for years one of the main elements of the ANC’s critique of South African 
liberalism (Devey, Skinner & Valodia 2006:2).  It is important that these points are 
not forgotten.  Though the notion of the ‘second economy’ may be an attempt to 
highlight the distance between the ‘insiders’ who are able to participate with 
benefit in the South African economy and the ‘outsiders’ who face major obstacles 
to such participation, it is important to go further than oversimplified notions of 
simple disconnection and exclusion, and to look in more detail at the exact nature 
of the real relationships and modes of articulation between the highly developed 
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corporate ‘centre’ and the economic margins where people are confined to low-
return informal activity and unemployment (Du Toit 2005).   
  
This chapter begins with a relatively general and brief discussion of the economic 
context of poor people’s livelihoods in two very different regions: the rural district 
of Mount Frere, and township life in Khayelitsha. This is linked to a discussion of 
some of the key similarities and differences between the urban and rural contexts.  
This sets the scene for a consideration of the implications for informal economic 
activity, and the linkages between formal and informal activities.  This chapter 
also considers not only economic formality and informality, but also the crucial role 
of the state and governance, and the implications of the relative weakness and 
lack of coherence in the local state, particularly in the Eastern Cape.  After 
discussing the livelihood implications of these structural features, the chapter 
closes with a brief outline of some of the key strategies for coping with these 
realities revealed by the data. 
5.2 The economic context of vulnerability 
5.2.1 De-agrarianisation in the Mount Frere district 
 
In the Mount Frere district people’s economic prospects are defined by the broader 
context of deep underdevelopment.  The overriding feature of this landscape is the 
relative absence of endogenous economic development (including agricultural 
activity) and the reliance on distant labour and other markets.  In what follows, 
the economic context of vulnerability in the region is sketched out in terms of 
three (ultimately interrelated) domains.  The first is the general decline of agrarian 
production, the second concerns the reconfiguring of regional economic activity in 
the absence of a local industrial or manufacturing base but with the ascendancy of 
big retail enterprises, the third and final point concerns the fate of remittances 
and back investment. 
 
The first issue is the general decline and ‘hollowing out’ of the Transkei agrarian 
economy.  While agrarian livelihood activities continue to significantly augment 
people’s livelihood (cf. Shackleton, Shackleton & Cousins, 2000), there is evidence 
that they are increasingly paying a supplementary role.  Very few households 
participating in the study were able to ensure food security exclusively through 
their own agricultural activities.  Those that generate significant agricultural 
production are typically the households that are well connected to the formal 
economy.  They dispose over the cash needed for inputs such as ploughing or the 
acquisition of livestock.  As is illustrated by some of the case studies in this report 
these comparatively better-off households are more likely to attract other kin 
members, and are more likely to preside over the requisite surplus labour needed 
for smallholder agriculture.  
 
De-agrarianisation is a global phenomenon and commonplace throughout Sub-
Saharan Africa.  It flows from a range of factors including rising rural population 
growth rates, the deleterious effects of market liberalisation and often sees rural 
dwellers diversifying their livelihoods into non-agricultural sources (Ellis, 2000).  
The nature and full extent of de-agrarianisation in the former Transkei is a matter 
of some scholarly contestation (cf. Beinart, 1992; Bernstein, 1996: McAllister, 
2000; Lipton et al. 1996; Manona, 1998; Andrews & Fox, 2004).  It is an issue 
further obscured by impulses towards viewing the region as a homogenous entity, 
rather than one traversed by sharp differences of soil ecology, rainfall and market 
access.  Moreover agricultural production in this region has often taken place 
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against adverse circumstances, including disruptive development and betterment 
schemes, a dearth of marketing and infrastructural support and a century of labour 
migration (cf. Bundy, 1988).  
  
Within the focal research area, there were strong indications that the role of 
agriculture has declined in the district.  Many of the large cultivated fields 
(‘intsimi’) are falling into disuse, while householder agriculture is limited to the 
garden plots adjacent to homesteads.  Informants readily relate the abandonment 
of the cultivated fields to the monetization of the agrarian economy, and the fact 
that ploughing is increasingly relying on mechanical rather than animal traction.  
Poorer householders do not have the money required to hire tractors to plough, nor 
do they have access to animal traction, with access to livestock the most 
significant variable influencing household agricultural production (Heron, 1991).  As 
cattle ownership is often highly skewed: 80% of households owned less than 5 head 
of cattle; about half owned none, and five per cent owned 10 head of cattle or 
more (see Table 7) and correlated with non-rural income sources, it tends to be 
concentrated in the hands of local elites such as traditional leaders, bureaucrats 
and businessmen (Cousins, 1996).  Sharp economic differentiation between 
households furthermore undermines cooperative work arrangements, such as the 
‘ilima’ (work parties constituted for weeding) and the collective ploughing 
groupings.  When better resourced households receive fewer benefits than they 
contribute to these groups they are inclined to withdraw from them, further 
undermining poorer household’s ability to engage in agrarian production (Spiegel, 
1979).  In the context of the large planning fields falling into disuse, evidence from 
elsewhere in the former Transkei suggests the smaller homestead garden plots are 
being intensively cultivated, in an effort to maintain output in the face of declining 
resources (Andrews and Fox, 2004). 
 
 





 Percentiles Number of Cattle 
N Valid 732.0 
 Missing 1.0 
Mean  2.6 
Percentiles 20.0 0.0 
 40.0 0.0 
 60.0 2.0 
 80.0 5.0 
 100.0 30.0 
 
The retreat from cultivation of the planting fields further feeds into the vicious 
circle of de-agrarianisation.  With fewer people cultivating there is little incentive 
for the entire village to keep stray animals out of the poorly fenced fields.  
Compulsory schooling has similarly reduced the availability of children to control 
livestock.  Many research respondents consequently report crop losses due to stray 
livestock, or expressed a reluctance to cultivate in anticipation of these large 
losses.  Interviewees also reported a process that might be called ‘bovine 
deskilling’: even where people have livestock, the oxen have not been trained to 
the plough, further increasing people’s dependency on mechanical traction.  A final 
pragmatic factor in the decline and reconfiguring of agriculture is the dissipation of 
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whatever homeland-era agricultural extension services (such as cattle dipping) 
existed in the past. 
 
There is a further element to de-agrarianisation which receives varying inflections 
in the literature, namely the complex “connections people made between food 
production, rural life and social identity” (Minkley and Banks, 2005).  Many of the 
crucial cooperative work arrangements described above depend on an underlying 
set of social and moral precepts.  Much successful agricultural production depends 
not simply on agricultural labour, but on a broader, collective commitment to an 
agrarian lifestyle.  McAllister’s (2001) detailed analysis of a productive maize 
growing district in the former Transkei suggests some of the characteristics of 
these areas.  They are typically: in the high rainfall coastal belt; undisrupted by a 
history of betterment planning or forced removals; relatively isolated from 
markets; and (significantly) home to inhabitants who demonstrate a commitment 
to a conservative, rural Xhosa lifestyle.  Relatively few of these factors correlating 
with successful agrarian production, are evident within the focal research setting in 
the Mount Frere district.   
 
The complex interplay between social identity and agrarian production is also 
evident in the changing nature of the household formation.  In the past, cash 
remittances enabled young men to pay dowry (‘lobola’) and thereby ‘build’ the 
homesteads (in both social and economic terms).  The resultant normative cycle of 
household development (Spiegel 1996) rendered agricultural work the preserve of 
middle aged men, who had retired from urban labour, and women.  There is some 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that local agrarian labour continues to be regarded 
as an inappropriate vocation for a young man.  One can only speculate on how this 
dynamic, along with vastly elevated levels of schooling in the last generation, and 
pervasive images of western consumerism have served to temper the emergent 
agrarian aspirations and identities. 
 
If a relative dearth of agricultural activity is a feature of the Mount Frere district, a 
further striking feature of the district is the absence of a thriving secondary 
economic sector (particularly light manufacturing or industry).  In the last decade 
many of the traditional avenues of industrial employment for residents of the area 
have waned. The Transkei Wild Coast belt, prioritised for labour recruitment 
especially since the 1970s, has borne the brunt of declining mine labour (Bank and 
Minkley, 2005), while the derelict industrial parks of Dimbaza and Butterworth 
attest to the collapse of regional industries, much of it textile and garment 
related.  From an employment high of 50 000 in the mid 1980s, most of these jobs 
ceased with disbanding of regional decentralization incentives in the 1990s (Nel 
and Temple 1992).  By 1998 Butterworth alone had lost 80% of its industrial jobs, 
each supporting scores of rural dependents (Bank and Minkley, 2005).  
Unfortunately South Africa’s twenty first century industrial core has little use for 
manual mine labourers; or workers in a textile and garment sector, hard hit by 
exposure to global competition. 
 
The overarching forces of economic change, market liberalisation and globalization 
are some of the factors driving the decline of both agrarian and industrial activity 
in this region and much of sub-Saharan African.  However, there are linkages and 
synergies between these two sectors: the Asian development literature is replete 
with accounts of rural industry.  Livelihood diversification (through non-farm 
employment, petty commerce and urban migration) now contributes to roughly half 
of all rural incomes in low income countries (Ellis & Allison, 2004).  Rural dwellers 
efforts to diversifying their occupation, to control for the effects of seasonality, 
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risk and declining agrarian output, serves to reproduce social differentiation.  Ellis 
(2006) notes that better off households tend to diversify into non-farm business 
activities (such as business, transport services, construction), while the poor 
typically diversity in the form of casual work, much of it in agriculture.  Although 
some commentators suggest that non-agricultural occupations such as weaving, 
pottery, beer brewing, carpentry and perhaps auto mechanics and transport 
services offer up the promise of nascent manufacturing or industry, Bryceson and 
Jamal (1997) remain pessimistic about the growth prospects for these activities.  
They that argue few of the skills and organizational features of these economic 
activities are really connected with industry.  Where these activities take place 
they generally represent a small scale, sporadic, survivalist risk mitigation strategy 
for household subsistence rather than proto-professional occupation.   
 
The general paucity of the secondary economic sector in this region is arguably not 
related to the lack of linkages with the formal economy, but by its very nature and 
ubiquity.  Systematically deprived of development for decades, the sudden 
deregulation of the former Transkei in the 1990s saw the regional retail economy 
rapidly dominated by large national supermarket chains which moved swiftly into 
the rural areas.  Although these supermarket chains supply cheaper food, their 
supply lines invariably bypass local production. The milk, meat and other 
perishables for sale Mount Frere supermarkets are sourced not from local 
producers, but rather the more distant commodity markets of Kokstad, Durban and 
East London.  Of the five largest supermarkets and wholesalers in Mount Frere, only 
a single store is in any sense locally owned (by a long-resident Cypriot Greek 
family).  Only they are readily able and willing to purchase products locally (see 
case study 13 below).  An important component of the agrarian economy and 
purchasers of local agricultural surpluses in previous decades, rural trading stores 
have been devastatingly undersold by the coming of large retail to Mount Frere.  
Many of the trading stores attest to a changed economic logic, they stand decrepit, 
with rows of empty shelves poorly stocked with merchandise. The trading store’s 
function as a site of labour recruitment has been long since rendered obsolete by 
the dissolution of formalised labour migration.  While its role as a nexus of 
communication, and conduit for postal remittances between rural residents and 
urban kin, has also been eroded by the digital technologies of ATM cards and 





Case Study 12: The rise and fall of a rural trading store 
 
Ms Safika has been the proprietor of a trading store, outside of the village of Akulinywa. Set 
amongst towering eucalyptus trees in an otherwise scrubby grassland landscape, the store 
consists of a cluster of buildings set a short distance from the dirt road.  The corrugated iron 
roofs wear a rusted patina, while faded signs for consumer products, some familiar and others 
long since forgotten, adorn the peeling buildings.  Decrepit petrol and paraffin pumps sit 
alongside corroded fuel tanks, testifying to former availability of fuel here.  The interior of the 
store is paneled with vast open shelves, with a modest range of items (mostly household 
commodities and non-perishable food items) spaced out along the vacant shelves behind the 
counter.  Articulate and candid, Ms Safika is an excellent informant.  Not only has she owned 
and worked the trading store since the 1977 ‘independence’ of the Transkei, her account 
suggested a fine recollection of dates and figures. 
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As a young, newly qualified school teacher Mrs Safika acquired the store, with a Transkei 
Development Corporation (TDC) loan in 1977.  She explained that a long standing family 
friend of her deceased parents was the shadowy benefactor who signed surety for her.  The 
store, expropriated from its former white owner, standing on a plot of four hectares with a 
large homestead behind it cost R25 200.  On acquiring the store Ms Safika also took a stock 
loan of R30 000 from the TDC.  She describes this as a time of great uncertainty for, despite 
her occupancy of the store, she did not feel her claim to it to be particularly strong as others 
had expressed interest in it.  However she fared well and paid off her stock loan in less than 
four years, and the property loan by 1982.  A time of prosperity and stability, she employed 
nine people in her enterprise she sold a range of grocery, household and agricultural goods, 
along with petrol and paraffin.  The trading store also operated a grinding mill (which charged 
villagers to mill their maize) and the early 1980s Mrs Safika erect a small post office in a 
building alongside her store.  The Post office supplied post boxes, a switchboard and 
switchboard operator.  The early 1980s also saw her divorced her school teacher husband.  
Mrs Safika reports that apart from being a drunkard, he fathered several illegitimate children 
in the village.  Her ex-husband was never involved in the store.  It was her trading store, she 
explained.  The moniker ‘trading store’ is however a slight misnomer, Mrs Safika purchases 
no agricultural surpluses from the surrounding populace. 
 
It was in the 1990s with the coming of ‘free enterprise’ that Mrs Safika reports her business 
began faltering.  Between 1992 and 1996 Transkei leader Bantu Holomisa issued a directive 
that effectively abolished the geographical exclusivity trading stores enjoyed.  Now ‘even if 
other traders set up on our front door’, Mrs Safika explains, they could do nothing about it.  
She attributed Holomisa’s embrace of ‘free enterprise’ to the influence of the ANC and offers 
as proof his subsequent joining of the ANC.  Prior to Holomisa, under Matanzima, trading 
stores were licensed (along with grinding mills) and spaced at least 15 kilometers apart.  The 
coming of free enterprise saw white commercial farmers tow their portable grinding mills in 
and set them up temporarily in the shade of the eucalyptus trees outside her store.  Mrs Safika 
recalls the disappointment of witnessing all her former customers queuing to have their maize 
ground.   
 
The coming of retail deregulation also saw a relaxation of the restrictions on wholesalers, who 
were now able to sell to everybody rather than just licensed traders.  The opening of 
wholesalers to all not only undercut Mrs Safika’s margins; it lifted the proprietal secrecy 
under which stores such as hers operated.  She described the difficulties standing in the same 
queue at a wholesaler with future customers because they knew exactly what she had paid for 
various items.  This generated ‘gossip’ as people would tell their friends to see how much 
more she was selling the items for than she paid for them.  There is a sense, in Mrs Safika’s 
account, of the changing social relationships with the surrounding community that 
accompanied her declining wealth.  Increased competition from wholesalers also came with a 
reconfiguring of supply chains into the Transkei.  Instead of buying from the likes of Mrs 
Safika, who in turn sourced her goods from both Mount Frere and more distant wholesalers in 
Durban and East London, consumers now went straight to big retail in Mount Frere.  
Particularly after 2000, with the national Boxer and Shoprite chain opening stores in Mount 
Frere.  Ms Safika explained that the opening of a Rhino chain store in more distant Matatiele 
further increased retail competition.  She cited the example of how ‘terrible, far much 
cheaper’ Rhino sold 500 gram bags of salt for 35c, whereas a similar sized bag cost 47c at the 
Mount Frere stores Mrs Safika was now patronizing.  Even the Post Office which used to 
attract customers to spend money at her store was downgraded to a postal agency.  The 
registered letters containing remittances which Mrs Safika used to distribute became 
superseded by bank accounts and ATM cards. 
 
Mrs Safika describes the mid 1990s onwards as particularly stressful.  For not only was her 
business failing, she was supporting a son at university and two daughters at a ‘multiracial 
school in Kokstad’.  In response to growing financial pressure she took an ECDC (East Cape 
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Development Corporation) loan of R75 000 in 1997.  For a year she was able to service her 
monthly loan repayments of R2 600, before falling into arrears.  Having never succeeded in 
clearing this debt and having been served with default judgements, the Sheriff of the court has 
come to her store and taken her stock and money out of the till.  Memorably describing her 
predicament with “this store is a Titanic, it is taking me down”, Ms Safika readily ascribes its 
declining profitability to the overarching forces of retail deregulation and yet she also nurses 
more personal regrets.  In her reflections, she rued the rapidity with which she paid back her 
first loans.  She speculated that if she had paid these back over the maximum prescribed 
period, her cash flow, and consequently access to stock would be better.  Perhaps, Mrs Safika 
muses, she might still have been profitable.   
 
 
Case Study 13: Taking a national retail franchise to the streets: Stavros’ 
supermarket 
 
Mount Frere may have a reputation as a small rural town; but anyone who pays it a visit on a 
weekday or Saturday morning will find a hub of commercial activity.  Far from being a sleepy 
town, it seethes with activity: at least the pavements of the N2 as it courses through town are 
solidly lined with street traders – local people selling fruit and vegetables, and Chinese and 
Pakistani peddlers (some of whom say they left their own villages in Pakistan a mere six 
months before) selling clothes, sunglasses and cellphone chargers.  In less than a kilometre of 
high street there are several automated teller machines (ATMs) – and the way they are 
positioned speaks volumes about cash flows in the local economy.  Although there are the 
free standing machines that snake with queues thirty or forty people deep on pension payout 
days and at the end of the month, every major supermarket is in close proximity to an ATM.  
People line up first to draw money, and then hand it over at the cash registers to purchase 12.5 
kg bags of maize meal, cheap meat and other bulk essential products.  On the pavement, mere 
paces from the local branch of Shoprite, is a steel shipping container with an ABSA ATM 
grafted onto its side.  Within the foyer of the local branch of the (Pick and Pay owned) Boxer 
supermarket the symbiosis between ATM and big retail is even tighter.  The new FNB 
machine is compact (the size of a hi-fi set), it need neither be large nor armoured as it 
contains no money.  Instead the machine issues vouchers which can be effortlessly redeemed 
for cash or good from the store cashiers, thereby sparing a superfluous duplication of the cash 
infrastructure.  ATM cash mostly goes to store tills anyway. 
 
Stavros’ Supermarket has existed in Mount Frere for several generations, and in various 
guises, for almost 80 years.  Although the new arrivals of Shoprite and Boxer pose stiff 
competition, Stavros’ large supermarket – now part of a national retail franchise chain — 
continues to do brisk business. Core to the success of the eponymous Stavros is that he has 
managed to ‘Transkeify’ the formula of the normally up-market supermarket franchise his 
store is part of, while continuing to beat his bigger rivals on quality.  Mount Frere residents 
will tell you that the fruit and vegetables at Stavros are not the cheapest, but they are the 
freshest.  When fruit and vegetables are not fresh, Stavros still sells them – but not in the 
store: a table is set up outside, and Stavros sells his bruised produce on the street, competing 
head-to head with the informal traders that are selling their bruised tomatoes and overripe 
bananas at a rand a bag outside.  Stavros’ ‘if you can’t beat them join them’ retail is aided by 
the absence of any municipal trading buy-laws in the administrative chaos of post-homeland 
Transkei.  Stavros, unlike the other large retailers in Mount Frere, will also buy produce from 
local farmers – but on condition, that they do not attempt to sell their vegetables elsewhere in 
Mount Frere.   
 
All of these arrangements have brought cheaper food to the residents of the district, but they 
also undermine the multiplier effect of local consumer spending. Cash comes into Mount 
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Frere in armoured transit vans; is deposited into the ATMs; is drawn by local people – often 
against funds deposited there by distant relatives or drawn down as social grants – moves five 
or ten metres across the street into one of the big stores, and leaves again: repatriated as 
profits to South Africa’s retail giants. Mount Frere is less a local economic hub than a node in 
a larger net.  
 
If the decline of regional economic and agrarian activity, along with the 
simultaneous ascendancy of an expansive, exogenous retail is the story of the 
former Transkei, a third element in the tale is back investment by urban migrants.  
Longstanding patterns of migration have facilitated substantial back investment 
into the former Transkei.  However many of these the links that enable investment 
of wealth and resources from the urban economic centres into the Mount Frere are 
weakening and fading.   Though the practice of remitting money continues the 
decline of the manufacturing and mining sectors has meant that both the search 
for jobs and the regularity of remittances have become far riskier and less certain. 
Migration has become a far more perilous and uncertain undertaking, in the post 
labour recruitment epoch.  What resources the better off households have 
managed to accumulate often represent the benefits of processes of saving and 
back-investment that is finite, and in many cases becoming exhausted.  Several of 
the better off households included in the study are subsisting off defined 
contribution retirement benefits or retrenchment packages.  Very few were 
receiving life long pensions.  Even households that appear relatively well-off at 
present, where a household member has toiled in the formal economy for a 
prolonged period of time and accumulated significant savings, is likely to shift over 
time as those savings become depleted by the demands of survival in an uncertain 
future. 
   
 
 
Case Study 14: The Radebes and the future of back investment  
 
The compound of Bulelani Radebe consists of a cluster of houses including two rondavels and 
a large, H-shaped house (with four bedrooms in the wings and a large central reception room).  
The homestead is affluent looking and includes a solar panel mounted on a short mast, for 
charging car batteries in order to run a TV or radio.  The household consists of six adults, 
including Bulelani and his wife, his adult son Anele and daughter Thando and two daughters 
in law (one of whom is married to Anele).  Thando and Bulelani’s two daughters in law, each 
have a child at the homestead.  Raising the final tally of individuals living at the household to 
11 are the two young sons of another daughter (ill with HIV in Cape Town). 
 
A cluster of Bulelani’s adult children and his grandchildren, live in the urban centres of Cape 
Town, Gauteng and Mthatha (Umtata).  The only exception to this distribution of 
grandchildren are the twin 13 year old boys, born to Thando, who live with their paternal 
grandmother in the North West Province.  Child support grants for three of the grandchildren 
at the household have been secured.  Both Bulelani and his wife were recently turned down 
for disability grants (neither being adjudicated sufficiently incapacitated). 
To an experienced eye Bulelani’s large compound, with its large well built house, furnished 
with an array of store bought furniture from the last three decades attests to an extended bout 
of labour in the formal economy.  This is in fact the case.  Bulelani first left the village in 
1961, and worked in the Free State for several months, before joining Iscor in Pretoria in 
November 1962.  He secured the job via his ‘grandfather’ (actually a paternal uncle) who was 
already working at Iscor and claimed that Bulelani was his son.  (In the past employment 
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opportunities were often awarded via paternal, or village based relations such as this).  
Initially Bulelani worked on the six month contracts which required return to the village at the 
end of the contract.  He explained how he lived in the Iscor hostel and (to the incredulity of 
some of the grandchildren present) earned R6.34 per week, of which he remitted R10 back to 
his wife each month via registered mail.  This was, Bulelani explained, more than sufficient 
for a bag of mielie meal and goat every month.  In terms of his employment at Iscor, he 
initially started unloading coal and lime from railway trucks.  He recalls the lime used to 
make him cough, so he convinced one of the clerks to make him a ‘quenching car’ (or 
‘bleskar’ in Afrikaans) driver, operating what sounded like a motorized cart which fed the 
furnaces.  A steady income enabled Buelani to marry his current wife in 1968.  Like many 
other women in the village, she made the sun-dried mud bricks and a builder was paid to 
construct the structures on their property. 
Bulelani worked at Iscor until November 1996, a total of 34 years, although his framed long 
service certificate hanging in the lounge records 28 years (his employment was to some extent 
intermittent in the early phases).  In 1996 he received a retrenchment package of 
approximately R105 000 and returned to the village.  Of this amount he purchased some 
furniture for the house, educated the three of his children to matric and paid labolo for his son.  
He also purchased three cows (but two subsequently died) and five goats (two of which have 
been slaughtered in traditional ceremonies).  The household cultivates maize (five 50kg bags 
last year), vegetables and a small amount of beans.  Bulelani explained that they are ‘still 
eating the money’.   
 
When asked about economic activity in the present, Bulelani explained that he sporadically 
gets a job to erect or repair fences every six months or so, for a sum varying from R300 to 
R600 (it seemed very negotiable).  Three of his children working in urban areas send 
remittances, ranging from R150 to R400 a month, collectively total about R600 a month.  In 
the decade since his exit from formal employment, Bulelani’s retrenchment package has 
steadily been eroded by the multiple demands on it.   
 
Bulelani reported the household not to have any other sources of income.  However further 
enquires of his daughter Thando revealed that she sells clothes.  Travelling to Durban via two 
busses (first to Matatiele and then a second to Durban, total fares of R95) she buys clothes 
from the factory shop and second hand shops for between R1000 and R1500.  She returns to 
the village and sells these, sometimes on credit.  Although debtors sometimes ‘run away’ and 
she is unable to collect the debt, she makes an irregular income from her enterprise.  She 
explained she started the business with capital from her boyfriend, the father of her child.  He 
gave her the money in lieu of other support for the child, and told her to ‘make business’ with 
it.  She was reticent on what sort of returns her business generates and the extent to which the 
proceeds of this business are pooled with the household accounts.  However her monthly 
contribution of R100 to an umcalelo (mutual savings society), suggests she probably 
generates a tidy profit of a few hundred rand a month.  
 
Bulelani’s son does ‘piece jobs’ on somebody else’s field.  He too retains whatever income he 
earns, and his parents expressed having no knowledge of how much he is paid.  Unlike his 
father’s generation, the ‘join’ (labour recruitment) no longer exists for men of Anele’s age.  
With its disappearance has gone formalised urban migration, the certainty of employment and 
the promise of the opportunity to build a homestead.  Anele is not uncommon in living with 
his wife and child at his parent’s compound.  He engages in the agrarian labour that might 
have been considered inappropriate for a young married man in the past.  His cash poverty is 
reflected in the fact that his father paid the R5 000 required as lobolo for his wife.  It is 
unclear how he will ever be able to build a homestead comparable to that of his father.  For 
the new face of urban-rural migration is represented by his wily sister: privatized, informal, 
vulnerable, and increasingly female.   





5.2.2 Race and space in Khayelitsha  
 
In Khayelitsha, the economic context is rather more complex and difficult to 
delineate with ease.  While poverty in Mount Frere is shaped by the key facts of 
remoteness, underdevelopment, de-agrarianisation and adverse incorporation, 
poverty in Khayelitsha seems to be shaped most above all by the political economy 
of racialised urban space.  Khayelitsha is a relatively recently created township, 
composed mostly of recent migrants into Cape Town; and from this perspective 
perhaps the most important fact about it is that while it is populated mostly by 
those who have left the Eastern Cape and the rural areas to seek jobs in the city, 
those who live in it are still in a very large measure economically, spatially and 
racially marginalised from that city.   
 
Table 8: Change in percentage sectoral contribution to GGP  in Cape Town - 1994 to 2005 (from 








Business services 3.07 
Wholesale & retail trade 2.48 
Construction -0.02 
Community social services -0.04 





In the first place, the urban economy has not succeeded in creating many formal 
employment opportunities for Cape Town’s poor, landless, relatively unschooled 
and African population. Increasing capital intensity in the economy as a whole 
since the early 1980s has driven a decline in manufacturing employment, with 200 
000 jobs being lost between 1980 and 1996 nationally. While Cape Town initially 
bucked this trend the period after 1996 saw significant manufacturing job losses; 
driven mostly by the decline in the clothing industry (see table).  In addition there 
has been a decline in the numbers of people employed in private households (SACN 
2004: 52).  On the whole then, employment opportunities for unskilled workers 
have been diminishing.  This is unlikely to be addressed in the future by the growth 
path taken by the city: like many other South African cities Cape Town has 
emphasised an outward looking, globally integrated growth path, emphasising 
financial services, tourism and export led manufacture (see SACN 2004 esp. 66 ff).  
Unfortunately this has not created many jobs for unskilled workers – and even 
where ‘unskilled’ jobs do become available, cultural and racial factors continue to 
exclude those who are not fluent in English.  While unemployment is better than in 
many other South African cities, estimates still put unemployment (in the 
expanded definition) at between 25% and 30% of the labour force (SACN 2004: 51).  
Within this general statistic, African migrants are disproportionately affected. 
 
 







While African migrants constitute the single largest group of migrants into Cape 
Town (constituting 54% of the cities immigrant population) they are also the most 
marginalized grouping; while the migratory flow of work seekers from the Eastern 
Cape dwarfs all others into Cape Town migrants from the Eastern Cape are also 
among the most likely to face unemployment, and on average report lower incomes 
than other migrants (Cousins, Parnel & Skuse 2005). 
 
Table 9: Cape Town Employment Status: Age 15-64: Totals by Race Group and Gender: 2004 














Employed 101,438 75,329 215,091 211,823 142,407 122,179 
Unemployed 78,000 91,607 51,445 46,122 4,400 2,906 
Not economically active 119,434 170,049 137,493 239,888 43,176 75,979 
 
 
To some extent the disproportionate inability of internal African migrants in Cape 
Town to access formal sector jobs flows from the underdevelopment of the Eastern 
Cape and from the educational legacy of Apartheid.  Although rates of schooling 
are higher than they are in Mount Frere (see table) large numbers of older African 
migrants in Cape Town’s African suburbs have very little education. 
 
Table 10: Educational attainment of adults in Mount Frere and selected African suburbs in Cape 







Completed 11-12 years of school 20.5% 29.9% 
Completed less than 8 years of school (entire sample) 40.6% 29.5% 
Completed less than 8 years of school (adults older than 40) 63.4% 56.4% 
Never attended school (entire sample) 5.7% 4.8% 
Never attended school (adults older than 40) 10.9% 12.1% 
  
This educational disadvantage is exacerbated by and interacts in complex ways 
with the local political geography of race and space in the aftermath of Apartheid. 
In an important sense, Khayelitsha is in, but not of Cape Town.  It is situated more 
than 30 kilometres away from the city centre, remote from the shopping and 
manufacturing sectors where most of the jobs are to be found.  Travel to and from 
these centres is expensive and dangerous.  In many ways, then, Khayelitsha is 
something of an economic, racial and cultural enclave.  As the case study of 
Nontuthuzelo Mbada showed (see Case Study 2 on p. 32), many people travel 
thousands of kilometres from the Eastern Cape to come to the urban areas – but 
rarely or never venture the last 15 to 30 kilometres into the economic hub. Half of 
the urban respondents to the 2002 survey reported that they were unable to speak 
either Afrikaans or English, a figure that was surprisingly relatively independent of 
whether they were recent immigrants or not; the low rates of fluency in umlungu 
languages among those with little education is not surprising (see table), but even 
among those who had had between and 11 and 12 years of schooling 28% reported 
themselves unable to speak Afrikaans or English.  This is an important disadvantage 
Section 5: Contextualising vulnerability   86 
 
 
in a city which is the only South African Metro area with a majority non-African 
population (Cousins Skuse & Parnell 2005). 
 
Table 11:  Percentage of various groups of adults in African Suburbs in Cape Town reportedly 




Economically, culturally and socially, Khayelitsha therefore has a paradoxical 
character. Thoroughly metropolitan and part of the urban economy, it also in some 
ways the Eastern Cape’s westernmost village.  Perched right on the urban 
perimeter of greater Cape Town, its denizens sometimes speak as if Encobo is 
closer than Claremont, and visit Qumbu more often than they do Kraaifontein.  
Created as an Apartheid dormitory township, removal to which was fiercely 
resisted in the 1980s, it has acquired a community character in its own right; while 
characterised by high levels of poverty and unemployment, is also bustling with 
informal activity.  
 
For the purposes of this report, there are four important ways in which these facts 
shape the ‘vulnerability context’ and impact on the livelihood strategies of poor 
people.  
 
(1) The first key factor is the simultaneous centrality and fragility of paid 
employment in or on the margins of the formal sector.  In the 2002 survey, 85% of 
the households in Cape Town’s African suburbs with an income of more than R1500 
contained at least one adult with access to permanent, stable employment. The 
data also highlight the insecurity of employment in the usually unskilled sectors of 
the economy: 31% of 622 urban households reported in 2002 that the breadwinner 
has suffered the loss of work in the previous year, and 30% reported the loss of a 
permanent job in the previous five years.   
 
(2) Secondly, as with the urban poor elsewhere in the world, urbanisation and 
integration into the urban economy is a double edged sword (see e.g. Fay 2004). 
On the one hand, closeness to the urban sector assures greater chances of 
employment and a better income. In South Africa as a whole, the average income 
for the people employed in the nine cities of the South African Cities network is 
significantly higher than the average income per worker in the rest of the country, 
while in Cape Town, unemployment has been significantly lower than the national 
rate outside cities (Boraine et al 2006 270).  But at the same time, the local 
economy is far more thoroughly monetized, and there is no agrarian economy that 
can cushion monetary shortfalls. This is an important point to be borne in mind by 
those who dismiss the role of so-called ‘subsistence’ agriculture in the Eastern 
Cape. While households were monetarily much better off than in Mount Frere, the 





Total sample  49.7 
Adult male 52.3 
Adult Female 47.8 
At address for less than a year 48.2 
At address for more than 5 years 50.4 
With no schooling 90.0 
With up to 7 years of schooling 67.5 
With 11-12 years of schooling 28.7 
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expenditure on food was almost the same (see table on p. 31).  While cash is more 
plentiful, the effects of cash shortfalls are more dire; while closer integration into 
the urban economy bought increased opportunities, it also meant that urban 
livelihoods are more sensitive to fluctuations and changes in that economy. This 
parallels the experience of the urban poor elsewhere in the world: in Latin 
America, for instance the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth is 
significantly higher in the urban than in the rural areas (see e.g. Faye 2004) 
 
(3) This increased vulnerability to fluctuations in the formal economy is made even 
more significant by the limited scope for informal economic activity that can 
cushion these shocks and supplement formal sector income.  Although qualitative 
research is able to reveal much broader participation in informal economic activity 
than the 2002 survey (see p.48), these activities have to be undertaken under very 
difficult circumstances.  The distance to the town centres mean that residents are 
far, not only from formal jobs, but for markets for informal economic activities.  
Unemployed African migrants in Khayelitsha trying to make a living from informal 
economic activities are essentially pinned down in the poorest parts of Cape Town.   
 
(4) As in the Eastern Cape, another problem is the fact that some of the linkages 
that do exist between the township economy and the formal economy are of a 
problematic kind.  A key issue here is the central and dominating role of large 
supermarket chains, which must necessarily crowd out informal economic activity.  
Again, it is not clear whether, in the context of economic vulnerability and fragile 
employment, the economic benefits of cheaper food outweigh the lost 
opportunities for self employment and multiplier effects. It is however clear that 
one of the key paradoxes facing those involved in informal sector activity is that 
while households in poorer communities are denied access  to markets in the so-
called ‘first economy’, corporations operating in the first economy have access to 
markets in more marginalised communities. This must significantly reduce the 
potential for local multiplier effects and economic growth within these 
communities 
 
This is related to another rather complex issue – that of debt and credit.  This has 
been extensively studies elsewhere (e.g. Collins 2005); here it should simply be 
said that the data gathered by the research project does not offer much support to 
the notion that a key problem of life in Khayelitsha is the lack of access to micro-
credit.  Though some depictions of ‘the second economy’ suggest that loan-sharks 
(mashonishas), preying on the poor in the absence of adequate microcredit 
provision by the formal sector, are a major reason for poverty (see e.g. Mbeki 
2003), the data gathered in 2002 and 2005 do not bear this out.  Only some 6% of 
Mount Frere households and 7% in Khayelitsha indicated that they owed money to 
micro-lenders in the 2002 survey.   Where households owed money it was far more 
likely to be to funeral associations in the rural areas (26% among Mount Frere 
households) and store credit (17.5% of households in Mount Frere, and 26% of 
households in the Cape Town Study. And in the 2005 study, only one informant 
indicated that he borrowed money from the microlenders – and that was to settle a 
furniture store debt. 




5.2.3 The urban and the 
rural 
 
The dynamics of poverty and 
vulnerability were very different in 
rural and urban contexts.  Here, 
our informants themselves saw the 
difference between rural and 
urban contexts in very stark - and 
somewhat idealistic terms.  Urban 
informants characterised the rural 
context as one in which people 
helped each other; while rural 
informants characterised the 
difference in terms of the 
supposed availability of jobs.  Both 
characterisations were somewhat 
idealistic: in fact, most people’s 
employment prospects in the urban 
areas were quite dismal, while the 
reality of life in the deep rural 
areas was very different from the 
romanticized picture painted by 
urban informants. 
 
At the same time there were some 
important differences to the ways 
in which social capital worked in 
urban and rural areas.  A key 
feature of rural civil society was 
that it was very hierarchical, much 
more shaped and ruled by 
traditional values and rules about 
gender and status, and that life 
was much less anonymous: most 
people would be very clearly 
‘placed’ in relation to one another 
in terms of the clan identity, social 
status, familial connection and 
history.  Urban life was very 
different. While urban life was not 
characterised simply the 
replacement of the logic of 
traditionality with those of modernity (Khayelitsha is in many ways a very large 
Eastern Cape village), the general character of social relations are very different. 
Social interactions are characterised to a far greater extent by anonymity and a 
much more democratic urban culture.  
 
To some extent this is linked to another important factor limiting and constraining 
informal economic activity.  For a variety of reasons – some historical, and related 
to the lack of real policing on the Cape Flats in the 1980s and 1990s, and some no 
doubt related to extreme poverty, crime and violence – and the fear of crime and 
Vuyiswa plans to get back into the fruit and veg 
business when Thandiwe is bigger. She wants the 
business to stay small an deal in fruit and veg 
only. She does not want to get bigger like 
Mababhela [a large local spaza] because there is 
a lot of tsotsi’s there and they will steal her 
things. (Ky 033) 
 
Neliswa L has been making a living selling meat 
ever since she came to Cape Town twenty years 
ago. The business is not easy: she says the 
smileys are not selling as they used to; perhaps 
(she says) because of competition, also she is 
scared of skollies (Ky 166). 
 
Thembisa M used to run a spaza and a successful 
shebeen in Crossroads (she claims to have been 
selling 1000 cases of beer a week at one point), 
and she owned two minibus taxis.  In the 1990s a 
boy who worked for her was shot and killed in 
her shop: she attributes this to another woman 
in Crossroads who was envious of her success.  
At this time she also lost her taxis – one was 
burned out in the taxi violence, and another 
damaged in an accident.  She cites these 
incidents as the reason why she has been 
reluctant to engage in entrepreneurial activity 
again. She says she is scared to run a shop. At 
the moment she earns money doing development 
work and working with NGOs (Ky 111).  
 
Lukholo M and her husband had a spaza in 
Crossroads. One problem they had there were 
lots of tsotsis that came and robbed them. They 
would take the zink out of the wall from the 
shack and take all the money and the groceries. 
Sometimes they would take the money that you 
need to buy your stock with. And sometimes you 
would put that money next to your bed but they 
would still be able to take it without you 
noticing. So the tsotsis robbed them several 
times.  So then they decided to stop the spaza. 
(Lukholo M, Ky 111).  
Box 2: Some Khayelitsha residents speak about the 
impact of crime on their plans 
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violence – are a central fact of life in Khayelitsha.  Some current research indicates 
that fear of crime and criminality may play an important role inhibiting plans for 
informal economic activity (Cichello 2005). In more than one case, informants 
corroborated this, indicating that crime, violence and the fear of violence was an 
obstacle in their informal economic activities (see Box 2).  It should however be 
stressed that it is probably an oversimplification to see crime on its own as a key 
factor in inhibiting self-employed activity: it is more accurate to see it as one 
factor playing a role in the context of the generally unpromising underlying 
condition for self-employed activity. 
5.3 The ineffectivness of the local state 
 
In section 5.1 it was argued that economic life in Khayelitsha as well as Mount 
Frere was characterised not so much by the absence of linkages with the formal 
economy, as the presence of adverse or disempowering linkages, and the dearth of 
positive, empowering ones.  But alongside the relative presence and ubiquity of 
corporate capital in the rural areas, another remarkable feature of economic and 
social life was the absence of the state. 
5.3.1 Traditional authority 
 
The first issue that should be remarked on is the lack of any effective local state at 
village level.  Traditional authorities are present but do not always act effectively 
either as agents of the state or as representatives of local people. This was 
particularly evident in the case of the remote village of Phuzayo, a village with a 
reputation of one of the more dangerous areas in the Mount Frere district, partly 




Case Study 15: Themba Mhlaba: One face of traditional authority and rural 
governance 
 
Themba Mhlaba is the headman of Phuzayo village in the former Transkei.  A discussion of 
this household is useful for two distinct, yet ultimately related reasons.  Firstly, it reveals 
something of intra-household dynamics and suggests how these affect well-being.  Secondly, 
keen attention to how he exercised his role as head in the village during the six months the 
team spent conducting research in the village, reveals some important questions about the 
nature of traditional authority and rural governance in the former Transkei.   
 
Approaching Themba Mhlaba’s somewhat isolated homestead one is struck by the poor 
quality of the accommodation.  It consists of two mud huts, which are largely unplastered and 
in a poor state of repair.  The first structure is a small cooking hut (with an open fire); the 
second is a compact L shaped structure consisting of two rooms.  On entering this dwelling, 
ones impression of the household’s material circumstances become no more favourable.  The 
gloomy interior of the combined bedroom–lounge is dirty, with stained walls and an unswept 
floor.  The furniture in the room is old and broken.  When it rains, water leaks through the 
badly repaired roof onto the grime encrusted velour lounge suite.  The homestead differs 
starkly with the homesteads of other headmen or chiefs in the area.  Traditional leaders 
receive a modest monthly stipend and they usually reside in homesteads of above average size 
and comfort.  Typically, the reception room of any respectable headman or chief would be 
immaculately tidy and furnished with serviceable, comfortable furniture in accordance with 
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his status; and his isidima would be evident both in his comportment and in his homestead.  
The rather shabby appearance of Mhlaba’s homestead is a clue that something is amiss.  
 
The second sign is the Mhlaba household themselves.  Themba and his wife are difficult 
informants to interview.  Unlike other resistant and reticent informants, Mhlabla was willing 
to talk to the team, but they often seemed muddled and confused.  Most respondents (like 
interlocutors in any conversation) generally sense the semantic thrust of a line of questioning 
and usually respond in kind, clarifying the underlying story that links their answers together 
into a coherent whole.  Themba on the other hand would dutifully and mechanically give 
responses - which would turn out to be increasingly contradictory.  His narratives, although 
freely proffered, were incomplete and incoherent.  His accounts moreover often put a great 
deal of pressure on a translator mediating between an increasingly contradiction laced account 
and an interrogative researcher.  Although Themba initially seemed a bit blunted and red-
eyed, it only later became apparent to the research team that he is a heavy drinker.  This factor 
contributes to the contradictions and confusion that often envelop his accounts.   
 
Although she doesn’t display signs of alcohol abuse, Themba’s wife is a similarly confusing 
respondent.  Her accounts are often marked by non-sequiturs, elisions and errors.  In the 
team’s first interview her reported age did not tally with the information from the 2002 
survey, when questioned on this she realised she had reported her age incorrectly and 
amended it accordingly.   
 
Themba’s adult daughter seems to be the most reliable of the household informants.  She also 
assumes responsibility for some of her father’s administrative tasks such as handing out and 
stamping forms.  The unwed mother of a young child, she wishes to complete her matric, and 
travelled to Cape Town to do this in 2002 but arrived well after the start of the school year 
and could not be admitted to a school.  The final adult in the house is Themba’s adult son who 
reportedly makes money by building houses for villagers. 
  
Themba’s household relies heavily on his headman stipend - raised from R1200 to R1700 
shortly before the fieldwork period.  Although not a large sum, it is an amount well above the 
mean income for many households in the village.  Themba’s daughter works in a community 
agriculture project and his son reportedly works as a builder within the village.  Reportedly 
earning R3000 for building a mud block hut, this money is split between the builders, so and 
his son can earn anything from R500 to R1000.  Themba’s son eluded the research team, and 
they saw little evidence of his building activity in their time in the village. Themba has no 
livestock, and engages in no cultivation, although his daughter as planted a very small garden 
(perhaps the surface area of an average suburban bedroom).  One of the four grandchildren 
within the household (his daughter’s child) was obtaining a child support grant, an application 
was lodged for a child support grant for one of the other grandchildren but neither of the 
remaining two children had the necessary birth certificates – this despite Themba’s purported 
access into the world of forms and administration.  At a household level, this was somewhat 
dysfunctional household unit.   
 
Themba explains that his headmanship is a hereditary position (both his father and 
grandfather were headmen) that he took over in 1988.  His headmanship came at the end of 
almost twenty years of migrant labour.  Themba took the ‘join’ (labour recruitment) in 1969 
where he worked on a dairy farm outside Cape Town.  He married his current wife in 1971, 
and his old pass book (which he still has) shows he commenced working at Cullinan diamond 
mine in 1972, followed by a spell at Randfontein mine in 1978.  Themba recalls working as a 
‘daka boy’ (a manual labourer mixing cement) in Qwa Qwa in the 1980s.  He became 
headman on 1 April 1988.  When he reaches retirement age, he will receive a regular state old 
age pension and his first born son will become headman.  
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The dysfunctionality of the household is evident in its inability to translate the receipt of a 
tidy monthly income into better quality accommodation.  Nor have the household head’s 
status and his income become manifest in educated adult children or clean, well-cared for, 
grant receiving grandchildren.  When diplomatically questioned about this strange 
disjuncture, his relatives confidentially concede that his drinking is a problem.  They draw on 
a theologically inspired – and strongly gendered explanation: Themba is ‘far from the grace of 
God,’ and they attributed this failing to the weakness of his wife, for it is women that are 
responsible for metaphorically ‘building’ the household. 
 
How does he perform his role as headman?  This is rather unclear. In describing his role in the 
village, Themba’s accounts are marked by a tendency to conflate the abstract ideal with actual 
practice; and his description of his functions do not stand up to much probing. He says that 
one important area of responsibility is helping the village by completing forms - all forms, he 
assures the team.  However Themba proves prone to omitting important details or overstating 
his role.  When the team expresses interest in the forms, and asks to see them, he turns out to 
have in his possession two types of forms, the first a “Declaration of Address Form” – with 
had a FNB logo on it - and the second a “Death Report” form.  The former allows Themba to 
duly certify that an applicant is a resident of the village (in an area which, of course, lacks 
formal addresses or title to land).  The latter form allows Themba to certify one of the 
residents of his village is dead.  It is then taken by the bereaved family to the Department of 
Home Affairs, the death registered with the machine of state and a death certificate issued.  
Themba therefore stands as an arbiter of existence and death, between his subjects and the 
formal state. 
 
Themba’s headman duties also include the allocation of household sites. This is reportedly 
done in conjunction with a small committee. Themba makes cryptic reference to site numbers 
being recorded on maps by the Department of Agriculture – but on further questioning, he 
admits that they have last done this in the village about twenty years ago.  In common with 
many parts of the former Transkei, it is unlikely that land tenure arrangements are recorded in 
any sort of central registry.  The third of Themba’s tasks, is adjudicating disputes.  These are 
generally limited to ‘disputes without blood’ (i.e. not murder, assault, rape etc), but rather 
minor offences, often concerning livestock and property. Given Themba’s general uncertainty 
and vagueness it is hard to see how he can exercise this role effectively 
 
How is Themba viewed within the village?  On the whole, there is evidence that many 
villages regard him as ineffectual and incompetent: though initially no informants spoke out 
against him, towards the end of the team’s six months of fieldwork informants sometimes let 
slip muttered asides about the unreliability of the headman. Several informants claimed that 
Themba is not impartial and is too easily ‘bought’ by a bottle of brandy: they doubted that he 
would be able to adjudicate conflicts fairly.  There were also other episodes which pointed to 
these sentiments:  during a public address within the village by the government officials, 
Themba’s ascendancy to the podium was marked by a suppressed laughing and muttering.  
And perhaps most tellingly, when Themba sold a cow that he had impounded for straying into 
another villagers garden, the animal’s owner responded - with little regard for the prerogatives 
of traditional authority - by pressing a charge of stock theft at a local police station, treating 
the headman’s actions as if they were those of a common criminal.  One of the distinctive 
characteristics of Phuzayo village, incidentally, was the relatively high incidence of conflict 
and incidents of violent crime (three murders in three years); and it is an interesting question 
whether the general absence of authority within the village may well contribute the violence 
and crime within it.   
 
Yet perhaps the most remarkable aspect that of the relationship between Themba and his 
‘subjects’ was their tolerance for him and their continued support both for the institution of 
headmanship and his right to occupy the position.  Their disrespect did not translate into a 
rejection of either the institution or his role in it: it was expressed at most in ‘offstage’ 
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disrespect and circumvention of his authority. Nobody questioned the legitimacy of Themba 
holding the post.  This valorization of the institution of traditional authority, and the universal 
inclination to view it as separately from the failings of its incumbents was even evident within 
our research team. Driving home in the team’s vehicle and discussing Themba amongst 
themselves, a locally born fieldworker readily conceded that although Themba was drunk and 
ineffectual he is not that bad.  When other team members expressed surprise, he clarified: 
Themba Mhlaba is not nearly as exploitative or venal as the headman of the neighboring 
village.  Perhaps his drunkenness is a blessing in disguise.  
 
 
Some features of the above case study become more comprehensible when 
considering the nature of traditional authority in the former homelands.  The 
colonial encounter, particularly the British system of indirect rule, stabilised itself 
by co-opting indigenous political systems.  Despite popular conceptions of 
immutable customary leadership, extending from the pre-capitalist, pre-colonial 
colonial past to the present, the institution is marked by the ‘invention of 
tradition’ (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983).  The chieftaincy collaborated with colonial 
and apartheid rule, chiefs and headmen were (and continue to be) paid 
administrative functionaries of the state.   
 
Some of the contradictions of hereditary leadership in a modern democratic state 
are considered by Mahmood Mamdani (1996).  Examining the dynamics of social 
citizenship in post-colonial Africa, he delineates its basic split between urban 
‘citizens and rural ‘subjects’.  While urban dwellers enjoy rights of access to law, 
political representation and civic rights as full ‘citizens’, rural residents are the 
quasi-feudal subjects of ethnic customary authority.  This, the ‘decentralised 
despotism’ of traditional authority has retarded participatory democracy and 
economic modernity in Africa, Mamdani argues.  Although the chieftaincy 
encapsulated a range of judicial, legislative, executive and administrative powers 
in the distant past, it is through the allocation and administration of land that it 
continues to derive much of its influence (Ntsebeza, 1999). 
 
The dismantled of racial privilege and ascendancy of a human rights ethos with the 
advent of democracy, has not fundamentally or consistently challenged customary 
power in South Africa.  On the contrary, a resurgence of traditional authority 
across much of the post-colonial world often draws on articulations of cultural 
rights (cf. Van Kessel & Oomen, 1997).  In the post-Apartheid era traditional 
authority has proved itself both politically organised, and adept at strengthening 
its legitimacy through appeals to tradition and culture.  In its regional strongholds 
of KwaZulu Natal and the former Transkei, where traditional authority enjoys 
widespread support, local governance often involves geographically uneven, 
politically unsteady alliances of chieftaincy power and democratically elected local 
government.  Much to the detriment of the latter, at the cost of ‘democracy 
compromised’, in the words of Ntsebeza (2006). 
  
The chieftaincy is however an ambivalent institution and the despotism of the 
hereditary leadership runs the full gamut, from benevolent to malevolent.  At one 
extreme the chieftaincy can be a benign, culturally affirming institution, binding 
together age old logics of social reciprocity and communalist values in spaces 
where there are other forms of authority and governance are weakly present.  At 
the other - all too common extreme - end customary leadership is exploitative body 
and reproduces patrimonial divisions based on a hierarchy of gender, lineage and 
generation (Ntsebeza, 2006; Oomen, 2005).   




Within village that became the focal research area in the Mount Frere district, the 
local headman is relatively undistinguished and commonly regarded as ineffective.  
He commands limited personal respect amongst the villagers, is generally reviewed 
as an unreliable arbiter of disputes and the research team’s inquires demonstrate 
that he is at best a poor conduit of administrative services.  Yet in his favour 
Themba Mhlaba is is merely dissolute and opportunistically rent-seeking, rather 
than truly exploitative or venal.  It is perhaps for this reason that he appears to be 
tolerated with indulgent good grace by his subjects.  However, the research team 
discerned that that an ineffectual headman, combined with a weakly present and 
frequently administratively fragile local state makes for relatively poor governance 
in the area.  This local power vacuum occurs to the ultimate detriment of of both 
safety and security (hence the history of violent crime in the area) and, ultimately, 
service delivery. 
 
5.3.2 Delivery problems 
 
These problems are linked to other incapacity issues within the local state.  Here it 
should be said that in the fieldwork, there was much evidence of significant roll-
out of services (most visibly in the form of infrastructural investment in local 
clinics and health workers) and development initiatives.  But this provision of 
services is not always effective. Though the elements of a developmental state are 
present, they are often dysfunction or unintegrated.  Primary health care clinics 
which stand as beacons of state-provided modernity are one particular example.  
Visits to local clinics revealed that both non-working vaccination fridges and 
medicine shortages were common in many clinics.  In one of the research sites a 
quick perusal of the dispensary revealed a shelf marked ‘paracetemol’ was devoid 
of medicine.  When questioned on this the local clinic sister indicated she had 
recently run out and was hoping for a delivery at the end of the week.  No, she 
replied, she had nothing at her disposal to substitute for the exhausted drug.   
 
In this context the physical presence of material infrastructure is often little 
guarantee of its functionality.  All three of the clinics visited had elaborate solar 
panel powered radio phones however none of these phones was actually working 
during our visits.  Even in a refurbished clinic, proudly bearing a granite plague 
commemorating of its recent formal opening by the province’s MEC for Health, had 
the same non-functional phone system.  The clinic sister explained that, the phone 
system had never, in her memory been operational.  Remarkably the phone did not 
work before, during or after the MEC’s visit.  We shared a laugh at the mischievous 
suggestion that the MEC ought to have been coaxed into lifting the silent handset 
to his ear.        
 
Clear weaknesses in infrastructural and service provision are linked to a second 
paradoxical feature of political life.  While on the one hand the state has very 
strict formal requirements with which people need to comply in order to qualify for 
benefits or receive services, the state is often unable to facilitate the basic 
conditions and services that would allow compliance.  One of the most recurrently 
reported obstacles to securing a social grant, apart from the transaction costs 
involved, is the absence of an appropriate form of identification, specifically a bar-
coded, Green covered RSA identity document.  (Older identity documents without a 
barcode or Transkei era documents are unacceptable).  Compliance with this 
requirement is often relatively expensive in terms of cash (see case study 32) and 
the time required to successfully process an application.  Furthermore the cost of 
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mistakes by the state is high, particularly as these costs often end up being borne 
by the very people who are most vulnerable.   
 
Quite apart from geographical distance and the weaknesses of local service 
delivery, interviews with Department of Social Development and Home Affairs 
officials highlighted several of the functional ‘gaps’ between the two departments 
and several of the difficulties associated with securing Identity documents to apply 
for grants.  These difficulties become amplified when applying for a grant for a 
child, as both the child and its guardian need be administratively ‘captured’.  The 
first difficulty is when the parents or guardians of children apply for social grants 
where neither they, nor the child, have identity documents.  In these cases a chain 
of documentation needs to be (re)created; often starting with a traditional 
authority agreeing to endorse the adult claims of residency, identity documents 
then need to be procured for the adults, children registered with Home Affairs, and 
finally the social grant applied for.  This is a laborious process, likely to be 
measured in months rather than weeks.   A second variation on the above is the 
task of applying for a death certificate for a deceased parent who never had an ID 
book in the first place, in order to apply for a grant.  This elicits a ‘manual’ death 
certificate from Home Affairs, a document devoid of an identity number (the 
deceased never having been registered in the central registry).  Social 
Development officials struggle to process grant applications (e.g. for a surviving 
child) with an ID number-less deceased parent.  Yet another permutation on this 
theme, are the surviving, undocumented dependents of (very specifically) 
deceased, ID document-less, unmarried mothers.  These surviving children pose the 
stiff challenge of having to be bureaucratically linked to surviving caregivers.  
Resolution of this task typically requires sustained engagement with Departments 
of Home Affairs, Social Development and the local Magistrates’ court.  
 
The two broad factors described above - the absence of an effective presence by 
the local state, coupled with the difficulties and expense of demonstrating 
compliance and eligibility - means that local elites can connive to ensure the 
capture of benefits intended for the poor.  This is illustrated by three micro-case 
studies from the Mount Frere area, which appear to show not only the prevalence 
of corruption and rent-seeking, but also how elite capture of local resources 
appear to impose additional burdens on poor people. 
 
 
Case Study 16:Gate-keeping, rent-seeking and bribe-taking: three stories from 
Mount Frere 
 
(1) Disability grants as local patronage:  It appeared to be common knowledge – and 
broadly accepted – in mount Fere that you did not have to be disabled to get a disability grant. 
In the course of the research more than one respondent described having paid a bribe to secure 
a disability grant.  All named the individual concerned, a local district surgeon.  The research 
team chose to step rather delicately around this issue, apart from not being centrally within the 
ambit of our research, we wished to neither put ourselves at risk by enquiring too directly 
after this, nor alarm informants by accusing them of complicity in grant fraud.  Despite this 
some informants breezily described paying the bribes, as thought this were a routine part of 
securing a disability grant.  When a hitchhiker in our vehicle asked a fieldworker to secure her 
a disability grant, his bantering response was that she ought to ask Dr ****,  her reply - only 
half in jest - was that his bribe was too high.  Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this 
activity was the highly variable amount of the bribe.  A particularly poor and isolated woman, 
who had never worked outside of the village, paid R300 every three months, while 
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respectable, better connected respondents paid this ‘thank you’ (as a fieldworker translated it) 
as a once off amount.  Knowledge of bribe paying to secure a disability grant appeared 
common amongst other officials.  We were told, towards the end of the fieldwork period, that 
although the district surgeon concerned still occupied his post, decisions around grant 
allocation had recently been delegated to a committee and were no longer in his hands. 
 
(2) Land tenure and gatekeeping:  A second story concerns the case of an elderly (78 year 
old) widow who retired from decades of toil as domestic worker in Johannesburg.  Due to her 
husband’s early death (in 1962), and her junior, second-wife status she was not able to occupy 
the homestead in his old village.  Instead she sought to secure a plot in her pre-marriage 
village, in order to build a homestead.  This proved to be an arduous process, it necessitated 
visits the local municipality to inform them of her plans and application to the local village 
headman.  The headman had to confer with the headman of the village in which she 
(nominally) lived previously and charged her both for the plot (R800) and an additional 
‘ukunyoba’ (bribe/tribute) of R800 for himself.  Summing the entire episode up thus, a 
fieldworker said, ‘It’s a bribe and not a bribe of two cents’ (i.e. a sizeable bribe).   
 
(3) Waiving the right to exemption from school fees A third story comes from a 
conversation conducted with an assertive young woman, who had been enrolled in Grade 11 
at a local rural school.  Questioning the school fees her impoverished family paid, the team 
enquired if her family had applied for school fee exemption from the principal.  Neither she 
nor any of her cohorts knew about such an exception.  She puzzled over the contradiction of 
her experience of learners being ejected from school for the non-payment of fees, and the 
team’s insistance that households such as hers would be entitled to ask to be exempt from 
paying school fees. After a moments though, she confidently hypothesised that school fee 
exemption is clearly a regulation applicable to provinces other than the Eastern Cape.  
Everybody has to pay school fees here, she maintained. 
 
Perhaps the most noteworthy part of these stories is not merely the existence of 
corruption, but also the fact that bribes for disability grants, for instance, followed 
the gradient of power and favoured the better off.  It seemed that wealthier and 
better off people paid smaller bribes while the poorest of the poor had to give up 
much larger ‘cuts’ of their grant money.  
 
Generally speaking, informality often seemed to play a role in disempowering 
poorer and more vulnerable people. In the absence of a state that clearly 
protected people’s rights, they would be more at the mercy of local gatekeepers 
and other stakeholders and embedded within circuits of patronage and informality.   
The manner in which informality and sharply unequal power relations serve to 
disempower poor people is often so ubiquitous and deeply normative, that even the 
marginalised themselves might not even necessarily discern these dynamics as 
particularly noteworthy (the unabashed candour with which some informants 
reported paying bribes in the above extract, points to this).   
 
Another consequence of the weakness of state structures was the exposure of 
poorer people to higher levels of criminality and violence.  Violence needs to be 
recognised as a livelihood issue; constraining people’s choices, for example 
discouraging informal economic activity and making it more risky (see the 
discussion in Box 2 above).  The impact of the pervasive treat of violence and 
criminality described in Khayelitsha also had analogues in the rural research site.   
 
An exchange from a rural focus group illustrated some of the tensions around 
power relations and criminal victimization.  The older men’s focus group discerned 
the need for a local police station to address the serious crime situation within the 
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village.  When members of the woman’s focus group mooted the same 
requirement, it soon became contested.  An animated focus group informant, 
rubbing the thigh of the woman seated next to her, mimicking how she imagined a 
policeman would sexually proposition her, while she attempted to lay a complaint.  
No, she and several female informants argued, policemen resident in the village 
would sexually harass local women and merely generate another set of problems.       
 
5.4 Implications for self-employment and informal economic 
activity 
5.4.1 Understanding informal economic activity 
 
The previous section considered some of the key features of the economic context 
within which poor and vulnerable people had to survive.  In both regions, one key 
feature of this context is labour market marginality:  the scarcity and insecurity of 
formal, permanent paid employment.  Clearly this means that much depends on 
the scope for informal economic activity and self employment, and the extent to 
which it is able to compensate for the lack of formal sector jobs.  
 
This is a somewhat neglected area of economic endeavour in South Africa.  Many 
analyses of ‘the informal’ sector, of self-employment or of ‘the SMME sector’ 
acknowledge the existence of a large ‘survivalist’ sector (Rogerson 1996) – but 
many then proceed essentially to ignore it. Most studies of informal sector, small 
businesses and self employment prioritise understanding the needs, difficulties and 
challenges facing those ‘businesses’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ in the ‘micro’ sector and 
up that have some potential of growing and  employing people beside the operator 
him/herself (e.g. Chandra et al 2001, Berry et al 2002, Ligthelm 20054). Even 
studies that are explicitly concerned with ‘township businesses’ such as spazas still 
concentrate on those that are large and formal enough to have significant credit 
needs and to be formally plugged into national supply networks (Ligthelm 2004) 
 
In this research project we did not attempt to assess the profitability or 
sustainability of any ‘informal businesses’ or investigate in depth the micro-
economics of informal economic activity.  Such an investigation would require a 
detailed research project in its own right.  At the same time, in-depth interviews 
produced many insights into the nature of the informal economic activities, their 
place in people’s livelihood strategies, and some of the constraints and difficulties 
that they faced.   
 
5.4.2 The nature and scope of informal economic activity 
 
We have already remarked on the ubiquity and elusiveness of informal economic 
activity (see p. 48).  Here, we highlight three other crucial features all of which 
have profound constraining implications on their ability to contribute to 
livelihoods.  
 
The first is the narrow range of informal economic activities (see Table 12 below).  
As other studies have pointed out (e.g. Rogerson 1996) survivalist and self-
employed activities tend to be concentrated in a small number of heavily 
overtraded sectors. A very small number of households had been involved in some 
kind of craft production or manufacture, or were involved in a moderately 
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established business (a well established shebeen, a spaza on a main road, a small 
builders’ business). Two households, interestingly, obviously gained somewhat from 
being strategically involved in community work of some kind (this category includes 
Khumbuza’s church work (see Case Study 6 on p. 32) and a household heavily 
involved in development and community outreach work).  Most of the activities 
relate either to small-scale retail and low value services. 
 
 






Reselling small items (sweets, cigarettes) 7 
Making mud bricks, plastering huts 7 
Preparing and selling food (smilies, walkaways)  4 
Domestic work within community 4 
Selling alcohol 4 
Rural services (fixing fences, hoeing fields, herding cattle) 4 
Childcare within community 3 
Running a spaza 2 
Dressmaking 2 
Making reed mats 2 
Traditional healer 2 
Community work 2 
Peddling in commercial centre 1 
Reselling clothes 1 
Transport services 1 
Brewing beer 1 
Running own building business 1 
Grass harvesting 1 
Collecting wood 1 
 
To a large extent this may be due to the relatively low costs of entry to these 
activities.  Some of the more remunerative businesses reported by informants 
required the possession of significant levels of skill or some other strategic 
advantage such as the spatial infrastructure on which dressmaking businesses of 
Madoda S (Case Study 1) and Phumi B (Case Study 3) relied.  Others seemed to be 
protected by some other barrier to entry – the building business listed above, for 
instance, belongs to the son of the local headman in Phuzayo, who could 
conceivably be given an edge by virtue of his father’s role in local land 
administration.  For the rest, the activities listed do not require high levels of skill 
or very extensive capital outlay: as Cichello points out, this means that capital or 
skill thresholds should not count as major barriers to entry (Cichello 2005).  But for 
exactly that reason, these sectors are also very crowded and competitive, which 
decreases their potential for bringing in significant income and makes it quite hard 
for them to be viable.   
 
The latter is an important point. Often, the marginal and survivalist nature of 
informal economic activity gives rise to the notion that the problem with ‘self 
employment’ and ‘micro enterprises’ among poor people is that poor people 
somehow lack entrepreneurial ability and consequently need training of some sort.  
This impression fails to recognise the significant amount of ingenuity, strategic 
knowledge and effort that is required to sustain informal economic activity under 
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the difficult conditions at the margins of the formal economy.  The people 
interviewed in the study often had a very clear sense of what was required in order 
to keep their activities going. 
 
We begin by describing in some detail one fairly typical informal ‘business’ – that 
run by Nomsa B (see Case Study 11) and some of her friends.  
 
 
Case Study 17: Cooking smilies in Site C, Khayelitsha 
 
Nomsa and her friends Zabantu and Luleka survive in Khayelitsha Site C selling smilies 
(cooked sheep’s heads) and walkaways (cooked chicken feet).  Zabantu (a shy, matronly 
woman) and Luleka (an easy-going woman who comes across as fiercely confident and 
down-to-earth) are old friends from Lady Frere.  Luleka moved over to Cape Town first and 
met Nomsa here and they became friends: their friendship was based on the fact that they 
were businesswomen together, selling smilies and walkaways. Then when Zabantu came to 
join her husband in Cape Town in 1996 she found Luleka here, and she joined the group.   
 
Because Zabantu and Luleka have properties set well back from the road and do not have big 
enough yards, the cooking happens in Nomsa’s property in M**** crescent, Site C. On the 
days that they are cooking the meat the yard is a hive of activity, swirling with smoke and 
cluttered with piles of sheep’s heads and other offcuts.  There is an amiable air of industry, 
and the women laugh and chat as they work. Nomsa and Luleka make smilies, Zabantu cooks 
chicken feet.  They came to this arrangement because they do not want to compete against 
each other too much; it makes more sense for one person to sell the chicken feet and the other 
to sell the smilies.  Nomsa and her friends did not explain why it made sense for them to have 
two people cooking the smilies, but it may be that it works for Nomsa to share the work with 
someone else. 
 
It is indeed arduous, unpleasant and heavy work. They generally get the meat on Monday 
mornings – that is, if their customers have paid them and they have cash on hand – and again 
on Fridays.  They go down to Nolungile train station meet the bakkies that bring the sheep’s 
heads, from the abattoirs. The bakkies are cheap – you pay R10 for a sheep’s head and R5 for 
a packet of 10 sheep’s feet. They generally buy abut 10 sheep’s heads in the week, and then 
10 more for the weekend. But you have to be there early, and when the bakkie comes, all the 
women run to be there, and if you come last you won’t get any smilies.  Then the sheep’s 
heads have to be cleaned – the wool is burned and scraped off in a fire; the heads are then 
boiled and cleaned further; they are split open and the brains removed; and finally they are 
cooked with spices – Nompumelelo uses Aromat.  It is a lot of work, and a lot of it is dirty.  
And paraffin is expensive: if Nompumelelo had to use paraffin to cook the smilies, she would 
not be able to make a profit (they sell for R20 each: the sheep’s feet, too, get a 100% mark-
up).  The chicken feet that Zabantu sells make about R15 profit a bag (she buys a 5 kilo bag 
for R50 and sells them 50c each).  So for the business to make any profit at all Nomsa and her 
friends generally have to gather wood.  They go to Driftsand, a good five kilometres away: 
sometimes there are government people clearing away invasive Port Jackson wattle and it is 
easy to get the wood. Sometimes one has to chop the trees down oneself.  It is not very hard 
work – the trees are slender – but Nomsa is not strong and gets tired easily.  For all that, she is 
better at chopping down trees than members of the research team – she has perfected a low 
energy but accurate stroke that cuts through the trunk with only a few well aimed blows.  If 
her neighbours are around, she leaves Andile there; if not, she takes him along.  If he gets 
thirsty and asks for water, she simply scoops up some of the standing marsh water with a 
discarded Coke can and gives it to him to drink.  
 
Section 5: Contextualising vulnerability   99 
 
 
Nomsa’s house is far from the main road, and she does not have a stall. In some weeks, 
Luleka is able to get a friend of hers who has a stall on Modderdam road to sell some smilies 
on her behalf.  But for the most part they rely on a local clientele who know them, and all of 
whom live at most a street or two away from them.  So their customers are people who come 
back again and again. (When people buy smilies, another informant told the team, it is often 
important for them to know who cooked it.  If your house is not clean, people will be reluctant 
to buy your smilies.) Very often, people do not have money to pay for the smilies, and in 
those cases they are given the smilies on credit.  This is a risk, because sometimes people 
don’t pay you back; and sometimes you have to go and get the money from them.  And 
Nomsa does not charge higher prices for smilies sold on credit: it is a situation where if you 
are not willing to give credit, you do not make the sale.  The team estimates that on the basis 
of the numbers Nomsa and her friends provide they make about R150 in profit a week. 
 
 
This account of Nomsa’s business highlights some aspects of what is required to 
keep afloat even an activity to which there are few barriers to entry.  In the first 
place (as in the case of Vusi’s paraffin selling – see Case Study 7 on p. 51), what 
gives Nomsa and her friends the edge is simply the ability and willingness to invest 
huge amounts of labour and time for very small returns;  spending hours securing a 
free fuel source.  Secondly, as in the case of Mam Thandi’s little spaza (see Case 
Study 8 on p. 53) the business relies for most of its clientele not on a relatively 
anonymous ‘open market’ of passers-by in the road but on a network of 
acquaintances who know Nomsa and Luleka.  A third typical issue central to the 
survival of a business is the need to be able to give credit (and recover debt), 
about which we will say more below.  
 
Not all self employed activities are as marginal or rely as heavily on the simple 
ability to input large amounts of labour for low returns.  One important exception, 
for example, is provided by the taverns described in the case study of Vusi above 
and in the case study of the well established tavern on p. 101 below.  But running a 
tavern involves significantly higher risks: not only is one exposed to police 
harassment and corruption, but one has to be able to put up with and contain the 
greater risk of violence from drunken customers. Though four of the case study 
households were involved in selling alcohol, four more specifically ruled it out as 
an option because of this risk. 
 
5.4.3 Synergies, leveraging and linkages 
 
A second important feature of the ‘survivalist’ informal economic activities 
revealed through research was their supplementary and complementary role within 
a portfolio of other activities to which they were linked in complex ways.   
But for the most part, a key feature of these activities is that they were not clearly 
distinguished from the domestic economy of the households: most of the 
households involved in informal retail, for instance, could be characterised either 
as ‘selling their groceries’ or as ‘eating their stock.’   
 
 
Case Study 18: 'My children eat the spaza' 
 
Sindiswa Mashiwane is the neighbour of Mam Thandi, the spaza owner described on page 53. 
Though they both run spazas, they are not in competition, and have designed their businesses 
to be complementary: while Mam Thandi sells sweets, cookies and chips, Sindiswa sells food 
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and other household necessities.  
Like Mam Thandi, she has survived 
like this for many years, but her 
spaza activities have never led to 
prosperity.  
 
One big problem has been crime, 
which indeed caused her and her 
husband to close down their spaza 
for a time (see Box 2 above) another 
has been simply that she sometimes 
had to spend the money from the 
spaza to feed the children; and then 
the business would be going slow.  
Moving to Khayelitsha has solved 
the first problem: they now have a 
brick house, which is substantially more difficult to rob, and they sell to customers through a 
window protected by wire mesh.  But her family is still, as she puts it eating the spaza.  This 
is particularly unavoidable during her numerous visits to the Eastern Cape. Each time she 
goes to the Eastern Cape, she explained to the team, it kills the spaza.  When the team visited 
her, two months had already passed since her previous visit, but the shelves were bare except 
for a few boxes of matches and some bottles of vinegar.  Part of  problem was also that she 
was in any case grievously short of cash, and it seemed that a lot of what spare cash they had 
was spent medical care for her husband, who had suffered a stroke some years previously, and 
she had not been able to replenish her shop. 
 
 
The important issue here is that survivalist enterprises in this kind should not be 
evaluated through an SMME lens: the lack of distinction between the household 
economy and the ‘business’ should not be seen as evidence that Thandeka or her 
peers do not understand ‘business principles’ and need training in 
entrepreneurship. Her difficulties in creating a ‘business’ separate from the 
economy of the household stem simply from the harsh realities of poverty.  This 
does not mean her business strategy failed; it simply means that utility of her 
informal economic activity should not be seen in terms of its potential to become 
the seed of a formal-like, profitable business but also in the way it allows 
participants to leverage and supplement scanty domestic resources, ‘reproduce’ 
and increase what income there is, and cope with shocks.  
 
The lack of separation with the domestic economy is only part of the story. Most of 
the informal economic activities in the study were not self sustaining, but 
depended for their continuation on people’s ability to leverage one activity through 
another, or to create complex synergies between activities. In some cases, as in 
the example of Mam Thandi mentioned above, a single person or a single household 
engaged in a wide range of activities that supplemented, complemented and fed 
each other – cash from looking after neighbours’ children or doing their washing 
providing resources to buy stock for the shop.  In other cases, funds from formal 
employment or from a social grant supplied the cash that enabled informal 






Figure 8: Sindiswa in her spaza 





Case Study 19: A well established tavern 
 
Dickson K and his family live in a corrugated iron shack (just up the road from Khumbuza M, 
the lay preacher described on p. 50) with his second wife, Bongisa, their child Asa and his 
children from a previous marriage. When Dickson is not at work his bakkie is usually parked 
in front of the shack, a shiny blue Toyota Hilux bakkie with Kaiser Chiefs written in gold 
lettering on the back of the canopy. Part of the shack is a large tavern, a long room that runs 
the length of the shack, one wall totally obscured by beer crates.  Inside the tavern are two 
large plastic garden type tables and improvised benches made from kitchen counter post-
formed tops resting on crates.  A few SAB promotional posters and a large TV constitute the 
décor.  The kitchen abuts the tavern portion of the shack, and contains a fridge and chest 
freezer.   
 
Dickson does not run the tavern.  He is employed as a carpenter by a company that installs 
kitchen cabinets, a job that earns him about R700 a week, a tidy income that is supplemented 
by Asa’s child support grant and the their informal economic activities.  Some of this income 
is earned with the bakkie – Dickson apparently takes some of his colleagues in to work every 
day, for which he charges them R170 each, per month.  The tavern is mostly run by Bongisa, 
a shy and self effacing woman he met at a Kaiser Chiefs game and whom he married in 1999.  
(According to Bongisa, before she was married to Dickson, the tavern was run by his 
children, the oldest of which was not more than 16 at the time). Bongisa  runs the tavern with 
quiet efficiency, allowing customers to help themselves to beers in the fridge and noting their 
consumption afterwards in a credit book; on Fridays, when they get  paid, they are required to 
settle their debt. According to Bongisa, she leaves the collection of debts to her husband.  
They purchase in the region of 40 cases of beer in a week, and when business is good they 
will purchase an entire pallet of 66 cases, which costs  more than R4000: besides earning 
money by taking colleagues to work, the bakkie is of course also key to the tavern business, 
helping them save the significant transport                                                                                                                    
costs. 
 
According to Bongisa the tavern is very well established: Dickson has been living in the 
shack for a long time, knows all the neighbours well, and is well versed in the people skills 
that give him his competitive edge.  He maintains co-operative relationships with the other 
tavern owner in the street (they help one another out by purchasing stock for one another on 
visits to liquor stores) and handles his customers adeptly – a key skill, according to Bongisa 
who says that knowing how to deal with drunk or difficult customers is an important part of 
running a tavern. Drunken patrons can be difficult, and can accuse one of not giving them 
their change back:  she responds to this by not fighting with them, but telling them to come 
and fetch it the next morning.  When they come the next day she reasons with them when they 
are sober.  She also explained that although Richmond is not a ‘big drinker’ he will sit and 
have a drink or two with his patrons.  Apparently drinkers do not like it when one does not 
drink, it makes one appear aloof.   
 
A rather bigger problem is their relationships with the police.  Their KHASE license has been 
cancelled, and they have been told they must join Nafcoc; apparently as consequence of this 
they were, at the time of the interview, being raided almost every weekend and have lost a lot 
of stock.  Although they have to close only at 9:00 PM the police some come before the 
stipulated 9:00 PM; indeed, they were raided at 6:00 PM a few weeks ago.  According to 
Bongisa the SAPS either take the alcohol or pour it into the ground.  They, and other tavern 
owners, have raised the matter with the local police and have been told that only police vans 
that have ‘Site B SAPS’ written on the side ought to be patrolling this area. Bongisa believes 
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that these raids were being conducted by opportunistic policeman from elsewhere: the police 
have also have been known to take wallets and cell phones of the shebeen’s patrons. 
 
 
What is significant about Dickson and Bongisa’s story is the way in which their 
different economic activities and assets complement one another.  Without the 
reliable and steady income from his formal manufacturing sector job, Dickson 
would probably not be able to afford the bakkie – and the ownership of the bakkie 
plays an important role both in the unofficial taxi service he provides for his 
colleagues and in transporting liquor to and from the tavern.  It is also worth noting 
that besides the human capital constituted by Dickson and Bongisa’s interpersonal 
skills, their business is also supported by their long history of local associations: 
both customers and tavern owners are known to each other, a fact that aids 
considerably in credit management and in their relative safety from crime – other 
than crimes perpetuated by the police, that is.  In section 6 we will return to 
consider in more detail the importance of social capital and the implications of 
how it is distributed. For now, it is simply important to note the synergies between 
the different activities.  The key to Dickson and Bongisa’s success is not only that 
they have significant resources of one kind or another – it is their skill in using one 
resource to leverage another so that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. 
This process, as we shall argue later when we discuss both how a well off 
household prospers (Case Study 20 on p. 107) and how a much poorer household 
manages to make ends meet (Case Study 21 on p. 109) is central to understanding 
both success and survival. 
 
 
5.4.4 Informal activity, social relations and credit  
 
The lack of separation between informal ‘enterprises’ and the domestic economy 
of ‘households’ highlights the way in which the conduct of informal economic 
activities is shaped by the social relations within which people operate.  To the 
extent that ‘social capital’ enabled people to make strong claims from family or 
household members, it played a key role both in enabling informal economic 
activity and limiting it.  The stories of Mam Thandi (see Case Study 8 ) and Mamzoli 
Mashiya (see Case Study 5) show one important way in which this works: there, the 
sustainability of an informal economic activity depends on the ability of Mam 
Thandi and Mrs Mashiya to get kin or household members to contribute unpaid 
labour time to the conduct of the business.  But when the ‘enterprise’ cannot be 
protected from demands for resources by family and household members, the 
business can fold. What is true ‘inside’ the ‘household’ is also true in relation to 
the markets in which informal economic activity was conducted.  We have already 
noted how the ability to compete depended not on classic forms of competitive 
advantage (e.g. better value or lower prices) but also on the social networks to 
which people had access and on which they relied for custom.  Another important 
way in which social relationships shaped the prospects for and conduct of informal 
economic activities was through the dynamics of credit.  Here, we are not talking 
about the need for credit on the part of people involved in informal economic 
business.  
 
Indeed, very few informants at all mentioned the need for credit as a major 
constraining factor, and the CPRC survey, as we have mentioned, indicate fairly 
low levels of business-related indebtedness (see p. 87 above).  But quite often 
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informants did without prompting 
highlight the difficulties posed by 
the fact that they needed to give 
credit. 
 
This should not really be a surprise.  
In a context where informal 
economic activity is pinned to 
impoverished areas, and where 
supermarket chains easily ‘suck’ 
large amounts of money out of the 
local economy, staying in business 
often depends on one’s willingness 
to give credit – and one’s ability to 
recover it (see Box 3).  As can be 
seen from the case study of Bongisa 
and Dickson’s tavern, and from the 
quotes in the adjoining text box, 
sustaining informal economic 
activities therefore required 
careful and astute credit 
management strategies.  This has 
important implications.  Quite 
obviously, this reliance on credit is 
another factor that means that 
even for very low level marginal 
activities, business is mostly 
conducted between people who 
know one another: extending credit 
to someone one does not know is 
risky.  But beyond this, one’s 
ability to pursue a business is also 
crucially affected by social identity 
and social relations.  More than one 
informant, for example, 
highlighted that gender played a 
major role in one’s ability to 
collect credit, holding that ‘a man 
can’t “collect” a woman’ or, 
inversely, that a woman could not 
“collect” from a man. This has 
important implications particularly 
for the ability of single female 
household heads to participate in 
informal economic activities. Nor is 
gender the only ground of 
disempowerment: being a cultural 
outsider would also make it hard to 
collect credit, as the example in 
Box 3 of Delia S, a young coloured 
woman living in Khayelitsha 
illustrates.  As in the case of 
Dickson and Bongisa’s long-running 
relationships with their neighbours, 
[K***] has worked as a petrol pump attendant on and off for 
many years.  At one point they tried to supplement this 
income by selling meat.  They own a chest freezer, which is 
in a cousin’s house.  They tried to sell chicken pieces, but 
this was difficult because people took meat on credit. They 
also bought two whole cows, using the income from K***’s 
job. The first cow was bought for R1700 from a farm on the 
other side of Durbanville: K hired a bakkie to bring it back to 
Khayelisha and paid for it to be butchered at Landsdown road 
butchery.  He sold the beef for cash and on credit.  This 
worked, so in 2002 he bought a second cow for R1600. But he 
lost money on this; too many people look meat on credit but 
did not pay it back.  (Ky 156) 
 
Thando lives with her father, surviving off his retrenchment 
package from Iscor and agriculture. She supplements their 
income by selling clothes. She travels to Durban via two 
busses (first to Matatiele R15, then to Durban R80 for a single 
trip; and there is a surcharge to bring the clothes on the 
bus). She buys from the factory shops in Victoria road.  She 
goes around the village and sells these, sometimes on credit.  
Sometimes debtors ‘run away’ and she is unable to collect 
the debt’ (Mf 072). 
 
Jabulani Rhotso lives on his own in a tiny shack on the verge 
of busy P*** road in Khayelitsha. He survives by doing piece 
work in the construction trade. He used to have a fruit and 
veg business – it was right next to his shack, on the verges or 
the roaring thoroughfare -  but that failed. The reason why 
his fruit and veg business failed was because his wife left 
him, so now he can’t collect the credit.  He says many of the 
women who used to buy from the business were women, and 
he had to give them credit. ‘And a man can’t collect credit 
from a woman.  A woman has to collect credit from a 
woman’ he explains (Ky 310) 
 
Nonzwakhazi M is visiting her daughter in Khayelitsha, who 
used to make sell tracksuits, but who now works in a clothing 
factory in Mowbray. According to Nonzwakhazi the reason 
why her daughter  chose to change from dressmaking on her 
own account to working in a factory is that people used to 
get dresses on credit and then not pay her.  She says says 
that the reason for this is her daughter is too sweet, so 
people take advantage of her.  Nonzwakhazi says that she 
herself would not be so sweet: if it is necessary to be rude 
she will be rude. If you are in business you need to be rude.  
Furthermore, she confirms that gender plays a role. She 
cannot confirm Jabulani’s assertion that it is hard  for a man 
to collect from a woman but she does say that it is hard for a 
woman to collect debts from a man – if you are rude to a 
man, he will shoot your or beat you. (Ky 164) 
 
Delia S, a ‘coloured’ woman, lives with her boyfriend Vusi 
who works at May Recycling, a plastics factory in Maitland. 
When she is asked what would be preferable, having a 
regular job at a place like May Recycling or being self 
employed she says she would not survive if she had her own 
business because she would have to give credit. She used to 
braid hair when she lived in Scottsdene and she says there 
are ‘many heads walking around there’ that she braided that 
she never got paid for. She does not have the ability to be 
hard and say, ‘no, you have to pay me now’…  It takes time 
to braid, and people will want credit. And with her not 
having Xhosa and being an outsider the community would 
just take advantage of her (‘dan gaan hulle gaan my nou eers 
vertrap’).  The work at the recycling plant is very hard, but 
at least she knows she is is getting her pay at the end of the 
week (Ky 089). 
 
Box 3: Some examples of the difficulties of having to 
give credit 
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all these factors highlight the importance of understanding in detail the nature of 
the social relationships which constitute the context of informal economic 
activities of whatever kind.  
5.5 Overview: the dimensions of economic marginalization 
 
The previous pages have sketched some aspects of the broader economic context 
against the background of which the people surveyed in the study had to make a 
living.  Before looking in detail at their coping strategies and plans, it would be 
useful to draw together some of the threads of argument so far and to highlight the 
most important features of the ‘vulnerability context’ created by these factors. 
   
(1) Fragile links with the formal economy: Perhaps the most important issue 
that should be noted is the absolute centrality of the formal economy to the 
livelihood strategies and prospects of everyone in the study. At first sight, this 
seems like an obvious and trite point to make, but at the same time it is of central 
importance.  All the households in the study that were doing well, and that  
seemed likely to remain that way, were households that either in the past or in 
the present had been able to secure a reliable and significant income by way of 
access to steady paid employment.  There was no non-poor household whose 
‘success’ did not depend in some measure on its success at gaining access to the 
formal economy.  
 
On the basis of the data gathered this seemed true also for those who were heavily 
involved in informal sector activity.  Where people were able to make a decent 
living out of agriculture or informal sector activities, it was on the back of formal 
employment.  No household had ‘powered’ its way out of poverty by relying solely 
on informal activity or agriculture. In the case of agriculture, this could be due to 
local factors: the district in which research was conducted had limited rainfall, 
imposing risks and constraints on the potential for agriculture. Certainly there are 
studies that highlight instances where rural communities have built up significant 
wealth as a result of agricultural activity unsupplemented by urban wages (Patrick 
McAllister, pers. comm.) but those cases seem to be relatively isolated, and 
depend on the powerful mobilisation of cultural capital in a particular region.  The 
material gathered by this project seemed on the whole to suggest that far from a 
‘second economy’ disconnected from the first, informal economic activities were 
intricately dependent on ‘formal’ sector work. 
 
But while access to formal and steady employment was absolutely vital to their 
chances of getting out of poverty in the long run, every indication is that these 
footholds in the formal economy are increasingly scarce and fragile. As the low 
levels of access to paid employment and the high levels of reported job losses 
quoted on p. 86 show, losing work was something that could happen quite easily, 
and for households that are so dependent on the steady stream of cash, the knock-
on effects can be significant. 
 
(2) Monetization, cash hungriness and ‘adverse incorporation’. The central role 
of paid employment and the implications of its scarcity and insecurity is attains 
particular importance in the context of the crucial role of f money to day-to-day 
survival.  Again, this may sound like a trivial point, but it is an important one.  
Daily life in South Africa, even in the remote rural areas and even among the poor, 
costs money. This is particularly true in the urban areas, but it is true in the rural 
areas too. Not only is cash needed for a host of daily necessities even in the deep 
rural areas (travel, electricity where it is available), but other forms of exchange 
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between poor people in daily life is heavily mediated by money.  To be sure: 
people did lend and borrow things, and did exchange favours and services in an 
informal way, but our research on informal economic activity and exchange did not 
seem to indicate the existence of any kind of well-developed and relatively 
independent barter economy.  While people might exchange ‘small things’ or do 
one another small favours, and though there were many instances where people 
performed menial tasks for food or help we did not encounter any instances where 
people could for instance, use mud-bricks to pay for a taxi ride, for electricity, for 
a phone call, or for a 12.5 kg sack of meal. Access to most of life’s necessities 
required cash.   
 
(3) The centrality of understanding vulnerability and coping strategies: Pro-poor 
policy in South Africa is focussed not simply on ameliorating the harsh effects of 
poverty, but also on addressing the disempowering dynamics that drive poverty.  In 
this section we have explored some of these disempowering dynamics, and have 
suggested that poor people in South Africa, far from being relegated to a separate 
economic realm disconnected from the ‘ first economy’, are thoroughly enmeshed 
in the formal economy – if not as producers, then as consumers – and dependent on 
it.  Though they are in many ways socially excluded, e.g. through remoteness and 
institutionalised forms of discrimination (e.g. the disadvantage faced in urban 
service oriented economies by those who cannot speak English) this is a form of 
social exclusion that operates within the context of broader economic 
incorporation.   
 
In addition, these examples highlight further reasons for revising the notion that 
the ‘second economy’ is somehow defined through disconnection and separation 
from the first.  Rather than existing in a separate economic realm, informal 
economic activity was very closely related to formal economic activities or to other 
‘formal’ ways of getting money (e.g. grants). 
 
This also has implications for our understanding of the potential of informal 
economic activity to alleviate poverty.  If linkages to the formal economy is one of 
the crucial empowering and enabling conditions for informal economic activity, this 
means that those who are most marginalised in terms of formal employment are 
also the most disempowered in the informal economy. Those at the very bottom of 
the pile have the least resources to be able to compete and sustain informal 
economic activities. 
 
This suggests that societal action to address poverty should not be premised on the 
assumption that the challenge is simply about ‘integrating’ people into the ‘formal 
economy’ (they are already integrated) or about making them independent of it 
(200 years of history would have to be reversed in order to do that); but to ensure 
that the terms upon which people engage with the formal economy are more 
favourable.  This however requires detailed knowledge, not merely of the 
structural features and social dynamics that disempower people, but also of the 
strategies and arrangements poor and vulnerable people have developed to deal 




6 MANAGING VULNERABILITY: AGENCY AND ‘SOCIAL 
CAPITAL’  
6.1 Vulnerability, risk and livelihood strategies: understanding 
agency at the margins 
 
In the previous section we discussed at some length some structural aspects of the 
economic context of vulnerability in the Eastern Cape and in Khayelitsha. We 
argued that the evidence supports those who question whether there is a ‘second 
economy’ systematically separate from the first.  Rather than explaining poverty 
through conceiving of people as simply disconnected or excluded from the 
mainstream economy, they seem solidly incorporated in it.  Their problems seem to 
flow not from the lack of connection but from the nature of those linkages.  Many 
of these linkages are of such a nature that they render poor people dependent on 
broader systems of production, distribution and exchange within which they have a 
disadvantaged, marginalised or disempowered position.  
 
In this section we explore some of the ways in which the people surveyed in the 
study dealt with these challenging social and economic realities.  This analysis 
involves recognition of the inventiveness and agency of poor people - the way in 
which different people, when faced with similar circumstances can adopt very 
different ways of dealing with them, leading to very different outcomes. It also 
involves recognizing that this agency is always historically situated.  The ability to 
cope with poverty or not is simply an individual characteristic: people very rarely 
behave like the decontextualised, acultural, ahistorical individuals supposed by a 
disembodied modelling exercise.  Rather, they inherit and benefit from more 
broadly transmitted forms of ‘cultural knowledge’ and social meaning — 
assumptions, frameworks, action repertoires, cultural and spiritual resources, and 
collectively shared experience about what works and what does not — that have 
evolved over time in particular historical contexts.   
 
For this reason it is again important to stress that we are once again not talking 
about the ‘coping strategies of the poor’ in general - as if these are universally 
true of people’s behaviour when faced with the difficulties we have described 
here.  In other South African contexts these patterns may very well be different. In 
the consideration of policy implications one will have to draw careful attention to 
which aspects of our analysis seem to hold true for other contexts, and which 
pertain largely to the Eastern Cape and Cape Town’s African townships. 
 
Most of this chapter will deal with what is commonly referred to as ‘social capital’ 
– the ways in which certain kinds of relationship and shared history allow people to 
co-operate, mobilise help, and to make claims for help and assistance.  But how 
people use social capital is, as we shall show, deeply dependent on the other 
strategies and arrangements they have developed.  Before we discuss ‘social 
capital’ we therefore begin with a general discussion of the broader ‘menu’ or 
repertoire of underlying strategies, arrangements and coping strategies brought to 
light by the research. 
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6.2 Some key strategies 
 
In this section, we survey some of the general strategies and arrangements that 
seemed to be in place in many of the households we studied.  Some of these will be 
familiar from the case studies and arguments in Sections 4 and 5; but here we 
consider how they work as strategic responses to the challenges of survival at the 
edges of the formal economy.  Not every strategic response was present in every 
household: indeed, some of the responses embody a range of different options. In 
addition, these strategic responses were often not explicitly articulated as such by 
informants. What follows is an interpretation: an attempt to highlight patterns in 
the data elicited through research, and to show how these patterns can be seen as 
rational responses to the challenges that flow from the vulnerability context. 
6.2.1 Developing a range of livelihood activities 
 
One key strategic issue is the ways in which individuals seemed to combine the 
portfolio of livelihood activities in which they were involved. Here, it should be 
said there was a range of variation.  Sometimes households were involved in a wide 
range of activities, all of which contributed to their overall survival.   
 
Case Study 20: A household more than the sum of its parts 
 
Siyanda and his family live in the distant rural village of Phuzayo.  The household is a nuclear 
family, consisting of 46 year old Siyanda, his 41 year old wife and their five children.  The 
three eldest children are attending school outside of the village, while the youngest two 
children a 12 year old girl and a five year old boy live at home.  Their homestead consists of 
several sturdy mud brick structures, including a large, well build house with a deep verandah, 
flanked by bedrooms on either wing.  The interview was conducted in a tidy kitchen, 
complete with new gas stove, although the household also has a lounge type reception room 
furnished with new chain store furniture.   
 
The relatively comfortable compound bears all the hallmarks of extended labour in the formal 
sector.  Siyanda first left the village in 1976 to work on a mine in Rustenburg, returning the 
village following year to be initiated.  In 1978 he began working in a Johannesburg gold 
mine, where he worked as a winch driver for 11 years.  He married his wife in 1982 and 
remitted money to her via post or people traveling to the village.  Throughout the 1980s his 
wife made the sun dried mud bricks out of which the homestead was built.  Siyanda’s 
employment ended abruptly in 1989, when he was severely injured in an accident.  A heavy 
winch cable snapped, the backlash knocking him unconscious and severing his left leg.  After 
convalescing in mine hospitals for two years he was medically boarded and returned to the 
village.  In 1992 he received a payout of R12 000 from the mines, which he has used to 
complete the construction of his current house, acquire livestock and school his children. 
 
The family’s income consists of two state disability grants (for Siyanda and his 15 year old 
daughter), a child support grant for the youngest child and a mine pension of R400.  The state 
grants are paid out at a store in the village; the mine pension into a bank account in town.  
Siyanda and his wife travel to Mount Frere once a month to withdraw the money from the 
bank account and buy about R300 of groceries.  This comparatively tidy income is augmented 
by produce from the planting field and a homestead garden that Siyanda and his wife 
cultivate.  They harvest enough maize for most of the year, along with vegetables. Despite 
Siyanda’s stiff gait (he wears a prosthetic leg, but walks unaided) his commitment to agrarian 
production is evident in his newly built ox draw sledge and the regularity with which he tends 
his fields.  Siyanda has five head of cattle (acquired when he retired to the village), but 
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usually pays (R400) for a tractor to do the hard work of ploughing his field.  He uses two of 
his suitably trained oxen combined with four of his neighbour’s animals for light ploughing, 
to draw the sledge and to collect wood.  This pooling of oxen into a workable span is however 
far from the full extent of the household’s alliances and synergies with others.  
 
Siyanda’s eldest 22 year old son lives with his aunt and uncle in Tembisa, where he is 
repeating matric.  This son has reportedly always been the favourite of his Tembisa-resident 
aunt, who only has daughters of her own.  Although the son was last in the village in mid-
2005 to be initiated, he favours ‘Johannesburg’ over the rural Transkei and has indicated he 
has little intention of relocating back to the village.  When questioned on his son’s plans for 
next year, Siyanda explained that he does not have money for ‘tertiary’ [education], but 
perhaps he will pay for his son to complete his driver’s license.  They send R400 a month to 
their son; via the bus driver of a long distance bus (the bus driver and Siyanda’s sister in 
Gauteng know each other). 
 
The next two oldest children, a teenage boy and girl are both attending school in Mount Frere, 
a two hour bus ride away.  They live with a maternal aunt who works as a clerk at a hospital, 
and who has three children of her own.  Siyanda’s wife, in turn, assumes responsibility for 
maintaining her family’s traditional family home (airing and cleaning it) that is occasionally 
used for traditional ceremonies.  She also skillfully brews the ‘umqombuthi’ (traditional 
sorghum beer) required at these occasions.  
 
The first of the two teenagers living with the aunt in Mount Frere is a 20 year son who is in 
grade 10 (old standard 8).  He returns home every weekend, but avoids paying the bus fare by 
helping with a young man’s work of loading all manner of items (luggage, groceries, 25 litre 
drums of paraffin, bound livestock, building materials, furniture etc) onto the high roof of the 
bus.  This arrangement is facilitated by the fact that his family is distantly related to that of the 
bus owner (a distant cousin, by marriage), who live adjacent to them.  (This is the same 
household whose oxen Siyanda pairs his with, in order constitute a full span).  However these 
long standing links do not automatically assure the young man of complimentary transport.  
Instead they confer the opportunity for him to enter into the web of reciprocity, where his 
assistance loading an unloading is rewarded with a free ride. 
 
The second child schooling in Mount Frere is a fifteen year old daughter.  Her eyesight and 
hearing are described as poor and she has always struggled to carry heavy weights on her 
head in the aftermath of ‘tonsils’ (lay descriptions of ailments tend to correspond poorly with 
a formal biomedical nosology).  Although she is reportedly intellectually on par with her 
cohorts, her ailment is serious and she receives a disability grant.  Her aunt, as a clerk at a 
hospital and therefore better acquainted with the world of medicine, took the child to Mthatha 
to get spectacles.  The aunt further assists by taking the R35 per month that Siyanda’s wife 
pays towards funeral insurance and depositing it appropriately.  It is a measure of this 
apportioning of tasks, and Siyanda’s unquestioning faith his sister-in-law that he expressed 
ignorance of the pragmatic details of these arrangements.  He wasn’t even sure with which 
company they had the funeral policy.  
 
 
The story of Siyanda and his family shows something of the complexity of the 
process whereby a household uses a multitude of complementary activities and 
resources to make ends meet. Siyanda’s accumulated assets, his disability grant, 
his agrarian production, his wife’s mud-brick making, and his son’s work and his 
relative’s assistance are all part of the picture.  Developing a portfolio of 
livelihoods activities also allows households to manage the adverse consumption 
effects associated with seasonality and to mitigate these.  For example many of 
the survivalist activities such has collecting grass (for thatching) or making sun 
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dried mud bricks are activities easily disrupted by inclement weather and the rainy 
season. But as important as the ability to reduce risk and the impact of seasonality 
through diversification is how these activities complement one another. The 
availability of cash in the household is key to their ability to invest in agricultural 
activity, allowing them to pay for mechanical traction.  The fact that they own 
some cattle puts them in a position to trade favours with their cattle owning 
neighbour.  These links of reciprocity are also essential to his son’s ability to get 
free rides on the bus. Note here how these long standing links do not automatically 
assure the young man of complimentary transport:  Instead they confer the 
opportunity for him to enter into the web of reciprocity, where his assistance 
loading an unloading is rewarded with a free ride. Similarly, the long association 
and relationship with his sister in law facilitates the relationship by which she is 
entrusted with the grant money.  Part of Siyanda’s success clearly lies in his 
industriousness over the years. But as important is his and his kin’s ability to 
processes of exchange and reciprocity that allows them to leverage these resources 
to greater gain.  
 
Further examples are provided by the story of Dickson and Bongani’s tavern (see p. 
101) or the Radebe case study referred to on page 67. These cases illustrate the 
way in which successful households could benefit from a dynamic in which success 
could ‘snowball’ and allow a situation in which the household’s livelihood strategy 
as a whole was in a sense more than just the sum of its parts. Here relatively large 
households with significant resources could reach a critical mass: while these 
resources meant that the household attracted or retained members who could 
make demands on those resources, this also constituted an opportunity: their 
services and labour could be spread across a large range of activities, and thus 
could improve the bargaining position of the household as a whole. 
 
Two things seemed to be part of the ability of these households to reduce risk, 
leverage scant resources and create internal synergies. One important factor in 
these cases seemed to that the household had control over significant material 
assets, often the result of investments of saving from involvement in the formal 
economy.  But as important was the internal organisation in these households: they 
were characterised by having a clear centre of familial authority – usually a 
patriarch, but sometimes a matriarch - and  a by the fact that the person who 
exercised that authority was in fact able to direct labour and resources effectively 
and skilfully to allow long term accumulation and savings.  This last is an important 
point – what is central here is not so much the mere existence of a centre of 
authority but the underlying co-operation that gives a ‘patriarch’ or a ‘matriarch’ 
his or her power. The ability of household members to co-ordinate and co-operate, 
indeed, seemed to make an important difference even in marginal situations.   
 
 
Case Study 21: The Mashiyas: doing so much with so little 
 
The Mashiyas are a household of four generations of women who occupying a very modest 
homestead in Phuzayo village.  They consist of: Nolinda (a great-grandmother in her 
eighties), her daughter (herself a middle aged grandmother) named Bulelwa; Bulelwa’s 33 
year old year old daughter, Thandeka; and Thandeka’s 11 year old daughter, Sibongile.  The 
women, ranging from great grandmother to grandchild, live in a small compound consisting 
of three small mud block huts in a distant village of Phuzayo.  Courteous and hospitable, the 
three adult Mashiyas were confident and loquacious respondents.  They seemed never to tire 
of talking to us, even after half a dozen long interviews.   




Their life histories contain a number of obvious commonalities: all three have worked as 
domestic workers outside of the village, and all relate narratives of abandonment by male 
partners.  It is in part this long absence of male breadwinners remitting money from the 
formal economy, which has patterned the material poverty of the household.  The household 
was, for instance, one of the very last to move to the current village under a process 
‘betterment’ (basically a process of compulsory villagisation) in the 1960s.  Households that 
moved late appear to have done so under much more adverse terms than the first of the 
relocating households.  They were often less able to absorb the economic shock of rebuilding 
houses and may well have had a less favourable choice of sites.  Therefore the Mashiya’s 
account suggests their current material circumstances have endured for decades. 
 
Although a number of points can be made in relation to the Mashiyas, amongst the 
noteworthy is a paradox that the research team grappled with.  Simply put, the Mashiya’s 
seem to do so much with so little.  Despite being income poor and subsisting on little more 
than a single old age pension and the odd remittance, they make provision for healthcare and 
have invested in improving the quality of their accommodation.  
 
The Mashiya’s income consists of a state old age pension of R780, some petty informal 
trading (described in more detail below), and some small and erratic remittances from 
Bulelwa’s son or her married sisters (averaging out at about R150 a month).  Finally, while 
Sibongile received a few months of Child Support grant payments, it ended abruptly.  The 
Mashiya’s efforts to get it reinstated have thus far failed. 
 
All of the adult Mashiya’s have worked in major urban areas as domestic workers at various 
points in their lives.  Typically taking ‘live in’ positions, the resultant savings on 
accommodation and food costs have often allowed them to remit a large proportion of their 
salary.  (Bulelwa spoke of remitting up to R450 out of a R500 monthly salary).  Amidst the 
uncertainties and vulnerability of domestic work, favourable employment opportunities are 
coverted and not simply discarded with changing personal circumstances.  For instance, when 
Sibongile approached school going age and with her great grandmother Nolinda grew frailer, 
it was decided that Bulewa would return to the village, while Thandeka would take her place 
as a full-time domestic worker with favoured employers in Durban.  Thus two generations of 
the Mashiya family effectively swopped jobs, reconfiguring their labour to satisfy middle 
aged Bulelwa’s desire to return to the village and the family’s care burdens 
 
What this enumeration of income and work history does not fully reveal is the general 
respectability the Mashiyas command within the village.  Nombuluelo is the ‘chairman’ of a 
recently established local agriculture development project.  Although unremunerated for these 
efforts and owning no garden or livestock of her own (apart from two pigs), she diligently 
tends the communal fields during growing season.  Uncertain of what the final benefit will be, 
she explains the household has ‘eaten [vegetables] from the project’.  In addition, both 
Nobmulelo and her daughter Thandeka have occupied prominent positions in the complex 
organisational arrangements required by funerals in the village.  Finally, the frail yet lucid 
Nolinda is occasionally consulted on how to appropriately conduct various traditional 
ceremonies.  These various roles and the collective respectability that accrues to the 
Mashiyas, suggests their ability to transact extensively in the world of mutual assistance and 
borrowing.   
 
A key factor in the ability of the Matyenis to survive is the way in which they are able to 
leverage their scant resources. A powerful example is provided by the way in which they 
finance their paraffin purchases.  When they receive their grant, they carefully keep separate 
the change left over after their major monthly grocery purchase.  This change is used in a very 
specific way: the use it to buy sweets and chips. These they resell to neighbours in the village, 
and then the returns are used to buy paraffin.  Their attention to creating small separate ‘ pots’ 
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of money, each with its own purpose and area of application, speaks of the attention and 
intention they devote to managing their scant resources.  
 
Another remarkable aspect of their expenditure is the way they have engaged with 
provisioning for upgrading their accommodation and health related expenses.  The current 
refurbishment of a mud block built hut required about R3000 worth of building materials 
(corrugated iron roofing, timber, doors and windows).  These were sourced from a hardware 
store with a small deposit.  The Mashiya’s regular pension income was clearly part of what 
managed them to convince the hardware proprietor that they were a sound credit risk.  Their 
evident respectability and isidima evidently plays an equally important role: the Mashiyas are 
well regarded in the village, and they will not renege on a debt, even if repaying the balance 
takes many months. Expensive thought it is, it is a wise investment: the replacement of a 
leaking thatch roof on the hut with corrugated iron will not only improve the quality of their 
lives (in an area known for winter snowfalls), it will free them from the ongoing labour of 
renewing the thatch.  
 
In addition, the Mashiyas estimate that between R100 and R150 is saved every month and 
drawn on when elderly Nolinda Mashiya occasionally falls ill.  Although there is a clinic 
within the village it is considered by many, including the Mashiyas, to offer a relatively poor 
quality of care (a clinic sister conceded that drug shortages were common).  Moreover any 
serious ailment or referral to hospital would rely on the chronically unavailable district 
ambulance.  Instead, the Mashiyas reason, it is best to catch the bus or hire a vehicle to get 
Nolinda to a private doctor in town.  While their concern for elderly Nolinda is doubtlessly 
motivated by concern and a sense of filial duty, her enduring health ensures the household of 
the pension that constitutes the bulk of its income.   
 
 
The Mashiyas’ story highlights the importance of intra-household co-operation and 
negotiation in the wise management of scarce resources.  Two points are 
particularly important.  The first striking aspect of their story is the care and 
ingenuity with which the pension is managed. Though poor, they have managed to 
preserve a level of dignity and internal caregiving that have eluded wealthier, but 
less organised households.  The second is the profound fragility of the equilibrium 
that they have managed to construct.  All that keeps this household from 
dissolution and destitution is the pension.  Should Nolinda die the centrepiece of 
their carefully constructed strategies for survival and dignity would be removed.  
Key here is not only the relative generosity of the South African pension, but also 
its regularity.  
 
Here, however, our attention is focussed primarily on the way they are able to 
manage this resource.  With a pension their only regular source of income, they are 
not only able to survive and care for the child even though their child support grant 
has failed; they are also able to invest in building improvements and buy private 
medical care for their eldest member.   Key to this has been their ability to make 
good joint decisions.  The ‘job swop’ organised by the Mashiyas and described on 
page 110 above is a case in point: a difficult conundrum – balancing the needs of 
different members of the household and the challenge of ensuring both 
remittances and a cash income - was resolved by re-allocating household members 
within the extended spatial network created through migrancy. 
 
This last point is quite important. Having someone ‘in charge’ of the household was 
not a sufficient condition for success even where the household did dispose over 
significant resources. The household of Themba Mhlaba (page 89) is a case in point: 
even though this household had access to a regular resource flow in the form of the 
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household head’s headman stipend, his alleged pattern of substance abuse seemed 
to be one of the factors which squandered this resource, significantly detracting 
from their overall well-being. 
 
Not all households were pluri-active in this way.  If household where additional 
reported activities or sources of income are minimal are discounted (and if reliance 
on grants and involvement in subsistence agriculture is taken into account), there 
seem to be at least seven households households in the sample that seemed to rely 
almost exclusively on one key activity or source of income without significant 
supplementary activities. A number of key points emerge. Firstly, all of the 
households that were heavily reliant on a single source of income were urban. This 
partly reflects the fact that involvement in agriculture was usually sufficient to 
allow the Mount Frere households to be classified as pluri-active – a reasonable 
decision, since even when agricultural activity played only a supplementary role it 
would often still embody a significant commitment of resources and labour time.  
Secondly, the households listed below seemed to embody a significant economic 
spread, ranging from the poorest and most marginalised household (Nomsa B’s 
household, Ky 006 in the table below) to those with the very highest levels of 
income and well-being (Ky 169).  There seem to be three groups.  One group, 
constituted by Nomsa B (Ky 006) and Neliswa M (Ky 166) are rural-disconnected, 
female headed households that do not dispose over significant amounts of spare 
internal sources of labour, and who rely on a labour intensive and low-margin 
activity for survival – cooking smilies.  A second group is constituted by households 
- Ky 169 and Ky 098 (the household of Xolile and Nontuthuzelo M) that are heavily 
reliant on formal sector employment, and who, while not currently pluri active as 
a local unit, are investing heavily in building up a homestead in the Eastern Cape. 
They seem to have little spare labour locally, but should their long-term strategy 
work, they will have succeeded in setting up a classically pluri-active rural 
homestead. Another, somewhat distinctive case (Ky 310) was a single person 
household economically disorganised by the departure of the resident’s partner. 
 
Only two households seemed genuinely to be putting all their eggs in the basket of 
one family member’s job. These were Ky 101 and Ky156:  both households where 
the main breadwinners had recently lost their jobs, and were spending their time 
seeking employment; in the case of one (Ky101) the breadwinner’s wife had left 
Cape Town and had accompanied their child to stay with rural relatives, while in 
the other, the partner was devoting her energy to child care and investment in 
education and training. It is interesting to note that at least one of these (Ky 101) 
had been pluri-active when he had been holding down a job, trying to buy and re-
sell meat using his salary as seed money.   
 





Key economic activities 
 
Household structure and context 
Ky 006 The household head’s main activity is 
making and selling smilies.  There is no 
other significant source of income other 
than a child support grant 
Household is composed of the single female head 
and her minor children 
Ky 098 The male household head works for a 
company that installs swimming pools.  His 
wife reports no other informal activities; 
she also says she has no friends in 
Khayelitsha and has rarely been outside 
Site B. 
 
Household is composed of the household head, his 
partner and their minor children.  The partner 
spends significant time in the Eastern Cape 
tending to their rural homestead. 
Ky 101 No income activity at the time of the 
study:  At the time of the interview he was 
Household at present composed of head, his 
younger brother (20) and his niece (19). Non-







Key economic activities 
 
Household structure and context 
not involved in formal sector work, but was 
looking for a job in the formal sector, and 
surviving on loans from family members. 
 
resident partner in the Eastern Cape, caring for 
children and staying with family.  
Ky 156 Household head worked his way up from 
being a petrol pump attendant to his 
recently lost job in a printing company.  At 
the time of research were receiving no 
income – head was looking for work, and his 
partner was in the last stages of completing 
her qualification as a nurse.  In the past, 
they have sold chicken pieces from their 
house, and bought and slaughtered two 
cows (commercially). 
 
Household composed of the household head, his 
partner, and their three underage children. 
Partner provides childcare and is studying for 
qualification as a nurse 
Ky 169 The male household head works as a 
security guard for the Cape Town 
Municipality.  They deny involvement any 
informal economic activity. They do 
however have significant agricultural 
involvement in the Eastern Cape 
 
The male household head, his partner and their 
three sons, two of whom are no longer minors but 
who are still at school 
Ky 166 The female household head has lived in 
Khayelitsha for almost 20 years, and has 
never had a formal job. She makes a living 
selling ‘smilies’. 
 
Household is composed of the single female head 
and two children, one of whom is a minor, and 
one of which is an unemployed adult. 
Ky 310 The male head of this household sometimes 
works with his brother who has a tiling 
business. He used to have a fruit and veg 
business but this collapsed when his wife 
left him 
 
A one-member household. 
 
It does appear then, that most of the individuals in the households studied here 
actively tried to diversify their activity portfolios, relying heavily on a single 
activity only if they were ‘pinned down’ into it by need and labour scarcity (as 
seemed to be the case with Nomsa B and Neliswa M) or when they were staking 
everything on finding a well-paying formal sector job: in the latter case other 
household members had either made use of the ‘safety net’ provided by rural kin 
or were investing in their own human capital. 
6.2.2 Investing in education and access to the labour market 
 
Our argument thus far has emphasised the centrality of the formal, urban labour 
market to individuals’ and households’ livelihood strategies. The first prize for any 
household was to ensure that one household member had access to a permanent, 
formal sector job.  One powerful testament to the key role this has played in the 
past was the near-universality of labour migrancy as a key life history component 
for household heads in the Eastern Cape sample.  Every single male household head 
interviewed in the Eastern Cape section of the study  had taken ‘the join’ as a 
young adult:  the employment history of each one of them reflects, in the span of 
one person’s life, the history of a key phase of unaccompanied male industrialised 
labour migrancy in South Africa. 
 
Alongside the desirability of securing urban employment was the risk factor.  In the 
absence of the institutionalised routes of ‘the join’ the struggle to find 
employment could often be an arduous one.  The story of Thandeka Mashiya, whose 
has already been mentioned in our discussion of the household of Nolinda Mashiye 
Section 6: Vulnerability and social protection  114 
 
 
on page 109 illustrates some of the risks and difficulties involved in leaving the 




Case Study 22:  Caught without help a long way from home - Thandeka 
Mashiya, Mount Frere 
 
Thandeka, a quiet and softly spoken woman of 32, forms the third generation of the four-
generation, matrifocal Mashiya household.  She was born in Durban in 1974 but grew up in 
the village, living in the house of her uncle, as her mother Bulelwa was still schooling at the 
time. (In fact, she says that when she was young neither she nor her brother knew that 
Bulelwa was her mother; she remembers the discovery of the truth as a traumatic event).  She 
struggled with school, having to leave for a time because of recurrent headaches, and in 1993 
she fell pregnant. When her grandmother Nolinda found this out she was told to visit Bulelwa, 
who was working in Durban at the time; and her mother in turn told her she could not school 
any further and had to get a job. She worked for a Muslim family in Durban for a while but 
left after four months, partly because of her condition but partly because they did not get on. 
She could not stay at her mother’s place of employment and spent a very unhappy time living 
with her sangoma aunt in Bizana before eventually returning - shamefaced and with her child 
- to the village.   
 
She attempted to go back to school, but this was impossible.  She was again struggling with 
illness, and both her daughter and her grandmother needed care - a situation they eventually 
resolved in 1998 with the ‘job swop’ described on page 110.  For some years she worked 
happily for her mother’s (and now her) employers Mr and Mrs S***, even managing to 
complete one more year of schooling, but this happy period ended (her account is unclear on 
the exact date) when Mr and Mrs S*** divorced and their household split up. For two weeks 
she worked for Malawian friends of her ex-employers but this arrangement turned sour.  
 
Suddenly she was in a crisis. She had managed to find employment elsewhere – but that job 
would only start in two weeks. In the interim she had nowhere to stay. She had made 
alternative accommodation arrangements with a friend of hers in Montclair but these suddenly 
fell through.  She did not know anyone else in Durban besides Mrs S***, who did not have 
space for her, and the Malawians, with whom matters had ended in a bad fight.  Her clothes 
were still with Mrs S*** (she says some of her clothes remain there to this day) but she 
decided that she had no option but to return to her village. She spent the night at the 
Clairwood train station. She was very unhappy and hungry and it was dark.  She did not have 
sufficient money to return to the village.  She reports that at one point she considered ‘selling 
her body’ (i.e. engaging in commercial sex work), but then decided against this.  After 
spending a night sleeping rough at the station, she offered her cell phone to a man for R80, in 
order to get the fare to travel back the village.  He gave her R120 for it. She went to the park 
and washed her face and combed her hair before catching a taxi back to the village.  When 
she told her family about all that had happened to her, they agreed that she should not return 
to Durban.  
 
Since then she has not had much luck finding or retaining employment.  Her troubles with 
stress, nerves and headaches have returned.  In 2005 she turned down an offer of employment 
as a housekeeper for a (single) Mthaha policeman (she based on her assessment on the job 
offered, she feared sexual harassment).  For six months she looked after a house and a child 
for a family in Spruitview in Gauteng but the return of her headaches put an end to that. When 
asked about her dreams, she still says that she does not see herself in the villages. She also 
remarks that one’s health has an effect on ones life.  She just tries to take it one day at a time.  
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When asked what she has done about her headaches, she replies that she goes to the clinic 
when it is really bothering her.  She gets stressed by not having a job.   
  
 
Clearly there are some rather unique and distinctive elements to Thandeka’s story. 
The recurrent illness which she describes as plaguing her since her teens clearly 
plays a role in her difficulties both in finding and holding on to employment, and in 
her interrupted education.  In addition, another, more resilient woman may have 
been less ready to throw in the towel at various key points in her life.  At the same 
time, her story illustrates some of the obstacles and risks that would be faced by 
anyone in her position.  The interruption of her schooling through her pregnancy 
and the ways in which decisions about care work constrained her (and her 
mother’s) decisions speak to the fundamental role gender and gendered power 
relations play in shaping her life chances.  The fragility and insecurity of her 
employment and its vulnerability to crises of relationship (the divorce of Mr and 
Mrs S***, her falling out with the Muslim household and the Malawians, and her 
fears of taking up employment with the single Mthatha policeman) is also 
powerfully illustrated.  But above all, the story of her night at Clairwood station 
illustrates the vulnerability of someone at the margins of the employment market 
in a context where she could not rely on the cushioning networks of kin and family 
connections. Even though there is no chance for employment in Phuzayo village, 
being able to attach her to her grandmother’s house offers some security and some 
chance for eking out a livelihood while she gathers her energies for the next 
attempt to establish a foothold in the formal economy.  
 
The story also casts some important light on the dynamics of membership of 
households with scarce resources, a theme to which we will return.  Clearly her 
grandmother’s pension is part of what makes it possible for Thandeka to return to 
her maternal home in the first place.  Yet it is hard to consider her an idle hanger-
on, battening on her elderly family member’s social grant.  As our discussion of 
their co-operation and pluri-activity in on page 109 indicates, she labours within 
the household, helping eke out the resources on which she depends.  And her 
attempts to continue seeking work, despite the fact that she clearly feels infirm, 
also speaks to her recognition of her households’ deeply fragile position. Should her 
grandmother die, her family will lose the one slender thread of access to funds that 
makes their household viable.  Sooner or later, they will depend on her ability to 
find a job.  
 
Clearly linked to the importance of establishing a foothold in the formal economy is 
the huge emphasis on and the massive investment in education (see Box 4 below). 
This investment very often did not represent merely an individual position.  
Keeping people in school and ensuring their qualification takes resources, and can 
require a high level of investment from the household as a whole.  A dramatic 
example of the extent to which family members will invest in the education of kin 
is provided in some detail on p. 145 below in the story of Simpiwe Fikile, the son of 
Mamzoli Fikile whose story in turn is told on page 49 above — but this is only one of 
a number of cases where pensions or packages had been spent significantly on 
putting children through school. So important is education that informants would 
sometimes be continuing to invest money in their children’s education even when 
those children were continuing to fail, or when qualifications had not led to jobs in 
the past.  Although this may seem like an irrational strategy, it clearly reflects a 
situation where the expected pay-off from an investment is so large that it is 
deemed worthwhile even when it involves significant sacrifice or risk. 
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6.2.3 Securing urban and 
rural outposts 
 
Even where households were not 
characterised by a wide spread of 
household activities internally, they 
were often part of a distributed 
kinship network that was. 
  
For rural households, it was 
important to be connected to an 
urban outpost: besides being the 
source of vital remittances, having 
urban relatives already established 
can make a crucial difference to the 
migration hopes of rural people 
wishing to seek jobs in the urban 
areas.  For urban households, as we 
have argued rural connections would 
continue to remain significant: for 
those who, like Xolile B in on p. 43 
above, intended to settle there, 
keeping a rural homestead going was 
of vital importance, while even 
solidly urbanised households would 
often fall back on rural support 
networks, for example sending 
children to stay with Eastern Cape 
relatives when life got difficult in 
the urban or – as Thandeka’s story in 
the previous pages illustrates -  
retreating there themselves if all 
else failed.  Besides being a 
framework for the redistribution of 
resources, and a network of links 
connecting urban and rural contexts, 
having access to a spatially 
distributed infrastructure of kin 
connections played a key role in 
facilitating mobility – and on the 
margins of the formal economy, with 
jobs being insecure and hard to find, 
it is no coincidence that the most 
desperately marginalised households 
seem to be those who are pinned 
down either in the rural and the 
urban contexts, unable to move. 
6.2.4 Investing in social 
standing   
 
Given the importance of kinship 
networks, the importance of investing 
Babalwa G, now retired, has spent her whole life 
doing a series of domestic worker jobs. Herself 
uneducated, investing in the education of her 
children has been a key aim. Her eldest son, Zuko, 
appears to have studied either as a mechanic or as 
a chemical engineer: according to her he worked 
for Sasol for 10 years before he died in a car 
accident in October 2004. Her youngest son, 
Mfundisi, is living in the back of her shack, studying 
tourism and travel at a local technicon. His fees 
and expenses are paid for with a bursary: a 
measured and thoughtful youth, he says that he 
hopes to get a job either as a flight attendant or as 
a travel agent, and that he has done a basic course 
in German to help him with this (Ky 107) 
 
Nombeka M grew up on her grandfather’s very 
successful homestead and was taken under the 
wing of a dynamic young Catholic priest, who 
supported her hopes for education in spite of her 
own family’s resistance. When she finished St 6 at 
the catholic school with a first class pass, the Priest 
saw to it that she was enrolled at another school, 
paid for her schooling and arranged for her 
accommodation with a local family.  After a while 
the priest was transferred away to another parish; 
his replacement was unsupportive of a young girl 
receiving education and, seeking to ensure her 
continued work for the mission, sabotaged her 
plans to study nursing by hiding a letter addressed 
to her. Nombeka subsequently went on to have 
more than one career: she was a successful 
businesswoman in Crossroads in the 1980s, and 
when she lost her shops and taxis in the violence, 
repositioned herself as a development worker. 
Though she has made a success of herself and is 
comfortable, her dislike for the priest who wrecked 
her educational hopes endured even when he was a 
very old man. [Ky 111] 
 
The Ceba household is one of the worst off 
households that the team visited in Mount Frere.  
The male (nominal) household head currently 
drinks and has been unemployed since the 1980s. 
Two of their children have matriculated and moved 
to town, but have been unable to secure anything 
but piece jobs. In spite of this, the household 
passes on the lion’s share of the three child support 
grants they do receive to their two grade 11 
daughters.  When asked why they continue to 
invest in their children’s schooling when it has not 
paid off in the case of the older children, Mrs Ceba 
made clear the expectation that the children would 
help them, and replied that she had not yet given 
up hope.  Maybe when the get a permanent job 
they will help and maybe these two girls will help 
sooner.[MF 627] 
Box 4: Some informants talk about investing in education 
Section 6: Vulnerability and social protection  117 
 
 
in social capital, and keeping family and other connections alive and warm, can be 
seen.  Skuse and Cousins, for instance, have argued that poor urban and rural 
people invest a significant amount of resources in communication – simply staying 
in touch with far flung relatives not simply for sentimental reasons, but also in 
order to maintain networks (Skuse & Cousins 2007).  Another form of investment in 
social capital is the need to invest in ‘dignity and respectability’ already referred 
to. Key here is the canny management of claims and counter claims.  On the one 
hand, investing in one’s respectability and status is important if one is not to risk 
marginalisation; on the other hand, it is also important not to expose oneself to too 
many claims (this will be explored later in this report when we consider the ‘dark 
side’ of social capital). This is an important issue for poverty researchers, for it 
means that we need to recognise that informants often have a vested interest in 
hiding resources! 
6.2.5 Consumption and asset smoothing:  
 
Another important coping strategy mentioned by informants was consumption and 
asset smoothing.  These well-known strategies essentially seek to modulate 
consumption, to smooth its peaks and troughs, particularly in the context of 
vacillating and insecure livelihoods. Consumption smoothing refers to strategies 
focussed on keeping consumption at constant levels, and may require the sale of 
assets; a converse situation is found when people sacrifice consumption and 
undergo considerable hardship to preserve their assets 
 
 
Case Study 23: Going hungry to keep the furniture - Thembelani Gwatcha, 
Khayelitsha Site C 
 
The shack where Thembelani lives with his younger brother and his niece immediately stands 
out from its neighbours: not only because it is painted in an attractive shade of pink, but also 
because of the digital satellite dish affixed to its roof.  The dish indicates that Thembelani is 
materially a lot better off than his neighbours, and this is confirmed by the interior of the 
shack: besides a lustrously polished wall unit (which according to him cost all of R14 000), 
there is a complete lounge and bedroom suite along with several expensive looking consumer 
electronic items.  
 
Interestingly, however, Thembelani’s neighbours might be worse off than him in terms of 
material positions, but many of them more are likely to be able to eat well every evening.  
Although he was relatively well-off until recently (both he and his wife had formal sector 
jobs) he now is unemployed.  Thembelani’s wife gave up her job as shop assistant at F***, a 
well known fashion chain, in order to look after their child, confident that they could live on 
his wages as a supermarket worker.  But a few months before the study started, Thembelani 
was fired.   
 
In response to this economic shock his wife and their young infant returned to kin in the 
Eastern Cape, while Thembelani remained in their rather presentable and well furnished 
Khayelitsha shack.  At the time of the 2005 interview Thembelani was devoting substantial 
levels of effort to regaining a formal sector job (by scouring job ads, applying for jobs, 
updating his CV etc) and dealing with his creditors.  His management of his creditors, to 
whom he owed substantial amounts of money for the expensive furniture and consumer 
electronics in his shack, encapsulated two distinct strategies.  Thembelani variously seeks to 
pacify and avoid them. He explained that on several occasions, with the furniture store at his 
front door, poised to repossess an item of furniture he would run to the ‘mashonisa’ (money 
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lender) or a family member to borrow money (often R100 or R200, a small proportion of his 
debt) to stave off the furniture store employee for a while.  Thembelani also sought simply to 
evade his creditors.  At the conclusion of the interview when the research team took down his 
(Telkom fixed line) phone number he instructed that if the team were to phone him, they 
ought to shout out immediately that they were not from the furniture store.  They ought to do 
this to avoid being deflected by his standard telephonic ruse of assuming a different identity 
and claiming that Thembelani is not available to accept the call.   
 
Allied to these efforts to manage his creditors, Thembelani was consuming very little.  He had 
not only eliminated the fiscal burden of his family by sending them away back to the Eastern 
Cape, he was spending negligible sums on food or energy.  Living frugally, and relying on kin 
members for the occasional meal, Thembelani was diverting whatever resources he managed 
to mobilise to retaining his household assets.  When questioned directly on for how long he 
thought his strategy would be viable, his reply was that he just needed to buy time, to find 
another job.  Thembelani was aware that the fiscal scales were tilted heavily in favour of his 
creditors, and to lose his household durables to them (even those that were close to paid up) 
would see him regain no or very little of the equity invested in these items. In his case, this 
strategy paid off.  By the time the fieldwork period had ended, Thembelani could report that 
he had found another job.  By relying on rural kin and his local networks, and by 
compromising substantially on his day to day consumption, he had managed to hold on to the 
household durables that represented his investment in respectability, comfort and status. 
 
 
If careful control of expenditure is an aspect of consumption smoothing, another 
important element is the ability to manage income flows.  Throughout the course 
of the research it became apparent that many respondents had sophisticated 
systems of quantifying and allocating the relatively diminutive levels of income 
they received.  A relatively common example of is provided by the Mashiya’s (Case 
study 20).  Of the old age pension received every month, the household allocates 
the leftover change from their monthly grocery shopping trip to town, for the 
purchase of sweets and puffed maize chips.  The maize chips are repackaged into 
smaller bags (each containing a handful of chips) and sold, with the sweets, to 
children in the village.  This income, leveraged out from the change from their 
groceries is allocated for the purchase of paraffin - a relative luxury which provides 
respite from gathering food or cow dung.  What is noteworthy about this elaborate 
choreography of provisioning and leveraging resources is that it prevents 
overspending on the household’s monthly shopping, by separating paraffin 
purchases from the larger sum.   
 
Another example of systems of lay accounting to manage income, was 
demonstrated by Mamzoli (see case study 5 & 28), who runs a small business from 
her homestead.  Selling various packaged chicken pieces, meat, sausages and beer 
from a gas powered chest freezer, she puts the proceeds of each class of inventory 
in a specific, individual container.  Using the material artefact of separate 
containers, allows her to track the sales and ultimately the profitability of the 
various items sold.  It also facilitates the checking of stock against the separate 
income in the various containers.  In the event of stock loss she would not simply 
reconcile a shortfall of stock against her aggregate takings, she can identify 
specifically in which class of items the shortfall is.  This prudent management of 
income streams is an essential part of managing ones consumption levels. 
6.2.6 Securing Patronage 
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The ability to secure patronage can play a very significant role in shaping the level 
of well-being attainable by an individual or household.  Patronage implies patrons 
who are better placed their recipients, usually in terms of their superior social 
connections and economic position.   Although domestic work can be amongst the 
worst paid and most insecure variety of quasi-formal employment there is a wide 
range of conditions and rewards associated with it.  The domestic work context 
often proved to be a strong source of patronage.  Probably as a consequence of the 
familiarity and intimacy of the domestic sphere, domestic work for a generous and 
relatively resourced employee, could sometimes generate solid returns.   Where a 
female domestic worker has been able to establish a stable and beneficial 
relationship with an employer, this security (even when wages are comparatively 
low) in one or two cases enabled them to save sufficiently to send children to 
school (and even onto tertiary education), significantly improving their prospects 
for escape from poverty in future.  Domestic work, particularly for middle to upper 
class families, enabled some of the focal households to significantly improve the 
quality of their furnishing on the basis of substantial in-kind payment of cast-off 
consumer durables and furnishings.  One Khayelitsha resident domestic worker who 
worked for an affluent white family was able to build a homestead in the Eastern 
Cape, send her children through tertiary education and comfortably furnished her 
township RDP house.  Another former domestic worker successfully made the 
transition from the quasi-formal domestic sphere into the formal sector.  Her 
employer took her to the small advertising agency he started, and she became the 
(self-described) ‘tea lady’ in what grew into a well-known advertising agency.  She 
eventually retired from this employment with a comfortable pension.  
 
Patronage also works in other social contexts.  It can be dispensed by government 
officials and traditional authorities and play an important role in peoples’ lives.  
Marginalised and poor households often depend on the intermediary role of officials 
and traditional authorities in the quest for access to resources.  Though these could 
give them significant access to resources, it also meant that they were subject to 
disadvantageous power relations.  Some of these dynamics and the rent-seeking 
and exploitative have been considered (in section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2) above. 
6.2.7 Ensuring your place in the household 
 
Some of the strategic imperatives discussed here are, in a sense, strategies that 
operate at the household level. It is important not to slip into the fallacy that 
households are necessarily unitary and coherent units where everyone’s interests 
cohere.  One important strategic terrain where interests could converge — but 
where they could also diverge in serious ways — was in individuals’ relationships to 
the households to which they were attached.  
 
Klasen and Woolard (2006) have argued that there seems to be a dynamic whereby 
individuals unable to secure employment attach themselves to households with 
resources. Inter alia they argue that this may contribute to people ending up in the 
deep rural areas far from labour markets. The data elicited in the present project 
supports this contention but also casts some light on the matter.  Particularly in 
the Eastern Cape, research highlighted numerous households where young people 
who had failed to find employment in the formal labour market were still attached 
to the homesteads of parents and other relatives.  In the rural research site 56% of 
households, while in Khayelitsha over a third of households, fell into this category.  
They contained at least one young adult, who failed to find formal labour market 
employment.  (Thandeka’s story on page 114 illustrates how important this 
strategy can be, and how vital the connection with even an impoverished rural 
Section 6: Vulnerability and social protection  120 
 
 
household can be as a way of ameliorating the vulnerability that flows from 
depending on hard-to get and insecure urban employment.)   
 
 









Number of households with no economically active adults (i.e. 
were all households members are inactive). 
3 (12%) 6 (24%) 
Number of households with at least one economically inactive 
adult who is engaged in care work (i.e. one member is 
economically inactive but doing care work). 
15 (60%) 23 (95%) 
Number of households with at least one economically inactive 
adult, who is not engaged in care work (i.e. one member is 
economically inactive and not reported to be doing any care 
work). 
7 (28%) 13 (54%) 
 
The above table shows the number of households with economically inactive 
adults.  The first row indicates households where no member is economically active 
(i.e. to have a single member economically active would violate this category).  For 
the purposes of this table ‘economically inactive’ is taken to be an adult (over 18 
years of age) who is not studying or attending school and not involved in any 
remunerative activity – either formal or self employment.  Nor are they actively 
and currently engaged in seeking employment.  Category two, in the above table, 
shows the number of households with at least one economically inactive adult (i.e. 
not engaged in formal or self employment), yet who is engaged in care work.  Care 
work is here defined as caring for: a child under 14 years of age, a person who is 
described as ill or disabled, or a person over 60 years of age who is described as 
frail, very elderly or in need of care.  Row number 3 in the above table indicates 
the number of households containing at least one economically inactive adult (i.e. 
involved in neither formal nor informal economic activity) who cannot be described 
as engaged in care work.  This could be an inactive, household member in a 
household of otherwise economically active and care work engaged adult members.   
 
A brief aside: for the purposes of this schematic analysis if household members self 
reported as engaging in care giving they were counted as engaging in care giving 
(i.e. category 2).  Additional household members, or alternatively members not 
described as engaging in care work, were deemed inactive (i.e. category 3).  
Throughout this process, the household composition was examined and the analytic 
question asked of the data was ‘Who here could become economically active if 
they had to, and if sufficient opportunity existed?’  This is a rather strict criterion 
for determining surplus household labour as care work does, in reality, consume 
the time of multiple female caregivers within a household. Category 3 above is 
therefore rather strict and likely to elicit the very upper ceiling of economically 
inactive, non-care giving household members.  In reality, few of these women 
would be totally uninvolved in care work.  However experience from the field 
suggested that this assumption of non-involvement in care work generally seemed 
more tenable with male household members – as carework tends to be intensely 
(female) gendered. 
 
Note that items in the three rows are not mutually exclusive.  For example, one 
could conceivably have a household with four economically inactive adults 
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(category 1), but one of whom is doing care work (category 2) and two of whom are 
engaged in no care work (category 3).  For this reason the numbers in the cells are 
not cumulative, and do not tally vertically up to the totals. 
 
A number of points can be made with regards to this classification.  Firstly a 
relatively small proportion of households in the two sites have no economically 
active adult/s.  This is best expressed in the converse: in almost 8 out of 10 cases 
at least one adult is economically active - even if it is relatively small scale and 
informal work.  Most households therefore have at least one economically active 
adult.  Of the households that did not, they generally fell into one of two 
categories.  Either they were surviving exclusively on one or more social grants 
(e.g. a pensioner living with grandchildren) or in two or three cases they were 
households were the breadwinner had withdrawn (retired, retrenched) from the 
formal economy, often with some financial resources. 
 
More than two-thirds of Khayelitsha households and virtually all Mount Frere 
district households had at least one economically active adult who was engage in 
care work.  Part of the difference between these two sites is that the rural Mount 
Frere households were, on the whole larger (i.e. composed of more members), 
some of whom would be in need of care.  Rural households frequently contained 
both younger and older members who require care. 
 
Similarly, the larger size of the rural households (relative to the urban households) 
made it more likely that that they would have ‘surplus’ adults, not engaged neither 
in economic activity and superfluous to the demands of care work.  Imposing the 
strict definition above, in terms of economically inactive adults, a third of the 
urban households and over half of the rural households had at least one 
economically inactive adult not needed for care work.  These were often a second 
or third adult member, other than the member engaged in care work. 
 
In summary then, while relatively few households had no members engaged in any 
form of economic activity, the vast majority of households especially in the rural 
Eastern Cape had economically inactive household members doing care work.  A 
sizeable proportion of households, especially in the Eastern Cape, have ‘surplus’ 
members, economically inactive and in addition to the requirements of care work.   
 
Does this mean that pensions provide a perverse incentive, creating an even 
greater incentive to keep the rural jobless far from labour markets – or does it 
mean that they help provide scarce resources to support stretched and threadbare 
rural social networks buckling under the burden of ameliorating employment 
shocks?   The answer probably depends on assumptions about the ability of the 
urban economy to absorb further job-seekers.  In any case it is clear that it is 
dangerous to generalise: as we have stressed in this report, the way in which 
individuals are inserted into the networks created by migrancy vary widely. Had 
Thandeka, for instance, not come from a household that lacked networks that 
could give her access to urban sources of support, it would not have been 
necessary for her to retreat to the rural areas at in the first place.  
 
Furthermore, as our argument in section 4.2.2 should make clear, it is probably 
best to stay clear of universalistic rational-choice style modelling of ‘household 
formation’.  Clearly the factors considered by Klasen and Woolard (wages, non-
wage income, ‘privacy costs’, economies of scale, and the labour market access 
implications of household location ) matter, but the discrete, bounded and 
relatively economically independent households imagined by the economic models 
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Woolard and Klasen discuss are very far removed from the porous, fluid and 
stretched systems this project explored.  There is no clear and simple boundary 
separating household members from non-members - at least as far as the sharing of 
resources is concerned:  as Ross and Spiegel’s research has consummately 
illustrated, who is attached to which household will therefore often be a matter of 
some complexity.  In addition attachment to a household (and separation from it) 
will always be caught up in the calculus of complex reciprocal arrangements that 
change over time. As the delicate balance of unequal sharing and self-interest in 
Vuyiswa’s household shows, being ‘part of a household’ is part of a complex and 
often uncomfortable accommodation involved contests and negotiations about 
what one is entitled to claim, what is shared, and what will be expected of one in 
the future.   
 
Our discussion of Thandeka Mashiya’s story has already illustrated some of the 
ambiguities and involved in household membership.  In Thandeka’s case, her 
reliance on the pension of her grandmother is handled within the co-operative 
framework of household decision-making, which sees the three adult women 
working carefully together to make the most of their scant resources.  The story is 
not always so happy. The difficulty that these relationships can sometimes involve, 
and the disharmonious domestic politics that it may involve is illustrated by the 




Case Study 24: Unwelcome in her mother's house: Nontuthuzelo Mbabane 
 
Nontuthuzelo Mbabane is a young woman in her early twenties who lives in the house of her 
mother, Nosikhumbuza Ntlazane.  Also in the house is her mother’s other two children by 
another partner, Zizipho and Nomvuyo, and Nontuthuzelo’s own eighteen month old child 
Amandlha.  From time to time they are visited for extended periods by Nontuthuzelo’s 
grandmother, Nonzwakhazi. 
 
It is clear that the relationship between Nontuthuzelo and Nosikumbuza is a strained one.  
Nontutuzelo herself was in fact not raised by her mother: while she was still a young child, 
her mother had left her in the care of her own mother Nonzwakhazi and had left for Cape 
Town in search of work.  Nontuthuzelo had stayed in Nonzwakhazi’s care until she was in 
Standard eight, at which time Nonzwakhazi had lost her disability grant (Nontuthuzelo says 
they stopped the grant because they said Nonzwakhazi was still fresh, she could work).  As a 
consequence Nonzwakhazi could no longer care for her, and she had to leave school.  She 
accordingly left the Eastern Cape and joined her mother’s household. Nosikhumbuza had in 
the meantime married Vusumsi Mbabne, a truck driver who had made good money and who 
had, among other things, taught Nosikhumbuza to sew.  Vusumsi died some years later of a 
mysterious ailment that had progressively paralyzed him, starting with his right foot.  His long 
illness, during which he could not work, and his unexpected death while visiting relatives in 
the Eastern Cape, was a blow from which the household apparently had never quite 
recovered.  For a long time Nosikhumbuza had survived by doing domestic work and by 
making and hawking tracksuits and other clothes in Site B, at one point sending her younger 
children back to the Eastern Cape to be cared for by Nonzwakhazi again. But in 2003 she had 
found employment in a clothing factory in Mowbray.   
 
Nosikhumbuza, a hard-bitten and grim-looking woman, seemed stressed and exhausted by the 
difficulties of keeping her household together.  For one thing, her middle daughter Nomvuyo, 
a buxom young girl who insisted on being called by her English nickname (‘Cutie’) was 
proving difficult to control, demanding luxuries like cellphones (she lost one and had her 
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mother replace it during the research project) and regularly asking for money to visit her 
uncle’s house on the other side of Khayelitsha, where she could play video games and watch 
TV.  For another, Nosikhumbuza clearly felt that Nontuthuzelo was not pulling her weight in 
the household.  Nosikhumbuza was paying for all the household expenses and groceries, 
while Nontuthuzelo, she said, was contributing nothing except some of the baby food and 
crèche expenses for Amandhla. 
 
Further investigation showed that the picture was rather more complex. Nontuthuzelo was 
holding down a job working for a ‘makwerekwere’ (foreign African) who had a stall in 
Claremont, helping him sell cellphone chargers and sunglasses on the side of main road just 
next to the Atrium shopping centre. The makwerekwere, a suave and charming Cameroonian 
who disingenuously suggested to the team that he should be called Rich (he was not) paid 
Nontuthuzelo a paltry R20 per day for her services – such a tiny amount that, were she to rely 
on minibus taxis instead of the train to commute, travelling alone would all but wipe out her 
earnings.  It is clear that with such a meagre salary (an amount that ‘Rich’ confirmed) 
Nontuthuzelo could not make very much of a contribution to the household at all. 
 
But was this the whole story?  Nontuthuzelo did not seem to mind her very low salary.  True, 
she told the team, it was not very much money – but at least she could sit down all day, and 
(she told the team) it was not very hard work. Clearly, from one perspective, the low salary 
prevented her from making more of a contribution to her mother’s household – but, 
conversely, her ability to rely on her mother’s income conceivably removed some of the 
incentive to look for better paying (and more arduous) employment.   
 
When the team visited Nosikhumbuza’s house for the last time, saying good bye and thank 
you at the end of the research project, Nosikhumbuza had mixed news to report.  For one 
thing, ‘Cutie’ – who had disappeared without a trace a week or two earlier, leaving no news 
of where she was, had returned, apparently having spent a week with friends at the seaside in 
Fish Hoek.  Secondly, there was a new addition to the household: a tiny neonate, only a few 
days old, curled up in blankets on the couch.  The team had not realised that Nontuthuzelo 
had been pregnant all along - and Nosikhumbuza had a new addition to her household.  She 
did not look happy.   
 
Driving away from Nosikhumbuza’s household, Sibongile the fieldworker was deeply 
distressed. ‘Nozikhumbuza does not love that child’ she confided to her fellow researcher.  
She thought about her harsh words for a moment, and then revised them. ‘No, she will love 
the child.  But she is angry.’ 
 
 
Case Study 25: Forming a household after the father has died  
 
The structure off the little shack occupied by the sisters Lulama and Luleka Botha and their 
children already tells a story.  It is a large but poorly maintained and shabbily furnished shack 
standing in the middle of a completely bare plot of soft sand. Leaning drunkenly against it is a 
second structure: a crudely built wooden lean-to with its own separate entrance: this belongs 
to their brother Vusi and his girlfriend Delia.  Vusi and Delia’s lean-to is barely big enough 
for a bed and a little stand with a primus stove; the interior of Lulama and Luleka’s shack is 
dirty and generally neglected. The walls on the inside of both structures are papered with 
smooth, garishly coloured sheets of plastic advertising a popular fast-food chain and a brand 
of potato chips.  The door handle on Lulama and Luleka’s shack is broken on the inside, and 
if the door shuts completely you have to fetch a fork from the kitchen an jimmy open the 
catch.  
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The shack used to belong to Thobile Botha. Not much is known about him, because he is 
dead.  What we do know is that he was a maintenance man, that he worked for the 
Department of Health in East London (he repaired wheelchairs and other equipment), that he 
divorced his wife at some time in the 1980s and that he moved to Cape Town in 1993.  He 
had a house in lower middle class Mandalay but he sold that after just one year, moving into 
the shack. His daughters joined him some years later, but their relationship appears to have 
been strained – the rather soft-natured Luleka tearfully tells how he refused to pay for her 
education when she asked him to, telling her she was fully grown and had an ID book. Their 
brother Vusi also joined them in the late 1990s and appears to have been similarly rebuffed: 
he says he and his father’s girlfriend did not get on.  He moved out and eked out an obscure 
living in Kraaifontein, running scrap metal (as he tells it) but perhaps also falling among 
thieves (Lulama told the team that her brother had been stout).  
 
Lulama and Luleka also did not get on with Thobile’s girlfriend, and after a while Tobile 
moved out to live in another shack with her. He became sick shortly after – Lulama (much 
more hard-bitten than her soft-spoken and tentative sister) says ‘we must be honest’ and 
discloses that he had HIV – and died in 2003.  The girlfriend made a short appearance, asset-
stripping the shack and removing many items of value, including the furniture and the 
welding machine – and disappeared; dying herself shortly afterwards. 
 
A little after this, Vusi returned. It appears to have been a difficult reunion. Vusi had not even 
been at his father’s funeral, and Lulama’s assessment is harsh: she believes Vusi’s main 
reason for returning was that he wanted to lay claim to his father’s property.  So strong is her 
suspicion of his motives that she cites this as one reason why she does not move out into her 
own place: Luleka is much softer than she, she says, and Vusi would be able to get her out of 
the house easily.  When the team first visited the household, the tension in the house was 
palpable;  this impression is confirmed by Delia, who says that at the time, Lulama and 
Luleka were not even sharing food with their own brother, making food and eating it 
themselves in a way she saw as a naked affront.  Shortly after this, Vusi started building the 
lean-to, creating a separate structure for Delia and himself.   
 
As time went by, and in subsequent visits, the tension between the two sisters and their 
brother seemed to abate.  Vusi strenuously denies that he wishes to take the house for himself: 
the reason why he was not at his father’s funeral, he says, was because no-one had told him 
that his father had died; he appears to express genuine sadness at his lack of relationship with 
Thobile, and says he never had anyone who could give him advice and make him strong.  
Indeed, he is considering moving to the Eastern Cape so that he can be close to his mother 
and get advice from her.  When the team visited on Vusi’s off days, Vusi and Delia could be 
found lounging in Lulama and Luleka’s shack, watching the murky television and chatting 
with the sisters.  It appeared that they were starting to share resources: they would share food 
from time to time; the garish plastic on the inside of Luleka and Lulama’s shack was plastic 
sheeting Vusi brought home from his workplace; and Delia got a place at the same box-
making factory where Lulama worked.  But tensions remained. While Lulama put in long 
hours every day folding cardboard boxes for a jewellery company on a piecework basis (they 
pay her 7c a box; she must make over a thousand boxes to bring home R100) Luleka did not 
appear to do much at all during the mornings, spending her days at church gatherings and 
leaving the children with neighbours.  And though Delia will not say anything explicitly 
negative about Lulama and Luleka, she still appears to radiate cheerful hostility, suggesting to 
the team that they are bad and careless mothers, spending their children’s grants on clothes for 
themselves instead of shoes for their children, and takes pains to point out to the team how, 
while she is happy to share food with the two sisters, they don’t appear to be willing to do the 
same.  Though the tension the team found in the shack on their first visit had reduced, the 
truce between the two groups remained uneasy and uncomfortable. 
 




Nontuthuzelo’s and the Botha siblings’ stories– like the story of the difficult 
material accommodation between Vuyiswa and Nolusindiso on page 38, illustrate 
the difficult and complex internal dynamics involved in the decisions of individuals 
to attach themselves to households.  These involve complicated trade offs that are 
often shaped by gendered power relationships. Nosikhumbuza’s household benefits 
from the co-operative sharing of burdens between her and her Eastern Cape 
mother; but sharing resources with her daughter (who may be resentful that 
Nosikhumbuza decided that she should stop schooling) seems to generate serious 
tensions.  In the next section we look in more detail at the way in which gender 
works to distribute the burdens that are involved in the accumulation and 
mobilisation of social capital. 
6.3 How social capital works 
6.3.1 Introduction: understanding social capital  
 
Quite clearly the ability to accumulate and use social capital was one of the most 
important ways in which individuals and households in the sample could gain access 
to additional resources, cushion themselves from shocks and ameliorate the worst 
consequences of poverty.  Social capital, however, played an ambiguous role.  On 
the one hand, the ability to make claims based on ‘social capital’ could make a 
very significant difference to well-being, and could give one access to significant 
resources. At the same time, as we shall show in this section, social capital worked 
in highly variable and differentiated ways.  Different people had varying abilities to 
use it and the kinds of resources that it enabled access could also vary hugely from 
context to context. In fact, social capital could sometimes work in ways that 
increased vulnerability and marginalisation for some. 
 
At the outset it is important to be very clear about exactly what is meant by social 
capital.  One problem here is the very prevalence of ‘social capital’ talk, and its 
increasing prominence not only in analysis but also in policy discourse. Often the 
term is used very loosely and imprecisely and with very little attention to the 
underlying assumptions and theoretical frameworks (for a discussion see Schuller 
Barron & Field 2000; see also Woolcock & Narayan 2000).  Thus ‘social capital’ is 
sometimes used interchangeably with ‘social relationships’; and at other times, in 
South African policy discourse, it seems to be used vaguely to refer to a kind of 
undefined ‘social connectedness’ or goodwill — as if it is a kind of quasi-theoretical 
translation of the concept of ‘ubuntu’, or a more theoretical term for the so-called 
‘fabric of society’ (see, for example, PCAS 2006).  This is not a very useful way of 
deploying the term, and it can seriously cloud our analysis. An adequate 
understanding of how social capital works requires us to define it rather more 
precisely. 
 
One underlying problem here is that even the theoretical literature on social 
capital is fairly divergent.  In essence there are broadly speaking two intellectual 
traditions that focus on social capital – in somewhat overlapping but significantly 
different ways. For both of them, social capital refers to a symbolic, intangible set 
of resources that exist in the context of a particular set of social relationships and 
upon which individuals or groups can draw to secure co-operation, or upon which 
they can draw when they are making claims.  Being able to draw on social capital 
is thus in an important sense one of the enabling conditions that allows an agent to 
transact (or which allows them to transact on more favourable terms). But 
different writers explore this resource in very different ways.   




One important tradition relies on the work of Putnam and Engelhardt and sees 
‘social capital’ as ‘generalized trust’. This is an approach to social capital that sits 
more easily with liberal forms of social analysis, partly because it lends itself 
rather easily to the (supposed) modelling of choices and decisions in a rational-
choice, methodological individualist framework (Fine & Green 2000). This has often 
gone hand in hand with rather de-contextualised and idealistic approaches to 
‘social capital’ and a tendency to speak about them in generalized and rather 
abstracted ways, with very little appreciation for the huge ranges of the kinds of 
relationships within which people act and the very divergent ‘social logics’ that 
play out in them (for a trenchant criticism of this essentialist and acontextual 
approach in sub-Saharan African analyses of ‘social capital’, see Meagher 2006) 
 
Important as ‘generalized social trust’ is, it is not the most important ways in 
which social relationships help poor people to mitigate vulnerability and deal with 
poverty.  To understand this, we need to look at the very specific relationships 
upon which people rely when making claims on resources or engaging in informal 
reciprocal exchange.  To do this is to look at social capital not as a generalised 
social resource, but as something that is unevenly at the disposal of particular 
agents (individuals or social groups).  An individual’s ‘good standing’ in a 
community, the relationships in which they stand to neighbours and kin; their 
reputation, the track record created by their past actions, constitute in this 
analysis an intangible but vital resource on which they can draw when making 
claims or enlisting the co-operation of others.  Social capital is something that is 
ceaselessly created and recreated, and which is mobilised and circulated in the 
making and honouring of claims and counter-claims.  Social capital therefore 
cannot be understood outside the context of the social relationships within which it 
exists, and the local histories, cultural values etc which shape how it works.   
Looking at these complexities allows for a more accurate analysis of the ways in 
which social capital is accumulated and used, who benefits from it, and who is 
excluded.  In particular, it allows us to distinguish between the following crucial 
aspects of the use of social capital: 
 
1) Social standing and status: one 
very specific way of approaching 
social capital is to focus quite 
narrowly on the particular 
relational resources — ‘social 
standing’ or symbolic ‘credit’— that 
a particular agent (an individual or 
a group) can accumulate through 
wealth, power and past 
interactions. One’s reputation as a 
good community member, as a 
trustworthy individual, as someone 
who has helped those around one 
(and therefore deserves help in 
turn), one’s creditworthiness, are 
all examples of individual social 
capital in this narrow sense.  
 
2) Social relationships:  This 
intangible ‘credit’ is something that can exist – and allow claims, 









Figure 9: A schema of key elements of social 
capital 
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underlying social relationship.  As we shall show in the subsequent sections 
of this chapter, the nature of that relationship and one’s position within it 
has very important implications for the kind of capital that can be 
accumulated and the nature of the resources that it allows one to get 
access to. 
 
3) Social meaning:  as we have pointed out earlier in this report, social 
relationships are meaningful relationships.  They are not simply objective 
facts, but partly constituted by underlying meaning-giving practices and the 
frameworks of expectation and understanding that one could rather 
imprecisely refer to in terms of ‘culture’.  This means that the working of 
social capital will always be to some extent socially and culturally specific; 
and will also be strongly shaped by how local history and contestations have 
shaped the way in which people draw on and use culture and identity 
resources.  This has important implications, since it means that there may 
be important differences in the way in which social capital works for 
example in urban and rural areas.  
 
4) Resources and assets:  Finally, though social capital itself is an important 
(symbolic) asset, some of its importance lies in the kinds of other material 
assets that it allows one access to.  People’s access to other assets and 
material resources will therefore have a fundamental impact on their ability 
to use social capital and what they use it for. 
 
Each of these elements interacts in complex ways with each of the others: social 
relationships, for instance, will often be powerfully shaped by the resources and 
assets people have control over; even if resources and assets cannot be understood 
outside a the cultural context of social meaning.  Furthermore, the ways in which 
people use their social capital and the nature of the transactions and negotiations 
within which it functions will in turn shape social relationships, the distribution of 
social assets and even the re-creation of social capital. 
6.3.2 Social capital and social relations  
 
We begin by looking at the key role played by the nature of social capital and the 
relationships within which it is deployed. The importance of this issue is often 
missed by econometric analyses of social capital which treat a wide range of very 
different kinds of social relations as equivalent and that treat social capital as 
something that can be measured simply in terms of the number or frequency of 
social interconnections, without distinguishing between the nature and kind of 
these connections.  An example is the South African Macro-social trends report 
which lumps together all manner of social connections – equating social capital 
with ‘visits to friends’ and general social cohesion (PCAS 2006: 73). 
 
Research in Khayelitsha and the Eastern Cape – by this project as well as in 
anthropological investigations – reveal a very different picture.  Social capital, 
viewed as the intangible ‘symbolic credit’ on which an individual could call on in 
their interactions with others, is embodied in very specific sets of behaviours, 
discourses, and very particular sets of relationships.  Above all it is linked to set of 
culturally specific values that define what is required of one to be reckoned an 
upstanding or decent member of society.  To have social capital in the 
communities within which our informants live, one has to have what in Xhosa is 
known as  isidima (loosely translated as ‘dignity’ or ‘esteem’) – a term that refers 
partly to the comportment and behaviour of the person themselves (thus the 
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former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, was universally recognised to be 
a person with impeccable isidima); but it also refers to the kind of household that 
the person keeps, whether their children are well cared for and well behaved, 
whether they are a good ‘citizen’ of their community; whether they partake 
regularly in the required rituals, attended meetings and generally behave in the 
way that is required of a respectable person of their age, status and gender in 
Xhosa culture.9  The respect and social standing over which a person disposes 
significantly strengthens their position in the various social relationships they have 
to negotiate and strengthens their moral claims for resources, assistance, co-
operation and recognition.  The importance of this kind of social standing is 
perhaps illustrated nowhere as directly and graphically as in the significant 
investments even poor households will make in respectable burials, and in ensuring 
the initiation of their young men: initiation is an investment in male personhood 
essential to masculine agency in both township and rural society, while attending 
and hosting respectable funerals is a major investment in social standing and 
respectability.  Though it may seem to make little sense in a narrow economic 
analysis, this respectability and standing plays a vital role in the broader processes 
of reciprocal exchange that are crucial to ameliorating vulnerability. 
 
Furthermore, important as ‘generalised social trust’ might be in a general sense, 
in-depth interviews indicated that much depended on the particular nature of the 
social relations within which social capital was mobilised.  Analysis of interviews 
show for example that particularly in the urban areas, the value of the social 
capital that could be mobilised in the context of, for example, kinship relations, 
was very different from the value of social capital in the context of neighbourhood 
or community relations.  In the context of kinship, people could and did make very 
significant claims, and could sometimes support one another in very significant 
ways -  giving or receiving valuable gifts, borrowing or lending significant amounts 
of money, or asking for or offering sustained amounts of material help e.g. through 
offering or asking for accommodation, sharing groceries, and so on.   
 
Neighbourhood or community relationships seemed to vary significantly.  In the 
rural areas — where, as we pointed out on p. 88, most social interactions occurred 
between people who were well known to one another, and who could ‘place’ one 
another clearly in village, family or clan networks — neighbourly or territorial 
relations could be economically significant. Participation in community affairs, 
assisting neighbours, and assistance to community members in need was all part of 
what was expected of a good community member, and such participation 
cemented their isidima or worthiness in the eyes of their neighbours. In urban 
areas, the claims that could be made on the basis of neighbourhood and community 
links were far more limited.  Sometimes neighbourliness could be the basis upon 
which people lent or borrowed ‘small things’, ‘borrowed’ (but actually paid for!) 
electricity, or asked or offered childcare.  The density of social connections that 
grew up over time in long-settled communities like Khayelitsha or Site B also 
contributed significantly to neighbourhood safety and probably reduced the 
impunity of criminals to some extent. But as our discussion of the perceived 
contrasts between urban and rural life showed, urban society was experienced by 
many informants as a terrain of danger, threats, indignity and the risks of 
anonymous encounters.  
 
While neighbourhood or community links could occasion certain kinds of help, this 
was often perceived as unsafe terrain – the terrain of ‘jealousy’ and the risk of 
                                         
9 These formulations owe much to the input of Pat McAllister (pers. comm.). 
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gossip. Sometimes, friendship constituted a very important form of social 
connection, allowing the formation of long-term alliances of mutual support 
between two individuals.  Here, it should be noted that ‘friendship’ is of course a 
very complex kind of relationship to understand in social context; while it obviously 
has a strong interpersonal dimension, the social meanings of friendship are 
powerfully shaped by culture.  This is an issue well outside the ambit of the 
present study. Here, we can simply note that the kinds of solidarity and resource 
sharing allowed by personal alliances could sometimes lead to the sharing of very 
significant resources – but that informants also perceived these kinds of 
relationships in very ambivalent terms. 
 
Another fairly important social capital was given by client-patron relations of 
various kinds. As discussed above, through connections with employers, or with 
traditional authority informants seemed to have been able to use employment 
relations as a way of getting access to significant patronage, as when domestic 
workers ‘inherited’ cast off furniture from the wealthier households that employed 
them, or when white colleagues at work passed on material goods to black co-
workers.  Connections with people in officialdom, or even traditional authorities, 
could also play a valuable role, particularly when those figures could intercede or 
act as brokers in relationships with an otherwise faceless bureaucracy. 
 
Finally, the social connections created through formal associations (e.g. 
memberships of stokvels / umgalelos (mutual savings societies), churches etc) 
could also allow people access to support or resources.  A very important point is 
also that participation in these community activities was one of the ways in which 
people could accumulate social capital – the dignity and respectability that could 
increase their ability to make claims on opportunities and resources.  
  
6.3.3 Reciprocity and power 
 
A crucial point is that social capital is usually mobilised within a context that 
placed a strong cultural emphasis on reciprocity and exchange.  The point is not 
merely that social capital plays a key enabling role in people’s negotiations and 
transactions with one another: it is also that social capital demands certain 
practices of reciprocity.  Thus, as anthropological studies have shown, being a 
‘good citizen’ by taking care of relatives, community members and neighbours and 
participating in networks of reciprocity is one of the ways in which one amasses 
social capital.  (Indeed, the relationships described above are probably best 
conceptualised as being partly produced and given additional cultural meaning by 
these acts of exchange and reciprocation.  Social capital depends on social 
relations and reciprocal exchange — but in another sense reciprocal exchange is 
what helps create and renew social capital and social relations.) 
 
Two important points flow from this. In the first place, although social capital 
could be ‘cashed’ into access to vital resources, such access would almost always 
take the form of an exchange; and would always involve some kind of reciprocal 
dimension.  It is important to note that these exchanges are not best understood as 
market exchanges; rather, they are exchanges that always happen in the context of 
social and power relations, and through which social capital is also being 
recreated.  A wide range of different forms of exchange exist, each with different 
implications for the resources they can mobilise – and the debts they incur. 
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Sometimes, for example, individuals could give or receive quite substantial gifts, 
particularly in the context of a close kinship relation.  But although a gift is never a 
sale, and is not explicitly a form of exchange, gifts exist in the context of 
obligation, duty and debt.  The gift of R100 with which Madoda helped Vuyiswa 
start her fruit and veg business, or the fridge freezer with which Mamzoli started 
her business were all given in the context of these larger practices of reciprocity. 
 
At other times, social capital was used in the context of informal processes 
whereby goods (e.g. sugar, tea, flour, salt, matches, paraffin, candles etc) and 
services (e.g. laundry, childcare, maintenance etc) were explicitly exchanged.  The 
important thing to understand here is that these exchanges are not simply about 
the trading of different commodities of notionally equal value.  Sometimes the 
social relationship was what conferred the ability to enter into a loan or exchange 
(in that a prior existing relationship had to be in place before one could have 
grounds for entering into an exchange relationship at all).  Sometimes this 
exchange could be monetized (in that one family member would do a favour to 
another, and would receive payment).  Neighbourliness could for example be the 
basis of an agreement to ‘borrow’ — in other words, buy — electricity.  Sometimes 
exchange could be a form of reciprocal lending or borrowing (food is ‘ loaned’ to a 
person on the understanding that they would ‘lend’ one something similar at some 
point in the future); sometimes there would be an explicit supposition that the 
item, or exactly the same amount of the same foodstuff, would be returned.   
 
These aspects of social capital have very important implications for the way in 
which it could work to ameliorate (or exacerbate!) poverty and inequality.  In the 
first place, it is important to emphasise that these forms of exchange are not 
necessarily equal. Some forms of exchange enabled by ‘social capital’ could have a 
quasi-coercive nature.  The patriarchal power of a male household head in a 
traditional Xhosa household is derived partly from the way he can use the status 
and standing accorded him by his position and his gender to get people to do his 
bidding.  Here, the example of Vuyiswa cited in section 4.1 is a good case in point: 
Vuyiswa has some security within her own household and within the broader set of 
social relationships created by her kin network – but to a large extent her place in 
this kinship network is dictated by iron rules – iron rules that indicate, for instance, 
that part of her proper role is to take on a the burden of care work.  But it is not 
only patriarchs who have positional power inside the kinship network: as the 
example of Nontuthuzelo Mbabane on p. 122  makes clear it is also possible for the 
adult offspring of the household head to rely on the fact of the parent child 
relationship – the fact that they could not ejected from the household – as a way of 
continuing to ‘hang on’ to households to which they were making very little 
contribution.  
 
Secondly, the way in which access to social capital depends upon culturally specific 
notions of respectability and status, and the way in which accumulating social 
capital requires involvement in networks and practices of reciprocity means that it 
is a double edged sword.  As Spiegel et al have observed in their analysis of 
domestic fluidity, extremely poor individuals are unable to benefit from the 
practices of exchange and reciprocity within which social capital circulates and 
through which it is generated, because they did not have enough resources to ‘get 
into the game’ in the first place (Spiegel et al  1994).  Again, the example of 
Vuyiswa in section 4.1 is relevant. To a large extent, Vuyiswa’s position in her 
kinship network is enabled significantly by the fact that she has access to a social 
grant.  This social grant enables her to transact within her kinship network.  For 
instance, without her social grant she would unable to invest to the same extent in 
Section 6: Vulnerability and social protection  131 
 
 
her daughter’s respectability by paying for her izila ceremony; which in turn would 
deprive her of an opportunity to amass social capital in her own right. 
 
The converse is also true.  While the lack of resources can function as a bar to 
entry into processes of reciprocal exchange, the social demand that one should 
participate in them can, as Spiegel et al  have pointed out, function as a powerful 
brake on better off households’ pathways out of poverty (Spiegel et al  1994). 
Those who are not able to close themselves off against claims from below will face 
serious constraints on their ability to accumulate.  And though extricating oneself 
from the ties of reciprocity is essential for long term and sustained accumulation, 
it is a risky strategy particularly where accumulation depends on access to insecure 
employment on the margins of the labour market.  Social capital involves a 
complex dance of give and take which it is both difficult to enter and hard to leave 
– a politics of intimacy that requires skill and involves risk.  
 
6.4 Informal social protection: who loses out? 
6.4.1 Reciprocity, informal social protection, and care chains 
 
These observations become especially crucial in the context of the role that kinship 
plays in domestic fluidity and the workings of ‘stretched’ or even ‘distributed’ 
households, and the place of care work within the transregional spatial networks 
and domestic systems created by migrancy.  In section 4.2.2 we argued that these 
networks played an important role in a level of livelihood strategy that existed at a 
supra-household, network level, distributing and allocating resources (including 
people) within this larger network.  This network is one of the key underpinnings of 
what we might call ‘informal’ or ‘private’ social protection – an informal social 
safety network that plays a crucial role in ameliorating poverty and reducing 
vulnerability at the margins of the formal economy. Bracking and Sachikonye, 
looking at similar dynamics in Zimbabwe, have called attention to the importance 
of this ‘distal’ social welfare (Bracking & Sachikonye 2006) which touches many 
people not directly in receipt of either wages or social grants.   
 
The processes explored in the previous section play an important part in the 
workings of this process. Complex webs of reciprocity, loyalty, debt and obligation 
are part of what create these connections between the city and the countryside.  
Each claim and each response can be seen as part of the process whereby resources 
circulate between people within this larger network, and whereby the effects of 
both positive windfalls and negative shocks are transmitted. It is important to note 
that participation in these networks brings both benefits and burdens.  
 
These factors mean that the care chains that connect the Eastern Cape with the 
metropolitan centres are of vital importance. Here, a key role is played by care 
work and the development of complex, spatially developed care chains. Rural kin 
often play a central role in dealing with the ‘care deficit’ experienced by urban 
families.  In half of the Khayelitsha households, the biological children of household 
members were either being taken care of by kin, or had been taken care of in this 
way at crucial times in the past; while in one third of the Mount Frere households, 
female household members were at the time of the study taking care of children of 
people who were working or looking for work in the urban areas; adding the 
households reliant on such relations in the past brings the total to 19 of the 24 
Mount Frere households. These care chains often extend across the urban rural 
divide but they are common within areas too: in the Mount Frere study, several 
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households reported that children were being taken care of by relatives elsewhere 
in the rural areas so that they could be closer to good schools (see Appendices, 
page,193).  
 
One of the most important ways in which social networks help households deal with 
shocks and allow them to exploit opportunities is through the development of 
elaborate ‘stretched’ and distributed care arrangements that pivot on the ability of 
kin networks to supply care for children (and sometimes to look after assets and 
property).  Sometimes, ‘swopping’ arrangements were in place whereby the visit to 
Cape Town of an Eastern Cape relative or household member would be enabled or 
facilitated by the ‘posting’ to the rural areas of a female urban household member 
who could take over the care work (see page 46 above).  Rural kin will take on 
these burdens of care partly out of a broader sense of obligation, but partly also as 
part of the complex exchange of duties, obligations, debts, services and favours 
that take place over a long time.  
 
These reciprocal arrangements have complex effects.  The fact that children are 
often sent back to rural families in the context of a crisis highlights how important 
these care networks are in helping families deal with shocks. But the very fact that 
shocks are absorbed in this way also highlights the fact that these care chains 
function to transmit shocks.  The death of a breadwinner, or the loss of a job in 
town, can result in the transfer of children to relatives elsewhere, increasing the 
strain on rural households thousands of kilometres away.  It works the other way 
too: rural benefits can be transmitted to urban households. Getting access to a 
pension may free up funds for re-allocation, or may allow an elderly person to step 
out of employment – and become available for care work.  Care work and 
reciprocity form one of the ways in which – sometimes co-operatively and 
sometimes conflictually – resources and burdens are distributed and re-distributed 
(sometimes for mutual benefit, and sometimes in very asymmetrical ways) through 
the spatially extended networks of kinship and alliance created through migrancy. 
6.4.2 The dark side of social capital 
 
Who benefits from these processes — and who does not — depends on the social 
logic of these informal networks. In this chapter we have looked at the ways in 
which ‘social capital’ functions in this process. Three key points have stood out: 
 
1) Accumulating social capital plays an important role in enabling people to 
transact within social networks and to engage in processes of reciprocal 
exchange that could help them get access to useful resources. 
 
2) Social capital is best understood not as a disembodied and ubiquitously 
available ‘generalised trust’ but as a social resource that is mobilised in 
culturally determined ways and in the context of particular social 
relationships. In this context, kinship plays a particularly central role, 
though community links, clan associations, and patron-client relationships 
can also be significant. 
 
3) Not everyone has equal access to social capital or can benefit from it in the 
same way, or transact on equal terms.  Those with few resources to begin 
with, and those marginalised within patriarchal practices, participate in 
these processes of reciprocal exchange on disadvantageous terms 
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These factors mean that although social capital plays an important role in 
ameliorating the effects of poverty and in helping manage risk, especially at a 
supra-household level, it could also work to worsen poverty, deepen ‘social 
exclusion’ and exacerbate vulnerability for certain groups .  This is a key point for 
those who would see social capital as a key component of an effective pro-poor 
policy. 
 
In recent years there has been some recognition that social capital should not 
simply be seen as a ‘positive resource’ in the community:  both scholars and 
policymakers have warned that there can be negative forms of social capital.  This 
recognition has however been somewhat limited to identification of particular 
forms of ‘negative’ social capital (e.g. the social capital that circulates in the 
networks of organised crime).  Our argument here goes further than this: Even 
‘positive’ social capital has its dark side.   
 
In the first place it is important to recognise that although social capital is 
accumulated and exchanged in ways that are shaped by cultural ideologies of 
reciprocity, ubuntu, mutual help and so on, the actual processes of negotiation, 
claims and counter-claims through which social capital circulates can often 
accompany a large amount of social tension.  Social capital can be eroded and 
exhausted (the people on whom you rely can get ‘bored’ with you) and the making 
of claims can involve real reputational risk (viz. the fear of ‘gossip’).   
 
Even more importantly, social capital can be unequally distributed, and can often 
involve very unequal forms of exchange. The gendered nature of care work – and 
the socially enforced willingness of women to comply with social expectations 
about care work and domestic reproduction – is a central example.  ‘Unpaid’ care 
work is to some extent socially valued, and does feature in processes of reciprocal 
exchange – but those exchanges can often be hugely unequal, placing a massive 
burden on the shoulders of poorer and marginalised women while offering them 
few pathways out of poverty. The story of Chuma, who agreed to take on the task 
of caring for the family homestead, but whose brothers reneged on their 
undertaking to support her, is a case in point.   
 
Focus group interviews proved a useful forum for exploring some of the ‘dark sides’ 
of social capital. One theme explored in the focus group concerned the social rules 
for ‘borrowing’.  In a natural, conversational manner this topic led to discussions of 
gossip, jealousy (and invariably) witchcraft.  In terms of borrowing, a sharp 
distinction is made between items (usually foodstuffs or household consumables; 
rarely money) that are borrowed and those that are given.  Borrowed items need to 
be replaced, either with a commodity of the same type or an alternative 
commodity to a comparable value.  There was unanimity that these types of claims 
are stronger when made against kin, and that they are far more likely to be made 
and honoured in rural areas.  Urban based focus group members explained that 
these claims could only reliably be made against kin and, occasionally, immediately 
adjacent neighbours.  (Although it appears some measure of urban social solidarity 
can play itself out along the ties of village of origin or clan, but these are generally 
very tenuous).  The claims made in borrowing or giving carry the risk that they will 
generate gossip, consequently a person who attempts to borrow too frequently is 
called ‘celiwu’ (‘one that asks too much’).  Borrowing and giving moreover have a 
strongly gendered dimension.  Therefore rural-based informants (of both genders) 
generally regarded rural men rather than women as more worthy recipients of 
assistance.  They reported that rural women could always do an array of casual 
jobs; while remunerative work for rural men on is limited to the occasional 
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construction work or herding livestock.  This gendered differential is also reflected 
in the way claims are articulated: Men seldom ask directly but rather visit at meal 
times or open with a conversational gambit such as the topic of soccer.  Women, 
tasked with the responsibility for domestic reproduction, tend to ask directly.  
 
Allied to the social complexity of articulating and responding to claims for 
assistance were the pervasive themes of gossip and jealousy.  A respondent 
explained the manner in which resentment and covetousness of success of others 
breeds jealousy with ‘umona uqala esweni ungene entliziyweni’ (‘Jealousy starts 
from the eye, and then goes inside your heart’).  Although successful people - it 
was reported - sometimes court envy by becoming aloof and looking down on 
others.  Accounts of bewitchment lay beneath the surface of many accounts of 
gossip and jealousy.  At the site of the rural research, several murders were 
attributed to rich people who sought to increase their wealth through ‘ukutwala’ – 
powerful rituals which require human body parts.  There was a widespread belief 
that many murders are committed by those who covet riches.  The focus groups 
readily evoked an outpouring of personal testimonials concerning witchcraft; belief 
in its influence even extended (in varying degrees) to members of the research 
team.  The supernatural is therefore a pervasive explanatory concept.  An assertive 
young woman stirred up much consternation amongst her peer group when she 
mooted using witchcraft to control wayward male partners.  With appropriate 
muti, a boyfriend could apparently become compliant, and help out with the most 
unlikely of domestic tasks such as washing nappies.  Her proposal met with howls of 
protest from the female group, but she responded to their accusations of cruelty by 
observing that men who abandoned her to raise children single-handedly were 
equally cruel.  Her account pressed into service a vision of the traditional 
cosmology complete with witchcraft, to contest gender inequality. 
 
In our description of Chuma and Nomsa we emphasised their deep passivity, while 
noting that it is unclear whether this passivity contributed to their poverty or also 
flowed from it.  Here, an important element can be added. One of the most 
important issues that shape who benefits and who loses from the way in which 
social protection works are the very powerful gender ideologies that shape social 
expectations of what is appropriate for men and for women. These are often 
strenuously enforced. The force and power of these ideologies can be conveyed by 
two case studies.  The first concerns how villagers reacted to a woman who did not 
toe the traditional gender line; the second illustrates a woman’s ultimately 
unsuccessful attempts to contest her victimisation. 
 
 
Case Study 26: A misbehaving woman - or a misunderstood one?  
 
Having travelled to a middle class housing estate on the edge of Butterworth, the research 
team felt as though it was about to meet a stranger we ready knew.  For tucked away in 
suburbia, with its neatly tended lawns and heavy lace curtains, we were to finally meet 
Sakhele Guba.  But to our surprise, rather than encountering a witch or a salacious temptress, 
a plump Xhosa matron emerged from the house, greeted us warmly and ushered us in.  How 
we came to speak with Sakhele, from where our expectations of her came, and the tale of how 
she was displaced from her household, is the subject of the case study that follows.  
 
Sakhele is the mother of four children, three of whom live in the distant village of Phuzayo, 
surveyed in the 2002 survey.  She was however neither present at the homestead in 2002 or 
2005.  At the time of the 2002 survey a paid caregiver was interviewed, on our 2005 return we 
were directed to a different caregiver.  The second caregiver, resident at her own house (a 
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short distance from the Guba homestead), disavowed responsibility for the Guba children.  
She explained she was merely buying them groceries with the regular remittance sent by the 
children’s father from his formal sector job in Gauteng.  However, the caregiver complained, 
even this minor arrangement was proving thankless and contested.  She was therefore on the 
verge of giving it up altogether; the children’s distant father could simply pay the monthly 
sum directly to the two teenage children, and their custodian, a 25 year old brother.   What of 
the children’s mother, we enquired?  The children’s mother – Sakhele - had been displaced 
from the household amidst mutual acrimony and recrimination almost five years ago.  This is 
why, the weary caregiver explained, the children are now suffering.  In the contradictory 
accounts of this domestic drama that we subsequently heard, only two points were agreed on 
by all parties.  The first, that the children’s disinterested father sends a regular monthly 
remittance of R500; the second that the children are suffering. 
 
As conflict marked accounts of the Guba household, the research team first conferred with 
several members of the household’s extended family elsewhere in the village.  We were 
reluctant to simply approach the three Guba siblings directly, in part, because the nominally 
in-charge 25 year old was reportedly prone to erratic behaviour and smoked large amounts of 
cannabis.  We spoke to him eventually, after first winning the trust and clarifying the 
background of the household. 
 
Lerato, the children’s aunt, was probably the most articulate of all the respondents, she 
narrated an elaborate account of Sakhle’s misbehaviour and the resultant dissolution of the 
marriage.  She explained that after her 1983 marriage Sakhele proved a diligent wife, she built 
the homestead and bore her husband four children.  With the benefit of hindsight Lerato 
however discerns the seeds of the current conflict, sown in the couple’s 1980s meeting in 
Welkom.  Sakhele is (in Lerato’s English words) a ‘township woman’, and therefore ‘is not a 
good rural woman, she is fighting”.  In this narrative, the catalyst for the family breakdown 
was Sakhele’s sexual misconduct in the late 1990s, when she took a succession of lovers, 
some of whom were, scandalously, substantially younger than herself.  She later absconded to 
Cape Town, only to return, unsuccessful six months later ‘wearing the same shoes’ (i.e. 
empty-handed).  The deteriorating relationship between Sakhele and her husband culminated 
in violence, when he beat her during one of his visits to the village.  He spent two nights in 
jail and appeared before the magistrate before she dropped the charges, and left the family 
home for good.   
 
Although Lerato maintains that her only concern is for the children and that, in her own 
words, ‘two is company and three is nothing’ (i.e. she has no interest / involvement in the 
failed marriage).  She was readily proffered an elaborate account of the genesis of Sakhele’s 
misconduct.  Sakhele is afflicted by ‘ikiwu’ a ‘dark snake’ inside of her, prone to making 
women both sexually insatiable and behaviourally erratic.  This affliction was understood by 
both informant and fieldworkers to generate psychic and medical symptoms, and on further 
inquiry, is popularly distinguished from bewitchment.  Lerato’s enduring concern is 
reportedly for the children: the 13 year old girl bereft of a mother, and 15 year old son suffers 
from epileptic like fits and struggles at school.   
 
The broad outline of Sakhele’s misconduct explained by Lerato was widely shared by 
numerous respondents.  Subsequent interview of the three Guba siblings highlighted their 
paradoxical situation: despite a regular remittance, and the comparatively high quality 
accommodation, they are painfully vulnerable.  The girl misses her mother; the teenage son is 
ill and dispirited.  Even the eldest son has been the victim of violent victimisation within the 
village, an event he found difficult to contest in light of his youth, lack of authority and 
absence of a social backer.  He is, after all, a young man without status or employment, doing 
the woman’s work of looking after two children. 
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Further enquiry, including the interview with Sakehle herself, came to modify the picture 
initially sketched by her sister in law, Lerato.  Expecting a Transkei medusa, the research 
team instead encountered a middle aged woman, who had been driven from her home, missed 
her children and eked out a living working as a domestic worker for a middle class African 
family in Butterworth.  She attributed her current predicament to her husband’s fickleness, 
and intimated that he had numerous extra marital liaisons.  It is important to note adjudicating 
the culpability of two partners in a failed marriage is hardly a productive undertaking, or the 
task of this research.  Instead what emerges from this case study is the manner in which the 
dissolution of a marriage saw the husband able to eject his wife from the household (that she 
physically built); deny her resources and regulate her access to their children.  His power to 
do this appeared complete and unchecked.  Furthermore the dominant account of this entire 
episode, articulated within the village (his village, into which she married), is highly 
sympathetic to his position.  It seems as though both the structural conditions and, indeed, the 




Case Study 27: Splitting the household - and smashing the house 
 
At the entrance to the village of Kufushane stands a compound, with a collapsed hexagonal 
hut.  While collapsed huts are not unknown in the former Transkei, I wondered why the new, 
shiny zinc (corrugated iron) roof had not been salvaged in this impoverished village.  One of 
our final interviews took us to this homestead where we encountered Mamtwana.  She was 
eager to speak and quickly launched into a narrative explained that the hut had not 
spontaneously collapsed; rather her estranged husband had deliberately demolished it.   
 
Born in the Free State, Mamtwana met her husband in over 25 years ago in Johannesburg, 
where he works for the municipality.  She was his second wife, bore him five children and 
reportedly got on well with his first, senior, wife.  However their relationship deteriorated 
towards the end of the 1990s.  He decided that as a newly ordained lay preacher, he ought to 
be joined by his first wife in Johannesburg.  His regular remittance to Mamtwana then 
declined over several months and finally stopped.  Her efforts to have it reinstated proved 
unsuccessful.  Mamatwana recalls crying one month, when her husband arranged to have a 
paltry 10 kg of mielies (maize), 2 kg of sugar and 1 kg of beans delivered - a quantity of food 
that would feed her and the five children for less than a week. 
 
In the narrative that followed, Mamtwana explained how she sought to enforce her rights.  
Inspired by her sister who had successfully claimed maintenance, Mamtwana took her 
husband to the local magistrates’ court.  Representing herself, and he with a lawyer, she 
secured a monthly maintenance order of R800 against him.  In response, her husband laid a 
complaint before the Tabankulu tribal court.  (We have a copy of this document).  The written 
complaint accuses Mamtwana of misbehaviour, including: of selling her husbands cows, of 
‘inviting witchdoctors to their house’ and of ‘going around thereby demonstrating that she is 
having an affair’ (sic).  This hand written complaint from the tribal authority calls her to 
answer the complaint and states that if she does not successfully do so the customary union 
will be dissolved and the dowry forfeited.  Having secured childcare maintenance in the 
magistrates’ court, Mamtwana was now being subject to counter-attack via customary law. 
 
In what can only be described as a remarkable act for an unschooled, geographically isolated 
rural woman, Mamtwana travelled to Umtata and consulted legal NGO, Lawyers for Human 
rights.  Although unable to help, they referred her to a Mount Frere lawyer who appeared 
before the tribal court and contested their authority to dissolve the marriage. (The lawyer’s 
compliments slip, attached to the tribal authority’s complaint letter, offers documentary 
support of this point).  The matter was referred to the ‘larger court’ (presumably the High 
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court), although it appears the tribal court proceeded and dissolved the union anyway.  At this 
point it became unclear, and contested, as to whether Mamtwana is legally divorced.  
 
Mamtwana’s husband then proceeded to strip the household of its only real movable assets - 
its livestock.  A vehicle appeared and took the Mamtwana’s 17 goats, an act apparently, 
sanctioned by the unprocedual tribal court.  After the ten head of cattle followed, Mamtwana 
consulted her lawyer to retrieve the livestock.  The sheriff of the court reclaimed the 
livestock, only to repeatedly have them stolen back by some of the estranged husband’s 
family.  The sheriff attempted to avoid the impasse by having all the livestock moved to an 
alternate site, from which most of the cattle were subsequently stolen anyway.  (Mamtwana 
sees the hand of her husband in this final act of dispossession).  With only four head of cows 
left, Mamtwana paid the lawyer, the sheriff and the keeper of the cows with an animal each. 
The sole remaining cow she sold for cash.  The livestock theft was reported to the police.  
 
At this point with the escalation of acrimony, Mamtwana started to fear for her safety and 
moved closer to the road, to occupy her hexagonal (‘six corner’) hut within earshot of the 
neighbours.  Further incidents of harassment by her husband occurred; he reportedly 
surreptitiously laced her water tank with an acidic chemical.  It was also at this point that her 
alienated husband instructed her to leave the homestead; she assertively replied that she 
would not and that ‘he was playing’.  The next day, while she was out, her husband, his father 
and two brothers came to the homestead and demolished the hexagonal hut and damaged the 
‘flat’ (rectangular dwelling), smashing the walls, breaking the doors and discarding all the 
food and clothes.   
 
 
Figure 10: Mamtwana, her children and her grandchildren in front of the house demolished by 
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When her children ran to summon her, Mamtwana ran to her homestead but villagers 
restrained her, saying that she would be killed by her enraged husband if she confronted him.  
When she later returned to the homestead the pigs were rummaging through the last of her 
food amongst her possessions that had been thrown out.  The police were summoned, but only 
arrived the next day, by which time her husband (who has a car) fled back to Johannesburg.  
His brother and father appeared before the magistrate, who dismissed the case saying it was 
simply a domestic disagreement.  He found it implausible that a man would destroy his own 
hut.   
 
The tenacious Mamtwana rebuilt the flat, but not the severely damage hexagonal hut.  But it is 
perhaps indicative of the scale of her husband’s victimisation, that his actions have divided 
even his own family.  While rebuilding their flat, Mamtwana and her children resided with 
another one of her husband’s brothers in the village (whom we interviewed).  Some of her 
husband’s family still include her in the all important traditional ceremonies while a splinter 
group of the family, sympathetic to him, conduct their own ceremonies.    
 
In conclusion two essential points concerning Mamtwana bear noting.  The first is that she 
contested her husband’s abandonment and asset stripping with a great tenacity.  For an 
illiterate and poor rural woman, she proved remarkably adept at accessing the machinery of 
law and challenging her marginalisation and victimisation.  The second point is that 
notwithstanding these efforts, and the sheer egregiousness of her husband’s victimisation, she 
was ultimately unable to enforce her rights.  Her efforts to seek remedy from an often distant 
and unresponsive civic law ultimately proved ineffective, and at several points were 




Here, we see the violent underbelly of the socially constructed values of dignity 
and respectability in the way those who do not conform to conservative definitions 
of what is appropriate for their gender are demonized and punished.  
 
The above case studies are of older, married women, but the dynamics of 
marginalised are in some respects far more pronounced among a younger 
generation of women.  The vulnerable position of younger women (such as Chuma 
Mfako, see Case Study 9 on page 32) within the networks of reciprocal exchange 
within which social capital is circulated needs to be understood against the 
backdrop of broader social and demographic changes related to the unprotected 
marital status of large numbers of unmarried and impoverished women.  This was 
one of the less anticipated issues that emerged from the analysis of interview data. 
In a large number of households, a young woman, or her senior female relatives 
were constrained to take care of the child of an absent father who was either 
unwilling or unable to maintain the child.  This pattern is partly a result of the 
sexual and courtship behaviour and choices of young men and women, but they also 
take place against the background of some broader social trends.  Although fertility 
rates among African women are declining, the rate for African females is higher 
than for any other population groups; (Moultrie & Timaeus 2002); at the same time 
it does seem that fewer people are forming conjugal unions secured through the 
payment of lobola and community recognition.  At the same time there has been an 
increase in popular discourse which focus simply on the choices of the young 
women concerned - for example the notion that young women are having children 
to get access to the child grant (which would surely be profoundly irrational, given 
that the direct and indirect costs of childrearing are far greater than the grant 
income).  Certainly, no evidence could be found in the present study that young 
girls choose to have children because of the child grant; as Beth Goldblatt has 
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pointed out, these popular discourses seem to have little to do with real facts and 
may owe more to anti-women ideological attack (Goldblatt 2005).  A more realistic 
explanation would centre on the broader economic shifts and changes that underlie 
the large numbers of young mothers.  An important part of this shift flows from the 
collapse of unaccompanied male labour migrancy as it existed in the Eastern Cape 
in previous decades and the closure of the economic path to manhood that it 
enabled.  A generation of young men are no longer able to constitute independent 
households.  It is no coincidence that ‘makhotis’ (newly married, dowry-paid and 
respectable Xhosa matrons) were only ever found in households that had a male 
member (invariably the makhoti’s husband or father in law) employed or recently 
employed in the formal economy.  The consequence of this is that large numbers of 
African women enter into relationships – and have children, with no legal or 
cultural sanction protecting their rights within the relationships.  Although makhoti 
status eludes them, they are technically entitled to claim maintenance from the 
biological fathers of their children, but this right existed in theory only – even 
where the fathers were employed and could pay maintenance the women involved 
seemed reluctant to press home their claims.  
 
Often, of course it is older women who bear the brunt of these costs.  Usually 
young women with children who were not being maintained by their fathers did not 
suffer social isolation, partly for the simple reason that they were usually able to 
rely on their own mothers for support.  But when women were denied these links 
their situation seemed far more desperate – partly because, by defying 
conservative patriarchal gendered norms, they were far more at risk of ostracism 
and exclusion. 
 
Finally, it should be pointed that it is not only women who were disadvantaged by 
the way in which patriarchal ideology and codes of respectability shaped the ways 
in which social capital worked.  Young men were disadvantaged too.  The collapse 
of the economic base upon which unaccompanied male migration had depended 
means one of the economic avenues to economic masculine empowerment had 
closed.  Young men who can not accumulate enough to pay lobola and whose 
parents could not pay it on their behalf cannot constitute independent households 
in their own right, and also end up socially marginalised. Unfortunately this was an 
issue that could not be investigated in the context of this study; the research focus 
on households that depended heavily on grants tended to privilege female headed 
households, and young men were often peripheral, absent or invisible in these 
networks.  Better understanding the social vulnerability of young men is something 





7 CASH TRANSFERS AND LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
7.1 Using social grants  
 
There is a well developed scholarship on the use of social grants (see e.g. 
Ardington & Lund 1995, Case & Deaton 1998; Lund 2002; Barrientos 2004). Some 
studies show that cash transfers (particularly to women) show a clear positive 
impact on the health and nutrition of other household members (Duflo 2003, Case 
2001). Some however have argued that social grants have had perverse effects, 
leading for example to a reduction in remittances from children living away from 
home (Jensen 2003). Others have argued that cash transfers lead to a sharp drop in 
labour participation in receiving households (Bertrand et al 2003); a conclusion 
questioned by Posel, Lund and Fairburn, who have shown that Bertrand et al’s 
argument ignoring the realities of migration and the crucial role played by non-
resident household members (Posel et al 2004).  They argue that cash transfers 
may lead to increase labour market participation by rural African women. 
 
The research shed some light on these matters. A large proportion of the 
households in the sample were grant recipients.  Some 15% of individuals in the 
Cape Town urban survey, and 21% of individuals in Mount Frere, were reported to 
be drawing down some form of grant or other in 2002 (this includes adults receiving 
child care grants on behalf of children (see Table 15).  Aggregated into households 
this meant that 41% per cent of households in Cape Town, and a massive 65% in the 
Mount Frere study were recipients of social grants of some kind or another (see 
Table 16). Because the present project selected half the households from the 
poorest quintile, the proportion of grant users was quite large: only nine of the 48 
households selected for in-depth study in 2005 were not in receipt of a grant at the 
time of the research, and two of these were eligible households where a child 
grant had been terminated or lapsed for some reason and where the child’s carers 
were either in the process of reapplying or intended to reapply. 
 
Table 15: Individuals reported to be drawing down social grants (source: 2002 CPRC/PLAAS 
livelihood survey) 
Type of social grant Mount 
Frere 
Cape Town 
Pension Allowance 13.19 3.48 
Disability Allowance 1.31 2.58 
Child Maintenance Grant 5.77 6.91 
Child Care Allowance 0.42 0.24 
Care Need Allowance 0.27 1.02 
No grant 79.05 85.77 
Total 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Table 16: Distribution of grant uptake across households (source: 2002 CPRC/PLAAS livelihood 
survey) 
Number of people in household taking up grants Mount 
Frere 
Cape Town 
0 35.98 59.26 
1 31.52 26.89 
2 20.78 10.14 
3 7.95 2.58 
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Number of people in household taking up grants Mount 
Frere 
Cape Town 
4 1.95 0.64 
5 0.98 0.32 
6 0.56 0.16 
7 0.28 0 
Total 100.00 100.00 
 
 
In a few cases, interviews elicited detailed information about how grants were 
spent (see the discussions below). In most cases, informants’ reports about grant 
expenditure were more general, listing only what grant money was usually spent 
on.  Importantly, however, interviews also included information about the use of 
grants not only within the household but in the (sometimes distant) households to 
which they were linked, and also about the impact that grant receipt and 
expenditure had on the spatially distributed care chains and migration decisions.   
 
In most households, then, grants clearly made a significant impact on day to day 
survival, allowing households to secure basic energy and food needs for the 
recipients as well as for other household members.  At times, the difference this 
made could be crucial, as is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the case of 
the Matibane orphans below, where the eldest of three siblings, still at school but 
too old to receive a foster care grant himself, shares his younger two siblings’ 
grant.  The use of grants to benefit household members other than the primary 
recipient is of course a well established feature of grant usage in South Africa 
(Duflo 2003) and the present study identified at a large number of cases where 
more than one person are ‘eating from the grant’. In fourteen cases – most of 
which were concentrated in the Eastern Cape, receipt of a pension or a disability 
grant also made it possible for a recipient to do care work, looking after underage 
children (including children who were eligible for a child support grant that had not 
been taken up) or a relative (Case & Deaton 1998; Sagner 2000; Barrientos 2002; 
Goldblatt 2005). Here, disability grants and pensions can be shown to play a vital 
role underpinning the spatially extensive ‘care chains’ that allowed rural 
households to take care of the children of urban kin.   
  
In at least ten of the cases receipt of grants played a role in other economic 
activities or investments, functioning as seed money in the informal economic 
activity of recipient households (for example, helping keep Vuyiswa’s or Mamzoli’s 
businesses afloat — see pp. 34 and 49) or facilitating agriculture by allowing 
recipients to pay labour or for ploughing. Grants also allowed people to acquire or 
improve homes - the Mashiyas, for example (see p. 109, but also household 158 on 
p.190). In some cases, there was also evidence of grants being invested in 
supporting, directly and indirectly, children’s education or supporting their access 
to the job market  - here we can list Vuyiswa paying her granddaughter’s transport 
costs to school;  Babalwa paying for Mfundisi’s pocket money while he was studying 
tourism (see Box 4 above);  the grandmother of the Matibanes helping paying for  
clothes for schoolgoing children (see the discussion below); using income from child 
support grants to allow older children to remain in school (household MF 627); and 
even sending money from the  Eastern Cape to maintain a son who was searching 
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7.2 Making decisions about grants  
 
Another important aspect of these case studies is the way in which they highlight 
the extent to which the wise expenditure of a grant was a collective household 
endeavour characterized by with careful co-operative decision-making about the 
allocation of scarce money.  This we have already discussed in some detail on p. 
109 above in our account of the way in which the Mashiya household combines and 
leverages their resources. There, it can be seen how the household judiciously uses 
a combination of resources to leverage their grant money and other resources to 
their collective benefit.  Their social respectability and the regularity of the 
pension, for instance, allows them to not only to survive but to buy building 
supplies – an important investment in a core shared asset -  while securing private 
medical care for Nolinda is a vital investment in keeping her alive, thus ensuring 
continued access to the pension in the future. 
 
Another interesting — if somewhat special — case illustrating the importance of this 
kind of co-operative dynamic in the spending of a grant is provided by the story of 
the Matibanes:  
 
 
Case Study 28: Aids orphans surviving on a foster care grant 
 
The Matibane siblings —  Zandisile (18), his sister Nokuthule (16) and their brother 
Sibongiseni (15) — are teenagers who live together in the village of Akulinywa.  Effectively 
orphaned by the deaths of their mother and grandmother, they were initially distributed 
amongst various family members.  But using the foster care grants they receive, they decided 
to reunite and reconstitute themselves as a household in the old family home.  The interview 
was conducted in their home, a single small mud rondavel scarcely big enough for a single 
bed and a small table.   
 
In 2002 the three children were being looked after by their grandmother, while their mother 
worked outside of the village, in the larger centres of Thabankulu and Johannesburg.  The 
remittances she sent were small and only covered food; their grandmother used to buy them 
clothes with her pension money.  She grandmother ran a small tavern from her home in order 
to augment her income.  After 2000 their grandmother became increasingly ill, stricken with 
cancer and unable to eat.  The eldest, then 14 year old Zandisile looked after her until she died 
in 2002.  In response to this shock the children’s mother returned from Johannesburg (where 
she had been working as a security guard, for the funeral).  Soon after this she grew ill, and 
never recovered.  She ailed for a year with the HIV-like symptoms of fits, skin lesion and a 
‘bad stomach’ before dying in 2003.  Although some family would sometimes pool together 
money to take her to the doctor, Zandile reportedly again did most of the day to day caring of 
his mother. This disrupted his schooling and he was forced to repeat a grade.  
 
With their grandmother dead and mother sick and unemployed the siblings recall this as a 
particularly difficult time. They relied on the beneficence of two women, both of whom they 
describe as mothers of their friends.  One of these women is comparatively well off; she is 
employed as a teacher in the local school and owns a local spaza shop.  The teenagers 
describe how they used to alternate between these two benefactors, going to one three times a 
week and the other twice a week for raw food that they would cook.  
 
Following the death of their mother the three siblings were split up.  Nokuthule lived at a 
distant uncle’s house in a different village before returning to another uncle in the present 
village, and eventually moving in with her great aunt.  The youngest sibling, Sibongiseni, was 
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already living with his great aunt.  Zandile in turn looked after the house of a distant relative 
(he does not know precisely how they are related) for which he earned R100 per month.  He 
then stayed with yet another uncle and his cousins, but with the start of the New Year they all 
returned to Johannesburg (where the cousins were attending school).  He was alone in the 
house and reportedly went hungry.  It was at this point that the siblings agreed they ought to 
live together.  They argued that they were raised together by their grandmother and were used 
to living together.  They convinced their extended family to allow them to open their late 
mother’s house.  Of the three mud block structures on the property, one collapsed and another 
destroyed by lightening so the two brothers occupy the small hut (one sleeps on the floor), 
while their sister Nokuthule sleeps each night at the house of their benefactor, the teacher cum 
spaza store owner.  She still cooks and eats with her brothers though, and considers herself 
part of their household. 
 
The decision of the siblings to reconstitute themselves as a household was facilitated by the 
fact that their great aunt reported their orphan status to department of Social Development 
officials in Mount Frere, and successfully secured foster care grants for the two youngest 
children.  Amidst frequent accounts of an unresponsive Eastern Cape state welfare machinery 
struggling with the demands on it the attentiveness and efficiency of the social workers has 
been nothing short of remarkable.  As soon as the children started staying together, they were 
issued with monthly food parcels.  They continued collecting these for four to six months at 
the local store or the chief’s house before the two younger children started receiving two 
foster care grants totaling R1060.  In 2005 the grant was raised to R1120.  Moreover their 
great aunt describes doing relatively little to apply for the grant (she is adamant that she never 
even signed an application form).   
 
Although the grant is paid out in cash every month at the local store, the social workers - 
supported by the siblings’ relatives - maintain close control over its expenditure.  The siblings 
and their nominal guardian, their great aunt, report to the social workers in Mount Frere every 
month and follow a strict budget.  The research team accompanied them on one of these 
visits.  Most of the grant is saved, as it will terminate when the children turn 18 years old.  At 
the behest of the social workers the younger children had bank accounts opened in their 
names, and R300 is deposited in each account every month, while R400 to R450 is spent on 
groceries.  The social workers told the children’s great aunt not to report to them from May to 
June 2005, when she returned in July the social workers sought to confirm that the regular 
bank savings were still taking place.  This was done to ‘test’ their management of the money. 
The children have each accrued about R3500 in each of their bank accounts.  The social 
workers also tell the great aunt and her charges to allocate fund for school fees at the 
beginning of the year, along with a budget for clothes at Christmas time.  Despite the fact that 
Zamile is not formally a recipient of a grant, they don’t hesitate to summon him (via his great 
aunt) to these meetings.  Although as an adult Zamile is chronologically ineligible for the 
grant, there seems to be wide acknowledgement amongst all concerned that the two grant are 
supporting three siblings.   
 
Grant receipt is not entirely uncontested though.  The youngest, Sibongiseni effectively 
dropped out of school mid way through 2005.  The social workers responded by summoning 
him and cautioned him that his grant would be stopped if he did not return to school.  They 
also warned him that he would not be entitled to the funds in his bank account, but rather they 
would accrue to his sister.  They gave the great aunt detailed instructions on how to report the 
matter to the school principal.  This intervention proved ineffective, and the social workers 
have sought to apply pressure on the somewhat beleaguered great aunt.  They have warned 
her that if Sibongiseni’s grant is stopped, she will have to feed him off her own pension.  A 
prospect she greeted with some alarm. 
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The story of the Matibane siblings is an interesting document of the agency of the 
three siblings, and the way they acted to ensure their mutual continued well-being.  
By reconstituting themselves as a household, they were able to pool their 
resources, and also look after the oldest sibling who was not eligible for a grant, 
and who had borne most of the burden of caring for both their grandmother and 
their mother.  Besides pooling the grant money, this recreation of the household 
helped them constitute themselves as a focal point for the care of their relatives. 
 
A number of further issues are notable here. Most obviously there is the very 
interventionist role of both the extended family and the social workers.  Less 
obviously, we should also note the way in which the foster care grant is 
supplemented with other, no less important forms of capital and resources, such as 
the pension of the children’s grandmother, the built assets of their dead mother’s 
home, and the significant social capital they are able to mobilise in enlisting the 
care of their relatives and family friends.  How the grant and the other resources 
are used is not simply a decision of the individual recipients but is part of a broader 
process of negotiation and discussion.   
 
To some extent the above story is a special case – the Matibane children’s status as 
orphans and the special role of the social workers clearly create a situation that 
facilitates this kind of careful allocation and application of grant money.  But at 
the same time, the kind of process described here in some detail - the making of 
careful decisions about grant expenditure – was present in some way or another in 
numerous cases. Here, our earlier argument about the importance of ideologies 
and practices of reciprocal exchange in the mobilisation of social capital, and the 
way in which these negotiations shape decisions about the distribution of resources 
in spatially extended kin networks is of central relevance.  Just as the impacts of 
shocks are transmitted and redistributed between households in this broader 
spatial network, so are the benefits of grant receipt.  Quite how a grant would be 
spent would be an individual person’s decision – but that decision is taken in the 
context of the debts, obligations, expectations, claims and counterclaims involved 





Case Study 29: Sending the child but keeping the grant 
 
One of the challenges of Lulama and Luleka (their household situation has already been 
described on p. 123 above) relates to the difficulties they face in caring for their children.  
Both of them are mothers. Luleka’s child is nine years old and Lulama has in fact had two 
children – one by a man who now lives in a village in the Eastern Cape, and a second child 
(now aged six) by her current boyfriend, who lives in his own shack not far away. The first 
child died by drowning in the previous year, a fact she recounts with dry-eyed matter-of-
factness.  It is a measure of how impoverished she is, and how little money her family has, 
that she was unable to bury her own child. The child was buried by the father’s family, and of 
her own family, Lulama was the only one who went to the burial.  One key problem they have 
at the moment is that they do not have enough money to pay for childcare.  Lulama’s 
piecework takes her away from home for most of the day, but pays only between R70 and 
R100 a day, a sum from which she and her sister and their two surviving children have to live.  
Were Luleka to find a job, it is not clear who would look after the children. The sisters have 
no local relatives. 
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An important source of help here is their mother, who lives on her own in an RDP house in 
Port Elizabeth, surviving on a pension and on part time domestic work earnings.  During the 
course of the research project she visited her daughters in Cape Town; and one of the 
consequences of her visit was that it was agreed Lulama’s surviving child would live with her 
in the Eastern Cape.  Lulama and Luleka say that they discussed the matter of the child grant. 
Their mother told them that because she was receiving a pension and some wages from her 
domestic work, she did not need the child grant as well.  She suggested that they keep 
drawing the child grant in Cape Town. The sisters use the grant for school fees, clothes and 
food for Luleka’s child.  
 
 
Case Study 30: A very important son: Simpiwe Fikile 
 
Mamzoli Fikile, whose business we discussed on page 49, describes Simpiwe as ‘a very 
important son’ - and meeting him and hearing his story, it is possible to see why.  Simpiwe is 
a large, confident man who works as a bakery manager for a large supermarket in Kokstad.  
During the interview he remains busy, giving instructions, taking notes and taking phone calls 
the entire time – exuding the energy and the determination of a man who has fought his way 
up from extreme poverty, and who is taking his family with him. Coming from an 
impoverished background he and his siblings were raised by his forceful mother, living with 
grandparents while she worked as a domestic worker in major urban centres.  He started in the 
early 1990s as a cleaner in Spar and worked his way slowly up the ranks in the bakery, 
starting as a doughman.  His mother was a domestic worker in Durban but he told her mother 
to ‘go home’ – i.e. to return to Phuzayo village - supporting her by sending remittances.  He 
also bought her a fridge so that she could start her business.  
 
When his mother got a pension (it was in around 1993), the pressure eased – on her as well as 
on him. She was able to sell less, because she was getting the pension and did not have to 
make so much money. He himself was able to return to school, while continuing to work for 
Spar during the evenings, matriculating in 1993 and continuing his training as a bakery 
assistant. In this time he had to support his brother Thabo who had been retrenched from the 
coal mine where he had been working in Johannesburg, and Thabo’s pregnant girlfriend (later 
wife) who had been disowned by her parents.  He subsequently ‘pushed’ Thabo’s wife to 
complete her schooling after she had had her baby (she subsequently became an ABET 
instructor).  He also supported his younger sister Thozama through agricultural school in 
Pietermaritzburg (she works as a chef making in-flight meals for the airlines); another person 
he ‘pushed’ though education was his wife, whom he married in 1999.  She completed her 
ambulance worker training and her drivers’ license: she now works for one of the states 
pension pay-out contractors.  Subsequently he left Spar and worked in Bizana for a while until 
he got his present position.   
 
His aim is to ascend further up the store hierarchy; in the interim he has bought a house near 
Matatiele. During the week he rents a house in Kokstad; on weekends he goes either to 
Puzayo to visit his mother and see whether she is all right; otherwise he goes to stay in 
Durban where he also has family: because his older brother has neither the time to take care 
of family business (he is often away working in Angola or Mozambique) nor the mobility 
conferred by a vehicle, the responsibility of sorting out family problems falls on Simpiwe.  He 
himself does not want to move too far from Phuzayo, because he worries about his mother.  











Case Study 31: Household synergies 
 
In 2002 the seventy-three year old Nobuhle’s household consisted of her and her two young 
grandchildren.  On the team’s 2005 return the house was shut up and empty and we learnt that 
Nobuhle had died.  At what point, we wondered, does a household cease to be a household?  
The two grandchildren formerly resident at the homestead were traced to the house of Nomsa, 
the daughter of the deceased Nobuhle.  Nomsa is the children’s grandmother, so Nobuhle, it 
transpired was actually their great grandmother.  The team sought out and interviewed 
Nobuhle’s daughter Nomsa in her comfortable homestead, a mere five minute walk from her 
late mothers’ vacant homestead.   
 
Nomsa’s household appears relatively prosperous, with well-constructed and spacious 
dwellings, modern furniture and a fair amount of livestock (including six cattle, and large 
numbers of smaller animals).  Nomsa shares the homestead with her retired husband, her 
daughter in law and five grandchildren.  The household’s prosperity is bound up with the fact 
that her husband worked as a sweeper at the Roodepoort municipality since the 1960s.  He 
retired to the village in 2000 and invested in building the two houses and acquiring livestock 
with his reported R42 000 pension payout.  Their monthly income of over R2000 consists of 
two disability grants (received by Nomsa and her husband for ‘arthritis’) along with the four 
child support grants received for the grandchildren. 
 
The re-absorption of her grandchildren into her household after the death of her mother is part 
of a long story of co-operative arrangements between Nomsa’s household and that of her 
mother.  In the distant past, when Nomsa’s husband was working - but before her mother was 
getting a pension - they used to support her.  Nomsa would bring her mother groceries and 
would pay her monthly contribution to the burial society.  Two of the grandchildren lived at 
the nearby home of their great-grandmother.  When Nobuhle began receiving her old age 
pension, the balance of reciprocal exchange shifted: Nobuhle was no longer so dependent on 
her daughter; and in fact she was often able to lend Nomsa money to bridge the shortfall in 
the hungry gap before she received her husband’s remittance.  When the elderly Nobuhle 
became ill with ‘chest problems’ in mid 2003 Nomsa was in turn able to repay that debt: she 
would cook for both dwellings and send food across with the grandchildren.  
 
After Nobuhle’s death in January 2004, her house was closed up.  On our inquires Nomsa 
explained that it will remain this way until her mother appears in her dreams and tells her 
what to do with it.  The boarded rondavels are to become the ‘khaya khulu’ (big house) were 
ceremonies will be conducted.  Perhaps in future another family member will occupy it. 
 
 
These stories show how the allocation of resources within and between households 
shift and changes over time according to the patterns of reciprocal exchange.  
Luleka and Lulama’s arrangement with their mother allows them to pool two child 
grants to look after one child – an arrangement that is made possible by their 
mother’s pension (had she not received the pension, it is likely she would have to 
do domestic work for more than a few days a week). It is notable that this 
arrangement, by reducing the child care burden on the two sisters (the child being 
cared for by their mother is the younger one) also increases Luleka’s freedom to 
search for employment.  Mamzoli’s pension, in turn, freed up her son, who no 
longer needed to send such large remittances, to go to school, allowing him access 
to better earning employment; and he repaid this debt and serviced his obligations 
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as a son by using his earnings to support the schooling of his kin and extended 
family. Nobuhle’s pension allowed a temporary reduction of in-kind flows from 
Nomsa’s house into hers and — importantly — allows her to repay some of her 
moral debt to her daughter; when she became ill the net flow of benefit once again 
returned to her, to such an extent that the two households all but fused.  As 
Nomsa’s story about waiting for the dream shows, it is a relationship that appears, 
(for her, at least) to continue even after death.  
  
Here it is important not to exaggerate. Clearly there are numerous cases where 
social grants are used in ways that do not optimally promote the well-being or 
security of the intended recipients. In the case of Lulama and Luleka, the team 
noted that Delia often liked to insinuate that Lulama and Luleka were spending the 
grant on clothing accounts for themselves as well as on food for the remaining 
child.  But this does not invalidate our point.  We have already highlighted how the 
circulation and use of social capital should not simply be romanticised, but is often 
accompanied by tension, conflict and disharmony.  The use of pensions and other 
grants for the broader welfare of the household does not flow from some kind of 
selfless generalised goodness on the part of recipients, but also from strong social 
pressures, and are intimately involved with the personal hopes of the recipients, 
their histories of debt, obligation and expectation, the social credit they have 
already accumulated and hope to accumulate in their social networks and so on.  
How a person uses their grant will be partly shaped by their own history and their 
disposition and the extent to which they have themselves bought into the familial, 
communitarian and domestic values of isidima and so on. It will also be profoundly 
shaped by their social status and role.   
 
Gender plays a role here: both men and women can choose to invest heavily in the 
well-being of their families but they often do it in very different ways. It is 
interesting, for instance to contrast Simpiwe Fikile, who serves his families through 
economic investment in the education and empowerment of his kin, with Mamzoli, 
Vuyiswa, and Nomsa who play their role primarily through investments in care 
work.  Duflo (2003) and others have highlighted the particularly important role of 
the way older women invest their pensions — this is not, we suggest because only 
women will invest in the broader well-being of their kin, children and families, but 
rather because women play their role particularly through direct and vital unpaid 
investments in household reproduction and care work. 
7.3 Indirect effects of grant receipt 
 
Two issues here are of particular significance to policymakers.  The first is the 
importance of understanding how social grants impact on supra- and inter-
household distribution of benefits. We have already noted the concerns raised by 
some scholars who have highlighted the possibility that social grant expenditure 
may lead to a reduction in private remittances. Jensen has argued that this is 
indeed happening in South Africa, and that each rand of public pension provision 
leads to a 25 or 30-cent reduction in private remittances (Jensen 2003).  Cox and 
Jimenez (1990), writing about social grants outside of South Africa, have argued 
that if private donors give less as public transfers increase, the effect of public 
programs on beneficiaries would be less than originally intended. As Francie Lund 
has pointed out (Lund 2002), this would be so only if one considers households in 
isolation: if a household is held to be a strongly bounded, independent, 
autonomous economic unit, the reduction of remittances in response to the receipt 
of a social grant would indeed be a problem for social policy.  But the households 
we have looked at this study are not so bounded, and these re-allocations are not a 
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zero sum game.  Rather, they form part of the larger process whereby resources 
are ‘moved around’ in the spatially extended networks created by practices of 
social reciprocity, migrancy and kin connections – process that play a key role in 
creating a network of ‘distal social welfare’ that extends well beyond those 
actually targeted by the grant.  Because private remittances are used to 
ameliorate vulnerability in the absence of a comprehensive social welfare system, 
‘crowding out’ should not be seen, as  Cox and Jiminez do, as a cost to the 
achievement of social objectives, but as a way in which poor people leverage the 
benefits of the social welfare they receive.  
 
But this ‘private’ social welfare is not universal or egalitarian in its workings.  This 
leads to an important second point.  Here, it can be argued that the receipt of 
social grants can help ameliorate some of the ways in which the unequal and 
gendered workings of social capital can lead to social exclusion.  A case in point is 
that of Vuyiswa in our first case study, who at one point used the grant as seed 
money for her fruit and veg business, and then at another point used it to facilitate 
her daughter’s Izila ceremony, thus investing in her daughter’s respectability, 
allowing her to marry again, and allowing her to return to employment.  Here, two 
important things stand out.  The first point to notice is the importance of the 
flexibility of how the grant was used – Vuyiswa’s ability to allocate resources first 
to one source and then to another – something that was facilitated by the grant’s 
being paid out as money and not, for instance, as food stamps.  The second is that 
the grant allowed Vuyiswa to transact in her kinship network.  In a context where 
social capital depends very much on reciprocal exchange, and in which lacking 
resources therefore is profoundly undermining of one’s agency as a social actor, 
receipt (and wise use) of the grant gives her resources in terms of which she can 
secure herself a worthwhile role in the system of exchange and negotiation 
constituted by the social network within which she exists. Not only does it allow 
her to transact from a position of greater power in her own household; it also 
allows her to intervene and contribute to the lives of distant relatives.  From a 
situation in which she would be perpetually at risk of being seen simply as a burden 
on her kin, bereft of social capital and transacting with her relatives from a 
disempowered position, receipt of a disability grant makes her (to use an imprecise 
term) a ‘player’ in a way she would otherwise not have been. As Sagner has 
pointed out (2000; see also Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock 2002) pensions can play 
an important role in helping those who would otherwise be marginalised to 
accumulate social capital on their own behalf. 
 
7.4 Grant abuse 
 
The section that follows looks at the misuse of grants, it seeks to discuss some of 
the complexities of defining inappropriate grant use, before considering misuse in 
terms of recipients receiving grants that they may not be eligibility for.  
 
In the research process, the research design and team placed great emphasis to 
developing a detailed understanding of how the research participants constituted 
their livelihoods and the place of social grants in these.  A consequence of this 
analytic receptiveness to complexity of the peoples’ livelihoods in context is that 
cases of what initially look like grant misuse or at the very least, imprudent grant 
use become far more intelligible.  An example of this would be the case of Vuyiswa 
and how her saving of R300 to R400 of a disability grant for her daughter’s izila 
ceremony becomes far more comprehensible and justifiable when considering what 
the successfully completed izila ceremony will enable.  Vuyiswa’s daughter not 
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only owe her a debt of gratitude, she will be able to respectably remarry and go 
out and earn an income, all of which will assure Vuyiswa of continued support in 
future.  Vuyiswa’s saving of a grant for a traditional ceremony therefore becomes 
considerably less ill-considered.   
 
This example shows that adjudicating appropriate grant use versus grant misuse is 
a difficult undertaking which can be made all the more analytically perilous by not 
having a sufficient grasp of the larger, household, communal and socio-cultural 
mores that shape individual actions.  Similar, difficult questions, could be asked of 
the example of Mrs Cebe (see Box 4) where the child support grants were being 
spent on educating older children (to hopefully gain a foothold in the formal 
economy) at the direct expense of the nutrition of the younger (designated grant 
recipient) grandchildren.  Adjudicating the appropriateness of this division of social 
grant resources, and the stark livelihoods dilemma underlying it, is extremely 
difficult.  If Nomalanga’s terrible choice seems wrong, it is at the very least 
plausible. This is not to say that the research process did occasionally not pick up 
instances of grant money spent on items with very limited social utility (such as 
alcohol); it is the fact that virtually everything else recipients spent money on 
could be justified, when viewed within the context of recipients’ lives.   
 
Grant misuse is far easier to discern in terms of inappropriate grant recipients, 
rather than inappropriate expenditure by legitimate recipients.  Disability grants 
were obviously the grants that could be most easily misused in this way.  Here a 
specific example is instructive. Several of the respondents in the rural Eastern 
Cape reported that securing a disability grant necessitated the payment of a bribe 
to a prominent local official.  In some cases this would be an ongoing bribe, a 
proportion of the disability grant paid every month to the official concerned.  Many 
respondents spoke quite freely of this, breezily naming the person concerned.  It 
seemed to be an open secret in the district and several households reported having 
a disabled member who was unsuccessful in their attempt to secure a disability 
grant because they were not able to afford the bribe. 
 
Conversely a consequence of this appeared to be several households with middle 
age (invariably pre-pension age) members who were in receipt of disability grants 
yet did not look conspicuously disabled.  Although it is all but impossible for 
researchers conducting interviews to discern whether disability grant receiving 
members are sufficiently incapacitated - this is a biomedical and bureaucratic 
question well beyond the scope and ability of the research team – some recipients 
did not appear disabled.  The case study below captures some of the contradictions 




Case Study 32: A road worker with a disability grant 
 
The contents of fifty three year old Monica’s neatly plastered and whitewashed hut attests her 
array of livelihood activities.  Behind a curtain hangs the reflective vest and a single orange 
traffic cone of those employed in a community road repair project, and alongside it is the cow 
tail whisk and white bead necklaces of a sangoma.  But not visible is the disability grant she 
receives. 
 
Monica lives in the homestead with her 16 year old son and eight year old grandson, but she 
has three grown daughters and a son.  One daughter lives in the village, while all the other 
children are resident in Cape Town or Johannesburg.  Many years ago Monica was called by 
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the ancestors to become a sangoma. She then left the village to work in as a crafter and 
sangoma in a tourist facility in the former Bophuthatswana.  Monica sent remittances, 
returning home for brief visits and when her ill and long unemployed husband died in 1992.  
Her relatively well paid work at the tourist resort came to an end with the unrest that 
accompanied the dissolution of Bophuthatswana.  After Monica returned to the village 
permanently in 1996 it was a difficult time, and her family was reportedly starving.  In 
response their predicament her then 23 year old daughter dropped out of matric and traveled 
to Johannesburg to find a job.  What she soon found in Johannesburg was a husband.  Only 
her husband was jealous and reluctant to allow his wife to work; yet she needed to earn 
money for her mother and siblings.  A deal was struck and it was agreed that they would send 
a regular sum of R300 to her mother.  In this period, when Monica became ill, her married 
daughter and husband’s support extended to paying for her to consult a doctor.  Their regular 
remittances only ceased in 2004, when Monica successfully secured a disability grant for her 
arthritis. 
 
During the late 1990s another source of support, but only food and groceries, was the third of 
Monica’s married daughters, who lives in the village.  When this daughter’s husband died in 
2001, she became less able to support her mother with four young children to feed.  However 
this daughter subsequently had a liaison with a man who is the ward councilor in the area.  He 
moved into her house and fathered a fifth child.  Politically connected, it was this ward 
councilor who secured Monica a job on the community road maintenance programme in 
2003.  According to Monica he did so because he could see that she was (in her words) 
‘suffering’.  However one cannot discount the possibility that fifty year old Monica, receiving 
a disability grant for arthritis, was favoured for the road maintenance project due to her new 
kinship status.  Whatever her kinship status though, Monica is required to actually work.  She 
would often walk kilometers from the village and be visible toiling at the side of the road, 
filling in potholes with a shovel.  For this work, twice a week, she receives R300 a month.  
Although it would be inappropriate to suggest that middle aged Monica is in perfect health, or 
that disability grant recipients ought to be excluded from the opportunities conferred by 
community projects, the severity of her condition does not appear to be an impediment to this 




7.5  Access, uptake, exclusion and costs of social grants 
 
There are well documented problems in social grant administration, included here 
is discussion of the rigidities and difficulties poor people encounter when trying to 
access grants.  These barriers often serve to mitigate against economic activity and 
mobility.  
 
One of the chief problems regarding social grant administration are the 
requirements that need to be met, in order to secure a grant.  Particularly in the 
rural Eastern Cape the state machinery is thin on the ground and its agents 
generally unresponsive.  So a key point is that that poor people are caught in the 
middle of a contradiction in terms of the way in which the state works.  On the one 
hand, access to public goods, including social grants, is subject to carefully 
specified formal requirements.  These requirements flow from the nature of South 
African ‘governmentality’ - the social technologies on which the state relies to 
govern at all.  J.C Scott has showed how important these social technologies are 
for rendering society visible to the state and allowing it see e.g. poor people.  
However if poor people cannot conform to these conditions, if they cannot make 
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themselves visible to the state by then they cannot be recognised as grant 
recipients by it.  However a key defining point about the local state, particularly in 
the rural areas, is its weakness and lack of capacity, rendering it unable to provide 
poor people with the services they need in order to comply with its requirements in 
the first place.  
 
Generally speaking, poor people’s inability to make themselves visible to the state 
takes two possible forms.  In many cases, as per the case study below, they 
struggle to afford the transaction costs associated with attempting to secure a 
social grant from inefficient and unhelpful state welfare machinery.  The 
transaction costs swell substantially when the grant recipients do not have birth 
certificates or identity documents.  Particularly in the rural areas, with the greater 
travel involved and an often less responsive state, the transaction costs hurdle 
becomes insurmountable.  Especially when the parents or care givers of children do 
themselves not have identity documents to enable them to be ‘seen’ by the state.  
For instance to be an adult without an identity book (not an unknown occurrence) 
applying for a child support grant requires sustained engagement not only with 
Department of Social Development officials, but also with the department of Home 
Affairs (to first obtain an official form of identity) along with the traditional leader 
where one lives (to attest to the fact that one is a resident the area).  Applying for 
a foster care grant, probably the most onerous of all the grants, requires 
engagement with many of these entities (Social Development, traditional leader 
and possibly Home Affairs), along with another arm of the state, namely the local 
magistrates court.  The case study that follows illustrates some of the complexities 
and transaction costs associated with applying for a social grant. 
 
 
Case Study 33: Two stories about the costs of a grant 
 
(1) Nomalanga lives in the distant village of Kufushane, with little more cash income that the 
monthly sum of R300 her husband earns for herding cattle.  Her grandchildren consume the 
small proportion of the child support grants that she does not remit to their mothers 
(Nomalanga’s daughters) who are schooling elsewhere.  When the child support grant 
Nomalanga was receiving for her then seven year old child abruptly stopped in 2002 she was 
reluctant to reapply for it.  A return trip to Mount Frere costs R32 (R16 one way).  At least 
two trips are required to apply for a grant (total cost R64) and one is far from assured of 
getting it.  One may travel to town only to be told by the by Department of Social 
Development officials that they are not currently registering children for grants, or that they 
will be doing so next week, or that one ought to wait for them to do a registering campaign in 
the village (despite the fact that no such campaign was conducted in 2004).  Besides, even if 
she were to get the grant it may, with no warning, be discontinued again.  
 
Nomalanga’s husband, who is elderly and frail, could conceivably be a disability grant 
recipient.  However securing the grant will require not only the minimum of two visits to 
distant Mount Frere, Nomalanga knows that they will have to see the District Surgeon in 
Thabankulu.  The village of Kufushane is not only difficult to access along a single dirt track, 
it falls administratively between two separate towns.  So while Kufushane village falls under 
the Thabankulu municipality, many of the provincial level services (except, inexplicably, the 
district surgeon) are based in Mount Frere.  This necessitates trips to both towns.  The costs of 
travelling to Thabankulu are equivalent of travelling to Mount Frere.  Assuming then 
Nomalanga and her husband undertake two trips to Thabankulu (as they have no way of 
knowing if the district surgeon will be available on a first visit) an additional expenditure of 
R64 is entirely possible.  This sum of R128 for transport (in the back of an enclosed pick up 
truck or bakkie) would easily escalate by R30 to R40 with the purchase of a bit of food for 
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lunch and payment for the photocopies of his ID book required with the grant application 
form.  Therefore a final (and probably very best case scenario), of R150 – R160 applying for 
the grant is entirely possible.  This for a grant that might not be awarded, represents an 
enormous gamble for an extremely cash poor household living on R300 a month.  As a 
fieldworker summed up the merciless calculus of applying for a disability grant ‘they if they 
go for a grant maybe they don’t get it, and they only eat R150 that month’.  
 
 
(2) We have already described Mam Thandi and her spaza on p. 53 . When the child care 
grant was extended to children aged 14 years, Mam Thandi applied for a social grant for her 
daughter Didi.  In February 2005, the grant was terminated.  She had to queue for a whole 
morning to find out what was going on: the DSD officials told Mam Thandi that she had to 
get a certificate to prove that her child was attending school. When she showed the research 
team the form the official had given her, they noted that the official had spelled her child’s 
surname incorrectly (Gxalane, not Gxalathane).  Mam Thandi did not think she could do 
anything about this.  She went to  the school and got the form signed by the principal.  Then 
she reportedly had to go to the local police station to sign a formal affidavit confirming her 
place of residence and stating that her child was going to school.  She reportedly also had to 
get her ID document photocopied.  Then she returned to the DSD offices to provide them with 
the form.   When she did so, the official noted that there was a discrepancy between the name 
on the ID document and the name on the form, and refused to accept the document, sending 
her back to her school principal with a second, now correctly filled in form. She returned with 
this; but reported that on the day she had set aside to submit the form, she had not gotten to 
the front of the queue by the time lunchtime arrived: the officials closed shop for the day and 
she had to return home having accomplished nothing.   She returned a fourth time; this time 
accompanied by one of the fieldworkers, Sibongile Mtini, and again she did not get served.  
She returned a final time the next week, and this time she managed to get the form submitted.  
The payment of her child grant resumed a month or so later.  She had lost more than six 
months worth of child grant payments due to this interruption.  In addition, on each of the 
days that she had to queue, she had had to close her spaza; costing her, she reckoned, R 40 or 




The above case studies are examples of a modestly complex grant to access.  It is 
not a scenario complicated by the need to access the local magistrates’ court, nor 
is the above protagonist devoid of an Identity document.  If these factors where 
present in the above case study, the requirements and time span required would 
rapidly escalate.    
 
In conclusion the difficulties around the uptake of and access to grants are not to 
suggest that administrative procedure and bureaucratic rigour are undesirable, it is 
simply to make the point that these procedures can impose substantial transaction 
costs on the most vulnerable and impoverished of potential recipients.  Moreover 
these transaction costs are exacerbated when the state and its agents are absent 
or inefficient.  The transaction costs become even more substantial when the 
states agents are rent-seeking or predatory (as in the case of the disability grant 






8 REDUCING VULNERABILITY AND DISEMPOWERMENT: 
SOME KEY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous sections we have looked at some detail at what we have called 
‘private social protection’ or ‘distal welfare’ – the strategies evolved by people on 
the margins of the formal economy and in the contexts created by labour migrancy.  
We have suggested that these strategies are in part responses to the very particular 
conditions experienced by people suriving in post-Apartheid migrant networks in 
Cape Town and the Eastern Cape.  These conditions are characterised on the one 
hand by a high degree of integration with the formal economy — and consequently 
high levels of monetization and cash hungriness — and on the other by the scarcity 
and fragility of stable, formal employment, and by adverse conditions for informal 
economic activity.  The strategic arrangements and livelihood approaches we have 
described here represent important and complex responses to this challenging 
environment — but, as we have argued, the costs and burdens that flow from this 
vulnerability are unequally distributed.  This is something that is often missed by 
accounts that simply  emphasise the resilience and ingenuity of poor people, and 
that focus on ‘coping’ in isolation without looking at long term sustainability and 
the costs of those coping strategies: those with less social power, those with less 
resources, and those marginalised within household arrangements and kinship 
structures also carry a disproportionate burden of the shocks associated with 
poverty, labour market marginality and ill health.  Powerlessness very often seems 
to breed more powerlessness, as those who still have some leverage and some 
power often externalize and pass on costs and burdens to those below them.   
 
We have suggested that within these strategies, social grants can do much to 
mitigate the ill-being associated with poverty.  In some cases — the Mashiye 
household described on page 109 above is a key example — a pension or a disability 
grant is all that stands between a household and complete destitution.  In general, 
social grants, particularly disability grants and pensions can play an important role 
in allowing people to leverage scant resources, can support informal economic 
activity, allow investments in the productive capacity and human capital of the 
household.  Finally, pensions and disability grants in particular, and to some extent 
foster care grants, have the potential to empower marginalised people socially, 
allowing them to accumulate ‘social capital’ and transact effectively in their 
kinship networks.  
 
What does this mean for social policy?  In the following few pages we sketch out 
some important consequences.  In the first place, we argue that one important 
component of strengthening the impact of social spending is not merely to worry in 
a narrow sense about whether people are spending money on the right things, but 
to make sure that the grants are received in a context in which it is possible for 
people to make creative or effective choices about how they will spend their grants 
in the first place.  A key role of policy, other than merely providing social grants, 
should be to create enabling conditions for effective grant use.   
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This means that one key underlying component of ensuring the effectiveness of 
social spending is to ensure, in the first place, that social spending and social 
policymaking is integrated within a more coherent overall social and economic 
approach to poverty alleviation.   At the very least it means that government 
should not, in a general sense, give with one hand and take away with another.  
The effectivity of social spending is undermined if social spending happens in a 
context where there is no integrated framework for poverty reduction in 
government; or where other social and economic policies increase the vulnerability 
and burdens of poor people.    
 
In the following pages we explore some of the requirements for a more integrated 
approach to reducing the vulnerability of poor people and the costs imposed upon 
them by poverty. The first overall goal of pro-poor policy should therefore be to 
challenge in a general way the patterns and processes that tilt the playing fields 
against poor people and which create the vicious circles of disempowerment we 
have described here.  The conditions that undermine effective grant use by 
individuals on the ground are often the same as those that more generally 
undermine the effectivity of other kinds of economic activities and choices.  This 
requires that pro-poor policymaking in government transcends the conceptual 
divide between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ policy. Policy should pay attention to the 
broader social relations and arrangements that can either be empowering or 
disempowering to poor people.  This requires going well beyond the limitations of 
current thinking on the ‘second economy’.   
 
Secondly, we argue that social policy and the design of cash transfer programmes 
in particular be sharpened by a clearer understanding of their role in South Africa.  
Policy reform should play to the system’s strengths, and be informed by a solid 
understanding of just what these strengths are.  Finally, we comment on some 
specific changes and policy options open to designers of ‘social development’ 
policy and cash transfers in particular.  
 
8.2 Ensuring enabling conditions for effective social grant 
use 
 
In the first place, it should be said that our recommendations here hinge on a set 
of assumptions about what constitutes effective social grant use. This study cannot 
judge, finally, on what sets of practices and choices constitute the best strategy 
for poor people wanting to get out of poverty.  It is not possible to adjudicate, for 
example, whether high-risk strategies that may generate high returns are better 
than strategies that reduce risk in return for more moderate incomes (this is often 
an assumption in some of the analyses of the trade-offs that are forced on poor and 
powerless people – see e.g. Wood 2003).  But it does seem that insofar as social 
grants play an important role in the kinds of practice that allow people on the 
margins of the formal economy to reduce vulnerability, invest in accumulating 
‘human capital’, accrue social capital and engage in economic activity, they may 
well make a significant contribution to more than mere amelioration, they could 
form part of viable strategies for escaping from poverty, and they can be argued to 
have an economically empowering role — even if only a moderate one. 
 
At the same time, our argument seems to indicate that this is only part of the 
picture. Many times our argument has highlighted key factors that could play a role 
in undermining or enabling effective grant use.  The mere fact of uptake of a grant 
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by an individual in a household is not in itself a guarantee that this grant will be 
optimally used.  Much depends on the ability of grant recipients to ‘leverage’ 
resources in the way we described in some of the case studies of careful grant 
usage.  To some extent these differences were due to individual decisions and 
ability.  Headman Mhlaba, for instance, does not at present draw down any 
significant grants at present, but were he to do so, there is no indication that his 
household would spend it any less ineffectively than his current stipend.  But the 
ability to make effective use of a grant is not merely dependent on the vagaries of 
‘character’, and individual choice. They are also powerfully constrained by other 
underlying factors – the conditions for effective grant use. 
 
Some of these underlying conditions are fairly obvious.  The Matibane case study, 
for instance, highlights the crucial role that (the often criticised) social workers 
can make in ensuring the effective use of a grant.  Here, effective grant use is 
enabled, not simply by the interventions of the social workers, but also by the pact 
established between the social worker and the siblings’ relatives. The success of 
that case study powerfully shows the difference that can be made when 
interactions between government service providers and citizens are constructive.  
This contrasts strongly with the numerous stories of ineffective social service 
provision —  not invalidating them, but indicating how much more can be achieved 
when services perform their function.  
 
Others are less obvious and require looking at the nature of social and economic 
empowerment with a wider lens.  Much of our argument in the fifth chapter has 
been about the generally disempowering nature of the broader economic context 
within which people operated. This broader context was one in which the scant 
monetary resources of poor people was often spent on unproductive expenses (the 
high cost of transport both in the Eastern Cape and in Cape Town is a case in 
point); or on disadvantageous and adverse connections with the formal economy.  
Similarly, the ineffectiveness of the local state is not something that only matters 
in poor people’s interactions with the Departments of Health, Education, or Social 
Development.  It undermines people’s empowerment as citizens generally. The 
erosive influence of the fear of violence and crime on economic activity that 
figures in some of the case studies described here and in the work of Cichello; the 
more subterranean and invisible role played by the lack of enforceable rights and 
the threat of violence in enforcing gender roles; the lack of societal regulation and 
protection of conjugal rights and contracts – all these are socially and economically 
disempowering in a broad sense. They undermine not only the effective use of 
grants, but the entire range of economic activities open to poor people. And this 
means that ensuring enabling conditions for effective grant use is not very 
distinguishable from ensuring enabling economic conditions more generally.   
 
This poses important challenges for poverty reduction strategies.  In particular, it 
suggests that it is necessary to transcend the ‘Chinese wall’ that often exists 
between social policy on the one hand (conceived to be the responsibility of the 
Departments of Social Development, Housing, Health and Education) and economic 
policy (seen as the prerogative of DTI and Treasury.  There is a danger that the 
present conceptual divide feeds into a lack of integration between strategies aimed 
at growth, and strategies aimed at helping the poor.  Having a more integrated 
coherent overall vision of how social grants can be part of pro-poor growth 
strategies — and how pro-poor growth strategies can help poor people ‘leverage’ 
their grants — is of key importance.  This means, we suggest, that it is necessary 
for government to go beyond the conceptual dichotomies of ‘second economy’ 
discourse; that it should think in a more coherent and inclusive way about creating 
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economically empowering conditions for those in the survivalist sector, that it 
should challenge the social and economic processes that create social 
disempowerment and marginalisation in the first place, and which impose 
disproportionate costs on poor people.  One of our key arguments in this paper has 
been that extreme uncertainty and vulnerability create a disabling context for poor 
people, requiring them to stretch already scant resources even further, forcing 
them into highly unequal and adverse trade-offs; a less uncertain environment, in 
which marginalised people are less exposed to costs and burdens imposed upon 
them by those slightly more powerful than they, would leave them freer to make 
effective social and economic choices, investing resources into their own and their 
kin’s economic and human capacity. 
8.3 The ‘second economy’ revisited 
 
One important area where this needs to be pursued is in addressing the set of 
issues currently framed in policy discourse on the ‘second economy.’  As we have 
said before, the second economy discourse marks an important recognition on the 
part of government of the limitations of ‘trickle down’ approaches, and of the 
reality that poverty in the South African economy has important structural 
dimensions. At the same time, the research findings cast into doubt the notion that 
the second economy should be seen as a problematic realm, defined by its lack of 
connection from the ‘first economy.’  In particular, announcing the need to 
‘eliminate’ the second economy, as some of the formulations around ASGISA do 
(e.g. RSA 2006:8), seems particularly unfortunate.   
 
For one thing, our findings highlight the vitality and the importance of informal 
economic activity, and provide evidence of the creativeness and inventiveness of 
poor people who use resources to leverage some additional advantage or benefit 
for themselves in conditions of great uncertainty and scarcity.  Often the strategies 
they adopt seem to be rational responses to these difficult conditions, not evidence 
of a lack of training or entrepreneurial know-how.  Devaluing ‘survivalist’ 
businesses, or trying to remake them in the image of a received idea of what a 
business ‘should’ look like in the difficult conditions of township or former 
homeland life may not be an appropriate response.  It is far from evident that a 
large scale process of modernisation – whatever that might entail – would help very 
much at all. Rather, careful attention is needed to the ways in which ‘informal’ 
activities and what we have in this report called ‘nano-enterprises’ can be 
empowered and made more effective or rewarding.  
 
This leads to a second point.  As we have pointed out, our findings seem to suggest 
that ‘structural disconnection’ does not capture the situation of the individuals and 
households described here. Far from being trapped in a ‘third world’ time warp and 
disconnected from the formal economy, the people we engaged with are 
thoroughly integrated with it.  Their economic activities are thoroughly caught up 
in the economic networks that are plugged into the mainstream of the South 
African economy.   Many of their activities and transactions, as we have pointed 
out, are thoroughly monetized, and even in the so-called ‘deep rural’ areas 
commodity systems are thoroughly dominated the lead firms and large corporations 
of the urban centres: Tiger Brands and Packco, Pick n Pay and Shoprite, Cell C and 
Vodacom.   
 
This should not be a surprise.  The entire history of the migrant system that arose 
in the Eastern Cape and the urban communities it generated is a story of 
integration lasting for more than two hundred years. Some of these connections 
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are creative.  Formal employment, for instance, can be used to support informal 
economic activities and forms of self employment that would otherwise be much 
more vulnerable.  High rates of saving and remittance from labour migrancy have 
meant that, despite very low wage levels in the Apartheid years, some Eastern 
Cape households have accumulated significant savings – enough to amass 
considerable assets, and to invest in the education of offspring.  Other connections 
are less advantageous, as when high degrees of monetization undermine the social 
relations that underpin agricultural production, or when large urban based 
multiples repatriate profits and undermine local multiplier effects. Certainly, our 
findings suggest that the way in which powerful supermarkets have reconfigured 
commodity chains has had an immense shaping influence on the economic terrain 
on poor people have to pursue their own economic activities. The problem lies not 
in lack of connection but in the nature of the connections: the spatial 
arrangements, for instance, that make it very difficult for African urban migrants 
to gain access to wealthy markets, while powerful national supermarket chains 
compete against small self-employed businesses in the townships.  
 
One troubling issue in this context is that in some ways the terms of integration 
seem to be worsening for many poor people.  Some important positive connections 
into the formal economy — those that allowed steady remittances from urban areas 
by male ‘circular migrants’ for instance — are fading; at the same time as the 
effect of the HIV/AIDS crisis poses new burdens of care, transmitted through 
spatially extended care chains from urban areas into poor households, often with 
elderly and female heads, by the unequal terms imposed by patriarchal gendered 
ideology and female head.  One set of connections that, for all their adversity, 
allowed significant rural savings is disappearing.  But at the same time other – and 
less advantageous - connections are strengthening.   Engaging with these dynamics 
is a challenging but vital task.   
 
A second set of issues relate to the consequences of informality and weak 
governance, particularly along the gender divide.  In many of the case studies 
described here poor rural people seem to be at the mercy of power holders who 
could exploit positional advantage over them in a way that was at odds with their 
identities as citizens.  This increases vulnerability and undermines pathways out of 
poverty.  Nowhere was this more true than for rural women who did not conform to 
the tight constraints imposed upon them by what ‘respectability’ and patriarchal 
society demanded – particularly in a context when the end of earlier paths to 
economic adulthood and thus to household formation mean that conjugal contracts 
are changing.  Although poor womens’ willingness to contribute huge amounts of 
unpaid carework is a massive and invisible contribution to the coherence of both 
rural and township life, these unequal processes of change end up making them – 
and the children who depend upon them – deeply vulnerable. Grants can play a 
part in mitigating this vulnerability; but in order to address these problems, the 
legal, social and economic underpinnings of poor women’s marginality need to be 
addressed 
8.4 Creating an enabling context for informal economic 
activities 
 
It is not within the remit of this report to suggest detailed plans to empower 
informal economic activities.  Here, all that can be pointed out is the lack of 
effective pro-poor informal sector policy in South Africa: while on the one hand, it 
has been clearly recognised that the so-called ‘survivalist’ section is massive in size 
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and contains a preponderance of women (a group the Department of Trade and 
Industry has a declared commitment to support) the Trade and Industry white 
paper contains no proposal as to how this sector can be supported (Devey et al 
2006). Rogerson (1996) distinguishes between, on the one hand, the survivalist 
sector, which is characterised as comprised mostly of the activities of those who 
are unable to secure regular employment, with incomes ‘fall[ing] short of even a 
minimum standard of income’, little or no opportunities for growth, and animated 
by little beyond the ‘desperate attempt to survive’ – and, on the other, micro-
enterprises that, though they lack the trappings of formality, ‘have the potential to 
develop and flourish into larger formal small business enterprises  - and then 
proceeds to focus almost entirely on the needs and challenges facing the latter 
section (see also Ligthelm 2004; Ligthelm 2005).  This bias, Devey et al argue, has 
continued to characterize post-transition industrial policy, with almost none of the 
initiatives and policies formulated by the DTI having any real relevance to the 
informal and survivalist sectors.  
 
Part of the problem is that most writing on the informal sector is informed by a 
powerful set of normative assumptions around the nature of economic activity, 
putting the self-contained business enterprise, which is at least in principle 
separate from the domestic economy of the entrepreneur, which secures labour 
through a market relationship, and in which growth and predominance in a 
particular market is an assumed underlying aim.  Viewing the survivalist section 
through such a lens, not much can be said. As we argued earlier, even micro-
enterprises that have gone well beyond survivalism still depend in complex ways on 
subsidies and interrelationships with other formal and informal activities.  Policy 
for the survivalist sector should not be aimed at first trying to transform economic 
actors into nascent ‘businessmen’ or –women.  Rather survivalist aims should be 
recognised as valid and contextually appropriate, and policy should be aimed at 
leveling the playing field where it is skewed against thoroughly marginalized and 
disempowered people.    
 
Laying out the elements of a policy framework which goes beyond these 
limitations, and which genuinely empowers and supports survivalist activity, goes 
beyond the scope of capabilities of this report.  Clearly there is a need to think 
about ways to encourage large retail to play a less extractive role and to encourage 
local multiplier effects, and to address the skewing of the competitive playing 
fields against survivalist retail.  But even before that, it can be said that 
government thinking could begin with a focus on identifying some of the broader 
factors which undermine economic activities of poorer people.  Undoing the racial 
legacy of Apartheid spatial planning, and the way that urban planning frameworks 
relegate poorer people to the distant city margins, for instance, is one important 
challenge.  If that cannot be done, ensuring that poor people can get easier and 
cheaper access to the markets in the wealthier urban hubs is a priority.   
 
But perhaps the most important conclusion flowing from our findings about the 
fragile, vulnerable and dependent nature of ‘survivalist’ and micro-enterprises is to 
re-emphasise the importance of integrating pro-poor thinking into policy 
frameworks for the ‘formal’, mainstream economy. All too often, the recognition 
of the inventiveness and resourcefulness of people in the informal sector leads to 
an invalid assumption that the informal sector for this reason can, on its own, be a 
major part of the solution; that poor people, left to their own devices and provided 
with the bare minimum of an enabling legal framework, can capitalize on their 
resources and power their way out of poverty. The evidence marshalled in this 
report offers very little support for such optimism.  Informal sector activity and 
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‘coping behaviours’ though clearly vital, and often very sophisticated, seemed for 
the most part highly marginal and fragile, and survival often came at a very high 
cost.  Very often, being able to secure resources from the mainstream economy – 
either in the form of wages, or in the form of social grants – was what made 
informal economic activity possible at all. Furthermore, as we argued above, 
staying or getting out of poverty seemed always to depend in large part on 
individuals getting access to a steady, salaried, formal sector job.  This has 
important implications. The poor cannot be left to the informal economy.  
Employment creation in the mainstream economy must needs be a central plank in 
the platform of any realistic anti-poverty policy. This is another reason to be very 
cautious of ‘second economy’ discourse: satisfaction at the apparent ‘success’ of 
the first world economy must be tempered by an awareness of its failure to create 
enough employment, and ‘second economy’ discourse can all too easily become a 
way of isolating the mainstream economy from a more searching appraisal (Frye 
2006).  
 
8.5 Addressing social exclusion and disempowerment 
 
A second raft of policy issues relate to the issues of social exclusion and social 
power relations.   
 
Here, foregrounding gender and looking at gender power relations is absolutely 
central.  The social exclusion of single female household heads, and the 
marginalisation of those who do not conform to very narrow gendered ideologies 
about female roles and activities is a key problem.  Careful thought has to go into 
developing legal frameworks that can recognise real-existing relationships (which 
do not conform either to western or traditional arrangements) and protecting the 
rights of people within it. 
 
Beyond that, a key issue that needs attention is the weakness and incapacity of the 
local state, particularly in the deep rural areas.  This is a sensitive political issue.  
Yet the political sensitivities around the constitutional status of traditional 
authorities’ power should not allow us to look away from the fact that these bodies 
seemed, in our study, to be highly ineffective. The absence of an effectively local 
state and the lack of any real sense of citizenship meant that poor and vulnerable 
people were entirely at the mercy of local power holders.  This also meant that 
measures intended to ameliorate vulnerability (e.g. the disability grant) were 
actually used in ways that benefited wealthier people.  Gender issues, and the 
forms of female vulnerability created by the changing nature of the conjugal 
contract, and the erosion of the economic basis of previously viable paths into 
economic adulthood, also need special attention.   
 
8.6 Ensuring the effectivity of social grants 
 
Thus far, we have argued that ensuring the effectivity of social spending is in part 
about creating a generally more supportive and enabling environment for those at 
the margins of the formal economy.  Uncertainty, lack of resources, unequal social 
power relations, violently enforced patriarchal ideology, and the ability of 
powerful elites to engage in rent-seeking, crowding-out and anti-competitive 
behaviour are among the factors that skew the playing fields against the recipients 
of social grants.  In a compelling ‘vicious circle’ of disempowerment, those without 
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resources are less able to enforce their rights and protect their remaining assets; 
are less able to resist highly unequal reciprocal exchanges.  These factors impose 
costs of their own, ensuring that poor and marginalised people bear a 
disproportionate share of the burdens imposed by shocks, by lack and by 
uncertainty; and mitigating these factors can help poor people use their scant 
resources more effectively. Thus one key component of ensuring the effecticivity 
of social spending, including social grants, is simply about creating more 
empowering (or at least less disempowering) social and economic conditions in 
general. 
 
More particularly, social grants as a component of social spending can make a 
powerful contribution towards reducing vulnerability and ameliorating the 
structural conditions that can trap people in the vicious circles of disempowerment 
and immiserisation.  But this requires that social grants are designed, delivered, 
administered and justified in a manner that is coherent and focussed, and which 
allows both government and grant recipients to benefit from the strenths and 
benefit of the system.  A few key issues are highlighted here. 
 
8.6.1 Overall approach: playing to the strengths of the system  
 
Social welfare in general, and cash transfers in particular, is a contentious area – 
particularly since the increasing dominance of fairly ideologically-driven 
approaches to welfare that have focussed more on politically capitalising on 
taxpayer resentment than on a dispassionate consideration of what is needed to 
help eradicate poverty.  In South Africa, the terms of the debate appear 
increasingly to be set in ideological terms – in relation, for example, to the notion 
that cash grants could help create ‘cultures of dependency’ and the like.  In this 
context it is important that the social and economic value of cash transfers and the 
social welfare system is recognised and the economically empowering effects 
highlighted and pointed out.  The findings of the research discussed in this report 
offer scant support for any notion that social grants are creating a culture of 
dependency.  Clearly there are ‘free riders’ in the system (although as the case 
study of Noluntu Mgavu on p. 122 suggests, free riders would be there in any case, 
with or without social grants); but for the most part, the livelihood strategies of 
the people who participated in the study was animated by an overriding focus on 
participating in the broader economy, investing in their own wellbeing and 
productive capacity, and retaining or acquiring a measure of economic 
independence – or at the very least, the ability to engage on some equal footing in 
the acts of reciprocal exchange on which their wellbeing depended.  Within the 
context of the vulnerability and uncertainty of life at the margins of the formal 
economy, social grants allowed some people to invest not only in their own 
wellbeing, but also in that of their dependents and families, and often gave those 
who would otherwise have been socially marginalised some vital social resources 
with which to barter.  These are important and worthwhile effects, and need to be 
recognised as such.  Social policy on welfare grants should of course be informed 
among other things, by the need for appropriate targeting and the need to avoid 
welfare fraud; but the overall terms of welfare policy should not be  in the first 
place and above all  be dictated by the need to eliminate ‘free riders’ and 
‘undeserving recipients’.  Rather than minimizing the negative, policy should focus 
on maximising the positive; strengthening the poverty-reducing, economically and 
socially empowering aspects of the grant system.  
 
 




8.6.2 Reducing administrative burdens on recipients   
 
The research findings highlighted some of the ways in which administrative 
functioning and delivery mechanisms imposed costs on poor people.  One of the 
paradoxes of social grant administration is that the costs of the process of 
demonstrating grant eligibility often makes accessing grants impossible for the very 
poorest.  One key issue is that inefficient administration by an incapacitated local 
state imposes additional costs precisely on those who are least able to bear them.  
It is reasonable that officials require documentation from applicants – but if the 
state fails to provide citizens with correct documentation, it is the recipients who 
bear the costs.  The research process highlighted a number of instances, as well, in 
which official discretion appeared to be used in ways that imposed unnecessarily 
onerous conditions on grant applicants.  But the problems extend well beyond the 
details of how officials use their discretion.  One example of an important systemic 
mismatch between the design of the delivery system is in the ways in which grants 
are linked to provinces.  Pension payment systems, for instance, appear to presume 
a sedentary population.  Yet ‘coping strategies’ and private social protection in 
post-apartheid migrant networks require, as we have seen, significant mobility; 
and elderly people often have to commute back and forth from one province to 
another.  If they have to return to their ‘home’ provinces simply in order to collect 
a pension, the system is imposing strenuous additional costs upon them.  The social 
grant delivery system needs to be designed in a way that takes into account and 
facilitates the mobility needs of poor people.  
 
8.6.3 Conditional cash transfers   
 
One important  issue currently being considered in South African social policy 
circles is the advisability of making cash transfers – particularly the child care grant 
– conditional, for example upon school attendance by children.  This matter was 
not at the centre of the present investigation, so no final and conclusive 
pronouncements can be made.  At the same time, the findings do suggest some 
important grounds for caution.   
 
Firstly, it is not clear whether there is a huge need for using the conditionality of 
child grants as a incentive to encourage schooling in the first place.  The track 
record of the South African government in combating basic illiteracy, and the 
relatively high rate of school attendance even in very impoverished former 
homeland areas suggests that the battle for the idea of universal schooling has in 
principle been won. There are good economic reasons for this: the kind of agrarian 
economy in which keeping children out of school makes sense in order to ensure a 
supply of domestic labour at home and in the field, has long disappeared from 
South Africa.  We have already highlighted the very high premium placed on 
education of both boy and girl children, and the hope of parents that it would 
ensure them a foothold in the labour market.  The evidence seems to suggest that 
except in very dire and difficult circumstances, parents prefer to keep their 
children in school.   
 
Secondly, this has an important corollary. In a context where parents, even though 
they may be illiterate, have bought into the value of schooling for their children, 
the failure of children to attend school is likely to be a symptom of much deeper 
levels of disorganisation, disunity, conflict and social disintegration in the 
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household.  A case in point is that of Nomsa (see page 69) whose son Vusumsi was 
refusing to attend school.  The truancy of her son did not flow from a lack of 
commitment to his schooling on her part; rather it reflected her relative 
powerlessness as a single, possibly HIV positive, debilitated and marginalised 
woman trying to keep a household together with very low resources of additional 
labour and authority.  It is hard to see what withdrawing a child care grant would 
accomplish in that case, other than to further reduce what little leverage she has.  
 
Finally, as we have already pointed out, some of the case studies have highlighted 
the extent to which additional bureaucratic requirements can impose unsustainable 
and disproportionate costs on poor people.  It appears that some officials are in 
practice imposing this conditionality at local level, and the case of Mam Thandi, 
who lost five working days trying to demonstrate the school attendance of her 
child, partly because of inefficient officials filling in forms incorrectly, is a case in 
point (see page 151).  Official conditionalities are already effectively acting to 
discourage the poorest of the poor (who are arguably the most in need of the child 
grant) from applying for it. Additional requirements could easily simply make this 
burden worse. 
8.6.4 Vouchers versus cash grants   
A third set of issues relate to proposals that child care grants, pensions and 
disability grants could be paid in the form of vouchers rather than in the form of 
cash.  Again, it is not clear what the direct benefits of such proposals would be, 
other than reducing the risk that recipients could spend money on non-productive 
on undesirable uses (e.g. tobacco and alcohol).  Against this must be balanced the 
generally empowering effects of paying over cash grants as money. Firstly, a large 
part of the utility of cash transfers in enabling informal economic activity, in 
allowing investments in property and in productive capacity; and in allowing 
allowing marginalised people to ‘transact’ in their social networks and 
accumulating social capital, flowed from the freedom they had in deciding how to 
spend their money, and to allocate these grants in different ways as their needs 
changed across time.  Paying pensions, DGs or child grants over as vouchers would 
significantly reduce their utility. Secondly, thought must be had for the broader 
‘cash hungriness’ that we noted in the household that we studied.  In a context 
where so many crucial necessities – energy, transport, building materials and so on 
– need to be bought with money, paying social grants over as vouchers may well 
have a  number of unintended side effects.  Were vouchers to be exchanged for 
cash at a discount for instance, the social effectiveness of cash transfers would be 
significantly reduced.  
8.6.5 Unnecessary costs and wasteful grant expenditure  
 
There is, however, one very important kind of ineffective expenditure which 
government can end; and that is the use of social grants to subsidise the effects of 
other government departments.  Large numbers of poor people unquestioningly 
continue to pay school fees; and there is evidence that they are actively 
discouraged from seeking relief from such payment.  Yet if social grants are used to 
pay for school fees – or indeed for any other form of cost recovery, this amounts to 
a direct reduction in the value of the ‘social wage’, and in effect a simple re-
circulation of moneys between government department.  Ensuring that poor people 
get the free energy and water they are entitled to, are not required to use 
pensions to settle municipal debts, and are not forced to pay school fees if they 
are already struggling to ensure adequate nutrition, should be a key part of an 
integrated pro-poor policy framework. Again, sensible spatial planning is a key 
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issue here; distance and the costs of transport impose a massive additional cost on 
poor people; pensions and other grants are not effectively spent if such a large 
proportion of household expenditure is simply dedicated to the costs of commuting 
across the distances created by Apartheid’s racialised spatial legacy.  
  
8.6.6 Recognising and supporting care work  
 
The research highlighted the importance and the gendered nature of care work.  It 
suggests that initiatives for using public works as a way of rewarding and 
remunerating care work is of key importance.   
 
More specifically, the research also highlights the importance of supporting care 
work within kinship networks. This has vital implications for the future of foster 
care grants. It is clear that there is a general practice of kin care that goes well 
beyond the remit of the foster care grant. It also seems that these practices do not 
only kick in for e.g. AIDS orphans but are part of the more general ways in which 
kin networks and social capital are used to ameliorate vulnerability. 
 
In general, grants should not be seen as narrow instruments to aid those who are 
economically incapacitated (which helps to create poverty traps and perverse 
incentives) but should recognise t the ways in which many (including the long term 
unemployed and the disabled) labour either in the informal economy or in the 
domestic ‘care’ economy, creating ‘social value’.  Social grants should be aimed at 
empowering these survivalist practices and coping patterns 
8.6.7 Gaps in the system 
Perhaps the most difficult issue facing social policymakers, however, is the 
challenge of formulating a more comprehensive social protection system for South 
Africans.  Cash transfers – particularly in the form of pensions and disability grants 
– clearly play a big role in reducing vulnerability for some of those who cannot 
generate sufficient income in the formal economy, yet large there are large 
numbers of people who fall outside the safety net of the current social protection 
system.  As we pointed out on page 30, almost three quarters of adults without 
paid employment in the 2002 Mount Frere survey, and  four out of every five in the 
Cape Town survey, were also not in receipt of any social grant.  The existence of 
this group poses important challengeS to government.  Quite aside from the social 
and human costs represented by this significant sub-grouping of unprotected and 
economically marginalised households, the lack of social protection specifically 
directed at their needs is clearly a factor that created ‘perverse incentives’ and 
distortions in the welfare system, for example in the rising numbers of disability 
grants.   
8.7 The social sustainability of poverty in post-Apartheid 
migrant networks 
Finally, one key point needs to be made of relevance to policymakers.  This report 
has highlighted some key aspects of the ‘coping mechanisms’ and strategies 
whereby poor people seek to manage the impact of uncertainty, vulnerability and 
their economic marginality in South African society.  Our stories suggest that these 
strategies often make the difference between survival and destitution.  Without 
the practices of reciprocal exchange we have described here, and the spatially 
extended social networks within which they are pursued, many of the people we 
have described here would much worse off. 




Yet, this should not give rise to undue optimism. In the first place, as we have 
stressed repeatedly, these ‘coping mechanisms’ and strategic responses often carry 
a cost. Ultimately many of these strategies are about sharing and distributing 
burdens and costs as well as resources; they are about poor people supporting 
those even worse off than they… or passing on shocks to them.  Moreover, these 
shocks and burdens are often unequally distributed, with those with the least social 
resources of power often bearing the brunt.  
 
In addition, our research must raise questions about the long term sustainability of 
the arrangements and situations we have described. In large part, what our report 
shows is how people in migrant networks deal with the costs and risks of 
integration into a cash hungry, uncertain economy by passing on many of those 
costs and sharing the risks with rural, often elderly kin.  To a large extent these 
networks appear to be kept going through three key things: firstly the massive 
investment of unpaid care work by women participaring in spatially extensive care 
chains.  Secondly, by the important supplementary role of a faltering rural agrarian 
economy, which somewhat loosens the grip of cash hungriness on rural households.  
And thirdly, by what resources have been accumulated in the past by rural 
households through their members’ employment, often in the form of fixed-size 
retrenchment packages.  None of these resources are inexhaustible. As HIV and 
AIDS undermine the labouring and caring capacity of rural households, some of the 
key mainstays of this fragile web are likely to start fraying – the ability of these 
coping mechanisms to mitigate vulnerability and poverty will fade.   
8.8 Conclusion 
In this report we have investigated in some detail the ways in which one particular 
group of economically marginalised South Africans — people living in post-
Apartheid migrant networks in one urban township and in one rural area — respond 
to the conditions which face them, and on the dynamics of vulnerability and 
poverty in this context.  To the extent that many of South Africa’s poor exist in 
similar migrant networks and systems elsewhere in the country, this particular set 
of case studies cast light beyond its immediate locality.  The ways in which cash 
transfers support and feed into existing coping mechanisms and survival strategies 
are likely to be very similar in other areas.   
 
At the same time, important further questions remain.  Above all, it is important to 
bear in mind that what has been explored in this report are stories and case studies 
from within one particular set of ‘livelihood ecologies’ or local political economies: 
relatively recent urban migrants in a young, spatially self-contained African 
township on the outskirts of Cape Town’s service and finance-based economy; and 
rural residents in one particular Eastern Cape District.  We need to know more 
about the social and economic dimensions of vulnerability and marginality in other 
contexts where migrant networks are differently configured or even absent.  What, 
for example, are the implications for vulnerability and poverty of places — 
Phuthaditjaba in the Eastern Free State is an example — where people are less able 
to migrate to urban areas in the first place? What happens to the social logic of 
‘social capital’ in areas that have been urbanised for longer, where links with the 
rural areas are weaker, and where the codes of conservative rural culture hold less 
sway?  What happens to household structure, social networks and reciprocal 
practices, for that matter, in places such as Cape Town’s coloured suburbs, where 
poor people are not able to draw on the cultural and rural hinterlands that sustain 
African migrant networks in the first place?  
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Finally, we need to know much more about the difficulties faced by particular 
groupings.  Quite obviously, understanding the needs of the groupings we have 
identified here as particularly isolated or marginalised within their social networks 
is a key priority.   Female headed households and skip-generation households are a 
well-known case in point.  But the dynamics and social processes that lead to their 
marginalisation need to be better understood.  At the core of many of the key 
issues that relate to power relations within and between households is the way in 
which gender relations are being reconfigured in South African society.  The 
economic arrangements that allowed a certain kind of patriarchally structured 
household are coming to an end; and gender roles are being reconstituted in 
African households.  Clearly women are net losers in many of these arrangements; 
but the massive failure, for instance, of fathers to play a role in the maintenance 
and care of their children is also part of the broader crisis of masculinity in South 
African society.  While men are able to avoid taking on the burdens of household 
reproduction and care work; that avoidance also comes at the cost of a degree of 
social disempowerment.  As Leslie Bank has pointed out, men who are not able to 
constitute themselves as breadwinners end up ‘socially excluded’ in important 
ways.  If the massively disruptive effects of the failure of the economy to create 
sustainable employment for a large proportion of the population are to be 
contained, and if those marginalised within the formal economy are to be able to 
find pathways out of poverty, that will only be possible if poor people are able to 
constitute co-operative households in which paid work, care work and household 
reproductive labour can be balanced and negotiated.  We do not know enough 
about how new South African masculinities fit in this picture. Here, the relative 
invisibility of men — particularly young men — is a key lack in the present study.  
To some extent the focus on child care grants and pension use meant that the 
study purposively selected households in which women played a key role.  Much 
more needs to be done to understand the challenges faced by men; and 
particularly by those who are unschooled, unskilled, unemployed and unable to find 
a place for themselves within the circuits and networks of private social protection 
and reciprocal exchange that makes survivable possible, for now, for many of South 
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Household care work 
Economic activities 










Married couple & 
5 children 
1 son lives with aunt in 
Jhb, 2 children (include 
disabled girl) live with 
aunt in Mt Frere. 
R 400 mine pension 
2 DG, 1 
CSG 
Subsisting off mine pension & social 
grants. Kids studying in urban centres. 









daughter in law & 
grandchildren 
adjacent.  
Look after 3 
grandchildren.  Older 2 
boys help her with tavern 
& planting. 
R500 meat retail, 
R600 beer retail, 
R400 regular 




A strong matriarch, augments income 
with meat & beer retail from gas 
powered freezer.  Good, supportive 











(most studying) & 
2 adult brothers 
Looking after children & 
grandchild. Large 
remittances to 3 studying 
children. Support to 
drunk & mentally ill adult 
brothers 
Retrenched from good 
formal job 
(R12K/month). Living 
off package. Selling 
spinach R30. 
1 CSG 
Very dignified and respectable patriarch.  
Subsisting off retrenchment package, 
but got agricultural ambitions.  Big 
comfortable homestead. Kids studying 
in urban areas. 13 dependents including 
adult brothers. 










Household care work 
Economic activities 










Married couple, 2 
adult children & 4 
grandchildren 
Looking after children 





Traditional leader but drunk and 
ineffective. Small, poor homestead. 
Confused and confusing household.  




Adult woman & 3 
young children 
Looking after children 
Ad hoc, informal work 
in village (mud bricks 
& plastering) 
1 CSG 
Isolated woman with 3 kids.  Relies on 
longstanding female family friends. 
Abandoned by kin.  Modest home. 




Young man and 
his two teenage 
siblings. Mother 
left house after 
dispute with the 
father.   
Distracted 25 year old 
looking after 2 teenage 
siblings. Paid caregiver 
has left. 
Receive monthly 
remittance from father 




Feuding parents marriage failed. Three 
kids left in home, receive regular R500 
remittance from father in formal sector, 
but the are vulnerable (health and 









Grandmother looks after 




Daughter struggles to 
retain urban domestic 
worker jobs.  
1 OAP. 1 
CSG 
stopped. 
Four generations of women (80 yrs to 
11 yrs).  Cash poor but good quality 
care.  Respectable and dignified people 





Married couple, 2 
adult children, 1 
daughter in law & 
6 grandchildren. 
Extended family 
(children) in CT 
and Jhb. 
Grandchildren cared for, 
including son of HIV + 
mother living in CT. Sons 
of an adult daughters 
looked after by paternal 
grandmother in NW 
province. 
Remittances for adult, 
urban children R600. 
Living off 1996 
retrenchment package 
(R105K). Adult 
daughter sells clothes 
(R300), son works in 
agricultural labour. 
3 CSG. 
Large extended family with many 
children.  Patriarch received a 
retrenchment package (1996), but it is 
almost exhausted.  Grown children send 
remittances.  Daughter in village resells 
clothes.  Son works in agriculture.  










Household care work 
Economic activities 









Adult woman, 3 
children & 2 
grandchildren 
Daughter went to Jhb to 
look for job, mother 
looked after grandchild. 
Informal economic 
activities in village: 
mud bricks, laundry & 
agricultural work. 
Unclear 
1 DG, 2 
CSG 
Widow, worked in urban areas after 
death of husband in mid 1980s.  Does 
lots of informal work in village.  
Grandchildren = potential care burdens 





daughter in law, 
son & grandchild 
Looks after grandchild. 
Informal economic 
activities in village: 
mud bricks, thatch 
grass harvesting & 
agricultural work 
(R200) 
1 DG, 1 
CSG 
Single woman works hard at village 
jobs.  Husband died young, and then 
paired off ('ngena') with brother in law = 





Adult woman, son, 






Looks after grandchild 
Household head has 
formal job in Jhb. 
Large amount of 
agricultural 
production.   
1 DG, 2 
CSG 
Relatively affluent looking.  Signs of 
considerable agricultural production & 
big homestead. Husband formal job 
('lab assistant') in Jhb. Son works in 








nephew & 2 
grandchildren 
Look after grandchildren, 
nephew and blind 
brother 
Retired from 
municipal job. R700 
pension. 
2 DG 
Respectable patriarch, worked at Jhb 
municipality, received pension.  Son ran 
away in Jhb. Thembelani died during 




Adult woman, son 
& grandchild. 
Extended family: 
children in village 
and urban areas. 
Look after grandchild.  
R300 community road 




Dynamic: works on community road 
project and as sangoma.  Was 
supported by daughter and son in law 
before she got DG. Daughter now 
connected to councillor.  










Household care work 
Economic activities 










Overseen by great 
aunt. 
2 grant receiving teens 
feed 18 year old grant-





3 teenage AIDS orphans. Split up on 
death of mother but then reconstituted 
household.  Also supporting older 
brother on grant. Only one small mud 









Look after their children.  
Father disabled and 
struggles to work. 
Village piece jobs 
(Mud bricks, fetching 
wood) maybe R200 - 
R300 
2 CSG 
Respectable people, with very modest 
homestead. She works in village jobs 
(mud bricks, wood fetching).  He was 






in law, 5 
grandchildren. 
Grandchildren 
reabsorbed into her 
daughter's house.  





2 DG, 4 
CSG. 
Respondent (great grandmother) died, 
grandchildren absorbed her daughters 
(their grandmother's) house.  Socially 
respectable, acquired assets with 





Elderly woman, 4 
children & 1 
grandchild 
Look after relative's 
children, none of her 
own.  





Husband in formal employ died.  Widow 
got package.  Looking after lots of 






adult nephew, 1 
child & 7 
grandchildren 
Looks after sister in laws 
children and supervised 
building of her house in 
village.  Looks after 
mentally ill nephew. 
Small intermittent 
remittances & R200-
R250 school feeding 
scheme work. Also 
makes bricks & fetch 
wood. (Maybe R500) 
1 DG, 4 
CSG 
Complex care arrangements, including 
of grandchildren (parents deceased).  
Respondent busy with lots of village 
jobs. Worries she will be suspected of 
welfare grant fraud for all the 
(legitimate) CSGs. 










Household care work 
Economic activities 










Adult woman, 5 
children & 2 
grandchildren 




Marriage ended, criminal victimisation 
and violence by husband. Livestock lost 





couple, 2 children 
& 3 grandchildren 
Look after grandchildren 





daughter who is 
nurse. 
2 OAP, 1 
CSG 
Former municipal retiree.  Married three 
times.  Spent pension package, live on 
remittance and social grant. Good 






daughter in law, 




Look after children 
R400 remittance from 
working son & 
informal work (mud 
bricks, wood, mat 
making). R210 creche 
work wage. 
3 CSG 
Complicated 2 part household.  Large 
well-furnished compound, village jobs 
and regular remittances.  Unclear extent 
to which income is pooled.  Potentially 





Married couple, 4 
children & 1 
granddaughter 
Look after children. Hire 
domestic & herdboy. 
Help villagers with forms. 




Two senior teachers.  Prosperous & lots 
of agricultural production.  Children 





Married couple. 2 
children & 3 
grandchildren. 
Other children 
working in cities. 
Daughters receive grant, 
retains part and gives 
balance to mother for 
grandchild. Remit money 
to schooling daughters.  




4 CSG  
Household head drunk and beaten up.  
Disorganised respondents with 
malnourished grandchild. Some CSG 
retained by mother and rest paid over, 
R300 of R540 CSG remitted to/for 
schooling daughters 










Household care work 
Economic activities 










'helper' and 2 
grandchildren 
Helper looks after her & 
grandchildren.  Looked 
after ailing,  daughter in 
law (now dead). 
R700 - R800 
remittance from 





Respectable single woman with dutiful 
son who sends regular remittance from 
Jhb.  Struggled to get site in village to 
build house, as a single woman. 








Household care work 
Economic activities 









Adult woman, 2 
sons 
Looks after children 
Seasonal farm work, 
informal smilies & 




Respondent dissolute & disorganised.  
Dirty house and truant children. Bit of 




Married couple & 
sister. 2 young 
sons and nephew 
Hh head's sister & child 
joined house. She 
provides childcare. 
Petrol pump attendant 
R1300 - R1400/month 
& wife domestic 
worker salary. (Maybe 
R1800) 
None 
Formal employment interregnum in 
2002, but now 2 formal jobs. 
Resourceful and industrious 
respondent. Hh hold includes pregnant 









granddaughter, son in 
law looks after EC cattle, 
extended family looks 
after other kids 
He was formerly clerk, 
disabled with back 
injury. Wife R1000 
monthly domestic 
worker. Daughter 
works formal job and 
gives them money. 
No DG 
or CSG 
Former formal employment ended.  
Receives no grant, supported by 
daughter who works for SANDF. They 
look after grandchild. 









Household care work 
Economic activities 














generational care chain 




Complex kinship links & support. 
Looking after grandchild & saving DG 




Married couple, 2 
adult children & 2 
minor child 
Widower. New spouse 
cares for stepchildren & 
tavern. 
R3000 formal sector 





Formal job & own bakkie.  Run tavern.  
New wife looks after kids and & tavern. 




2 adult males & 
their 2 wifes. 2 
adult children & 4 
grandchildren 
Child care for cash & 




job. R200 child care 
(R400/month) 
1 CSG 
Very squalid small two room shack, 
crowded with 2 two families. Squashed. 
Bit of informal work, bit of beer brewing. 




Married couple &  
4 adult children. 
None in household 
Fruit & veg R300. 





Self report very poor, but respectable & 
supported by church congregation 
(rent, phone, groceries etc). Regular 




2 adult males (half 
brothers) 
2 ex-partners & four 
children all in EC. Not 
sending remitances to 
them. 
R1200 UIF payments 
(but ending), casual 
construction work 
(R500 - R1600). R470 
selling paraffin or 
beer. (R1100 - 
R2000/ month).  
None 
Two brothers. Former formal 
employment, but now rely on informal 
trading.  Children & ex-partners in EC. 
Organised household.  Genial but 
rather inscrutable male respondents. 









Household care work 
Economic activities 









2 sister, each has 
a boy. Also 
partially separate 
hh consisting of 
brother & his 
girlfriend. 
Child care by 
unemployed sister 






2 households inhabiting one shack. 
Initially signs of conflict but appears 
resolved. Some formal employment. 





Married couple, 3 
children & infant 
Child care 
Formal construction 
job R1720 month 
Lost 
CSG 
Self report poor but formal sector job. 
Focus, social connections & substantial 





brother & niece 
Hh head's wife & child in 
EC. 
Lost good, formal 
sector retail job.  
Relying on  family. 
No 
In transition. Lost good formal job. Wife 
& kid in EC. Big priority: retain 
household assets against loss to 




Adult woman, her 









contributes too.  
1 OAP, 1 
CSG 
Former domestic worker who made 
good, building houses (both C.T & E.C) 
and tertiary educated kids. Got 





Adult woman & 3 
teenage children 
Not in family, kids are 
grown up. 
R 900 overseeing TB 
treatment, several 
community projects at 




Former entrepreneur, now community 
development dynamo. Articulate, busy, 




Married couple, 3 
young daughters 
Three young children 
Was earning R1200 
to R1600 monthly at 
printing company 
contact expired.  
Lost 2 
CSG 
Nuclear family with kids. Lost CSGs 
(salary was too high) & then lost formal 
sector job. Stuck in between. Transition 
phase. 









Household care work 
Economic activities 









Adult woman with 
son & grandchild 
No young / elderly 
Manufacture and 




Unconcerned about waning formal 
employment. Makes dresses and 





1 elderly woman & 
2 grown children 
Unclear Possible remittances. 
Probably 
OAP 
Comfortable RDP home, pension & 
working kids support her. Evasive & 







grandchild & 2 
stepsons 
Look after grandchild 
and disabled adult 
stepson. 
Fruit and veg stall 
R250-R300/montly. 




Getting social grants but marginsalised 
and ineffectual. Half built RDP style 






couple, 2 children 
and 2 
grandchildren 
Looking after grandchild 





No economic activity. 
1 DG, 1 
CSG 
Formerly formal employment, spent 
R100K package on 'doctors' (biomed & 








Son severely mentally 
disabled.  Paying for 
grandchildren in tertiary 
education. 
Formerly worked as 
'tea lady', receives 
app. R780 pension &  
bit of sangoma work. 
Maybe R900 
1 OAP, 1 
DG 
(R1560) 
Confident, successful retired domestic 
worker & 'tea lady' receives OAP & 
private pension. Son DG. Paying for 





Adult woman, 3 
daughters & 2 
grandchildren 
Looking after grandchild 
Beauty earns a salary 
perhaps R500 & 
daughters R 380 
1 CSG 
Loss of husband's salary with his 
death. Daughter free riding. Unruly 




Adult woman & 2 
daughters 
Unclear No reported income. 
No 
grants 
RDP house.  Supported by family. 
Vague & evasive. 









Household care work 
Economic activities 










Adult couple, 3 
children 
Some childcare required. 






Comfortable RDP house and own 
vehicle. Long history of formal 




Married couple & 
5 teenage children 
2 children joined hh from 
EC. Slightly disabled 
child. 
Contractor: normally 
up to R3600 per 
month & R700 
domestic worker. 
(R700 - R4300). 
No 
grants 
Nuclear family, last 2 children recently 
came from EC. Has good formal job 
(plastering subcontractor). Temporarily 




Adult woman & 
teenage daughter 
Do childcare for cash 
R 600 from spaza 




Out of kinship links, but resourceful & 




John R.   
Married couple & 
4 children 






RDP house. Have some temporary 
employment. 












Ky 006 The household head is part of a group of three women who cook smilies (sheep’s heads), and walkaways (chicken feet) in their front 
yard.  Her eight year old son, who is often absent from school, sells peanuts to other children. He gives the money to his mother and 
she keeps it for him.  Another son, who has left the home, works in a shop in a village in the Eastern Cape.  He is not paid for this but 
receives groceries for his efforts 
Ky 022 The male household head works in a petrol station in Killarney.  His wife sells cigarettes (and apparently nothing else) from her house.  
She gives the money to her son so that they can buy food for school  
Ky 023 The household head is unemployed. His wife works as a domestic worker.  His brother in law, who lives in a backyard shack and shares 
some resources with them, sells sweets on the trains. 
Ky 033 The female household head used to have a fruit and veg business, which she has given up temporarily so as to be able to care for her 
sister’s daughter’s child. 
Ky 046 Household head has formal employment in with a company that installs kitchen cupboards. Also runs a tavern, owns a bakkie which is 
used to earn money transporting colleagues to work. 
Ky 052 A confusing household (two households living in one shack). One member works on a regular basis as a contract plasterer. Some of the 
women look after children at R200 a month and also brew beer. 
Ky 068 The informants deny involvement in any informal activity.  The household head, though, is the ‘President’ of a Zionist church; 
congregation members supply them with food and airtime and pay rent. 
Ky 071 The household is made up of two middle aged ‘half brothers’ who used to work at a timber company until 2003.  One brother does 
casual work in the construction industry; the other brother runs a small shebeen and sells paraffin and cigarettes.  He would not return 
to the timber company if they offered him a job again. 
Ky 089 Breadwinner works in a ‘factory’ in Maitland, making cardboard boxes for jewellery firms at about 7 c a box.  They used to sell ice 
lollies in the summer for some money.  Their brother, who now lives in another shack on the same property, and who shares some food 
with them from time to time, works in a plastic recycling factory; but survived for a period in the previous year ‘running scrap’ in 
Kraaifontein. 








Ky 098 The male household head works for a company that installs swimming pools.  His wife reports no other informal activities; she also says 
she has no friends in Khayelitsha and has rarely been outside Site B. 
Ky  101 Both adults in this household had formal sector jobs in the retail sector. Before that, the male household head worked for a long time 
in a spaza owned by a woman who owned a number of spazas.  The woman gave up her work to care for their child when it was born; 
shortly after that the man lost his work.  The woman has returned to the Eastern Cape to look after relatives.  At the time of the 
interview he was not involved in formal sector work, but was looking for a job in the formal sector. 
Ky 107 Retired domestic worker living off a pension and remittances from family members.  One of the members works full-time as a gardener.  
Ky 111 Household head has a long history of involvement in informal sector work, including owning two taxis and running a shebeen. She has 
lost all this and currently works in the development industry. Earns about R900 a month overseeing DOTS, but is also at the centre of a 
number of interlocking community projects, including a soup kitchen, from which she receives in kind contributions 
Ky 156 Household head worked his way up from being a petrol pump attendant to his recently lost job in the printing company.  At the time of 
research were receiving no income – head was looking for work, and his partner was in the last stages of completing her qualification as 
a nurse.  In the past, they have sold chicken pieces from their house, and bought and slaughtered two cows (commercially). 
Ky 157 The household head is employed in a plastics firm.  At the same time he is running a traditional dressmaking business, buying material 
locally and making the dresses here, and then sending them to his wife in the Eastern Cape to sell.  
Ky 159 One of the sons gets periodic work ‘standing on the side of the road’ in the construction industry.  The family’s main economic activity 
is running a fruit and veg business which operates from a stall on the corner of two prominent thoroughfares.  
Ky 161 This household is supported mainly through the activities of Mrs V, who works as a domestic worker. Her husband is incapacitated and 
does not work and they have a severely disabled daughter.  Two other daughters have been sent to the Eastern Cape and support 
themselves through selling fruit and vegetables 
Ky 163 Retired domestic worker living on a pension. Makes some money being a traditional healer. 
Ky 164 The female household head survived for a long time making and selling clothes on the street.  Shortly before the time of the research 
project, she found work in a clothing factory in Mowbray.  Her daughter works for a foreigner who sells cellphone chargers, belts and 
cheap sunglasses from a pavement stall in Claremont. 
Ky 166 The female household head has lived in Khayelitsha for almost 20 years, and has never had a formal job. She makes a living selling 
‘smilies’. 
 
Ky  169 The male household head works as a security guard for the Cape Town Municipality.  They deny any informal economic activity.  
Ky 170  
Ky 185 The female household head runs a small spaza, selling sweets, cooldrinks and biscuits.  She also does laundry for neighbours and looks 
after at least two children; for the one she is paid R300 per month; in the case of the other there is no rigorous arrangement of 
payment, but she is given ‘something’ (food or some money) at the end of the month. 








Ky 310 The male head of this household sometimes works with his brother who has a tiling business. He used to have a fruit and veg business 
but this collapsed when his wife left him 
  
MF 001 rely on subsistence agriculture and various social grants plus a small mine pension 
MF 013 The female head of this household sells meat and beer for a living.  
Mf  020 The head of this household worked for Iscor until he was retrenched, working his way up to the rank of process controller. He is heavily 
involved in agricultural activities, and sells some of his produce to other villagers. 
MF 028 The head of this household is the local headman.  His sons have an informal local building business: they charge R3000 per house and 
share some of the money with their parents. 
Mf 050 The single female household head survives on the single child support grant, and by making mud bricks and plastering houses.  She used 
to work at a local spaza until she became pregnant.  She also helps out with local ceremonies, doing menial household work; it is not 
clear whether she is paid for this. Her brother who works in Cape Town reportedly has a taxi business; he sometimes sends money.  
MF 058 This household runs a shebeen in the village. In addition, they are supported through a disability grant, a child support grant, and the 
female household head [check] also makes mud bricks. 
MF 061 The Mashiya’s.  [David, help me here – they are NOT involved in informal economic activity at present?] 
MF 072 The household lives in part on the retrenchment package obtained from ISCOR by the household head after more than 30 years of 
service. The male household head sometimes fixes fences for a sum of R300 to R600 but this work is infrequent. Their daughter 
Noluthan sells clothes, buying them wholesale in Durban and selling them, often on credit, to villagers.  Their son Linda, does ‘piece 
jobs’ on somebody else’s planting field 
MF 327 .  Economic activities include making mud bricks, washing laundry and hoeing other people’s fields for a daily rate. She also worked for 
Mvula trust in village, a job she got through the ward committee member.  Clearly able to access some social capital 
MF 339 This household receives a DG and shares an OAP that they get from the brother of the female household head’s deceased husband (she 
has been ‘paired off’) with the brother in accordance with local custom. This income is supplemented by piece jobs such as grass 
harvesting, for which they get R200 a month, and mud brick making.  She sometimes secures the services of men to help her by brewing 
or buying beer. 
MF 344 The (very reticent) female head of this household survives mostly on remittances received from her husband, who works at a lab 
assistant or at a chemist in Johannesburg. The household is extensively involved in agricultural activities and fences are well 
maintained. The informant denied any informal economic activities. 
MF 349 The main form of income of this household was two disability grants.  No informal economic activity was reported.  
MF 370 Female household head relies on a disability grant – and on income participating in public works maintenance.  She also earns some 
money on the side as a sangoma 
MF 385 This is a household composed of three orphaned children.  They are supported, inter alia, by their grandmother, who sells alcohol from 









MF 390 The male household head is unemployed after losing his job on the mines.  He does piece jobs in support of his wife, who makes mud 
bricks.  She also collects wood from a stand of trees down the hill, for which she gets R15 per bundle, and plasters the exteriors of 
people’s rondavels.  She makes traditional dresses and aprons etc.  They also get some support from their daughter, who lives in a 
nearby village; the daughter’s husband cannot work because of burn wounds; they weave and sell grass placemats for a living. 
Mf 393 Household lives on two disability grants and a child support grant. They are significantly involved in agricultural activity. No other 
informal activities are reported 
Mf 567 The household head is a widow living off her deceased husband’s provident fund payment.  She grows mielies and makes mudbricks to 
supplement her income. 
Mf 569 The household lives on the pension of its senior female member and the disability grant of her brother. They make mud-bricks to 
supplement their income. 
Mf 583 Relies on CSG and remittances from family.  
Mf 588 Household subsisting on OAPs and CSG and some involvement in agriculture. 
MF 607 The household is headed by a woman whose husband does piece work in Secunda but who does not remit money.  She makes mats and 
sells them (the big plain sitting mats are R50; the small detailed ones are R10).  She sells them around the village. Beforehand she used 
to collect wood and make mud bricks but she is now too ill (with arthritis and asthma). Her daughter in law lives in the compound and 
works with another woman a pre-school as a ‘volunteer’.  They look after 21 children for a monthly fee of R10 per child:  however not 
all the parents pay this.   
Mf 619 Household relying on two formal sector jobs (principal and deputy principal) and extensive involvement in agriculture. 
MF 627 Very poor household, unclear precisely how they survive.  Household survives on CSGs, brickmaking and plastering, as well as some 
herding of other people’s cattle. 
Mf 636 The female head of this household survives on her pension and the remittances sent by her son. She also makes reed mats for during 
traditional ceremonies; she sells these from R50 to R70 
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Reliance on grants 
 
Notes 
Ky 006 Two CSGs 
Survive on CSG and income from informal economic activities.  One of her children is in 
eastern cape in care of parents who receive pension 
Ky 022 Three CSGs  
For the duration of 2003 they reportedly survived off the child support grant - his wife’s 
domestic worker job only started in 2004. 
Ky 023 No grants. Had a DG, which lapsed. NA 
Ky 033 One DG 
Saving R400 a month toward daughter's izila ceremony, R200 groceries supplementing 
niece's domestic worker salary; sponsors educational travel for granddaughter 
Ky 046 One CSG 
Well-off household living on formal sector work and tavern. No specific information on 
CSG usage. 
Ky 052 One CSG 
A very poor household. Survive off CSGs small amounts of income earned from childcare.  
Some of the children are in the Ciskei (Wittlesea) with two boys surviving on the 
grandmother’s pension. 
Ky 068 No grants. Had a DG; was terminated 
Poor household surviving off formal sector employment of one son, informal activities and 
income (mostly in kind) from religious activities. DG was ended in November; as a result 
of this HH decided to come back to the Western Cape. 
Ky 071 
No grants (no one eligible). Relatives in 
Eastern Cape have pension. 
Child is living with its grandmother in the Eastern Cape; she has no land and no livestock 
and is living off her pension. 
Ky 089 
Two CSGs. Relative in Eastern Cape has 
pension. 
One of the children being taken of in East London by its grandmother, who survives on 
domestic work and pension. Mother still collecting CSG in Western Cape. They spend their 
own CSGs on food and on clothes accounts for selves and remaining child. 
Ky 098 Used to get a CSG but it was terminated. 
Grant lapsed and mother has not reapplied because she says the process is too onerous 
She says she needs the money – she can see there is a gap.  The gap is evident when she 
sees the children don’t have socks or underclothes.  The money that her husband makes is 
just enough for them to eat from.  H 
Ky  101 No grant  
Ky 107 CSG and probably an OAP (not confirmed) 
Female household head survives on remittances and probably OAP. Provides some funds 
(‘pocket money’) to her son who is studying 
Ky 111 No grant reported (none eligible) NA 






Reliance on grants 
 
Notes 
Ky 156 No grant - forfeited because of means test Lost grant because social workers saw wage slip.  Then lost job. Too onerous to reapply. 
Ky 157 No grants - no one eligible NA 
Ky 158 OAP 
Non-disclosing household. Live on OAP and (murky) other sources of income. OAP 
reportedly helped with building of house. 
Ky 159 CSG, DG and OAP 
Survive on OAP, DG and income from informal economic activity. Very impoverished 
household in very poor accommodation. 
Ky 161 DG, CSG. Had a second DG but it lapsed 
Surviving on grants and income from one domestic work salary. HH (epileptic) re-applying 
for DG. 
Ky 163 OAP and DG 
Retired domestic worker. Mentally disabled son requires constant care. She pays for her 
grandchildren to study at college & a plumbing course 
Ky 164 
CSG. Gogo in Eastern Cape had DG, lost it. 
Now has OAP. 
Daughter of female HH survives on parental wage income and own informal sector 
earnings. CSG goes for crèche, child’s clothes and sometimes groceries.  In the past, HH’s 
daughter stayed & schooled with grandmother in Eastern Cape, relying on DG.  
Ky 166 
CSG. Brother in Eastern Cape depends on a 
DG 
Impoverished household female headed household surviving on informal economic 
activity. CSG pays for expenses related to child's schooling. Brother lives in Eastern Cape 
since getting stroke - getting DG allows him to stay in Cofimvaba and care for family 
homestead. 
Ky  169 No grants (no-one eligible) NA 
Ky 170 No grants (no-one eligible) NA 
Ky 185 No grant (lost a CSG) 
Impoverished female headed household surviving on informal economic activity.  Going 
through onerous re-application process during course of fieldwork visits. 
Ky 310 No grants (no-one eligible) NA 
MF 001 Two DGs and a CSG 
Comfortable household surviving off OAPs, DG, agricultural activity. Income facilitates 
involvement in agriculture (e.g. paying for ploughing of field). Send money to child in 
Johannesburg. 
MF 013 CSG and OAP 
Female headed household surviving on remittances, OAP and income from informal 
activity. OAP supports business; receipt allowed her to scale down her economic activities 
and relieved pressure on son's remittances, allowing him to invest in other people’s 
education.  
Mf  020 No grants (no-one eligible) NA 
MF 028 
CSG (a number of children in the household 
are eligible but not taken up) 
A disorganised and confusing household. Homestead is ramshackle and badly maintained 
in spite of fact that HH is village headman with stipend. 
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Notes 
Mf 050 CSG. Lost OAP when parent died 
Impoverished and marginalised household. Report that they  were in a much better 
position when they were receiving an old age pension  
MF 061 
OAP.  Had a CSG but lapsed due to lack of 
documentation 
Live off remittances, OAP and income from informal economic activities.  OAP pays for 
private medical care for recipient; also for a lay-bye of building materials.  
MF 072 Two CSGs Living off retrenchment package, CSG, urban remittances and occasional rural piecework.  
MF 327 Two CSGs 
Female headed household surviving off wide portfolio of informal activities and 
mobilisation of social capital. CSG spent on groceries, and  clothes for the children 
MF 339 One DG, One  CSG 
HH severely arthritic, survives off grant, remittances and informal economic activity. Has 
to pay portion of DG as bribe to doctor 
MF 344 Two CSGs and one DG 
Use unclear – household non-disclosing. Household prosperous, survives on (probably 
significant) urban remittance, social grants and apparently extensive agricultural 
activities.  
MF 349 2 DGs 
Household head retired and disabled after lengthy spell of urban employment.  Household 
cares for children and disabled relative.  
MF 370 DG 
Survives off DG and informal economic activities. Before DG started, depended heavily on 
remittances from relatives, who paid for her to see a doctor.  Once she got the grant 
Ntombikayise and her husband stopped sending her money. Takes care of grandchild. 
MF 385 Two foster care grants 
Survive off FCGs, help from relatives. Grandmother was buying them clothes out of her 
old age pension. From FCG  they pay for groceries funeral insurance, school fees and 
shoes.  Recipients share food with (non eligible) eldest. 
MF 390 CSG; expecting a pension 
Impoverished household; HH head sickly and disabled but receive neither a DG nor an 
OAP. Survive off CSG and informal economic activities. With pension they are going to buy 
food and are hoping to improve the house.  
Mf 393 Four CSGs and two DGs 
Household surviving off  retrenchment 'package,' agricultural activity, remittances and 
grants. Mother of informant (now dead) received an OAP.  Before she received it, they 
used to support her with groceries and by paying her funeral policy.  Once she obtained a 
pension she was able to help them bridge shortfalls before her husband sent his monthly 
remittance.  After her death household reabsorbed into daughter’s. Grants pay for 
groceries, including for one child not receiving grant. 
Mf 567 DG - several CSGs not taken up 
An impoverished household taking care of several relatives’  children, one of which has 
been abandoned by his mother. Survive off DG and remains of package. 










Four CSGs and a DG… entitled to more but 
does not apply because fears being 
suspected of fraud 
Survive off the grants. HHH looks after a number of children and a disabled relative and 
secures grants on their behalf.  
Mf 583 CSG 
A household disorganised by the acrimonious and violent break up of a marriage. CSG used 
to buy food for child. 
Mf 588 
Two OAPS. Eligible for DG (epilepsy)  and 
CSG – but neither taken up 
Survive on OAPs and agricultural activity. Take care of  child not in receipt of CSG.  
MF 607 Three CSGs 
Comfortable homestead apparently at odds with low reported income. Survives on 
remittances, agricultural activity and CSGs.  Children well cared for. Evasive on financial 
matters (possible internal conflict) 
Mf 619 No grants (ineligible) 
Wealthy household (principal and deputy principal).  Informant says she does not help her 
own family beyond paying traditional ceremonies, i.e. she does not help with day to day 
expenses such as groceries.  She explains that her mother gets an old age pension which 
takes care of these expenses. 
MF 627 
2.5 CSGs (get R100 of CSG from non resident 
daughter) 
Non-resident daughter apparently used to make mud bricks and plaster houses but does 
not do so any more; informant speculates this might be because she is ‘tired’ amd living 
off the child support grants. Household lives off 2 child support grants  plus R100 passed 
on by non-resident daughter; of this some R300 is passed onto the two grade 11 daughters 
to enable their education.   
Mf 636 OAP 
Survives off remittances, informal economic activity and OAPs. Some of this money goes 




















Two children from a previous marriage live with the female household head's mother.  The household head receives no maintenance 
from the father of the children.  Her oldest son is 'running wild' and plans are being made to send him to the Eastern Cape as well.  
She relies on the help of neighbours to care for her child when she has to go to town. She also sometimes receives 'charity' care from a 
friend who runs a crèche for children with HIV or with HIV+ parents.   
Ky 023  
Two children live at the eldest daughter's house in (middle class) Mandalay.  Two more children stay with an uncle in the Eastern 
Cape.  One child is being cared for at the house; when the male household head is looking for work, the child is looked after by his 
brother in law's girlfriend who has a shack in their backyard 
Ky 033 
The female household head has given up her fruit and vegetable hawking business to look after her sister's daughter's (i.e. niece) 
youngest child.  They say they are doing this is because the crèches that give decent child care (i.e. that will change nappies and 
provide adequate food) are too expensive.  Another child belonging to the sister's daughter is being taken care of by daughter of the 
household head in the Eastern Cape 
KY 052 
Two children belonging to one household member are being taken care of by the mother of the household member in the Eastern 
Cape.  She can do this because she is receiving a pension.  There was also an infant (aged about 5 months) living in the house at the 
time of the interview.  This child was placed in the care of one of the female household members by its mother just before she was 
imprisoned.  The informants indicated they have been looking after the baby for two months but would probably receive no money for 
their efforts. 
Ky 071 
The male head of the household has two children by two different women.  One of the children is being taken care of by his mother; 
another is being taken care of by the mother of the child.  He does not pay any maintenance to either of them 
Ky 089 
Two sisters live in this house.  One has sent her child to the Eastern Cape to be taken care of by her mother. She says that she did this 
because she has financial problems, while her mother is receiving a pension. The fathers of the children are not paying maintenance.  
Ky 098 
A female adult in this househ ld regularly spends long periods in the East rn Cape, tending to the homestead they are building there.  
Her children (all of school going g ) remain in the Western Cape, under the care of her husband (their father) 
Ky 101 
When the informant in this household lost his job, his wife and their child moved back to her mother in the Eastern Cape. She was 
living there and caring for the infant at the time of the study, while the informant looked for urban jobs and fended off his creditors 
Ky 107 
The retired female household head has three older children and three younger grandchildren living at the house.  She looks after the 
grandchildren. 
Ky 111 
The middle aged female informant has several older children, but they are indistinguishable from the mass of people who congregate 
around the community development project and day care centre that she runs.  (She is an important conduit of donor funding and has 
organised several community initiatives).  She is separated from her husband. 
KY 156 
The informants are a married couple, and they jointly look after their three young children.  As he is (temporarily) unemployed and 
she is studying, he occasionally does the care work. 
Ky 158 A reticent and resistant interviewee.  This elderly woman lives with two of her adult children.  It is unclear whether she looks after 





The wife of this informant spends most of her time in the Eastern Cape, looking after the homestead and five children (not all of them 
hers).  When the wife visits Cape Town once a year, their daughter 'swops' over, and she returns to the Eastern Cape to undertake the 
child care work 
Ky 159 
The household head and his wife are joined in this residence by their daughter and granddaughter, when their daughter (the child's 
mother) works elsewhere either the informant or his wife look after the grandchild. Also resident in this household are two teenage 
sons from a previous marriage.  They moved in recently, after the death of their Eastern Cape grandmother.  
Ky 164 
The daughter of the female household head grew up in the Eastern Cape in the care of her grandmother while her mother looked for 
work.  She had to move back to the Eastern Cape when her grandmother's disability grant was terminated.  During the time that the 
daughter lived with the grandmother, her mother had two more children with another man.  When he died, these children were also 
sent to stay with their grandmother. The grandmother was doing domestic work in East London at the time, so it was an aunt and the 
eldest daughter (i.e. the sister) who did the care work 
Ky 166 
When the informant migrated to Cape Town, she only took her youngest child with her.  Three other children remained with her 
mother in the Eastern Cape, and only joined her much later. 
 Mount Frere 
MF 001 
The informants are a couple with five children.  The son and two daughters (one of whom is partially disabled), of the informants live 
with their aunt in the town of Mt Frere town where they attended school.  An older son lives with an aunt in Johannesburg, where he 
is repeating grade 12. The fifth remaining child stays with the informants at the homestead in the village. 
MF 013 
The female household head and her 32 year old daughter-in-law (who lives in a homestead adjacent to hers) are the only adults at 
these homesteads.  They look after a total of six grandchildren, while the children’s parent’s (i.e. the informant’s adult children) work 
predominantly in Durban and Kokstad.  The household head looks after the grandchildren exclusively when the daughter in law works 
or travels outside of the village. 
MF 020  
The informants, a married couple, have a total of nine biological children.  Four are schooling in Mthatha or Gauteng, while five 
children live with the informants in the village.  One of these children has a young infant of her own (i.e. a grandchild of the 
informants).   Two adult brothers of the male household head also live with them.  One of the brothers is described as mentally ill. 




The informants, a married couple, have two adult children and four grandchildren living with them.  Two of these grandchildren are 
their son’s, a third is their daughter’s and the fourth and final grandchild was born to another daughter who subsequently died.    
MF 050 
The female household head looks after the homestead on behalf of her extended family.  She takes care of her own three children, 
each by a different partner and none of whom pays maintenance.  When she goes to visit her grandfather, she leaves her two older 
children with a distant neighbour and takes her infant with.  
MF 058 
A materially well-off household characterised by the collapse of care arrangements. The main breadwinner works in Johannesburg and 
sends a regular remittance. The breakdown of the marriage and the enforced departure of the breadwinner's wife, followed by 
unsatisfactory paid caregiver arrangements, meant that no clear set of care arrangements currently exist.  Multiple informants 
indicated that the two teenage children and their nominally in charge 25 year old brother 'need parents'. 
MF 061 
Four generations of women, resident in one homestead.  The youngest, an eleven year old girl, is looked after by her grandmother 
when her mother seeks work in the urban areas.  The great grandmother is lucid, but herself in need of care. 
MF 072 
A married couple who live with two adult children and two daughters in law at a large homestead.  The two adult children and 
daughter’s in law have a total of five of their own children; in addition two grandchildren (whose mother is ill in Cape Town) live with 
them. 
MF327 
In the past the female breadwinner of this household migrated extensively doing domestic work. At this time she did not take her 
children with her but split them up and distributed them amongst her husband’s family in the village. At present, two children are 
schooling elsewhere and are staying with relatives. At the time of the interview, the breadwinner’s adult daughter was herself 
reportedly unable to migrate to Johannesburg to seek work because she could not find a caregiver for her child.  Leaving the child in 
the household would inhibit the breadwinner's ability to do the piecework she relied on 
MF 339 
When this female informant with two children was widowed she was 'married off' to her deceased husband's brother, and bore an 
additional three children.  She currently looks after two of her grandchildren at her home.  
MF 340 
An elderly woman, whose husband works in Johannesburg, lives with her son, his wife and their child live at this comfortable 
homestead.  In additional the informant and her daughter in law look after another two grandchildren who are resident at the house 
MF 349 
An elderly female household member has a teenage son, and look after a maternally-orphaned nephew, two grandchildren (one of 
whom was 'dumped' on the family by the girlfriend of one of her sons), and a disabled (blind) elderly relative (the brother of her 
husband).   
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MF 370 A middle aged woman looks after her last-born teenage son and a younger grandchild. 
MF 385 
Three orphaned children, living on two foster care grants (the eldest is over 18 years and therefore ineligible) in a household of their 
own.  They are nominally overseen by an elderly great-aunt. 
MF 390 
The elderly male household head is frail and sickly.  His wife, the female household head provides care for both him and their two 
children.  Two other older children have already left the household 
MF 393 
The household heads, a married couple, share the house with their daughter in law (who has two children), and an additional three 
grandchildren.  Two of the grandchildren used to live with the great grandmother a short distance away, but she recently died hence 
they returned to this household. 
MF 567 
The widowed household head only had a single child who died in infancy. She took on one relative’s child to help around the house.  
When her husband's employment package paid out, three additional relative’s children joined her household to be cared for. 
MF 569 
The female household head looks her mentally ill adult brother (who receives a disability grant), along with eight grandchildren and 
the children of several other family members.  She has successfully secured a number of social grants for them. 
MF 583 
The female household head has been abandoned by and become estranged from her husband.  She looks after her four children (the 
fifth has left the household) and two grandchildren. 
MF 588 
The retired household head and his (third) wife look after their epileptic adult daughter and her daughter (i.e. their granddaughter).  
Several adult children have already left the household. 
MF 607 
Elderly female informant and last born child and her daughter in law jointly care for three grandchildren, including the child of the 
daughter in law’s husband (i.e. the informant’s son) from a previous relationship.  
MF 619 
A middle class couple (employed as a teacher and principal) live with their three children and the two additional children of relatives.  
They have three children in boarding school.  Also resident at the compound are two domestic staff, one of whom has a child 
dependent. 
MF 627 
A poor household.  The male (nominal) household head appears to abuse alcohol. They have one child living with them, along with 
four grandchildren.  Some of the children look conspicuously malnourished. 
MF 636 
The daughter in law of the very elderly female household head died recently.  The household head’s son (the deceased woman’s 
husband, works in Johannesburg).  Resident in the household are the deceased woman’s two children (i.e. the head’s grandchildren).  
The household is monetarily comfortable through a regular remittance but labour poor, so they employ a younger woman to help with 
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Ifomu yokinikezela ngodliwano-ndlebe NO:                                                     
 
Esi sivumelwano siqinisekisa ukuba udliwano-ndlebe lwakho 





acishilele igama lam, inkangeleko, ubekeko kunye nelizwi lam kumathotholo 
wokucishilela, ikhasethi lokucishilela, cishelelo olu luzokuthi lusetyenziswe 
kuphando-fundo lwe- Vulnerability, Labour Markets and Social Protection olu 




• Udliwano-ndlebe olwenzwe nam luzokugcinwa kwi Dyunivesithi 
yaseNtshona Koloni kunye nase Centre for Popular Memory 
kwiDyunivesithi yaseKapa apho zothi zigcinelwe ukusetyenziselwa 
ukufundisa kwakunye naku phando-fundo.  Izikhutshelo zingathi 
zenziwe ziphelele okanye zingaphelelanga kumajelo osasazo, 
nonaphakade apha emhlabeni kodwa phantsi kwemiqathango 
engqongqo edweliswe apha ngezantsi. 
 
• Ukusetyenziswa kolu phando-fundo eluntwini luzokuhamba 
ngokwemiqathango engqongqo yengalo yomthetho enobulungisa. 
 
• I-Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies kunye neDyunivesithi 
yeNtshona Koloni zizo ezizokuba nelungelo lokubhala nokucishilela 
lolu phando-fundo, nto leyo ithi yenze ndinikezele elam ilungelo 
lokubhala nokucishilela endinganalo kwigalelo lam. 
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• Esi sivumelwano simele uvumelwano phakathi kwam kunye nomphandi 
lo yaye utshintsho luvumelekile kuphela xa mna nomphandi lo 
sivumelana koko ze kube kokubhaliweyo. 
 
Ukusetyenziswa kolu cishelelo luxhomekeke phantsi kwale miqathango 
ilandelayo: 
 
1. Igama lam ndifuna likhuselwe esidlangalaleni yaye lingapapashwa.  
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